DIPLOMATIC NORMS AND PRACTICES COMPLICATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Most diplomatic norms and practices facilitate conflict resolution. The principle of reci­procity, as we have seen, may contribute either to the resolution or aggravation of conflict.

Precedence

Historically, diplomatic notions of precedence have aggravated conflict resolution and, in several cases, contributed to conflict and violence. Yet this represents a problem that has eventually found a diplomatic solution. Whereas diplomacy has always rested on notions of coexistence and reciprocity, as mentioned above, great importance has been attached to the precedence, or order of importance, of individual rulers and states.

In theAncient Near East, a standardized and generally accepted arrangement distinguished between “great kings” and “small kings,” and in the evolving complex network of rela­tionships with Egypt, rivalries and jealousies among great kings over their standing in Pharaoh's eyes were frequent (Avruch, 2000: 164; Liverani, 2001: 39-41). Disputes over precedence are recorded in ancient Chinese and Byzantine diplomacy as well (cf. Britton, 2004: 95; Shepard, 1992: 61-2).

Early European diplomacy was “full of end­less crises caused by intended or unintended slights occurring between ambassadors or their retinues - usually the latter - and also resulting from attempts by ambassadors to gain a higher status in their treatment by the ruler to whom they were accredited, some­times by seeking to perform highly personal services” (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 65). Especially between France and Spain, there were endless struggles for precedence entailing violence and threats of war (see, for example, Jonsson and Hall, 2005: 54-55).

Conflicts over precedence haunted inter­national conferences as well, entailing long, and not always successful, negotiations con­cerning the order in which representatives would be seated at the conference table. For instance, the Thirty Years' War was prolonged and the Treaty of Westphalia delayed as a result of quarrels over status and precedence, which reflected the competing principles of hierarchy versus dynastic state equality (Holsti, 1991: 33).

Further disputes could arise regarding the order in which representatives would sign agreements and treaties. Treaty signatures were long ordered according to precedence, which invited controversies. Gradually, how­ever, a new principle emerged, the alternat, according to which each representative signed his own copy of the treaty first. While disputed at first, this principle has been institutionalized to the extent that it is still adhered to today. The alternat did not solve problems of precedence altogether, as it did not prescribe the order in which other signatures were to follow (Nicolson, 1977: 99-100; Satow, 1979: 24).

When the Holy Roman Empire came to an end in 1806 and France, with a republican rather than monarchical form of government, was no longer in a position to reassert its claims to privileged rank, questions of prece­dence became less acute (Satow, 1979: 24-5). The Congress of Vienna in 1815 drew up a convention establishing precedence among diplomatic envoys according to the date they have presented their credentials, disregarding precedence among their principals altogether. Thus, the ambassador who has served longest at a post is considered doyen or dean. As spokesman of the diplomatic corps, the doyen has certain rights and duties as well as an amount of influence (Nicolson, 1977: 226).

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 established the principle that representa­tives at conferences sign treaties in alpha­betical order (Nicolson, 1954/1998: 45-6). Alphabetization has since become used by most international organizations for avoiding precedence issues in seating representatives.

Openness

If precedence as a conflict-generating diplo­matic norm has been neutralized and given way to diplomatic practices that facilitate conflict resolution despite status differences, other diplomatic norms and practices are more double-edged. In the last century, the transition from “old” to “new” diplomacy has had important implications on diplomatic norms and conflict resolution. The American President Woodrow Wilson stated after World War I in his Fourteen Points that a new kind of diplomacy based on moral and democratic principles was to be developed. Hence, Wilson's well-quoted statement about “open covenants openly arrived at” became the normative principle of a new and public diplomacy (Eban, 1983: 345). These princi­ples stemmed from a view that old diplo­macy, characterized by secrecy, encouraged conspiracies and war. It meant, for instance, that international negotiations should now be pursued openly and in public, without private or secret understandings. These assumptions were strengthened by the growing influence of media and public opinion, which demanded an open and democratic diplomacy. The expectation that diplomatic practice in general would change resulted in an increase of open international conferences, multilateral diplo­macy and personal involvement of politicians (Eban, 1985: 10; Watson, 1982: 121). Hence, public diplomacy became an integral principle of any state claiming to be a democracy and the “public's right to know” was not to be disregarded, for instance, concerning information about new policies and official negotiation positions.

