“A Plague on Your Borders”: Disease Control and Administrative Reforms in Late Eighteenth-Century Ukraine

OKSANA MYKHED

Devastated and unexplored, welcoming and open to a stranger - these were the characteristics a traveler would give to the land and people living in late eighteenth-century Ukraine.

While epidemics of bubonic plague played a major role in the creation of bor­ders and quarantining complexes that divided off eighteenth-century empires and their people,³ the traveling physician observed that no such well-organized government initiatives existed to protect Kyiv and the two Ukrainian provinces bearing the city's name. Kyiv was not only a large hub connecting the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian, and Ottoman empires but also the major entry point to the Russian Empire in its western borderlands.

Ambitious and eager to expand the empire through geographic exploration and acquisition of new territories, Catherine II did not expedite the physical and administrative separation of the Kyiv province in the mid-i/6os. In fact, early in her reign, Catherine II intervened in Polish-Ukrainian relations and facilitated an influx of Right-Bank Ukraine's political elites, church and religious commu­nities, as well as the peasant and Cossack population into the empire. Kyiv played an important role in these integrative initiatives and became a center welcoming and hosting these newcomers. The city and the Russian Kyiv province enjoyed a semi-autonomous status and relative freedom compared to similar cities in the inner provinces of the empire. The outbreak of the bubonic plague in Kyiv, how­ever, changed these conditions and called for immediate action terminating such open-door policies. This paper argues that the medical disaster of 1770-71 rede­fined the role of the city and the province in the empire; initiated its higher subordination to the major imperial political, medical, and military institutions; and turned it into the center of the Kyiv vicegerency, an administrative unit cre­ated in accordance with the provincial reforms conducted in the empire in the mid-i77os.

Treatment of the Bubonic Plague in Ukraine

The bubonic plague was among the most challenging cataclysms influencing human life in the Ukrainian territories in the late eighteenth century. The pop­ulation living during this period compared the pestilence in its destructive effect to wars, famines, and fires; and often experienced all of these disasters in their short and dramatic lifetimes.⁴ Indeed, the plague was difficult to diagnose at the early stages, especially for inexperienced medical professionals or people without any medical training.

The plague is caused by the bacterium yersiniapestis, often spread by fleas and their hosts, rodents, such as rats. Since irregular cleaning of the streets and prox­imity to domestic animals provided opportunities for rat infestation, these factors may have affected the spread of the plague. In addition, poor hygiene and mal­nutrition made people susceptible to other diseases and weakened their overall health, thus decreasing their chances of surviving a plague epidemic. Townsmen and villagers living in eighteenth-century Ukraine were not aware of these facts. Before the discovery of germs, there were many theories explaining the nature of the bubonic plague, its treatment, and the ways the disease was transmitted from one person to another. The majority of medical professionals supported the mi­asma theory that did not define the plague as a separate disease and linked the origins of all contagious diseases to polluted air. The air condition was linked to weather fluctuations, and the likelihood of an epidemic of plague was mistakenly attributed to temperature and precipitation.

Another smaller group of medical professionals supported the contagion the­ory, which argued that the plague was transmitted through physical contact with the sick. This theory was developed based on the century-long observations made by government officials, sailors, and merchants who saw the effectiveness of the practices of isolation and quarantining in preventing the plague. The proponents of this theory, including Samoilovych, advised that the sick be isolated from the healthy and that sanitary cordons around towns be created. In the mid-eighteenth century, this theory was relatively new. It was based on intuition and the practices traditionally accepted in European ports and towns experiencing high popula­tion density and frequent outbreaks of the plague. There was no scientific ex­planation justifying the practices of isolation and quarantining, and without knowing the true nature and reasons for the disease, state governments and mu­nicipal councils used a combination of methods recommended by the followers of these two theories.⁹

The practice of constructing quarantines and sanitary cordons was not fol­lowed on a regular basis in Ukraine.

Physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and other professional medical personnel were not available in most Ukrainian towns and villages. Hence, the local population often relied on quacks, priests, and astrologers who replaced these medical pro­fessionals but had no relevant training. They were hired by the nobility or the com­mon population and did more harm than good in administrating anti-plague precautions on the local level. Some of them explained the epidemics as the wrath of God or linked the plague to the movement of stars and planets, thus supporting ignorance, superstitions, and misconceptions. Fear, the lack of knowledge about the disease, and poorly coordinated government measures made these people very popular and increased demand for their services.¹¹

Some quacks that were lucky enough to survive a plague epidemic became so rich that they were able to obtain noble status in the Commonwealth or be ad­mitted to town councils in Left-Bank Ukraine. They were well respected by the population and enjoyed absolute freedom to administer any anti-plague precau­tions they conceived. The population did not distinguish them from physicians or other medical professionals. For instance, during his trip to St Petersburg, Samoilovych was able to stay in Vinnytsia for a short period of time and conduct isolationist anti-plague measures that stopped the epidemic in early 1770.¹² How­ever, when the town witnessed another outbreak several months later, the struggle with the pestilence was led by a local quack who ordered the laying of the bodies of the deceased on the outskirts of the town and conducted magic rituals on them.

The clergy of different denominations believed that they could protect the population from the plague with their prayers and used the outbreaks to attract villagers to church activities. In September 1764, when there was an outbreak of the plague in Balta, a local Orthodox priest required all residents to fast for three or more days and pray in the church. Both Uniate and Roman Catholic priests in Ukraine proclaimed that prayers, fasting, and even donations of money to the church would guarantee protection from the plague. Still, while the deaths con­tinued, the priests believed that the flock did not demonstrate much needed de­votion and obedience. Frequent public ceremonies and prayers often led to even more deaths and were followed by a rejection of the church and disbelief.¹⁴

It is not surprising that desperate and panic-driven peasant communities ex­periencing plague outbreaks often made quacks or priests the victims of mass hysteria and scapegoating. Popular imagination linked them to the dissemination of the foul air that caused the plague. For instance, when several people died from the plague in Voitivka, a village not far from Uman, in the spring of 1770, the peas­ants accused their Orthodox priest of causing the deaths. The priest, named Vasyl', was believed to be a ghoul who walked at night, opened the windows of peasant homes, and exhaled poisonous air inside to infect the homes with the plague. This story seemed to be so persuasive to the villagers that even the priest's family agreed with the accusation made by the community. The peasants found the priest guilty and executed him. After the execution, the plague did not cause new deaths in the village, which seemed to justify this unlawful act. Even the szlachta court that later investigated this murder accepted the peasants' argument and found them not guilty.¹⁵

Such activities distracted the population, government, church, town councils, and courts from the monitoring of neighboring territories, quarantining, border closure, and isolation. These methods contributed to the creation of sanitary cor­dons against the plague, an effective but expensive and time-consuming measure often used in disease control and prevention. The creation and closure of sanitary cordons was impossible without a well-developed infrastructure, including one or two major roads with militia outposts guarding the entrances, well-defined city or provincial borders, and fortification or other defensive constructions. A line of outposts could host quarantine facilities with warehouses and hospitals. Outpost guards and militia allowed newcomers to enter the province only after quarantining them and disinfecting all their belongings. The newcomers’ clothes, merchandise, and household items were disinfected by sprinkling with alcohol or vinegar, or aired with smoke from burning cedar or herbal powders either out­doors or inside the quarantine houses for several days. All newcomers were re­quired to remain in quarantine, which accommodated them at hotels designated for this purpose or in hospitals for a period of three to six weeks. Travelers paid high fees for the quarantining services, a solid source of income for provincial governments or town councils. Merchants who frequently traveled from one province to another to sell salt, food, textiles, wood, or other commodities con­sidered quarantine stays, disinfection, and preservation of merchandise in rented warehouse space important expense items included in their accounting books.¹⁶

An effective protection from plague outbreaks required the maintenance of highly paid human resources difficult to find and retain in the Ukrainian bor­derland territories that offered numerous career opportunities and were expe­riencing vibrant economic migration. Local city and provincial governments often lacked the funding to maintain permanent militia units, large teams of quarantine medical professionals, and outpost guards. Hence, to save funds, they dispatched temporary militia regiments and hired medical professionals or quar­antine personnel only during the periods when outbreaks of the disease were believed to be more likely; i.e., from late spring to mid-fall. These limited re­sources offered protection from some outbreaks of plague, especially during the trade fairs or other merchant activities conducted in late summer and early fall. However, even these temporary protection measures were irregular and de­pended on the availability of sufficient funding included in the city and provin­cial budgets. In the late 1760s and early 1770s, these funds were spent on the support of militia and the army participating in the regulation of social turmoil in the Right-Bank Ukraine and the Russo-Ottoman war. During this period, Kyiv as well as other Ukrainian borderland towns and villages remained exposed to different newcomers, including those who skipped quarantining and brought a dangerous disease and devastation to the local population.

