Formation of the Imperial Russia Bureaucratic Class in Steppe Ukraine in the Late Eighteenth Century

OLEKSANDR PANKIEIEV

The late eighteenth century in the history of the Russian Empire is characterised by the adoption of numerous reforms that introduced new norms for the gov­ernance of the vast territories.

This article aims to survey the process of formation of an imperial bureaucratic class in Steppe Ukraine in the late eighteenth century. The importance of the bu­reaucracy to the process of incorporating Steppe Ukraine into the Russian Empire is undisputable. A series of successful military campaigns as well as the signing of inter-state treaties brought about the forced expansion of the Russian Empire's state borders. As a result, an imperial bureaucracy was installed as a new social class in Steppe Ukraine. In the accessioned territories, the government considered its primary objective to be establishing a networked system of agencies, including adequate staff that would promote and strengthen the authority of the Russian Empire. The local official was the main transmitter and implementer of imperial state policy on the ground.²

The term bureaucracy is used in this article to identify those who are involved in performing administrative duties, but as Marc Raeff points out in his study of the origins of the intelligentsia in the Russian Empire during the eighteenth cen­tury, “it is perhaps inaccurate to speak of the group of Russian career officials as a bureaucracy in Max Weber's sense.”³

Historical Background and the Military Factor

The irreversible deprivation of autonomy in Steppe Ukraine was begun by Em­press Catherine II as soon as she was crowned in 1762.

In Steppe Ukraine the transformations began with the disbanding of three military formations - New Serbia, Sloviano-Serbia, and the Sloboda Regiment - created in the early 1750s on the border of the Zaporozhian Host.⁵ In 1764 these entities were reformed into the New Russia gubernia, heralding the start of im­portant political, social, cultural, and administrative transformations in Steppe Ukraine. The New Russia gubernia also included the so-called Ukrainian Line, lancer regiments, and some companies of the Poltava and Myrhorod reg­iments that had previously been under the jurisdiction of the Hetmanate.

The creation of a separate New Russia gubernia did not sever the existing tra­ditional administrative ties in the region with the Kyiv gubernia and the newly created Little Russian Collegium (or College). We can observe a certain logic in the appointments of chief commanders of the New Russia gubernia.⁶ For exam­ple, in 1765-66 the position of commander-in-chief of the New Russia gubernia was taken by a former member of the Little Russian Collegium, Lieutenant­Colonel Iakov von Brandt; he was succeeded by Fedor Voieikov, as simultane­ously chief commander of the New Russia gubernia and governor-general of the Kyiv gubernia.⁷ In order to stay up-to-date on matters in the New Russia gu­bernia, the Kyiv gubernia governor established a New Russia expedition, which handled all the documents relating to urgent matters of governance in the gu­bernia - especially those pertaining to government officials.⁸

It may be assumed that in the beginning, the imperial authorities did not con­sider New Russia to be a proper gubernia, but only an extension of the traditional military settlements in the region.

In 1768-74 the military presence in the region increased substantially due to the Russo-Turkish war.⁹ During this time, civilian agencies were mostly occupied with billeting and provisioning the imperial army, while gubernial administrative matters were not a priority. After the war the large officers' corps, which had steered the successful combat operations, formed the backbone of imperial gov­ernment agencies that were installed not only in the newly established gubernias in Steppe Ukraine but in other regions of the Russian Empire as well. With a se­rious lack of civilian government officials, the military represented practically the only source for replenishing their ranks.¹⁰

The Russo-Turkish war ended with the signing in 1774 of the Peace Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, which was beneficial to the Russian side. It stipulated that huge tracts of land previously belonging to the Ottoman Porte and its vassal, the Crimean Khanate, would be ceded to the Russian Empire. As a result, the Za- porozhian Sich lost its geographical advantage and became surrounded by ter­ritories belonging to the Russian Empire. The Zaporozhian Cossacks who had guarded its frontier were no longer needed and even became a hindrance to the imposition of order in the region. Thus, at the start of June 1775, pursuant to a decree by Catherine II, the Zaporozhian Sich was surrounded and destroyed.

Potemkin: The Kingpin and His Adjutants

The main task imposed by the central imperial authority on the local adminis­tration at that time was to organize and unify the conjoined lands and former Liberties of the Zaporozhian Host in conformance with current Russian laws. The task of implementing imperial policy in this region was placed on Grigorii Potemkin.¹¹ He was first appointed supreme commander of New Russia, and later also governor-general of the newly created Azov and New Russia gubernias.

Creating the Azov gubernia was necessary because adding the newly acquired territories to the existing New Russia gubernia would have made it too large and governing difficult. Thus, the Azov gubernia was established on 14 February 1775, with Vasilii Chertkov appointed governor. Although Potemkin's order to this effect was only promulgated on 4 August 1775, Chertkov was acting in the gover­nor's capacity since the very start of the gubernia's existence; this is shown from Potemkin's constant orders addressed to Chertkov and from Chertkov's reports back to the governor-general.

Chertkov was an unusual figure. He was a competent and experienced official, knowledgeable about the situation in the region. Prior to his appointment as governor of Azov gubernia, he served a lengthy term as head of the New Russia gubernia chancellery.¹² Potemkin trusted Chertkov to resolve important state is­sues that concerned not only the Azov gubernia but also Steppe Ukraine overall. In the first few years after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, Chertkov ini­tiated almost all the changes that took place in the region. Then, in 1783 he was promoted to governor-general of Kharkiv and Voronezh gubernias. This meteoric career rise is easily explained by the fact that Chertkov’s productivity in Steppe Ukraine was noticed in St Petersburg. It is probable that Potemkin himself initi­ated Chertkov’s promotion, for having such an experienced figure in the region would not have helped his own authority. Potemkin simultaneously moved to Steppe Ukraine and began controlling all events in the region himself.

He had previously governed the region from St Petersburg, but decided to leave because of his cooling relationship with the empress and a growing un­favourable atmosphere in the court. By doing so Potemkin likely wished to im­prove his situation in the court and win back Catherine’s favour, for unifying the rule in Steppe Ukraine was a high-priority objective of imperial policy.

Another important person in the region was Matvei Muromtsev, the governor of New Russia gubernia (1775-78). However, despite the equivalency of their po­sitions, Chertkov was granted greater authority than Muromtsev, which is ap­parent from the content of Potemkin’s orders to the governors. Chertkov’s orders from Potemkin usually contained directives that applied not only to the admin­istration of Azov gubernia but also to that of New Russia gubernia.

Potemkin’s order dated 18 July 1775 required Chertkov to submit proposed sub­divisions of the Azov and New Russia gubernial lands, particularly those acquired as a result of the imperial victory in the Russo-Turkish War, as well as of territories that were part of the Zaporozhian Liberties prior to the destruction of the Cossack Sich.¹⁴ The governor-general advised dividing the gubernias into provinces and those, in turn, into city-centred counties (uezdy), while leaving the free parcels of land for future settlement. For an efficient distribution in the gubernias, Chertkov and Muromtsev were required to compile staffing lists for positions in the gubernias that included information on the qualitative and quantitative char­acteristics of the region’s population.¹⁵ The instructions stated that this was an urgent matter, and on 31 August Potemkin sent another order to Chertkov with more specific details on how the staffing lists should be compiled.¹⁶

The work to compile the staffing lists lasted until September 1775. That same month, Potemkin petitioned the Senate to adopt his proposal regarding the ter­ritorial organization and staffing of the two gubernias, but the Senate did not ap­prove them as such. Thus, most of the changes Potemkin ordered to the admin­istrative-territorial organization and staff in gubernial agencies were implemented without senatorial approval.¹⁷ His special status in the imperial court did allow for most of his decisions to be adopted unilaterally.

