Conclusions and Forecasts

Historians are justifiably wary of making predictions. But inasmuch as “futurology” has lately achieved academic respectability, I will venture to advance some forecasts about the direction which Ukrainian political thought is likely to take.

1. As a result of the territorial consolidation of Ukrainian lands within one body politic, future currents of ideas and political movements will be less sectional than in the past. This does not preclude the possibility that certain areas with pronounced geographical and historical traits (for in­stance, Transcarpathia) will retain a regional identity. But regionalism will play only a subordinate role within the framework of a unified Ukrainian nation.

2. In the past the Ukrainians were overwhelmingly a peasant people, and this fact was reflected in their ideologies. Populism, the dominant trend of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was peasant-oriented. The conservative trend also had an agrarian colora­tion. The social structure of Ukraine has, however, undergone a pro­found transformation during the past half-century. At present, about one- half of the Ukrainian people are already urban, and the rate of urbaniza­tion is bound to increase. Despite the communist regime’s conscious policy since the 1930s of Russifying the cities, a Ukrainian industrial working class and an urban technical intelligentsia have come into exist­ence. The latter group fulfills a function analogous to that of the middle class in Western societies. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that Ukrain­ian social thought and political programs of the future will be less deter­mined by peasant concerns than in the past. Yet it is likely that a marked “village background” will remain a characteristic feature of Ukrainian life and thought for a long time to come.

3. The image of intellectual uniformity which Soviet Ukraine, together with all of the USSR, offers to the world should be considered a superfi­cial and necessarily transitory phenomenon. The varieties of thought and opinion have not been eliminated, only forcibly silenced. They still lurk beneath the surface, not only as survivals of the past, but as living intel­lectual forces, generated anew by the dialectical nature of society and hu­man thought. According to official Soviet doctrine, there is no place for ideological diversity in a “socialist” society, where antagonistic classes allegedly no longer exist. But this claim is belied by the tremendous ex­ertions of indoctrination, propaganda, and outright repression which the regime must constantly apply to maintain the appearance of ideological uniformity. Any lifting, or even partial weakening, of restraints is bound to lead in a short time to a resurgence of ideological and political pluralism.

4. The four main trends of modern Ukrainian political thought are still alive, if only in latent form. This assumption is based on the experiences of the World War II era and on a study of contemporary intellectual fer­ment in the Ukrainian SSR. Given the opportunity, the traditional trends would surface again, although certainly in a new, changed form. It is im­possible to assess their future relative strength, or to predict which of them will become a leading force. The resolution of this question will depend not only on internal Ukrainian factors, but also on the prevailing political climate in Eastern Europe as a whole. The two most likely alter­natives, however, are either an evolution on national-communist lines (i.e., the endowing of the fictitious statehood of the Ukrainian SSR with real substance), or, in the event of a revolutionary upheaval, a turn to­ward democracy (i.e., a revival of the traditions of the Ukrainian People’s Republic).

5. Perhaps the most portentous issue in the future evolution of Ukrain­ian thought will be the problem of a synthesis of antagonistic political- ideological trends. The absence of such a synthesis was a major cause of the failure of the independent Ukrainian state in 1917-21. In view of the country’s precarious geographical location, its political survival will depend on Ukrainians’ ability to resolve their internal differences ami­cably and to maintain a reasonable degree of solidarity against foreign threats and pressures. Civil wars are a luxury that Ukraine can ill afford. But what could be the meaning of such an envisaged synthesis? It cer­tainly does not imply the reduction of antagonistic trends to a single unitary formula. It should rather be conceived as a process of mutual ad­justment. The trends, which in the past were simply juxtaposed, would have to learn the art of constructive interaction. Before this could take place in the practical political sphere, and finally be institutionalized, it would have to occur first on the intellectual plane. A step in this direction would be the cultivation of an inclusive vision of history, embracing all the facets of the nation’s past, even those which in their own time were irreconcilably opposed to each other. What is needed is a type of mental­ity which makes it possible to find in London monuments to both Charles I and Oliver Cromwell. Such an attitude precludes neither a critique of personalities, groups, and ideas nor the taking of a definite stand on con­troversial current issues. But it requires a spirit of catholicity which views all the nation’s past and present spiritual and material achieve­ments as a common inheritance, and not the exclusive property of any faction. Obversely, it also implies the willingness to accept a share of moral responsibility for one’s nation’s mistakes and follies, even if they were perpetrated by specific groups or individuals.