Social Turmoil and Lack of Border Security

In his traveler’s notes, Danylo Samoilovych, who crossed the two banks of Ukraine on his way to the empire’s capital, mentioned unregulated population movement and the overall destruction of towns and villages in Right-Bank Ukraine. The physician observed that local inhabitants left their homes in great panic to find a forest or other safer place to escape the plague. Some of the population did not have stable homes, while others considered their homes unsafe because their towns and villages remained ruined after the civil war that struck the area just a couple years earlier. Many towns and villages remained unprotected from pil­lagers, bandits, and soldiers who could spread the plague. In the towns that sur­vived the recent social cataclysms, the most revealing sign of the coming plague was the swift departure of the nobility and town councils. Their actions proved their helplessness and confirmed the perceived danger of the epidemics that shook the region in 1770.¹⁷

Just two years earlier, in 1768, the territories of Right-Bank Ukraine and the Russian Kyiv province were exposed to a political conflict and social unrest that destabilized the society of the region, disrupted its economy, and ruined quar­antine and defensive complexes that could prevent the outbreaks and protect the population from the plague. Russian interventions in the political life of the Commonwealth conducted since 1764 triggered a conflict between different social and religious groups in the region. Shortly after the Confederation of Bar initi­ated by local szlachta,¹⁸ the Cossack and peasant Koliivshchyna rebellion began.¹⁹ Both movements culminated in a civil war that resulted in the deportation of some Polish nobility from the region, the violent destruction of Jewish commu­nities, and the arrests and executions of large groups of the peasantry and Cos­sacks. The conflict was orchestrated in Warsaw and St Petersburg to increase Russian political influence in the region, and some tensions between the local nobility and peasants were expected; the civil war had quickly spiraled out of the control of the Russian or Polish authorities. The governments of both states were greatly alarmed and put maximum effort to quash both rebellions in 1768-69. While the Polish side relied on small private militia regiments owned by the szlachta and magnates, Russian imperial authorities dispatched a massive army, thus gaining a solid military advantage and centralized control over Right-Bank Ukraine and the Kyiv region.²⁰

Between 1768 and 1774, the Russian army as well as administrative and military officials were constantly present in the area due to the empire’s participation in the Russo-Ottoman war. Even though Ukrainian territories were not a zone of conflict directly involved in this war, the continuous presence of the Russian army turned them into an open space exposed to unregulated population movement.²¹ The major and minor roads in Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine were used by the Russian troops to access the main battlegrounds in the Ottoman Empire. Local nobles, Cossacks, and peasants frequently communicated with the Russian troops, and supplied them with forage, food, clothes, and other essentials. Taverns, guest houses, and churches often served as temporary shelters to quarter Russian sol­diers. While these activities revitalized small trade, the region failed to recover from the civil war and suffered from a severe economic decline.²²

Ukrainian towns and villages paid a heavy price for being centers of the social turmoil and hosting the Russian army. Uman, Bila Tserkva, Korsun, and numer­ous villages were left in ruins with no town councils and militia garrisons to pro­tect them. In the past, these towns had large quarantine facilities and hospitals, and hosted teams of medical professionals who could administer anti-plague pre­cautions. After 1768, however, the quarantines and hospitals were defunct, the medical professionals escaped the rebellions or were hired to assist the Russian soldiers, and militia service was discontinued.²³ City councils and other local gov­ernment authorities often fled their jurisdictions and there was no one to organize effective work of the quarantines. The townsmen or villagers who observed the beginning of the epidemics fled their homes in great panic, took some food and home essentials, and built ramparts in the fields where they lived in full isolation for several months. These hermits sent scouts to their former villages and towns to check whether the plague had subsided and returned to their homes or resettled in new places.²⁴ Many towns and villages remained unattended, witnessed bandit attacks, and were exposed to travelers unintentionally spreading the plague. Kyiv chancellery as well as small courts and commissions functioning to resolve dis­putes between Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine's populations were overloaded with banditry, invasions, and pillage cases in the early 1770s. These border courts and commissions were assigned by the Russian and Polish governments as temporary institutions investigating border-related crime and conflicts.²⁵

There was no clearly defined and fortified border between the two banks of Ukraine due to a prolonged political dispute between the Russian Empire and the Commonwealth regarding this issue. The two states planned to demarcate and close the border in 1765-68, but social unrest and the beginning of the Russo- Ottoman war in 1768 interrupted these plans. According to earlier diplomatic agreements, the border was based on the Kyiv line of outposts located in Right­Bank Ukraine following the Dnipro river and marking the triangle of the Irpin and Stuhna rivers.²⁶ The town of Vasylkiv hosted the major outpost and the largest temporary quarantine facility located on the line.²⁷ The five-mile zone surrounding the outpost line was supposed to be depopulated, a policy that both states were unable to execute due to increased colonization that took place in Right-Bank Ukraine in the mid-i76os. Numerous Russian officials who travelled to the region emphasized the need to demarcate and strengthen the border in order to secure the protection of Kyiv and solve many Russo-Ottoman-Polish borderland disputes. They also argued that well-developed fortifications and other defensive units constructed on the border could allow the empire to use the border infrastructure to temporarily quarter the army and officials engaged in diplomatic negotiations or the Russo-Ottoman war.²⁸

Theoretically, the outpost line was supposed to be regularly maintained and updated by the Cossack Hetmanate and the empire. However, administrative au­thorities in Left-Bank Ukraine struggled to find sufficient funding and human resources to guarantee uninterrupted work on the outposts. A few small garrisons of land militia quartered in huts or old fortresses were located in remote places, too far to effectively monitor the major roads and entrances to Kyiv.²⁹ Mounted troops which were supposed to guard the line were divided into very small de­tachments and sometimes forgotten or neglected. Peasants and permanent settlers in the area were expected to provide provision and forage for these detachments without any compensation or payment, which motivated them to avoid this im­portant task. The outpost regiments were not able to compete with peasant and Cossack rebels, as well as with large groups of illegal migrants who could easily quash them while crossing the line.³⁰

In the late 1760s, it was evident to the Russian imperial authorities that the border vaguely defined by the Kyiv outpost line did not have enough capacity to stop unsanctioned population movement and lacked the manpower to guard en­trances to the province. However, there was little to no attention to protection from the plague as an important motive to close the border on the Kyiv line and add quarantines to the border security system in the diaries and reports of Russian officials from this period. Sporadic source evidence about customs and quaran­tines on the Kyiv line confirms their temporary character and ineffectiveness.²¹ Due to the porous nature of the Kyiv outpost line, merchants and other travelers possibly infected with the plague could easily bypass Vasylkiv. Other supplemen­tary quarantine facilities were designed as temporary institutions constructed for short periods of time and dismantled when the fear of the plague in the border­land subsided. The Kyiv line consisted of only three or fewer quarantine surgeons who did not have much experience in treating plague patients.³² Soldiers and out­post guards examined travelers who entered the outposts but lacked sufficient knowledge to identify individuals infected with the plague. Understaffed outposts teams did not have the capacity to dispatch militia or soldiers to monitor neigh­boring territories, receive news about the outbreaks of the disease happening nearby in time, and close all entries to the province or stop the population move­ment.³³ In the spring and summer of 1770, the plague broke out in the towns and villages of the Polish Kyiv palatinate. By that time, the pestilence crossed the Kyiv line and entered Kyiv, which, while located on the Right Bank, was the major city of the Left-Bank Hetmanate.