The “Gubernial Institutions” Decree, the Zaporozhian Cossack Factor, and Crimea

The central imperial authority demanded the fastest possible implementation of the 1775 administrative reforms in the region too, but it was impossible to carry out this order instantaneously. By any measure, the region was not ready for such fundamental and pivotal changes. This was primarily due to its Za- porozhian legacy, which prompted caution in approaching the administration of territories that had been previously part of the Liberties of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host. Another important argument in favour of postponing the imple­mentation of gubernial reforms was the region’s small population. According to the “Gubernial Institutions” decree, there should have been about 400,000 males in the gubernia, including at least 30,000 in each county.²¹ Population growth was the cornerstone of the cameralistic ideas on which Catherine built her “en­lightened” rule, with high population numbers equating to “well-being, power, and happiness of the state.”²²

Therefore, the model introduced by Potemkin in Steppe Ukraine during the first years of his term as governor-general was rather transitional in nature - taking existing local historical development trends into consideration while planning in the future to fully eliminate all differences in regional management.

The New Russia gubernia had some staff positions in place, but the Azov gu­bernia did not. Equally notable is the fact that for a long time the Azov gubernia did not even have government premises. This prevented Chertkov from fully car­rying out his gubernatorial functions, which he repeatedly brought to Potemkin’s attention in his reports.²³

Upon the liquidation of the Zaporozhian Sich, the “Liberties of the [Cossack] Host Beyond the Rapids” were brought wholly under the New Russia gubernia, and subsequently it was decided to divide them evenly between the Azov and New Russia gubernias along the Dnipro River. However, the government could not permit these territories of the former Liberties to remain uncontrolled while the problems surrounding the new administration were being resolved. Thus, immediately after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich a new position of supreme commander was introduced, and in August 1775 Lieutenant-Colonel Petr Norov was appointed to govern the former Liberties. Norov also assigned retired officers of the imperial Russian army to oversee the wintering quarters of the former Zaporozhian Host.²⁴

The deconstruction of the old order went at a slow and deliberate pace, without any hasty destruction of traditional channels. The government assessed the sit­uation and public sentiments in the region before deciding on a course of action. The old Cossackpalankas formed the basis of newly created counties, which re­mained within the boundaries of the liquidated palankas and retained their names. Thus, the Samara, Protovch, Barvinkove, Kalmiius, and other counties were established.²⁵ In the counties created out of the former Zaporozhian Liber­ties, administration by commissar was imposed instead of county administra­tions, and land management became the purview of land commissars. Other territories were governed by county or voivodeship chancelleries headed by voivodes. However, in territories that were not formerly part of the Zaporozhian Liberties there were also cases of commissar rule being imposed in the counties, or of land commissars heading the county administrations. For example, land commissars were appointed in the Dymytriievo and Kerch-Yenikale counties of Azov gubernia.²⁶

In the immediate years after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, land ad­ministrations and land commissars were introduced in the territories of Steppe Ukraine not only with the intention of establishing control over the local Cossack population but also as a means of mitigating the extreme shortage of cadres. The land commissar system was introduced as a temporary measure that should have operated only until staffing was finalized for the new gubernias. From time to time, in their reports submitted to Potemkin the governors would request the es­tablishment of county chancelleries instead of the commissar administrations.²⁷ Nevertheless, in certain counties of the Azov and New Russia gubernias they re­mained until the very last. There were also instances of a single land commissar ruling over two counties simultaneously.²⁸ In counties whose seat was a fortress, there were no county chancelleries or land administrations, and the existing com­mandant chancelleries were used. Such counties had a special status, according to their strategic situation. The counties were not subordinated to provincial ad­ministrations; for matters of land management, they turned to the governor, while military issues were brought to the governor-general, Potemkin.

Another important argument for postponing the implementation of the “Gu- bernial Institutions” in the region was that the gubernias of Steppe Ukraine still lacked a noble social class. According to the provisions of the decree, the nobility should participate actively in local government, forming a collective that should select candidates from among themselves for positions in the county and guber- nial agencies. Indeed, the local self-government was intended to be comprised of a significant proportion of elected bureaucrats. In reality, the nobility was very reluctant and did not want to participate in such activities. Many of them, al­though owning estates in Steppe Ukraine, never even visited the region.

Other classes were also supposed to elect representatives from among the gen­try to represent their interests in county and gubernial agencies. Here we note, however, Chertkov’s recommendation that foreign settlers and former Cossacks not be included in the elections to these positions. Even though the reform stip­ulated the election of members of the land court, Chertkov proposed that they be appointed:

To lay on them in all instances the proceedings of the court is quite without benefit, and for them the new domestic matters are burden enough, in con­sideration whereof we believe that all judges in all counties, also assessors of the superior land court, who pursuant to the general regulation on vicegerencies should be elected from the nobility, as well as all ispravniks in the vicegerency, should not be replaced by election but appointed by the vicegerency authority, accordingly with subsequent ratification pursuant to the regulation, not by election.²⁹

Regardless, throughout the latter 1770s and early 1780s the region gradually lost its traditional features. More and more often the matter was raised of im­plementing the provisions of the “Gubernial Institutions” decree, as evidenced by a series of orders received by the officials to submit suggestions in this regard. Another factor prompting this development was that by the start of the 1780s the decree had already been implemented in Left-Bank Ukraine, establishing the Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siverskyi, and Kyiv vicegerencies. As already noted, however, the main problem with the Steppe Ukraine gubernias was that none of them had sufficient population numbers to sustain the implementation of the provisions of the “Gubernial Institutions.” The reforms also required even greater numbers of qualified officials for all the positions in the newly created institutions. The lack of a bureaucracy was moreover affected by the cancellation in 1774 of a res­olution that landlords were allowed to take possession of properties only if they engaged in military or civil service in the Steppe reaches of the Russian Empire, which was a significant disincentive for the gentry to take up such service.³⁰ The problem of a lack of bureaucrats was partially solved by engaging retired officers from local regiments, who had no means of making a living except in government service, or the Cossack starshyna, which was being ennobled at the time and ap­proached the Russian nobility in terms of equivalency of rights. The shortage of chancellery staff was also a significant problem. Officials gradually began to stream in from other regions, facilitated by the attitude throughout the empire that Steppe Ukraine was a place where it was easy to have a good career, obtain a high position, and increase one's wealth. Mostly this was attributed to rumours about Potemkin's group and the wealth that its members could easily earn. At that time, Potemkin was unusually generous in granting land to almost everyone, and later he regretted it. The members of Potemkin's group were also seen to ob­tain promotions faster than their counterparts in other gubernias.

At the start of 1783 Potemkin informed Catherine about the population num­bers in the region; at the time, the gubernias of Steppe Ukraine had 370,000 males.³¹ A decision was made to abolish the Azov and New Russia gubernias and combine them within the boundaries of a single administrative entity. It was then, on 30 March 1783, that the decree was issued on implementing the “Institutions for Governing the Gubernias” in Steppe Ukraine, establishing the Katerynoslav vicegerency and approving its staff appointments.³² According to the order, the Katerynoslav vicegerency should be divided into twelve counties, with the pos­sibility of increasing this number if needed. Given the specificity of the region, Potemkin as governor-general was authorized to create the province.

Final staffing arrangements and the administrative organization of the Katerynoslav vicegerency took until the end of 1783. The newly appointed gov­ernor, Timofei Ivanovich Tutolmin,³³ participated actively in this work, but the plan he developed to create a separate Kherson province was never adopted. Thus, following Potemkin's submission, on 22 January 1784, the Imperial Senate issued a decree to divide the Katerynoslav vicegerency into fifteen counties.³⁴

Potemkin noticed that the number of counties depended on population num­bers as well as on the fact that “due to the insufficient population numbers in some of the vast counties, it is quite unnecessary at this time to establish county representative offices in them, rather only the ones that are absolutely necessary.³⁵ Pursuant to the “Gubernial Institutions” decree, local authority was divided according to function, with separate administrative, financial-economic, and court agencies. Their operations also needed a large staff of bureaucrats, which prompted Potemkin to decide not to open all the agencies at once, only those needed for the early stages. Many of the agencies were opened with authority over two counties or cities together. Furthermore, in order to fill many of the elected positions from the gentry in the vicegerency, it was necessary to organize assemblies of the nobility.