At the same time, as Eban (1983: 34) notes, “the hard truth is that the total denial of privacy even in the early stages of a negotiation process has made international agreements harder to obtain than ever in the past history.” Hence, there is a built-in tension between publicity and diplomacy. In some circumstances, diplomats may prefer to negotiate privately and thereby limit the publicity surrounding a diplomatic process. In contrast, news media work to expose and scrutinize activities of diplomats and politicians, thereby strengthening the public consciousness that secrecy runs counter to democratic principles (Cohen, 1986: 69). In short, publicity and the need for privacy in diplomacy are clearly two opposing principles that originate from two completely different frames of reference involving the nature of information and who possesses it. Privacy and discreet diplomatic strategies are often critical when pursuing conflict resolution and rapprochement between hostile parties. Tony Armstrong (1993: 138-40) concluded from his analysis of three cases (1972 Basic Treaty between West Germany and East Germany; US normalization with China in the 1970s; and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979) that diplomatic initiatives, which successfully reached an agreement, were conducted away from the public, on a high political level, and with few participants involved. In these secret and private negotiations, assurances and commitments were provided, which were essential for the parties to negotiate in “good faith.”

Consequently, high media exposure has to a certain extent limited the autonomy and flexibility of diplomats. Particularly in cases with active domestic constituencies with hawkish and opposing views of conflict reso­lution, concession-making is difficult. Thus, there exists ambivalence among diplomats about the publicity surrounding some of their activities. The bumpy start of the Middle East peace process in the 1990s is a case in point. The bilateral negotiations in Washington were hampered by constant leaks as well as press conferences in which the parties justified their position.

This was one major reason why secret negotiations were sought in Oslo. Yet, the setbacks and problems in conducting secret negotiations were soon discovered by both sides after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1993. If secrecy was the key to reach an agreement, it was also the key to its undoing. For fear of leaks, never in the entire process of negotiation did the Palestinians review the documents with legal consultants. The Israelis also avoided any involvement of experts, including military ones. Most importantly, the negotiators did not prepare and mobilize domestic support for the agreement. As Yossi Beilin (1999: 3), one of the architects behind the Oslo channel, poignantly states: “We thought we were absolved of the need to continue molding public understanding, and in this we were wrong. We were also mistaken in that we didn't show the public what we envisaged at the end of the process, and we thereby exposed ourselves to unnecessary accusations and questions.”

Constructive ambiguity

Another double-edged principle concerns constructive ambiguity. As discussed earlier, it may facilitate conflict resolution. Yet it may also be obstructive. Constructive ambiguity is often used to overcome deadlocks by avoid­ing and postponing detailed interpretations until implementation. The basic rationale is that the parties will be committed to a signed agreement, following the dictum of pacta sunt servanda.

Recognition

Diplomatic recognition, in terms of accepting other actors as more or less peers and treating them accordingly, is equally essen­tial to personal and international relations. There is, however, one significant difference between the two. Whereas the development of relations precedes reciprocal recognition between individuals, recognition is a prior condition for official relations to develop at the international level. Recognition is a prerequisite for reciprocal exchanges in international relations. From the viewpoint of individual political units, diplomatic recog­nition represents a “ticket of general admis­sion to the international arena” (Krasner, 1999: 16).

The principles of diplomatic recognition have varied considerably throughout history, ranging from inclusive to highly exclusive. At one extreme, recognition might be, and has been, granted to virtually anyone with some authority and material or moral resources, as was the case in medieval Europe. At the other extreme, only specific actors with certain attributes are recognized, such as sovereign states adhering to the principles of Western civilization. Whereas inclusive recognition patterns would seem to facilitate the resolution of conflicts involving several different types of international actors, exclusive recognition limits the ability of diplomacy to resolve conflicts to those involving a specific kind of recognized actors.

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 laid a foundation for the gradual emergence of the territorial, sovereign state. As diplomatic recognition gradually became essential to statehood, other types of political formations were delegitimized. Recognition, in other words, became increasingly exclusive. Even­tually, rules of diplomatic recognition were incorporated in international law. Even if international lawyers, diplomats and states­men today agree that statehood requires a central government that exercises effective control over a defined territory and a per­manent population, and has the capacity to enter into relations with other states, there are examples of non-recognition of units that fulfill these criteria as well as recognition of units that do not fulfill them. For instance, in 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declared the state of Palestine on the basis of the UN partition plan from 1947 that proposes one Jewish and one Arab state. At the time of declaration, the PLO did not control one inch of Palestinian territory, and yet over 100 states recognized the state of Palestine. Hence, the factual conditions many states require for recognition have changed over the years, and ultimately recognition remains a political act.