The Outbreak of Plague in Kyiv: 1770-71

In August 1770, sporadic deaths from the plague were documented in Kozelets, Bila Tserkva, Boryspil, Brovary, and Pereiaslav. Even though by that time both the Russian Senate and the Kyiv governor-general's chancellery ordered an increase in security at the outposts, it was difficult to implement this order in Left-Bank Ukraine in the late summer when seasonal trade fairs in Kyiv were opened and the Russo-Ottoman war continued. There were no physicians in the nearby towns and villages who had experience organizing quarantining procedures in the past. A quarantine physician who worked in Vasylkiv was not in the town assisting a large number of Russian soldiers who participated in the war.³⁴

In August 1770, several persons perished from the plague in Vasylkiv. At ap­proximately the same time, in late August, the plague claimed its first documented victims in Kyiv, a Polish merchant and his family. The neighbors of the merchant family who communicated with them and exchanged goods also soon perished. Unfortunately, at first, the city government did not pay attention to this tragic incident and turned a deaf ear to the voices of alarmed neighbors of the family. The police did not investigate the reason for these suspicious deaths, and the local merchant community continued their regular trade operations without any fear or understanding of the danger stemming from this activity.

If the government and the police had paid more attention to suspicious deaths in the merchant community, the city and its environs could have been able to avoid the plague. Unlike St Petersburg, Cracow, or Warsaw, Kyiv lacked an archi­tectural and topographic unity and was effectively divided into several parts that were easy to isolate from one another. While the locals did not like this feature, it could have been a blessing for a medical team organizing anti-plague precau­tions in the city. Up until the early nineteenth century, the city's three major dis­tricts, the Old City, Podil, and Pechersk, were surrounded by high hills and meadows that could have been an ideal barrier dividing and isolating healthy individuals from the sick.³⁵ Travelers to Kyiv highlighted this unique feature of the city and even viewed the districts as three separate towns. For instance, the author of a diary describing the visit of Empress Elizabeth to Kyiv in 1744 stated that she visited “all three of the towns” and stayed in “one of them called Pech­ersk.”³⁶ Sparsely scattered buildings and the lack of substantial population move­ment among the districts could stop the spread of the disease and allow the authorities to close all city walls in a timely manner. Unfortunately, this oppor­tunity was lost due to lack of timely government intervention and anti-plague precautions in the late summer of 1770.

Unlike the architectural planning, the materials used in the construction of Kyiv's homes and sanitary conditions in the city might have contributed to the swift spread of the plague. Even the houses of the wealthiest residents of Podil were constructed of wood, which was easily infested with rodents spreading bac­teria and plague-infected insects. Many people experienced difficulty maintaining good hygiene due to limited access to clean water. Podil was situated in a lower lying area that was very close to the Dnipro River, and part of it was often flooded, leaving the area humid and dirty. There was no regular garbage collection and disposal in Kyiv. Even though the municipal council had employees responsible for these services, the lack of supervision and regular funding for these workers did not allow them to fulfill their duties properly. Up until the early nineteenth century, Kyiv experienced problems with street cleaning and sanitation in public areas.³⁷ The quality of the roads in Kyiv was also a problem often mentioned in travelers' accounts and other sources. Indeed, heavy rains often made roads in both Kyiv's suburbs and the city center unusable and caused merchant carriages to be stuck in deep mud.³⁸ Experienced merchants who knew about this problem strived to pass Vasylkiv and other outposts and quarantines before the fall season by secretly negotiating with outpost guards and physicians and offering incentives for shorter inspections. When heavy rains began in September and early October, they would struggle with getting merchandise delivered to Podil or suffer losses due to carriage damage. Despite constant active foreign and domestic migration to Kyiv, the city had no population growth and very high mortality rates triggered by unsatisfactory sanitary conditions and the circulation of numerous diseases, including bubonic plague.³⁹

Podil was the first district where the outbreak of the plague began. As a major business center in Kyiv, Podil traditionally attracted large groups of diverse traders, sellers, and buyers from Crimea, Europe, and the Ottoman and Russian empires. This part of the city hosted large trade fairs and headquartered many businesses. In the late 1760s and early 1770s, Kyiv had about fifteen to twenty thou­sand inhabitants, most of whom resided in Podil.⁴⁰ Large trade fairs usually took place three times a year and lasted for about fifteen days. However, in Podil, the commerce and the flow of diverse populations never ceased. The vibrant mer­chant community in Podil conducted trade and rented storehouses and private residences from the municipal council, in this way supporting the local economy. The municipal council benefited from the commerce and other merchant activ­ities via the collection of high fees granting permissions to trade in this busy and well-known part of the city. The peasant and poor population of Kyiv also wel­comed merchants who often recruited them as highly paid assistants. Kyiv mu­nicipal authorities worked hard to ease the bureaucratic burden imposed on new merchants wishing to conduct their business operations in Kyiv. Sometimes, these efforts were not fruitful and corruption or negligence occurred. While registration in the city books was required for merchants who rented commercial space and residential houses in Podil, some of them are unknown to historians because their origin and merchandise remained undocumented. Not surprisingly, it was a chal­lenging task to identify specific people and commodities infected with the plague or other diseases brought to the city in 1770.⁴¹

Time is money, and long bureaucratic quarantining and registration proce­dures led to higher fees, rent payments and taxes for merchants eager to swiftly sell furs, textiles or food items at Podil’s markets. Hence, some merchants offered fees or gifts to Vasylkiv guards and medical personnel to “persuade” them that they arrived from safe places without the plague and could skip quarantining. Some merchants presented falsified documents claiming previous quarantining or Catherine’s II permission allowing expedited entrance into the city. Earlier investigations of such cases initiated by Kyiv general governors revealed that many police officers, doctors and quarantine administrators in Vasylkiv partici­pated in bribery and corruption.⁴²

Meanwhile, the deaths in Kyiv continued into the early fall of 1770. Several dozen townsfolk perished in a short period of time, but authorities who investi­gated the reasons for these deaths found no buboes on the bodies of the deceased. Some barbers and pharmacists from this investigative team admitted that they did not know the reasons for the deaths. Others suggested that the deceased suf­fered from a severe case of influenza. Their reports to the municipal council and the governor-general confirmed the unusual character and potential danger of an unidentified disease but did not call for swift isolationist measures.⁴³ This con­fusion led to a delay in anti-plague precautions and became the major cause of the spread of the pestilence in all districts of Kyiv. In late September 1770, the population from all districts of the city participated in trade fairs in Podil, where the plague had already begun.⁴⁴

The Senate and the Medical Collegium assigned doctors Sila Mitrofanov, a quarantine physician, and Johann Lerche, one of the leading specialists on plague in the empire, to fight the epidemic.⁴⁵ Both physicians arrived in Kyiv in Septem­ber-October 1770. While it was already impossible to stop the epidemic, their major task was to decrease the number of plague victims and to stop the pestilence

Table 5.1 Expenditures of the Kyiv Chancellery on the construction of quarantine facilities, outpost, and custom complexes, 1771-72*

*The table is based on the data collected from rgada, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1605, l. 179.

from moving eastward.⁴⁶ According to Lerche's evaluations, by mid-September, six thousand people had died from the plague in Podil alone. The failure to isolate Kyiv in a timely manner led to the spread of the plague by Russian soldiers, students of the Kyiv Academy, and merchants who fled the city in a great panic. The police estimated that about 1,000 residents were able to leave the city before all roads to and from Kyiv were closed.⁴⁷ In the fall of 1770, the plague reached Kozelets, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, and the villages surrounding them.⁴⁸

After the decline of the epidemic in the winter of 1771, Kyiv authorities decided that the pestilence was over. In May 1771, access to Kyiv and all major roads en­tering the city were reopened. However, as Dr Lerche predicted, in June 1771, the plague reoccurred in Kyiv and other borderland towns due to the illegal trade of the household items appropriated by garrison soldiers from infected houses. The pestilence started in the village of Pyrohiv and in Pechersk, the places where this trade frequently took place.⁴⁹ In addition, the soldiers failed to prevent the Kyiv poor from settling in the abandoned houses of plague victims or runaways, thus contributing to a further spread of the disease. The situation spiraled out of the control of the Kyiv government and the police were not able to guard or burn in­fected houses to prevent this practice.⁵⁰ Lerche's reports accused the Kyiv garrison commandants of the lack of subordination to him and the governor-general and sabotaging anti-plague measures in the city.