The large expanses of the counties of Katerynoslav vicegerency made the work of the imperial government officials significantly more difficult, especially the court system. A report dated 18 March 1786, from the governor of Katery­noslav vicegerency, Ivan Sinel'nikov, to governor-general Potemkin states:

The expanse of the counties in Katerynoslav vicegerency is a considerable obstacle, as we have learned from our experience with managing urgent matters, particularly the work of the lower land courts carrying out inves­tigations on location and fulfilling orders sent from the vicegerent’s and other legal offices - especially concerning criminal cases that brook not the least delay, as required for order and strict enforcement of the law, inasmuch as the ispravniki in the lands have only two assessors, they cannot keep up with handling all the corrections required of them, and given the too few numbers of judges in those courts.³⁶

Therefore, to improve the efficiency of land courts in the counties of the vicegerency, based on the provisions of the “Gubernial Institutions” Sinel'nikov proposed designating an additional assessor for each county.

According to an imperial manifesto dated 8 April 1783, the Crimean Khanate was included as a part of Russia,³⁷ and the government hastened to impose a com­prehensive administrative-territorial structure on the peninsula. The case of Crimea deserves a separate study, and therefore we will not go into the details here. Some of aspects of the formation of the bureaucratic class in the Russian Empire are well descried by Kelly Ann O’Neill.³⁸

Thus, in February 1784 Potemkin submitted a draft administrative structure to the empress for her approval, along with a list of agencies he was planning to establish there as soon as possible.³⁹ The draft was approved by Catherine’s decree, and the “Gubernial Institutions” were implemented in Crimea with the estab­lishment of Tavriia oblast.⁴⁰

In order to take Crimea into its legal possession, the Russian Empire leaned on the local Muslim elites, involving them in government and giving them equal rights with the Russian nobility.⁴¹ The governing bodies of Tavriia oblast were not completely formed until 1787, when all the positions were filled and the same procedures were established that obtained in the rest of the territory of the Russian Empire,⁴² including elections held for judges and assessors. But the period leading up to 1787 was difficult. Before the agencies were finally opened, the administra­tive, financial, and economic functions were carried out by the Tavriia oblast au­thority by means of its general and advisory entities as well as by the chancellery.⁴³ The overall process of establishing an imperial officialdom in Steppe Ukraine was affected by further administrative transformations in the region resulting from the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-91. The Russian Empire acquired the lands bounded by the Buh River, the Polish border, and the Dnister. In 1792 these ter­ritories were divided into counties and added to the Katerynoslav vicegerency.

In the Wake of Potemkin’s Death

However, 1791 marked a new stage in the history of the institutionalization of not only Steppe Ukraine but the region as a whole. That is because the supreme leader of the land - Potemkin - died that year, and until Platon Zubov was appointed governor-general the region was in a strange situation concerning the subordi­nation of the Steppe Ukrainian gubernias. This three-year period highlights and illustrates the specificity on the whole of the institutionalization and functioning of the bureaucratic class in the region and demonstrates the actual weight of the region in the Russian Empire. Namely, after the death of Potemkin it was Cather­ine II herself who was the supreme leader; she even declared herself the gover­nor-general of the territory. Executive and supervisory authority with regard to government policy in Steppe Ukraine was assigned to Mikhail Kakhovskii, but real control was exercised by Vasilii Popov, who formerly managed Potemkin’s field office. Major-General Popov issued orders to those who ranked above him, including General-in-Chief Kakhovskii. Given the legislation of the time and the prevailing tradition concerning imperial military ranks and subordination, this fact seems quite strange. For example, right after Potemkin’s death the governor­generalship of the region was sought by Mikhail Kamenskii, who reasoned that he was entitled to it by rights of seniority. He could not comprehend what it was that tied together people in Potemkin’s team like Popov, Bezborod'ko, Golitsyn, Faleev, and others. In truth, Potemkin had successfully gathered a team in which each member carried out a specific function, and one could only be a part of it if one comprehended and aligned his own desires with those of Potemkin and the needs of the state. Popov was chiefly in charge of maintaining and dispensing funds from a discretionary spending account, which meant that everyone in the region was dependent on him. He moved to St Petersburg and took up the posi­tion of state secretary, and later was promoted to chair of the Cabinet of Catherine II; he carefully followed all the affairs of the region. Regarding his rule over the Steppe Ukraine gubernias, Popov appealed to Potemkin’s memory and his will. Virtually every document submitted for the empress’s signature included a for­mulaic phrase like “as the late prince suggested” or “appointed by the late prince G.A. Potemkin.”⁴⁴

A contemporary chronicler, Adrian Gribovskii, opined that Popov did not pos­sess any particular talents to distinguish him within the bureaucratic cadres.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, Potemkin had respected Popov above all for his loyalty and will­ingness to carry out any kind of errand around the clock. Gribovskii described the relations between Popov and Potemkin as follows: “He was in a practically hopeless situation at the chancellery, stuck in the same suite as the prince, avail­able at any time of night, which the prince often spent without sleeping due to insomnia, fully prepared to appear as soon as he was called. By this means, and by quick and accurate fulfillment of the tasks, he gained the prince’s practically unlimited trust, which he exploited up until his very death.”⁴⁶

Those who were close to Popov enjoyed a great advantage in obtaining titles and promotions. To gain access to his circle, it was sufficient to be recommended by his current mistress or to introduce him to an attractive woman who might become his next one, so Gribovskii claimed.⁴⁷ Neither did the writer fail to note Popov’s connection to the discretionary spending account,⁴⁸ calculating that Popov would certainly not be able to cover the excessive costs of all the luxuries he so enjoyed with only the income granted to the estate in Reshetylivka; it would have been enough for only a month of the lifestyle he led. However, Popov had unrestricted access to the discretionary military funds, and he also held the purse strings to the revenues from Katerynoslav vicegerency and Tavriia oblast, which added up to two million roubles per annum, while the provincial chancelleries also brought in twelve million roubles in silver. Thus, if Popov personally suffered a lack of finances, he could help himself, unhindered, to this money at any time. Gribovskii cites an example when Popov lost another large sum at cards, then went to his office and soon returned with a full cap of chervontsi.⁴⁹ After Potemkin died, Popov tried in any way possible to prevent an audit of the discretionary spending account and to hide the shortfall in funds.

Finally, in 1800 Popov was ordered to compile a detailed report on the accounts of the late Prince Potemkin.⁵⁰ According to the memorandum submitted by Popov, expenditures of the discretionary funds were governed by the following procedure. The paymasters were to issue moneys pursuant to Potemkin’s written or verbal orders. The moneys could also be dispensed based on orders from other persons who had obtained the governor-general’s permission; in such cases the moneys were issued without any objection or receipt given. Therefore, wrote Popov, reports on the expenditures had never been required or submitted.⁵¹

The era of influence wielded by Potemkin and his team ended in 1793, when an old adversary of Potemkin - Zubov - was appointed governor-general. His term as governor was marked mainly by his efforts to eclipse the legacy of his predecessor. In 1795, despite the unjustifiability on economic or any other terms, Zubov created his own vicegerency. To satisfy only his own ambition, the Vozne­sensk vicegerency was cobbled together in the south from parts of Bratslav vice­gerency, lands obtained from the Treaty of Ia§i, and the Kherson, lelyzavethrad, and Novomyrhorod counties of the Katerynoslav vicegerency.