During the nineteenth century, diplomacy had the character of a European “club,” into which other states were admitted only if they were “elected” - that is, recognized - by the other “members.” The Congress of Vienna in 1815 established that states would not be regarded as sovereign unless recognized by other powers, primarily the great powers of the day. The Final Act of the Congress listed 39 sovereign states in Europe, much fewer than the number of polities claiming to be sovereign (Holsti, 2004: 128). After 1815, in the Concert of Europe era, members of the Holy Alliance tended to treat revolutionary or republican governments as outlaws to be excluded from the “club” (Malanczuk, 1997: 83). Nor did the European states allow non­European polities into the “club.” Despite commercial relations with Asian powers, such as China and Japan, whose rulers were treated as if they were sovereign, none was recognized as a state. Imperialism implied “civilizing” rather than recognizing states (Holsti, 2004: 129).

After World War I, democratic constitutions and guarantees for minority rights were added to the recognition criteria used by the victorious states (Holsti, 2004: 129-30). US President Woodrow Wilson's plea to “make the world safe for democracy” was emblematic of this change, and a prominent case of non-recognition was the US refusal to recognize the Soviet Union until 1934.

After World War II, recognition and non­recognition again became prominent political instruments as a result of three major devel­opments. Most important was the ideological and strategic rivalry of the superpowers, but concomitant processes of decolonization and the proliferation of international organizations also contributed to bringing issues of diplo­matic recognition to the forefront (Doxey, 1995: 307).

The most striking manifestations of politi­cal use of the recognition tool during the Cold War were the cases of China and the German Democratic Republic. Between 1949 and 1979, successive US administrations refused to recognize the communist government of the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, instead supporting the claim of the nationalist government of Taiwan to represent all China. This entailed preventing the PRC from taking China's seat in the UN Security Council until 1971. Another example was the Hallstein Doctrine of the West German government, denying recognition of any government recognizing the GDR, which was seen as a creation of the Soviet Union in breach of treaties between the allies concerning the administration of Germany after World War II. Only after Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik led to mutual recognition of the two Germanies in 1972 did Western states recognize the GDR (Doxey, 1995: 308).

Recognition of the new state formations that resulted from the end of the Cold War was relatively unproblematic: neither the reunifi­cation of Germany nor the dissolution of the Soviet Union or the “velvet divorce” negoti­ated by the Czech and Slovak republics raised thorny questions of recognition. However, recent developments seem to have sharpened the political conditions many states require for diplomatic recognition. For instance, in response to the momentous developments after the end of the Cold War, EC member states adopted common guidelines for the recognition of new states in December 1991. Specific requirements include the rule of law, democracy and human rights; guaranteed minority rights; the inviolability of frontiers; acceptance of commitments regarding disarmament and nuclear non­proliferation; and an undertaking to settle by agreement all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes. Recognition of “entities which are the result of aggression” is expressly excluded (Malanczuk, 1997: 89; Cassese, 2001: 50; Doxey, 1995: 312­13). Other criteria for recognition that are used or proposed in today's world are non­dependence on foreign military support and respect for other states'rights (Peterson, 1997: 77-81).

In many contemporary conflicts, diplomacy is stalled because recognition needs to be resolved before any meaningful progress can be made. Non-state actors contest their unrecognized status and governments dispute claims for “proto-political status” (Richmond, 2006: 68). Diplomacy therefore becomes a new “battle ground” where parties are not primarily seeking compromise and conflict resolution, but use these diplomatic pro­cesses to gain recognition and international legitimacy. As Oliver Richmond (2006: 66) underlines: “The assumption of a compromise is so often of only secondary concern.” This was the reason why it took over two years before any progress was made in the Middle East peace process in the early 1990s. It was only with the mutual recognition between the Israeli government and the PLO that an agreement could be reached in late 1993.

Another example where considerations of recognition delayed conflict resolution is in the prolonged controversy over the shape of the table at the Paris negotiations to end the Vietnam War. To seat the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (Vietcong) at a four-sided table with representatives of the United States, North Vietnam and South Vietnam would have accorded it equal status. Therefore, much time and creativity were spent on finding a configuration that did not imply diplomatic recognition.