The two major institutions of government in Kyiv, the governor-general and the municipal council, lacked coordination to organize effective anti-plague mea­sures. The city legislature, police, and a part of medical services were subordinated to the municipal council that was also the major city government institution rec­ognized by the merchant community in Podil.⁵¹ The governor-general was a per­son designated by the Russian empress and representing the empire in the province and was required to control the city garrison and the outpost guards in Vasylkiv. In 1770, the Kyiv governor-general experienced conflicts with the mu­nicipal council. The centuries-old institution and the empire's representatives competed for the right to collect taxes and the distribution of funds in the city. Their relations lacked trust, and initiatives offered by an opposite party were often rejected as unnecessary or too expensive.⁵² In addition, there were multiple prob­lems not addressed by either of these two parties. Such initiatives as a renovation of old fortification structures and roads, and the construction and maintenance of quarantines, hospitals, and shelters were possible only when sufficient funding was allocated. However, the governor-general and the municipal council's mem­bers refused to take the initiative. As might be expected, both parties governing the city were unprepared for the great challenges brought by the plague. The plague outbreaks of 1770-71 were the turning point for this conflicting duumvi­rate. Soon it became a subject of thorough investigation and imperial adminis­trative reforms in the province.

Russian Reforms in Quarantining and Border Security

In the winter of 1771, imperial officials began to actively intervene in anti-plague measures in Kyiv and investigate ineffectual border security in the province. In addition to Drs Lerche and Mitrofanov, Catherine II dispatched her assistant, Major of the Life Guards Mikhail Shipov, to help Fedor Voeikov in reforming the border infrastructure and the quarantine system on the Kyiv line.⁵³ Shipov's first reports to the Medical and Military Collegiums in St Petersburg called for a re­consideration of abandoned construction projects designed to enhance old and building new quarantine facilities on the line. The project began in 1771 and lasted until the early 1780s. Originally, this construction project was first introduced in the mid-i76os. However, due to the lack of funding, the beginning of the Russo- Ottoman war of 1768-74, and non-recognition of the bubonic plague as a se­rious problem challenging the security of the empire's borders, this plan was discontinued. There was no progress on the project after 1766. The reports and complaints of medical professionals, Fedor Voeikov, Petr Rumiantsev and other officials from Left-Bank Ukraine contributed to the decision to relaunch it in the early 1770s.⁵⁴

The project originated in May 1764 when the Senate and the Medical Collegium issued instructions to the governor-generals of the Kyiv and New Russia provinces to create and collect plans of existing quarantine houses, suggest locations for new ones, and provide budget estimates. A preliminary investigation demon­strated that besides the quarantine facilities in Vasylkiv and Kremenchuk, there were no permanent quarantine houses on the Kyiv line of outposts. The plans for future quarantine facilities and information about their desired locations re­quired by the Senate were prepared and sent to St Petersburg in 1770-71, shortly before the plague outbreaks in the Kyiv province occurred. In January 1771, the Senate considered some of these plans. However, the construction of new quar­antine houses only began in 1772.⁵⁵

Substantial funding allocated for the construction of quarantine facilities, out­post and custom complexes in the early 1770s confirmed the great interest of the empire in the project. The investigative commission chaired by Shipov as well as the chancellery of the Kyiv governor-general were generously funded by the Med­ical Collegium and the Senate to support the project. In addition to this funding, Kyiv Governor-General Voeikov and Mikhail Shipov received high personal salaries of five hundred rubles each. Such funding was offered to the highest paid officials of this rank in the Russian Empire. The large expenditures of the Kyiv chancellery excluding the salaries of the project leaders are summarized in table 5.1.

The Senate, Medical, and Military Collegiums in St Petersburg required Shipov and Voeikov to supervise the construction of new quarantine facilities and the advancement of the existing complex in Vasylkiv with new buildings, hospitals, and warehouses. According to Shipov's inspection submitted to the Senate before the project began, Vasylkiv was the strongest quarantine and outpost complex on the Kyiv line. Nonetheless, the outbreaks of the plague in Kyiv proved that quar­antining and border security in Vasylkiv were ineffective. One of the problems experienced by the complex was the inability to accommodate an ever-growing flow of travelers and merchants in the small number of buildings belonging to it. To solve this problem, quarantine officers used the yard and the buildings of the Mezhyhiria monastery to quarter travelers and to conduct some of the quar­antining procedures. As the monastery was close to the city and did not have the capacity to fully isolate visitors, they were able to exit it and communicate freely with city residents eager to sell them food and other items improving their stays. Voeikov and Shipov were right to request an extension of the Vasylkiv complex so that it became the only institution to control visitor stays, the sale of food and other items, as well as the collection of high fees for the services. Similar to Va- sylkiv, the quarantine complex in Kremenchuk was extended and additional smaller quarantine facilities were built. Overall, the Kyiv line of outposts included large quarantine facilities in Vasylkiv, Kremenchuk, and Pereiaslav as well as smaller quarantine houses in Sorokoshychi, Dobrianka, and Perevolochna.⁵⁶

A leading role in the quarantine construction project, generous funding, and recommendations of the imperial representatives in Kyiv strengthened the power of the governor-general of Kyiv. He became the major imperial representative leading the official demarcation of the border with the Commonwealth and over­seeing reforms in border security and public health in Kyiv and the province.⁵⁷ The governor-general and his assistants became the major officials who received and reviewed all financial documentation of the complexes. From the early 1770s, they were also responsible for managing all operations of the border complexes, recruitment and retention of employees, and the collection of all merchant and visitor taxes and fees. Some of these funds supplied the city and provincial bud­get, but the major part was directed to the imperial treasury. While operational expenses of the complexes were covered mostly by the Kyiv government, the em­pire took responsibility for continuous wages as well as food and forage supply in case of economic turmoil, crop failure, or famine to guarantee their uninter­rupted work.⁵⁸

The empire strived to build diverse teams of outpost and quarantine employees consisting of local peasantry and Cossacks, as well as workers transferred from other provinces. Their jobs were considered highly paid and prestigious and could be compared to the status of officers in the imperial army. To supply the quar­antine complexes with highly-qualified full-time medical personnel, the Medical Collegium and the Senate issued the decrees of 1771-72 which opened new va­cancies, regulated salaries, and offered subsidized housing for quarantine physi­cians, nurses, and pharmacists. An additional two thousand rubles were allocated by the Medical and Military Collegiums to build this housing in close proximity to the Kyiv line.⁵⁹ To uncover any illegal activities among customs and quarantine personnel and increase their loyalty to the empire, the imperial government en­couraged the personnel to report any abuses of power or any suspicious activities of their colleagues. Informants received up to 50 per cent of uncovered bribes if any corruption was confirmed. All personnel were required to openly demon­strate loyalty to the empire and swear an oath of allegiance to Catherine II.⁶⁰