Frank opinions about Potemkin’s camp were shared in correspondence be­tween Fedor Rostopchin⁵² and Semen Vorontsov, an imperial envoy in London whom the former had met on a trip to Britain in 1788. Vorontsov also had a per­sonal grudge against Potemkin, as during the Russo-Turkish War all his combat successes had failed to be recognized, neither by Potemkin nor by Catherine II. For his part, Vorontsov had adamantly opposed the policy of the empress from the very beginning: back in 1762, Vorontsov did not accept the coup d'etat that had brought down Peter III and installed Catherine as empress, placing himself in a dangerous predicament in the imperial court. In personal recollections com­piled at Rostopchin’s request after Catherine’s death, Vorontsov provides clear reasons for his dissatisfaction with the ruling elites of the Russian Empire, and of Steppe Ukraine in particular.⁵³

The period of Potemkin’s reign is eloquently illustrated in this excerpt from one of Rostopchin’s letters to Vorontsov in England in early October 1791, after the prince’s death:

His demise was as uncommon as indeed was his life. Everyone here is pre­tending to be grief-stricken, and no one is thinking about the consequences. By seniority G. Kamenskii has taken over as leader. It would be fair to say that the day of Potemkin’s death is a day of rebirth for honest people, and that none of the military is sad about it; but many are thinking that they have lost their chance for new promotions, awards, etc.⁵⁴

Rostopchin states that anyone who took advantage of the prince’s favour and made his career on it deserves to be called his flunkey. He further says that one could find twenty examples of former sergeants of the guard being promoted within two years, or even less, to the rank of lieutenant-colonel.⁵⁵

There is valuable information to be found about governance in the region dur­ing the three-year period between Potemkin’s death and the appointment of Zubov as the new governor-general. In the history of the imperial bureaucracy in Steppe Ukraine during the latter eighteenth century, 1791-93 is one of the least studied periods. Rostopchin tells us that Popov's influence increased during this time, and that he appointed all the officials in the Katerynoslav vicegerency.⁵⁶ As alluded to above, Popov promulgated all his decisions in the region by referencing Potemkin's wishes: “Such was the will of the late prince.”⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Rostopchin is extremely critical of Zubov's rule. Copying Tu- tolmin, he calls him a “good-for-nothing boyo,” and he is particularly indignant about the young Zubov's incompetence and lack of leadership ability. In Ros- topchin's opinion, all the administrative deeds of the new leader of the Steppe Ukraine region were motivated only by his attempt to aggrandize himself and nothing more. A fair share of criticism is also directed at Tutolmin, former gov­ernor of the Katerynoslav vicegerency. As Rostopchin wrote to Vorontsov, “He is junior to you in service years, but he passed you a long time ago.”⁵⁸ He also held that everyone with a connection to Potemkin had a tainted reputation, and that included Tutolmin.

Potemkin's inner circle had been formed by what David L. Ransel describes as an exceptional patron-client relationship for that time.⁵⁹ Those closest to him and those whose loyalties were verified enjoyed enormous social and economic advantages. Their commitment needed to be shown not to the state but personally to Potemkin and his inner circle, despite their frequent overt abuses of power. For their part, opposing camps watched Potemkin and his entourage closely, in order to catch them out in wrongdoing, if possible. But Potemkin would person­ally take charge of any matters that could discredit him, denigrate his achieve­ments, or, worst of all, be disclosed to the public. His opponents repeatedly accused him of embezzling funds from the state treasury and of underhanded spending, but Potemkin was able to avoid any scandalous publicity.

As his successor, Zubov initiated several audits of Potemkin's cash reserves and business affairs. Zubov called into question many of Potemkin's directives concerning land distribution, and everything he did was motivated by his wish to wipe Potemkin's name from the annals of history. However, Zubov's own ap­proach to forming his inner circle hardly differed from that of his predecessor.

Neither did the lower rungs of the bureaucracy fail to secure their own inter­ests or take advantage of favourable moments that frequently came their way. None of these affairs were disclosed, however, as the informal “corporate” net­work was structured so as to protect all of its members, and any documentation of illegal schemes that could be traced was swiftly dealt with or disappeared.

The affair involving a gubernial officer from Azov gubernia, Georgii Gerse- vanov, is a typical example. In a brief report dated 1782, another gubernial officer, L. Alekseev, informs Potemkin about the appointment of one Titov as a collegium assessor instead of Gersevanov, who was being investigated for illegally exporting salt and travelling abroad.⁶⁰ This affair was swiftly covered up from public scrutiny. Then, in 1783 Gersevanov submitted a kowtowing memo requesting a promotion and to be pensioned off imperial service for health reasons - but he simultaneously failed to mention the investigation and instead noted that his service as gubernial officer had never been interrupted,⁶¹ although, as documentary evidence shows, the investigation was still ongoing, albeit in relative obscurity.⁶²

The gubernial officer Alekseev was himself also found out, in schemes con­nected to illegal land acquisitions. In 1781 the collegium secretary K. Bystrys'kyi, in a memo addressed to Potemkin, accused Alekseev of illegally acquiring 1,500 desiatins of his land, which he had received in 1776 upon obtaining a staff position in the Azov gubernial chancellery.⁶³ Interestingly, the land bonus was apparently his main motivation for pursuing the chancellery position in the first place.

In 1782 Potemkin received yet another denunciation accusing Alekseev of illegal acquisition of land on the Kalchyk River.⁶⁴ This time, the case against Alekseev backfired on the accuser, Lt I. Skryzhenskii. The denunciation revealed that this matter was not new and had been dragging on for some time. The Azov governor Chertkov ordered the illegally acquired lands to be returned to Skryzhenskii, but Alekseev not only disobeyed, but also threw Skryzhenskii in jail for fifteen days in retaliation for having the temerity to submit a denunciation against him.

The abuse of official status in order to obtain tracts of land was a widespread practice during that time. As early as 1777, Chertkov mentions numerous cases of illegal land acquisition by military officers and local civil servants.⁶⁵ Officials could not resist the temptation to engage in financial fraud - particularly when they had direct access to cash that was easy to conceal by simply not recording its existence. A vivid example of such a scheme flourished at the Taganrog customs port, where collected duties swiftly disappeared into the pockets of local officials.⁶⁶

Director Burbas of the Taganrog port and other customs workers recorded smaller volumes of goods being imported - or they would altogether allow the ships belonging to certain merchants to unload without any controls or logging of goods that would normally be subject to import duty. These were indeed ex­tremely serious violations, which were difficult to conceal. Thus, in an effort to demonstrate that such things were supposedly exceptions to the rule rather than a widespread practice, not only Director Burbas but all his subordinates involved in the scheme were dismissed.

Notably, however, only a few of these schemes became widely publicized, and according to official documents, only a few bureaucrats were punished by being dismissed. The system was set up in such a manner that problematic officials were quietly transferred to other positions, often without any mention of investigations or accusations against them in their previous position.

To be sure, local agencies received many complaints from the public concerning the failure of bureaucrats to fulfill their primary responsibilities or delays in re­solving various issues. However, only a small number of such complaints resulted in officials being charged.

The top leaders such as Potemkin and Zubov certainly closed their eyes to a multitude of violations on the part of local officials. First of all, they needed to retain the loyalty of the bureaucrats, who also expected to obtain social and eco­nomic privileges. Secondly, there was a real lack of professional bureaucrats in the region. Therefore, there was an unofficial social contract, which often super­seded the official legislation in the Russian Empire.

Staffing Numbers in the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy, and Again the Military Factor

Given that the staff structure of agencies of the Russian Empire in Steppe Ukraine was in constant flux during the entire second half of the eighteenth century, the number of officials hired on staff were also constantly changing, making it diffi­cult to establish clear statistics during this period.

We can speak of more-or-less exact numbers of officials in the region for only a few specific years. The most exact information on the approximate numbers of bureaucrats is available for 1787 in the Katerynoslav vicegerency. According to the corresponding official register there were approximately 1,352 persons in the vicegerency's civil service;⁶⁷ almost half of the bureaucrats worked in the chan­cellery. By comparison, the entire vicegerency that year had a population of over 389,000 male persons, of whom 1,590 were from the nobility.