As these examples illustrate, problems of recognition may hamper interaction between states and non-state entities in particular. Today, the growing interface between domes­tic and international conflicts necessitates just this kind of interaction. Diplomats and NGO representatives communicate, share informa­tion and negotiate with increasing frequency and in varying contexts to solve global or regional conflicts. Yet mutual suspicion tends to preclude full mutual recognition (cf. Cooper and Hocking, 2000).

Multilateralism and “polylateralism"

Multilateralism entails several constructive innovations in diplomatic practice, but may also complicate conflict resolution. The earliest multilateral forums were high-level congresses called to arrange the terms of peace settlements, such as the Congresses of Osnabruck and Munster resulting in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Diplomatic conferences, peacetime meetings of diplo­mats, were unknown before 1830 (Langhorne, 2004: 284-5) but have since then surged in frequency, significance and complexity. In the middle of the nineteenth century, there were about three international conferences annually, today more than 3000 (Holsti, 2004: 191).

The creation of the League of Nations after World War I and the United Nations after World War II were attempts to create permanent multilateral institutions to prevent and resolve international conflicts and wars. In many ways, multilateralism has increased transparency and new democratic practices of diplomacy. Some even argue that multi­lateralism provides the best opportunity for successful conflict resolution, since multilat­eralism is inclusive, subject-focused and sets explicit deadlines for negotiations. As a result of the revolution in mass communication, conference diplomacy may also be viewed as an excellent tool for political leaders to publicly demonstrate their commitment to resolving international crises (Berridge, 2002: 148-49).

Conference diplomacy differs from previ­ous diplomatic forms in several respects, such as the forging of coalitions and groupings, potential leadership roles for the chair and international secretariats assuming important functions. Moreover, diplomatic conferences provide ample room for informal “corridor activity” (cf. Kaufmann, 1996; Walker, 2004).

In global conferences and multilateral forums, NGOs have increasingly been granted presence. The growing participation by a vari­ety of actors has resulted in “polylateralism” as a new mode of diplomatic dialogue besides bilateralism and multilateralism, implying relations between official entities (states, international organizations) and unofficial, non-state entities (Wiseman, 1999). Twenty years ago, NGOs staged protests outside the doors of international organizations and had to gather information from the dustbins of national delegations; today, many of them are involved in preparing global UN conferences and routinely get the floor in plenary meetings. On several global issues, such as environmental protection, trade and human rights, NGOs have become key actors that cannot be bypassed in the search for viable solutions. Two prominent examples of active NGO involvement in diplomatic processes concern the 1997 Ottawa convention banning anti-personnel landmines and the 1998 Rome treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (Cooper and Hocking, 2000: 361-76).

According to Hocking (2004: 92), the diversity and heterogeneity of actors and practices have transformed diplomacy from operating within clearly delineated borders to a “boundary-spanning” activity. For instance, track-one diplomacy may be supplemented with track-two diplomacy, which refers to everything from citizen diplomacy, pre­negotiation, interactive problem solving to back-channel negotiation. Track-two diplo­macy is frequently used to resolve deep- rooted and complex identity-based conflicts and conducted by informal intermediaries, such as NGOs, academics and private citizens. They strive to create a non-judgmental, non- coercive and supportive environment for conflict resolution. Without governmental constraints, it is assumed that such a frame­work will facilitate shared perceptions of fears and needs, which may reframe conflict and generate mutual understanding and ultimately new ideas of conflict resolution (Rothman, 1997).

Yet, multilateralism may also complicate or hinder conflict resolution. For instance, conference diplomacy is often described as a highly complex and unmanageable practice, with too many actors, issues and levels of negotiations. Consequently, a central issue in many multilateral settings is to manage complexity and insecurity. One way to reduce and manage the number of actors and negotiation positions is to form coalitions. However, it is time-consuming to consolidate a joint platform. When a consensus is achieved, it tends to generate inflexibility and rigidity in the negotiation process, since unity within the coalition is prioritized (Leigh-Phippard, 1999: 98-101). Moreover, conference diplomacy is often criticized as a kind of “public appearance diplomacy” where political leaders are more concerned with their public image than with negotiating the issue at stake. For instance, in the early 1990s, a series of conferences on the war in Bosnia were held under public pressures. World leaders convened several times to give a public appearance of concern about the war, but with poor results (Aggestam, 2004: 6).