Another reform contributing to the transformation of the quarantine and out­post complexes into provincial institutions belonging to the empire was a merger of these complexes with existing customs units. Several years before the social turmoil and economic decline of 1768, the empire abolished the practice of leas­ing the customs to merchant representatives and transferred them to state own- ership.⁶¹ Combined with the quarantines, customs operating on the Kyiv line were a solid source of revenues for the empire and the provincial government. There is no data for 1771-72, but in 1766 the custom house in Vasylkiv collected 40,000 rubles from imported merchandise only.⁶² In total, Vasylkiv and all other custom houses on the Kyiv line collected over 305,000 rubles annually in 1764­65. Back in the mid-i76os, this amount was equal to 35 to 40 per cent of all cus­toms revenues collected by the empire excluding the port customs in St Petersburg.⁶³ Thus, the imperial officials expected that the new permanent quar­antine, outpost, and custom complexes built on the Kyiv line would not only protect the province but provide substantial revenues that quickly compensated an initial investment of 8,172.83 rubles and reimbursed other expenses made in 1771-72.⁶⁴ On the one hand, these changes greatly improved the customs and quarantine services and procedures, and increased the safety and profitability of the complexes. On the other hand, the Kyiv province and the city of Kyiv lost control of the revenues generated by customs and quarantines. As noted earlier, they received only a small part of these revenues. Even Kyiv governor-generals, who were the major representatives of the empire, eager to secure more cash for the province, were not able to change the distribution of funds without the sub­mission of numerous requests and justifications to the Senate in St Petersburg.

Advanced quarantine and customs complexes operating on the Kyiv line not only became a rich source of cash filling the empire's coffers. They contributed to the development of the Kyiv province by changing the geographic, social, and economic landscapes of the region. While their construction erased numerous gaps in the defensive fortifications and facilitated the demarcation of borders, Kyiv and smaller towns and villages surrounding them experienced an economic revival and the influx of new population. The population benefited from new jobs and the high demand for temporary housing and participated in economic activities supplying food, forage, and other essentials needed for an increased in­flow of visitors using the complexes.

In the mid-i77os, foreign and domestic visitors considered Vasylkiv the major entrance to the empire located on its western border. Following their entrance to the border outposts, travelers were required to document all their personal items and merchandise. These items were kept separately from visitors, and doc­uments submitted by the owners served as inventories to redeem them upon completion of the sanitation process.⁶⁵ Because merchants and travelers were not allowed to have any contact with their merchandise and baggage after entering quarantine buildings, special employees were charged with the guarding and dis­infection of these items.⁶⁶ Quarantine workers prevented any access of the local population to the merchandise and baggage, especially if it contained textiles, clothes, or fur. The clothes of all guests were disinfected in the quarantine facil­ity's airing rooms. Money, papers, or mail of quarantine customers were taken from them for disinfection through a sprinkling with vinegar. Even though all buildings were usually located close to each other, the sick, suspicious, and healthy travelers were carefully separated.⁶⁷ The supervisors of hospitals and residences swore an oath to follow this rule. Quarantine employees regularly observed the health status of quarantined travelers and recorded it in their books. Quarantine employees daily aired the hospitals and residences. While they used incense to air the residences of the richest travelers and cedar smoke for middle class hous­ing, wood resin served to air the quarters of poor travelers. Both the hospitals and residential quarters provided a full supply of food, clothes, and other house­hold items.⁶⁸

Based on the example of the Moscow and St Petersburg quarantine facilities, quarantine houses and hospitals on the Kyiv line imposed a monopoly on the sales of food and forage on their premises. The fees and prices for these services were regulated by the empire and did not always follow local standards. The Senate forbade changing customs and quarantine fees in the Kyiv province even when visitors complained that they were too high. The Senate decree allowed the poor or foreign travelers to borrow money, food, and forage from the provincial bud­gets to cover the expenses of their quarantine stays. However, servants, soldiers, and clergy were required to request funding from their supervisors or the church.⁶⁹ No one was allowed to leave quarantine buildings without a certificate of safety and good health. After quarantining, medical exams and disinfection, travelers received special passports that served as official permission to enter all provinces of the empire. All passports were signed by the Kyiv governor-general or his assistants, and the names of their owners were listed in the chancellery doc­umentation. These new regulations allowed for information gathering and en­abled the imperial authorities to trace who, when, and why entered the Kyiv province. The provincial reforms that continued in the late 1770s and the early 1780s redefined the administrative status of Left-Bank Ukraine in the empire and institutionalized the medical services existing in the region in accordance with the imperial standards established in St Petersburg.

Administrative and Medical Reforms

The construction of large customs and quarantine complexes, the closure of the border with the Commonwealth, the accumulation of substantial monetary and human resources, and increased control over government actions in Kyiv allowed Catherine II to integrate the province into the empire based on general provincial reforms conducted in 1775.⁷⁰ The administrative reform and the creation of the Kyiv vicegerency (namisnytstvo) in Left-Bank Ukraine was finalized in 1781. Be­ginning in 1771, it took the empire's governors of the province about a decade to prepare for the reform. This preparation began from the creation and closure of a border equipped with strong outposts, quarantine, and custom complexes. It continued with the introduction of public hospitals and other medical institu­tions subordinated to the Medical Collegium in St Petersburg. Catherine’s II in­structions given to such Left- and Right-Bank Ukrainian provincial leaders as Petr Rumiantsev or Mikhail Krechetnikov demonstrated an attention to gradual changes and preoccupation with the attitude to the empire among the local pop­ulation. In one of her secret instructions toward the provincial governors, the empress required officials to avoid introducing any drastic changes that could provoke discontent or ambiguous reactions from the nobility, soldiers, mer­chants, and peasantry. Military actions, coercion, or conflicts were considered strategies to avoid. The instructions also suggested the governors maintain old institutions and traditions but make gradual changes that would adjust them to the imperial standards. It became a common practice for the governors to call provincial assemblies and seek the opinion of the provincial nobility and their subjects about certain problems in the province to secure their support. The gov­ernors were also instructed to improve the medical services available to the pop­ulation as well as demonstrate to them the progressive and innovative character of the new imperial institutions.⁷¹

The Kyiv vicegerency system increased the power of imperial representatives (vicegerents) appointed by St Petersburg and confirmed Kyiv as the capital and the center of the new province.⁷² The system abolished the traditional for Left­Bank Ukraine old regiment (polk) system and introduced a standard for the empire division into eleven counties (uezdy). The territory of Left-Bank Ukraine included Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi vicegerencies and formed the Little Russian general-governorate (general-gubernatorstvo) headed by Petr Rumiant­sev.⁷³ The vicegerency had a complex network of administrators assigned by the empress and approved by Rumiantsev, and by Krechetnikov who temporary re­placed the former in the early 1790s. These government officials were required to report all outbreaks of the plague and other contagious diseases and report about the quarantining and other measures they administered to protect the population. They were also required to demarcate all town and village borders and send de­tailed descriptions, atlases, and maps to the Senate, Medical, and Military Col­legiums for final approval.⁷⁴ In 1783, the chancellery of the Kyiv vicegerency initiated a review of all government institutions and town councils in the vicegerency. All local officers and administrators received an order to prepare for the review and demonstrate the effectiveness of their work.⁷⁵

Among other changes, the vicegerency system increased the centralization of medical institutions by subordinating them to the provincial government chan­celleries. This system made provincial governments responsible for a number of medical needs in the provinces, including the distribution of medical offices, requests for additional medical professionals from the Medical Collegium in St Petersburg, and the provision of guidance for medical teams during plague out­breaks. Regional medical councils introduced in the mid- and late-i/8os partially released the provincial governments from the supervision of all medical profes­sionals in the provinces and increased the standardization of medical services. The councils were subordinated to the Little Russian Medical Board, the institu­tion that represented the Medical Collegium in Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine. These innovations greatly centralized the public health system in the Ukrainian territories and allowed the medical institutions of the empire to regulate this sys­tem. Private medical practitioners, pharmacies, and hospitals sponsored by the landlords or town councils became subject to audit and certification. While before the reforms of the 1780s these medical professionals and facilities were funded from private sources or patrons and fully depended on their support, the empire turned them into semi-autonomous government institutions receiving contin­uous financial support. Medical professionals who worked without much super­vision in towns and villages in Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine were required to send quarterly progress reports to the Medical Board. After the reforms, the work and experience requirements for these medical professionals were standardized, so they could have better career prospects in the empire and abroad.⁷⁶