If these numbers are compared with the mandatory number of officials stip­ulated in contemporary legislation for the effective functioning of gubernial and county institutions, we see that certain elected positions remained vacant, while the number of officials in appointed positions was nearly in line with the legisla­tive norms concerning staff in those times. Consideration must also be given to the fact that the borderland situation of the region necessitated the functioning of a series of additional agencies and positions that did not exist in other regions - namely, a network of customs and quarantine facilities. In addition, the ongoing land distribution greatly increased the importance of surveyors.

There is some uncertainty with regard to the number of chancellery officials, because it was not specified in any legislative act. Generally, the numbers were determined by the needs and capacities of the government budget. For our ex­ample, based on the above-mentioned table, in 1787 in the Katerynoslav vice­gerency there were approximately 700 chancellery employees.⁶⁸

As also repeatedly mentioned above, in the initial years of forming gubernial and county agencies in the region, a significant part of the officials comprised former military officers of the Imperial Russian Army, who simultaneously ful­filled military as well as civilian duties. This is not unusual, given that Steppe Ukraine at the time maintained a constant military readiness, justifying the high concentration of military personnel that was engaged in governing the re­gion at the first opportunity. Given further that the supreme leader in the region was concurrently the vice-president, and subsequently president, of the War Collegium, the fact that military personnel dominated in governing the region is even more logical. It is also worth remembering that among the nobility it was a long-held opinion that military positions were much more prestigious than civilian positions.

During that period, the usual reason for a military man's full transfer to civilian service would be disability due to war wounds - which would often lead to sub­sequent discharge from civilian service as well. Furthermore, many of the older military men were attracted by the possibility of a settled lifestyle. And not least of the benefits perceived by many in transferring to the civilian bureaucracy was the possibility of obtaining a promotion in rank.

Nevertheless, by the end of the eighteenth century the number of officials who had begun their career in the ranks of the military had decreased noticeably. For example, of ninety-eight studied biographies of officials in the main agencies of the New Russia gubernia⁶⁹ in 1798, sixty-eight of them had begun their career as civilians and had never served in any military capacity whatsoever.⁷⁰

Those who had commenced their career serving the state in army ranks were generally very familiar with the region, having participated actively in the Rus­sian Empire's military operations in these territories that ultimately resulted in its increased authority and aggrandized territory. There were, however, instances of military service taking place in other locations. For example, the collegium assessor in the judicial chambers of the first department of New Russia gubernia, Fedor Marchenko, had previously participated in military campaigns against the Swedish fleet on the Baltic Sea.⁷¹ In 1794 he was discharged at the rank of first lieutenant, at the age of 27, and in 1797 he was appointed collegium assessor in the new gubernia; there are many other such examples.

Social Standing in the Steppe Ukraine Imperial Bureaucracy

Concerning the social status of the higher-ranked officials at the end of the eigh­teenth century, most of them did come from the nobility, while the rest were from the clergy, raznochintsy (“people of various ranks”), and military officer and in­fantry families. A sizable proportion of the bureaucrats were of Cossack starshyna lineage, while nearly ten per cent were from foreign countries. The most numer­ous of these were Greeks, Georgians, and Poles, but there were other nationalities as well. For example, the collegium assessor K. Lambros, in charge of security at the Kozlov quarantine facility, came from Moldavian nobility.⁷² The head of the Odesa Port quarantine facility, court adviser M. Karpov, is indicated in an official list as being “from the nobility of the Moldavian-Wallachian principality.”⁷³

There were also representatives of Ragusan nobility - for example, the titular counsellor Marko Stuli, in charge of security at the Kaffa quarantine facility.⁷⁴ The titular counsellor Petr Monasterli,polizeimeister of Novomyrhorod, was de­scended from Hungarian Serb nobility.⁷⁵

Analyzing the positions held by representatives of foreign nobility, we can see that they were mostly assigned to imperial agencies that anticipated frequent con­tacts with other foreigners and required knowledge of foreign languages. There­fore, it is no surprise that the greatest numbers of the foreign nobility worked in the Russian Empire's customs and quarantine facilities.

According to the studied official personnel records of over three hundred officials, at the end of the eighteenth century only around eleven per cent of them originated from Ukrainian territories. In the personnel record field “comes from which rank,” those originally from Ukrainian territories were recorded as “from Cossack rank,” “Little Russian,” or “Little Russian nobility.” Nevertheless, it may be assumed without a doubt that the percentage of Ukrainian-origin officials was actually much higher. This assumption is based on the probability that by the end of the eighteenth century many of the bureaucrats had already changed to a different employee category and were thus not recorded in the above-mentioned categories.

For example, in the New Russia gubernia lists for 1798 the court adviser Stepan Myronenko is recorded as “from the nobility.”⁷⁶ He had begun his service in 1775 in the Donetsk regiment as a company quartermaster. After an assignment as a bookkeeper in Azov gubernia, he was appointed secretary of an accounting team touring the new Katerynoslav vicegerency. Myronenko also participated on several occasions in the Russian Empire's military campaigns in Crimea. According to the official personnel record, among his possessions were also “Little Russian sub­jects in Bakhmut county, 150 souls.”

This was a typical career for the nobility in the Russian Empire. But if this in­formation is compared to the official 1785 personnel record for Stepan Myro- nenko, the first thing that we note is that he is listed there as “self-determined Little Russian.”⁷⁷

Looking at the official personnel records of the 1770s and 1780s, we see that the proportion of Ukrainian-origin officials was approximately forty-five per cent. However, if only the chancellery officials are considered, the Ukrainians among them were definitely in the majority.

For example, the high percentage of Ukrainian officials in the chancellery is clearly illustrated in a report dated June 1785, written by Ivan Sinel'nikov about the awarding of promotions in rank to four chancellery officials in the Katery- noslav vicegerency:

The vicegerencial management, having observed the labours, efforts, and care in keeping written records on the part of the following chief clerks found in our staff - sub-lieutenant Ivan Rozsoshnyk and gubernial regis­trars Tymofei Komar, Grigorii Kitsenko, and Ivan Soloshych, who have ex­ercised their authorities from the former Azov and New Russia gubernial chancelleries according to the mandates granted to them - to be com­mendable and their behaviour respectable, wherefore from the local gu- bernial chancelleries they merited being awarded the following ranks.⁷⁸

In the official group list accompanying the above-mentioned report, the origin of all four officials recommended for promotion in rank is indicated as “Little Russian.”

In August of that same year, 1785, Sinel'nikov submitted another report about promoting three more bureaucrats from the Katerynoslav Criminal Court - the archivist Iakov Malakhnenko and chief clerks Maksym Kliushnyk and Ivan Kushch - to the rank of provincial secretary;⁷⁹ in the official group list, these three are also recorded as “Little Russians.”⁸⁰

During this period, the Zaporozhian Cossack starshyna was also being inten­sively recruited to the Russian nobility by way of recognizing an equivalency with, or direct granting of, imperial Russian military rank. For example, in Potemkin’s application alone to the War Collegium dated 7 August 1779, it is recommended to award military ranks to sixty-nine representatives of the Zaporozhian Cossack starshyna.⁸¹ According to the scholar Natalia Sureva, after Potemkin was appointed president of the War Collegium, he initiated the award of military ranks to over one hundred fifty former members of the Cossack starshyna.⁸² Having a military rank allowed them to easily continue working and to delay transferring to the civilian service, which many former members of the Cossack starshyna indeed did. Meanwhile, for Potemkin this was an ideal scheme with which to replenish the staff of his agencies with bureaucrats of the required rank while obviating the centralized system of granting ranks that was governed by heraldry standards.

The decrease in the number of Cossack starshyna descendants among the bureaucrats at the end of the eighteenth century is also partly related to Zubov's appointment as regional governor and the death of Catherine II, which ushered in a period of turbulence and redistribution of powers in the region specifically and in the Russian Empire overall. The exclusion of a large portion of the former Poltava regiment from the administrative jurisdiction of the Katerynoslav vice­gerency in 1802 prompted a significant exodus of Ukrainian-origin officials to the newly created Poltava gubernia, where they joined the already established Zolotnyts'kyi, Ostrohrads'kyi, Bystryts'kyi, Bunyts'kyi, and Kapnist dynasties.⁸³

Demographics in the Imperial Bureaucracy: Age and Health

The average age of officials working in the Russian Empire's agencies in Steppe Ukraine at that time was 30-40 years. Two factors are primarily responsible for partially influencing the prevalence of this age range of the public servants. First of all, most of the young ones arrived from other regions, presumably attracted by the idea of rapid upward mobility in their careers and increased financial wealth. Where they came from was not seen as offering any prospects, due to competition and other factors of no benefit to them.

Secondly, if truth be told, the conditions the officials had to work in were far from the ideal or what was expected, and often unfavourable, forcing many of them to retire on a disability pension. Many of them were forced to work in con­ditions that were even not conducive to survival. It took time to build the premises for the Russian Empire's new agencies in the region; therefore, in their first years of operations, while hiring ever-increasing numbers of staff they had to function in premises that were not suitable for long-term use.⁸⁴ Conditions for the bu­reaucrats were dank, dark, and cold.

There were instances of newly hired officials who were not even able to com­mence their duties due to a sudden worsening of their health. For example, Cap­tain Pryma, just appointed as land commissar in Kriukiv county, had to step aside due to ill health and allow the secretary of the New Russia chancellery, P. Vasyl'iak, to take over.⁸⁵ There are many such examples.

Similarly, in 1781 the registrar of the Slovianske provincial chancellery of New Russia gubernia, thirty-six-year old I. Vyshnevets'kyi, began a kowtowing petition to be discharged from service due to health problems. According to his staff record, Vyshnevets'kyi was “Little Russian.”⁸⁶ But in the petition he specifies that he was “born in a Little Russian city but by nature [is] from Polish nobility.” Vysh­nevets'kyi commenced his government service in 1765 at the Poltava magistrate’s office as a clerk, and later also worked as a clerk in the Azov gubernia chancellery and as registrar at the Poltava provincial chancellery. He had a brief term of mil­itary service in Crimea in 1774 before the Peace Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca and participated in suppressing the Pugachev Rebellion that year.⁸⁷

Vyshnevets'kyi wrote: “But I felt in myself, from the work I was burdened with through all the past years of service, a weakness in my health and eyes, so that in this, my current position I have not the strength to continue any further, nor in military service.”⁸⁸

In turn, the Senate was often suspicious of the large number of petitions from this region for discharge due to ill health, and sometimes the Senate would express its misgivings directly. For example, in the case of discharging the recording sec­retary Lukianovych for reasons of illness, the Senate was in doubt as to whether he really had any health problem. In the Senate’s opinion, he was motivated only by the mercantile desire to obtain a higher rank upon retirement. In the Senate’s ruling on this case, it is written: “We suggest that the reason is not illness but the lack of disposition of Secretary Lukianovych to serve. He shall not be discharged from his position so as to obtain a promotion until he makes an effort to earn it, otherwise he shall be discharged from staff service and not be engaged in any business matters afterwards.”⁸⁹

However, in his report on this matter Sinel'nikov insisted that according to the memos received from the state treasury, Lukianovych was truly unable to fulfill his duties for a lengthy period due to his poor health; for this reason he was laid off but retained his seniority, and another registrar, one Fedotov - who had often carried out the work of the sick man previously - was designated to replace him.⁹⁰ If an official was unable to exercise his authority only temporarily due to illness, efforts were made to find a replacement for his position until he was able to again take up his duties.⁹¹

Payroll Problems and Compensatory Perks

Despite the perception of Steppe Ukraine as a fantasy paradise for elevating one’s social and economic status, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century the local officials had to face chronic non-payment of salaries. As a result, many employees had no means of existence - which, in turn, caused their health to de­teriorate and prompted them to leave for other gubernias.

The failure to pay imperial government officials is vividly illustrated in a report addressed to Potemkin from the New Russia gubernial chancellery, which includes the following testimony: “From the report sent from this chancellery to Your Highness dated the 25th day of February in this year 1781, Your Highness already has been informed about the drastic shortage in this gubernia of treasury funds, and what privations because of it the staff assigned here are suffering from not receiving the moneys owed to them.”⁹²

Frequently, the payment of insufficient funds, or non-payment altogether, would occur due to various bureaucratic problems or misunderstandings between different agencies and staff. The documents we analyzed abound with complaints and requests to resolve non-payment issues. For example, in 1784 even Sinel'nikov himself complained to Potemkin that he had been fulfilling the duties of governor of the Katerynoslav vicegerency for almost a year as well as simultaneously con­tinuing to command the Kherson regiment, but that he had been refused payment for the latter because he was now receiving a governor’s salary.⁹³ Considering this to be unacceptable and unfair, Sinel’nikov wrote that “during all of last year I never received it and am suffering privations. And for this reason I dare to humbly request that Your Highness grant it to me from wherever it should be issued, and make it happen immediately.”⁹⁴

In 1786 Sinel'nikov again penned a letter about the need to issue the back pay that was owed to various officials throughout the Katerynoslav vicegerency. In­deed, the problem of back pay or wages too low to survive on lasted through the end of the century, and it remained unresolved even in the first few years of the nineteenth century. Many imperial government employees depended on their salaries, having no other means of survival. However, there was a group whose financial standing was relatively strong - namely, officials who possessed land and peasants. Toward the end of the eighteenth century this group represented approximately thirty-five per cent of the bureaucracy. As was also mentioned above, Potemkin found ways to compensate some officials from other revenue streams under his control.

Notably, most of the tracts of land and peasants belonging to imperial gov­ernment officials working in Steppe Ukraine at this time were not actually located in the gubernias of Steppe Ukraine. Many officials owned peasants in Little Russia gubernia. Among them, for example, were H. Brazol,⁹⁵ an advisor to the trustees of New Russia gubernia; Petr Neverovskii, deputy governor and a collegium ad­visor who owned an impressive 190 souls in Zolotonosha county;⁹⁶ and D. Shmakov, an advisor in the first department of the judicial chambers of New Rus­sia gubernia and a collegium advisor, possessed 40 souls in Kremenchuk county, Little Russia gubernia, and 23 souls in New Russia county, New Russia gubernia.⁹⁷

The head of the above-mentioned first department of the judicial chambers of New Russia gubernia, state councillor S. Shchukin, maintained an estate staff in Tver gubernia.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, the head of the second department in the same gubernial agency owned a surplus forty peasants in Dorohobuzh okruha, Smolensk gubernia.⁹⁹ Available information indicates that imperial Russian bureaucrats in Steppe Ukraine maintained possessions in Tula,¹⁰⁰ Tambov,¹⁰¹ Kostroma,¹⁰² and Sloboda Ukraine¹⁰³ gubernias.

Apparently, few officials of Ukrainian origin owned land or people. Informa­tion exists about the surveyor of Mariupol county, land secretary V. Medovnikov, who owned 28 male persons;¹⁰⁴ the above-mentioned S. Myronenko, who owned “150 Little Russian subjects”;¹⁰⁵ and the secretary of the Bakhmut county court, M. Babenko, who owned six peasants.¹⁰⁶

Conclusions

The forcible expansion of the Russian Empire's borders mandated the formation of an imperial bureaucracy in Steppe Ukraine, as elsewhere in imperial Russia during the second half of the eighteenth century. After having for many centuries existed with their own specific systems of order, adding these territories to the political corpus of the Russian state required that the authorities develop man­agement models that would facilitate the quickest possible conformity of admin­istrative affairs in these lands with the legislative norms of the Russian Empire, while taking into consideration the specificity of prior historical development in the region.