The reforms in public health and the introduction of medical councils ad­vanced public health services received by the local population. Prior experience with the anti-plague precautions in Kyiv in 1770-71 proved the importance of un­interrupted quarantine services and cooperation between medical and govern­ment institutions to increase plague awareness and organize prompt preventive measures. Thus, medical reforms in the provinces forbade physicians or related professionals to travel long distances and assist soldiers in remote garrisons or serve patients who were not included in their districts. During outbreaks of plague or other contagious diseases, local physicians continued serving their patients without interruption and were required to participate in anti-plague measures. The Medical Collegium assigned additional medical professionals to attend to patients in border quarantine facilities, so there was no need for local physicians to interrupt their work.⁷⁷

The creation of centralized medical services and the joint work of medical in­stitutions with the provincial governors greatly reduced difficulties in the orga­nization of anti-plague measures during plague outbreaks in 1795-1800. All neighboring provinces were swiftly informed about the epidemic, the population movement was halted, and the provincial governors received numerous resources to fight the plague outbreaks much more effectively than had happened in Kyiv in 1771. The cooperation between provincial authorities, the control of the border and quarantines by these authorities, and the presence of highly qualified medical personnel allowed the reduction of plague-related mortality among the popula­tion and stopped the spread of the disease to other provinces. For instance, this cooperation took place during a plague outbreak in Podilia, when the governor of Kamianets-Podilskyi A. Bekleshov requested additional soldiers and quaran­tine personnel to assist with a border closure. The governors of other provinces swiftly sent the soldiers to Podilia as well as helped Bekleshov to swiftly recruit additional quarantine personnel.⁷⁸

Imperial reforms provoked by the epidemics of plague greatly increased the role of provincial medical institutions in promoting awareness about the disease and advocacy for the contagion theory. Good hygiene and cleanliness became subjects frequently discussed in popular newsletters and during church services or other gatherings. The new provincial government strived to promote the ed­ucation of the population and organize public campaigns that discouraged the consumption of contaminated water and unprocessed food. The campaigns were oriented against malnutrition and poverty, which were believed to contribute to the spread of plague and other diseases. The influence of town or village physi­cians on the local population greatly increased by the end of the century. With the support of government institutions, medical professionals were finally able to compete with quacks and conjurers whose services were still popular among the peasantry.⁷⁹ Using medical teams to reach the local population, the imperial government supplied grain, food, or other essentials in case of a crop failure, famine, or outbreaks of epidemic diseases.⁸⁰

The responsibilities of the Medical Board went beyond the regulation of the work of regional medical institutions. The board empowered its members to strategically collect diverse information about the local population. For instance, it produced annual reports about the climate and weather conditions as well as described the most common seasonal medical problems experienced by the peas­antry and discussed methods to solve these problems. These reports were ad­dressed to higher imperial medical authorities and sometimes exaggerated the effectiveness of the Medical Board and the local physicians. They nonetheless of­fered useful insights about the lives of the population and confirmed the increased attention of the imperial authorities to their subjects. Connecting the province to the empire, the reports called for government actions and funding to support local inhabitants. The Medical Board proposed that physicians assist the poor in struggling with human or cattle diseases via cooperation with local priests. Col­laboration with the church became an important tool in fighting peasant super­stitions and ignorance and solidified the partnership between church authorities and the empire. The reports often concluded on an optimistic note and praised the empire for implementing progressive laws that made cooperation between provincial governments, physicians, priests, and police possible and productive.⁸¹ Even if exaggerated, the results of the work of numerous medical professionals in the Ukrainian territories contributed to the integration of the provincial pop­ulation into the empire in the late eighteenth century.

Conclusion

While the outbreaks of the bubonic plague that began in Right-Bank Ukraine in 1770 continued for several months before the disease reached Kyiv, the city met the challenge totally unprepared and suffered tremendous human losses. The Russian imperial authorities suppressing the noble-peasant rebellions in Right­Bank Ukraine were fully aware of the destruction of roads, defensive fortifications, and quarantines in the region. Still, the empire failed to stop the plague and reduce the number of its victims in Kyiv and Left-Bank Ukraine. This unpreparedness was partially linked to the empire's participation in the Russo-Ottoman war that consumed significant human and financial resources as well as the inability to close the border between the two banks of Ukraine due to a lack of effective in­frastructure and unregulated population movement. In the late 1760s, the creation of a strong system of quarantines and border security on the Kyiv outpost line was not the top priority for either the local administration or the imperial au­thorities in St Petersburg. However, the outbreak of plague in Kyiv and the spread of the disease in major towns in Left-Bank Ukraine in 1770-71 alarmed the empire and prompted consideration about the need to change this approach, secure the border defense complexes, and organize more effective measures to prevent new outbreaks. The reports of the governor-general, the alarming complaints of physi­cians fighting the plague in Kyiv, and observations by imperial officials investi­gating the quarantines called for immediate action and reforms. As a result, the construction of large quarantine and custom complexes merged with customs was initiated in 1772. Highly profitable, the complexes not only strengthened the border but also generated substantial revenues collected by the empire.

This construction project contributed to the imperial reforms in Left-Bank Ukraine that continued for about a decade and culminated in the creation of the Kyiv vicegerency in 1781. Cities, towns, and villages in this new administrative unit appeared on maps and experienced a new life as places with well demarcated borders and active anti-plague precautions conducted by large teams of new governors and physicians. Most of them were assigned personally by the empress and carefully monitored by the Military and Medical Collegiums in St Petersburg. These reforms allowed for swift and centralized government action during the outbreaks of the plague and facilitated the administrative and economic inte­gration of Ukrainian territories into the empire in 1781-93. A highly centralized medical system, the swift reporting of emergencies, and effective support by the neighboring provinces made the outbreaks of the plague much less severe and more preventable. Medical and administrative institutions created in the Ukrainian provinces after the partitions of Poland followed the standards intro­duced in the Kyiv vicegerency and were often administered by the same imperial authorities entrusted by Catherine II. Thus, the provincial reforms introduced in Left-Bank Ukraine and replicated in other Ukrainian territories later in the century became a powerful instrument helping the empire integrate new terri­tories and people into its orbit.

NOTES

1 The work and life of Danylo Samoilovych [or Danila Samoilovich in some sources] has not attracted much scholarly attention. For more information about this physician of Ukrainian origin, see Danilo Samoilovich, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, (Moscow, 1952) and Mykola Borodii, Danylo Samoilovych (Kyiv, 1987).

2 Samoilovych praised the population of Right-Bank Ukraine for their hospi­tality and willingness to assist numerous foreign travelers. Ironically, these values exposed them to the dangers of unwanted gifts of contagious diseases brought by these guests. In many cases, the plague was transmitted to local inhabitants by soldiers, merchants, or other travelers whom they hosted in their homes.

3 For a discussion of this topic in the broader context of European and Mediterranean histories, see James D. Tracy, ed., The Rise of Merchant Em­pires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750 (Cambridge, 1990); Mark Harrison, Contagion: How Commerce Has Spread Disease (New Haven and London, 2012); and Nukhet Varlik, ed., Plague and Contagion in the Islamic Mediterranean: New Histories of Disease in Ottoman Society (Arc Humanities, 2017). The role of epidemics of plague in the making of Russo- Ottoman borders is explored in Andrew Robarts, Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman-Russian Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (London, 2017).

4 Olena Zamura, “Velykyi Shalenets”’: Smert’ i smertnist’ vHet'manshchyni XVIIIst. (Kyiv, 2014), 64-71; Jaroslaw Burchardt and Dorota Burchardt, “Morowe powiertrze - krotki szkic do historii zarazy na ziemiach polskich w pierwszej polowie XVIII wieku,” Nowiny Lekarskie 77, no. 4 (2008): 334-8.

5 Bubonic plague was also mentioned as morowe powietrze in Polish and Ukrainian sources and literature.

6 Mykola Borodii, Danylo Samoilovych (Kyiv, 1987), 23-4; M.K. Borodii, “Do istorii borot'by z chumoiu na Ukraini,” Ukratns 'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 5 (1984): 82-90.

7 Fr. Giedroyc, “Obrona od zarazy morowej w Polsce (profilaktyka moru) w wiekach ubieglych,” Krytyka Lekarska, 2 (1899), rok III; Burchardt and Burchardt, “Morowe powiertrze.”

8 Burchardt and Burchardt, “Morowe powiertrze.”

9 For Samoilovych's exposition of this theory, see his Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 13; Numerous examples of the usage of the two methods in anti-plague pre­cautions by the Russian imperial government may be found in: Afanasii Sha- fonskii, Opisanie morovoi iazvy, byvshei v stolichnom gorode Moskve s 1770 po 1772 god s prilozheniem vsekh dlia prekrashcheniia onoi togda ustanovlennykh uchrezhdenii (St Petersburg, 1787).

10 Giedroyc, “Obrona od zarazy morowej,” rok III.

11 M.K. Borodii, “Do istorii borot'by z chumoiu na Ukraini,” Ukratns ’kyi isto­rychnyi zhurnal 5 (1984): 82-90.

12 V. Otamanovs'kyi, “Do istorii medytsyny ta aptechnoi spravy u Vinnytsi i Vinnytskomu poviti druhoi polovyny XVIII st.,” Zbirnyk pam’iati akademika Teofila Havrylovycha Ianovs ’koho (Kyiv, 1930), 323-4.

13 Otamanovs'kyi, “Do istorii medytsyny ta aptechnoi spravy,” 323.

14 Giedroyc, “Obrona od zarazy morowej,” rok III; Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents; here­inafter - rgada), f. 248, op. 113, d. 505 (Ob opasnoi bolezni i karantinakh 1765-1766 g.), 1-34.

15 Ia. Sh. [Iakov Shulgin], “Ubiistvo upyria v Kievshchine vo vremia chumy 1770 goda,” Kievskaia starina, no. 2 (1890): 338-41. This case was considered in Kodnia court in 1770-71. The author of this short article providing the court record (p. 341) argues that the decision of the Polish szlachta jurors was also motivated by their anti-Orthodox bias and a lack of interest in executing

the peasants for the murder of an Orthodox priest.

16 John T. Alexander, Bubonic Plague in Early Modern Russia: Public Health and Urban Disaster (Baltimore and London, 1980), 29-35; M. Tyshchenko, “Forposty, mytnytsi ta karantyny na zakhidnomu pohranychchi u zv'iazku z zovnishnioiu torhivleiu Ukrainy v XVIII st.,” in Mykola Tyshchenko, Narysy z istorii zovnishnioi torhivli Ukrainy v XVIII st. (Bila Tserkva, 2010), 5-76.

17 “Litopys monastyria Vasyl'ian: rik 1770,” Dilo 43, no. 11 (1890).

18 More information about the Confederation of Bar may be found in the following studies: Wladyslaw Konopczynski, Kazimierz Pulaski: zyciorys (Cracow, 1931); Also, see his Konfederacya Barska: korespondencya miedzy Stanislawem Augustem a Ksawerym Branickim, lowczym koronnym, w roku 1768 (Cracow, 1872); S.F. Ivanitskii, “Znachenie barskoi konfederatsii v istorii krestianskogo vosstaniia na Ukraine 1768 g.,” Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta, no. 19 (Leningrad, 1939): 211-53.

19 For a review of the literature about the uprising, see Zenon Kohut, “Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent Historiography,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 1, no. 3 (1977): 359-78. Religious motives for the uprising are discussed in Barbara Skinner, “Border­lands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy,” Slavic Review 64, no. 1 (2005): 88-116.

20 Ivanitskii, “Znachenie barskoi konfederatsii,” 245.

21 Samoilovich, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 34-5.

22 K. I. T-ii, “Kratkii ocherk istorii goroda Umani,” Kievskaia starina, no. 8 (1888): 381-94.

23 rgada, f. 248, op. 113, d. 505, l. 4-15; “Litopys monastyria Vasyl'ian: rik 1770,” Dilo 43, no. 11 (1890).

24 “Litopys monastyria Vasyl'ian: rik 1770,” Dilo 43, no. 11 (1890).

25 Archiwum Glowne Akt Dawnych (Central Archives of Historical Records; hereinafter - agad), Archiwum Zamoyskich, sygn. 3031, 217/349, Memorial do Komissyi i rewidowania duktu granicznego miedzy panstwem Rossyskim a Nayiasn. Rzeczpospolita (Warszawa, 5/7/1766).

26 The following document based on an inspection of the outposts in the mid- 1760s provides important details about the Kyiv or Vasylkiv outpost line: rgada, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1499 (Raznye bumagi, kasaiushchiesia do morovoi bolezni i karantinnykh domov, 1754-1778), l. 32. The length of the Kyiv line was about 393-395 miles. The outposts were located one to four miles apart. The ability to timely pass fire or other signals from one outpost to another was a key factor defining their effectiveness. Vast forested territories, limited manpower, and long distances between the outposts made the line open to il­legal border crossings. More details about the outpost line are also provided in M. Tyshchenko, “Forposty, mytnytsi ta karantyny na zakhidnomu pohranychchi u zv iazku z zovnishn oiu torhivleiu Ukrainy v XVIII st. In Idem, Narysy z istoriizovnishn’oi torhivli Ukrainy vXVIII st. (Bila Tserkva, 2010), 5-76. For a discussion of the Russo-Polish border demarcation problem, see O. Mykhed, “Not by Force Alone: Public Health and the Establishment of Russian Rule in the Russo-Polish Borderland, 1762-85,” in Borderlands in World History, ed. Paul Readman, Cynthia Radding, and Chad Bryant (London, 2014), 134.

Serhii Shamrai, “Misto Vasyl'kiv,” Istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk, no. 3 (1929): 40.

Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva, no. 57 (1887): 251. A.A. Bibikov, Zapiski o zhizni i sluzhbe Aleksandra Il'icha Bibikova (Moscow, 1865), 62.

V. Antonovich, Issledovanie o Gaidamachestvepo aktam 1700-1768 g. (Kyiv, 1876), 41-2.

M. Tyshchenko, “Forposty, mytnytsi ta karantyny na zakhidnomu pohrany- chchi u zv'iazku z zovnishn'oiu torhivleiu Ukrainy v XVIII st,” in idem, Narysy z istorii zovnishnioi torhivli Ukrainy v XVIII st. (Bila Tserkva, 2010), 5-76.

Franz Doerbeck, Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii s osnovaniia gosudarstva do nastoiashchego vremeni (St Petersburg, 1905), 115.

rgada, f. 248, op. 113, d. 430, l. 39.

Nikolai Zakrevskii, Letopisi opisaniegoroda Kieva, chast' 1 (Moscow, 1858), 86; Doerbeck, Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii, 115.

In the 1770s, Kyiv had a plan that many foreigners called very unusual and in­convenient. The Old City, Pechersk, and Podil were linked by roads; however, they were located about one to two miles apart. Podil and Pechersk were sur­rounded by high hills and fortress walls that isolated them from the remain­ing city territory. See Zakrevskii, Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva, 84. I. Pantiukhov, Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva (Kyiv, 1877), 98. The division of Kyiv into the three districts was preserved after the plague out­break in 1770-71, see “Statisticheskoe opisanie g. Kieva, sostavlennoe v 1775 godu,” Kievskiegubernskie vedomosti: chast’ neofitsial’naia, no. 12 (23 March 1857): 73-4.