The lack of qualified officials presented an especially acute problem, as the im­plementation of the empire's centralizing policies in Steppe Ukraine demanded the engagement of a significant number of human resources. The imperial gov­ernment in Steppe Ukraine had to compete for personnel with other territories of the Russian Empire, which were also experiencing shortages of officials to fill the number of vacant positions. While the proportion of military officials was much greater in Steppe Ukraine, due to the situation of the borderland gubernias and Potemkin's status as the President of the War Collegium, it was still not suf­ficient to resolve the problem. As time passed, it became easier to hire represen­tatives of loyal local elites, and there was also an unmistakeable influx of cadres from other gubernias of the Russian Empire.

It certainly is necessary to mention in conclusion that a significant albeit subjective role in the bureaucratization process in Steppe Ukraine was played by the highest authority in the region - namely, Potemkin and his inner circle. Potemkin's special status in the imperial court and the limitless trust of the Em­press which he enjoyed allowed him to use his own judgement on many matters in steering the region. As a result, a number of the appointments to bureaucratic positions took place in violation of the regulations and of legislation concerning the imperial bureaucracy.

Another point worthy of note is the large number of Ukrainians among the newly hired contingent of officials - especially the clerks, where nearly every sec­ond official was of Ukrainian background. However, by the end of the eighteenth century it became more difficult to identify which officials were Ukrainian, for once they ascended to the imperial nobility, information about their origin was often left out of the official records.

In any case, representatives of the Russian nobility constituted an indisputable majority of management positions in the county and gubernial administrations, and most of them were the former military officers who had been engaged to control the region in the first stages of its incorporation into the political and ad­ministrative sphere of the Russian Empire. Others - including members of foreign nobility - arrived in Steppe Ukraine with the intention of improving their eco­nomic situation as well as social station by means of obtaining promotions to higher rank. But in fact, the reality of the situation in the region failed to live up to the rosy and hopeful picture that was portrayed of it.

NOTES

1 John P. Le Donne, “The Territorial Reform of the Russian Empire, 1775-1796 [I. Central Russia, 1775-1784],” Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 23, no. 2 (1982): 147-85; John P. Le Donne, “The Territorial Reform of the Russian Empire, 1775-96 [II. The Borderlands, 1777-96],” Cahiers du monde Russe

et Sovietique 24, no. 4 (1983): 411-57.

2 Don Karl Rowney and Walter M. Pintner, “Officialdom and Bureaucratiza­tion: An Introduction,” in Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, 1980), 7.

3 Mark Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York and London, 1966), 107.

4 Zenon Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorp­tion of the Hetmanate, iy6os-i8:os (Cambridge, ma, 1988); Svitlana Potapenko, “Cossack Officials in Sloboda Ukraine: from Local Elite to Impe­rial Nobility?” in Dimensions of Modernity: The Enlightenment and its Con­tested Legacies. Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, vol. 34 (Vienna, 2015), accessed 1 September 2020, https://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting- fellows-conferences/vol-xxxiv/cossack-officials-in-sloboda-ukraine/;

Volodymyr Sklokin, Rosiis’ka imperiia i Slobids'ka Ukrama u druhiipolovyni XVIII st. (Lviv, 2019).

5 S. Didyk, “Dolia naselennia Novoslobids'koho kozats'koho polku pislia zas- nuvannia ι-ϊ Novorsiis'koi hubernu,” in Sicheslavs ’kyi al 'manakh: zb. nauk. pr. z istorii kozatstva, vol. 6 (Dnipropetrovsk, 2011), 66-74; O. Posun'ko, Is- toriia Novoi Serbii ta Slov’ianoserbii (Zaporizhzhia, 1998).

6 B. Hal', “Osoblyvosti administratyvnoho raionuvannia Mezhyrichchia Orili i Suly (druha polovyna XVIII st. - XIX st.),” in Istoriia i kul 'tura Prydniprov’ia: Nevidomi ta malovidomi storinky, vol. 8 (Dnipropetrovsk, 2008), 12.

7 A.V. Makedonov, K svetskoi i tserkovnoi istorii Novorossii (XVIII-XIX vv.) (Zaporizhzhia, 2006), 10.

8 I. Savchenko, “Mistsevi orhany upravlinnia Novorosiis'koi ta Azovs'koi hu- bernii,” in Zapysky naukovo-doslidnoi laboratorii istori'i Pivdennoi Ukrainy Zaporiz ’koho derzhavnoho universytetu. Vol. 6, Pivdenna Ukraina XVIII-XIX st. (Zaporizhzhia, 2001), 244.

9 Brian L. Davies, Russo-Turkish Wars, 1768-1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire (London, 2016).

10 Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, ed. Walter McKenzie Pintner, Don Karl Rowney, and Helju Aulik Bennett (Chapel Hill, 1980), 117.

11 A special role in administering the region was played by Potemkin's assigned staff. Immediately after being appointed to his new position, Potemkin de­manded that his chancellery be given the same authorities and number of staff as the governor-general of Little Russia, Petr Rumiantsev. According to the records, Potemkin's office had twenty-five staff in 1783, which by 1791 had increased to fifty-one; eighteen of those fifty-one officials were civilians. This office, located in and overseeing the territory of the Steppe Ukrainian guber­nias, partially took on the functions of the central government bodies of the Russian Empire. Catherine II was actually grateful for this turn of events, for neither the Senate - constantly undergoing reforms - nor the empress's Cabi­net were capable of reacting in a timely manner to the dynamic changes hap­pening in the region. But at that time even Catherine could not imagine that Potemkin's chancellery would concentrate authority over the region fully in his hands - although perhaps it was predictable. An important reason for this is that the powers of the governor-general were not clearly defined by law; another was that Potemkin's favour with the empress increased his boldness. He was able to take advantage of virtually limitless trust and conduct his policies in the region unfettered. Almost equally important was his role as president of the War Collegium, which cannot be considered a coincidence.

12 O. Pankieiev and A. Olenenko, Azovs’ke namisnytstvo: nerealizovanyiproekt (Zaporizhzhia, 2011), 5.

13 N. Bolotina, Deiatel ’nost’ G.A. Potemkina, 1739-1791 gg., v oblasti vnutrennei politiki Rossii (Moscow, 2010); O. Eliseeva, Geopoliticheskie proekty G.A. Potemkina (Moscow, 2000).

14 A. Olenenko, “Istoriia formuvannia kordoniv Azovs'koi hubernii (1775-1776 rr.): za materialamy opublikovanykh dzherel,” in Volyns’ki istorychni zapysky, vol. 2 (Zhytomyr, 1999), 173-4.

15 V. Kozyriev, Materialy do istorit administratyvnoho ustroiu Pivdennot Ukratny (druhapolovyna XVIII-pershapolovyna XIX st.) (Zaporizhzhia, 1999), 173.

16Ibid., 178.

17Savchenko, “Mistsevi orhany pravlinnia,” 245.

18 A. Shmidt, Materialy dlia istorii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannye ofitserami gener- al’nogo shtaba. Khersonskaiaguberniia, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1863), 49.

19 Hugh Ragsdale, “Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project,” The Slavonic and East European Review 66, no. 1 (1988): 91-111; Isabel de Madariaga, “The Secret Austro-Russian Treaty of 1781,” The Slavonic and East European Review 38, no. 90 (1959): 114-45.

20 James A. Duran, “Catherine II, Potemkin, and Colonization Policy in Southern Russia,” The Russian Review 28, no. 1 (1969): 24.

21 Decree “On institutions for the administration of gubernias of the All­Russian Empire” dated 7(18) November 1775.

22 Roger Bartlett, “Cameralism in Russia: Empress Catherine II and Population Policy,” in Cameralism in Practice: State Administration and Economy in Early Modern Europe, ed. Marten Seppel and Keith Tribe (Woodbridge/Rochester, 2017), 68.

23 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (Russian State Archive of Military History; hereafter rgvia) f. 52, d. 92.

24 “Bumagi kniazia Grigoriia Aleksandrovicha Potemkina-Tavricheskogo 1774-1788 gg.,” Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov, ed. N.F. Dubrovin, vol. 6 (St Petersburg, 1893), 36-7.

25 Kozyriev, Materialy do istorit, 185.

26 O. Olenenko, “Osoblyvosti administratyvno-terytorial'noho ustroiu Azovs'koi hubernii,” Muzeinyi visnyk: naukovo-teoretychnyi shchorichnyk 12 (2012): 97.

27 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents, hereinafter - rgada), f. 16, d. 588, ch. 6, l. i96v.

28 RGADA, f. 16, d. 588, ch. 10, l. 386.

29 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 10, l. 509-lOv.

30 A. Boiko, Pivdenna Ukratna ostann 'ot chverti XVIII stolittia: analiz dzherel (Kyiv, 2000), 67.

31 rgada, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 12, l. 171.

Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (hereafter pszri), Sobranie pervoe, vol. 21 (St Petersburg, 1830), 889.

Potemkin was annoyed that there were almost no free territories remaining in the region for him to gift to people from his camp, so he ordered Tutolmin, the newly appointed governor of Katerynoslav vicegerency, to annul all the land gifts that he had not personally approved. For his part, Tutolmin per­ceived the illegality of this way of handling matters and attempted to solve the problem by legal means. He sent an order to the local authorities to com­pile memoranda concerning whether those who received land allocations were fulfilling their usage. These actions likely did not conform to Potemkin's ideas of regional governance and as a result, Tutolmin did not stay for long and was reappointed to a different gubernia.

pszri, 22: 10-11.

N. Bolotina, Deiatel ’nost’ G.A. Potemkina (1739-1791 gg.) v oblasti vnutrennei politiki Rossii (Moscow, 2010), 81; rgada, f. 16, d. 799, ch. 1, ll. 164. rgada, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 5, ll. 146.

rgada, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 12, ll. 68-9.

Kelly Ann O'Neill, Claiming Crimea: A History of Catherine the Great’s Steppe Empire (New Haven, 2017), 84-123.

“Proekt administrativnogo ustroistva Tavricheskoi oblasti, podannyi G.A. Potemkinym Ekaterine II v fevrale 1784 g.,” Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii, no. 19 (1893): 71-5.

Administrativno-territorial’nyepreobrazovaniia vKrymu 1783-1998gg. (Simferopol, 1999), 118.

O'Neill, Claiming Crimea, 84-123.

Bolotina, Deiatel’nost’ G.A. Potemkina, 89.

D. Prokhorov, “Organy upravleniia Tavricheskoi oblasti posle prisoedineniia Kryma k Rossii: 1783-1787 gg.,” Materialy po arkheologii, istorii i etnografii Tavrii 5 (1996): 220.

A. Boiko, “Diial'nist' V. S. Popova po upravlinniu Pivdennoiu Ukrainoiu na pochatku 90-kh rr. XVIII st.,” in Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakul 'tetu Zaporiz’koho national’noho universytetu 7 (1999): 98.

Gribovskii served in Prince Potemkin's military expedition chancellery start­ing in 1787, and after the latter's death the chancellery was managed by Platon Zubov. In 1795 he obtained the position of state secretary in the court of Catherine II. After her son Paul I ascended to the throne, Gribovskii was sentenced and imprisoned for illegal land schemes, resettling peasants, and stealing paintings from the Tauride Palace in St Petersburg.

46 A. Gribovskii, Zapiski o imperatritse Ekaterine Velikoi: reprintnoe vosproizvede- nie izdaniia 1864 goda (Moscow, 1989), 20.

47 Ibid., 22.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Boiko, Pivdenna Ukratna, 65.

51 “Kratkaia zapiska o prikhode i raskhode ekstraordinarnykh sum v raspori- azhenii pokoinogo kniazia Potemkina byvshikh,” zooid 8 (1872): 225-7.

52 Rostopchin took active part in the assault on Ochakiv and in the signing of the Treaty of Ia§i in 1791. He was not in Potemkin's camp, but he was well ac­quainted with his activity by observing members of his team. Rostopchin felt a personal enmity toward the governor-general and everything connected to him. Most probably his negative attitude to Potemkin and his milieu was based on his anger at not belonging to the select cohort of those who partici­pated in the important affairs of state and also enjoyed all kinds of privileges in their career advancement. Meanwhile, it is well known that Rostopchin himself was blocked from being promoted.

53 “Avtobiografiia grafa Semena Romanovicha Vorontsova,” Russkii Arkhiv 1 (1876): 54.

54 “Izvestiia iz Rossii v Angliiu: pis'ma grafa F. Rostopchina k grafu S. Vorontsovu,” Russkii Arkhiv 1 (1876): 82.

55 Ibid., 84.

56 Ibid., 95.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 David Ransel, “Character and Style of Patron-Client Relations in Russia,” in Klientelsysteme im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Antoni Mqczak (Munich, 1988), 217-18.

60 rgada, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 9, l. 670.

61 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 10, ll. 49-5O.

62 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 10, ll. 141.

63 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 9, ll. 79.

64 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 9, ll. 305.

65 rgada, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 9, ll. 348-9.

66 rgada, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 9, ll. 205-8.

67 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 2, ll. 336-8.

68 Ibid.

69 Administrativno-territorial’nyepreobrazovaniia vKrymu, 122-3.

The reign of Paul I, who ascended to the throne after the death of Catherine II in November 1796, was marked by policies contradicting those of his mother. They impacted the Steppe Ukraine most of all, where by his decree the Katerynoslav vicegerency was not only replaced, and its central city was even renamed (albeit briefly, 1797-1802), from Katerynoslav to Novorosiisk. The new New Russia gubernia was decreed in December 1796, combining the former Katerynoslav and Voznesensk vicegerencies along with Tavriia oblast. O. Pankieiev, ed., Hrupovi formuliarni spysky Novorosiis’ko'i huberni'iza 1798 r. (Zaporizhzhia, 2011), 36.

Ibid., 86.

Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 86.

Ibid., 63.

rgada, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 1, ll. 100-3.

Ibid.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 3, l. 187;

RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 2, l. 166.

RGADA, f. 16, d, ch. 2, ll. 168-9.

D. Evarnitskii, Sbornik materialov dlia istorii zaporozhskikh kazakov (St Peters­burg, 1888), 208-9.

Natalia Sureva, “Kooptatsiia zaporoz'koi starshyny do dvorianstva u zakono- davchii praktytsi Rosiis'koi imperii,” Naukovipratsi istorychnoho fakul’tetu Zaporiz’koho natsional’noho universytetu 26 (2009): 91.

A. Boiko, “‘Pereiaslavs'ka metafora' u suspil'nomu butti Stepovoi Ukrainy ostann'oi chverti XVIII - pochatku XIX st.,” Skhid-Zakhid: Istorychno- kul’turolohichnyi zbirnyk 9/10 (2008): 74.

rgada, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 5, l. 65.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 9, l. 192.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 6, ll. 185-6.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 6, l. 188.

Ibid.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 1, l. 96.

Ibid.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 9, ll. 269-269v.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 6, ll. 265-265v.

RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 1, l. 32.

Ibid.

Pankieiev ed., Hrupovi formuliarni spysky, 18.

Ibid., 23.

97 Ibid., 34.

98 Ibid., 32.

99 Ibid., 41.

100Ibid., 52.

101Ibid., 48.

102Ibid., 79.

103Ibid., 80.

104Ibid., 110.

105Ibid., 98.

106Ibid., 58.