Pantiukhov, Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva, 102. Pantiukhov, Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva, 78. Zakrevskii, Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva, 85-6.

Pantiukhov, Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva, 97.

Ibid., 104.

Alexander, Bubonic Plague in Early Modern Russia, 110-15.

rgada, f. 248, op.113, d. 1605 (O morovoi iazve v Moskve, ob opasnoi bolezni v raznykh mestakh Rossiiskoi Imperii i zagranitsei, a takzhe o padzhe skota i stroenii karantinnykh domov, 1770-1796), l. 168-9.

Zakrevskii, Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva, 86.

Ibid.

Doerbeck, Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii, 115. rgada, f. 248, op.113, d. 160, l. 91-2.

Doerbeck, Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii, 115-16. Serhii Tokerev, “Borot'ba z proiavamy epidemii chumy v Nizhyns'komu polku v druhii polovyni XVIII st.,” Nizhyns'ka starovyna, 5, no. 6(9) (2008): 21-6.

Borodii, Danylo Samoilovych, 33.

S.A. Verkhratskyi, “Chuma v Kieve v 1770-1771 godakh,” Materialy nauchno- prakticheskoi konferentsii posviashchennoi 225-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia vy- daiushchegosia otechestvennogo epidemiologa Danily Samoilovicha (Nikolaev, 1969), 53-4.

As a city with Magdeburg Law, Kyiv had the municipal council as the major government institution. Later in the century, Catherine II realized the incon­sistency between the legal rights and freedoms given by this law to some cities, and the office of governor-general. After the introduction of the Kyiv vicegerency, part of the rights and freedoms granted to Kyiv by Magdeburg Law were abolished. However, the empress hesitated to liquidate it in full. Kyiv lost its remaining Magdeburg Law privileges much later, in 1835. For instance, in 1766, only a few years before the major outbreak of the plague, the governor-general Fedor Voeikov had a conflict with the Kyiv municipal council. When Voeikov requested an additional physician from the Medical Collegium in St Petersburg, the municipal council refused to accept this physician and defined his qualifications as unsatisfactory. Since the mu­nicipal council was responsible for funding and housing the new physician, this new medical professional was forced to leave Kyiv. For more details, see “Predstavlenie gener.-gub. Voeikova o naznachenii doktorov v Kievskuiu gu- berniiu (1766 g.),” Kievskaia starina, no. 12 (1903): 139-41.

Zakrevskii, Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva, 88-90. rgada, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1499, l. 32.

rgada, f. 248. op. 113, d. 1535 (Ob opasnykh bolezniakh, 1770-78), l. 230-1, 512.

rgada, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1605, l. 168-9. For a brief discussion of the extension of the outpost line, see Mykhed, “Not by Force Alone,” 134.

Mykhed, “Not by Force Alone,” 134-5.

Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (hereinafter - pszri), vol. 19 (St Petersburg, 1830-35), 246 (13588, Aprel2, 1771, Senatskii [ukaz] “O proisvozh- denii provianta krestianam, nakhodiashchimsia na forpostakh dlia soderzhaniia karaulov”).

rgada, f. 248, op. 113, dd. 430, l. 31, 154-5 and 1499, l. 149. pszri, 11829, 15:261 (Maia 23, 1771, Senatskii [ukaz] “Ob opredelenii shtab- ili ober-ofitserov v nekotorye tamozhni dlia prismotra i o proizvozhdenii im zhalovania iz tamozhennykh dokhodov”).

Compared to earlier years when customs were administered by leaseholders, custom revenues in 1764-5 were 1.5 times or about 55,000 rubles higher.

S. Shamrai, “Misto Vasyl'kiv, IX-XVIII vv.,” Istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk, no. 2 (1928): 95.

E.V. Litsoeva, “Dinamika tamozhennykh tarifov na Ukraine-Getmanshchine v XVIII v.” In Torgovlia, kupechestvo i tamozhennoe delo v Rossii v XVI-XIX v. (Kursk, 2009), 203.

RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1605, l. 178-9. RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, delo 1499, l. 149.

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Sankt-Peterburge (Russian State Historical Archive in St Petersburg; hereinafter - rgiap ), f. 1374, op. 1, d. 90 (Donesenie Slobodsko Ukrainskogo gubernatora A. Teplova o merakh pre- dostorozhnosti priniatykh vo vverenoi emu gubernii protiv rasprostraneniia morovoi iazvy), l. 1-11.

rgiap, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 90, l. 5-8. RGIAP, f. 1374, op 1, d. 90, l. 1-9. pszri, 19, 13599, (Aprel' 27, 1771, Senatskii [ukaz] “O vydavanii deneg na propitanie soderzhashchimsia v karantinakh nedostatochnym liudiam”). Major provincial reforms initiated by the empire were drafted and approved by the Senate in 1775. These reforms were based on the exploration and re­ports submitted by numerous governors and administrators, including Petr Rumiantsev, Grigorii Teplov, Jacob Sievers, Zakhar Chernyshev, and Mikhail Krechetnikov, who knew the Ukrainian territories well. The reports described general conditions of the provinces and borders, economy, as well as the level of medical services needed for the population. While a general reform plan of provincial development was created based on the evidence provided by specific provincial authorities, the governors received some freedom to intro­duce the changes specific for each province, aiming to modernize them and improve their administration. The reports of Rumiantsev and Teplov were the major source of information about Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine. They described it as an autonomous region ruled by the nobility who regulated local trade, tax collection, and subordinated major groups of society. Regula­tion of the fiscal system and transformation of the elites were the major steps encouraged by the empress.

“Reskript imperatritsy Ekateriny II na imia Generala Krechetnikova,” in Materialy dlia istorii Podol’skoigubernii. Pribavlenie k Podol’skim Gubernskim Vedomostiam (b.m.: 1885), 6-16.

pszri, 20, 14392 (Noiabr' 7, 1775, “Uchrezhdeniia dlia upravleniia gubernii Vserossiiskiia Imperii, chast' pervaia”).

Petr Rumiantsev was the governor of the Little Russia governorate since 1765. His rule was interrupted by the Russo-Ottoman war when he served as a commander in the Russian army. Rumiantsev was well received by the local nobility and offered Catherine II different approaches to gradually attach the peasantry to specific locations and landlords. Some of these reform projects were supported by the empress. On the one hand, the process of enserfment of the peasantry was perceived as a very unpopular step among the local population. On the other hand, depriving the peasantry of the freedom of geographic mobility greatly reduced population migration, thus making the government plague prevention initiatives more effective.

Kyiv received such a plan in 1784. The work on it was initiated by Fedor Voeikov in the mid-i77os.

Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivs ’koi oblasti (State Archive of Kyiv Region; hereinafter - dako), f. 1, op. 316, spr. 1864 (Tsirkuliar Kievskogo namestnicheskogo pravleniia, 1 noiabria, 1783), ark. 7.

rgiap, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 86 (Donesenie Kamenets-Podol'skogo gubernatora A.A. Bekleshova, minskogo gubernatora Z. Karneeva, kurskogo S. Burke- sheva, orlovskogo V. Voeikova i smolenskogo I. Mezentsova o merakh, prini- atykh vo vverenykh im guberniiakh protiv rasprostraneniia chumy), l. 1-2. rgiap, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 86, l. 1.

RGIAP, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 86, l. 1-2.

Dvadtsatipiatiletie Obshchestva Kievskikh Vrachei, (1840-1865) (Kyiv, 1865), 5-6.

rgiap, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 88 (Perepiska po povodu poiavivsheisia v Litovskoi gubernii morovoi iazvy i padezhe skota, 1797), l. 1.

rgiap, f. 1294, op. i(internal op. 9), d. 22 (Raport v gosudarstvennuiu meditsinskuiu kollegiiu iz Malorossiiskoi vrachebnoi upravy), l. 1-9.