Khmelnitskys Death and the Destruction of the Muscovite Army
When word was brought to Khmelnitsky that the Cossacks had abandoned Rakoczi at Medzybozh, the Hetman flew into a rage, threatening to execute Zhdanovych and his officers. The failed campaign in Poland was to be Khmelnitsky s last disappointment.
He had been unwell for four months and soon after suffered a stroke. He lay unable to speak for five days, and died the next morning on 6 August 1657 at the age of 60. Bohdan Zinovy Khmelnitsky, the elected Hetman of the Za- porozhian Armywho had given his people freedom, the father of the entity that would become Ukraine, was no more. After lying in state to allow friends and strangers to bid their final farewells, he was buried beside his son Timysh in Subotiv, in the church he had built. The Ukrainian Spartacus was gone, but unlike the celebrated Roman gladiator Bohdan Khmelnitsky and his Cossacks lived to see the liberation of the people. During his rise to prominence Khmelnitskyhad whittled away at the direct democracy practiced by the Cossacks, much of it probably by necessity. Due to the greatly increased size of the Cossack army, and for security reasons, the rank-and-file mass “radas,” whose decisions had always been binding on all officers, were no longer held. Theywere replaced by councils of the officer corps which began to act as an advisory body for major policy decisions, when convened by the Hetman. The interests and ideology of nobles-turned-Cossack officers did not always conform to that of the common Cossacks, particularly when officers and other serving nobles began to receive land and settlements for services rendered. The population was scarce and there was usually enough land to go around, especially as some Cossack communities were deserting Ukraine to escape the fighting and settle in the Tsar of Muscovy s empty territories.Shortlybefore his death Khmelnitskybroke another fundamental Cossack practice, that of electing the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, who was the recognized ruler of Ukraine.
In the spring of 1657 the bedridden Khmelnitsky convened an officer “rada” where he asked the assembled council to affirm his wish that the position of hetman be given to his 16-year-old son Yury (“Yuras”). The officers agreed by a unanimous vote, out of respect for the ailing hetman, and the lad was elected as Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. Yuras was sickly and weak without military experience, and Ukraine was surrounded by enemies. Showing more sense than his elders, Yuras called another officers’ “rada” for 23 August 1657 where he pointed out that he was too young for the job, and Onlywanted to study in the KyivAcademy. The officers agreed, and Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s General Secretary Ivan Vyhovskywas appointed to replace Yuras until the boy came of age. On 26 October a general Cossack “rada,” with representatives from the rank-and-file, met in Korsun, the Cossack capital, where under the horse-tail “bun- chuk” standard Ivan Vyhovsky accepted the hetman’s mace of authority. Both elections were contrary to tradition since a hetman of the Zaporozhian Army could only be elected by rank- and-file Cossacks at the Dnipro Sich.Ivan Vyhovsky, however, was the best military choice for hetman. He was Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s closest collaborator and most certainly took part in planning the strategies of the Cossack victories. Indeed, he may have been personally responsible for some of the victories following Berestechko, as claimed by a Polish undercover agent in the Cossack camp, who wrote in June 1651: aVyhovsky is in charge of absolutely everything and dispatches envoys himself, without Khmelnitsky.... He counsels and decides even on questions of war.”48 He was a member of the Ukrainian landed gentry from the northern part of Kyiv province and was educated as a lawyer in the Mohila Academy in Kyiv. Appointed deputy “starosta” (governor) of Lutsk in the Polish royal administration, he fought in the Polish army at Zhovti Vodywhere he was ransomed from Tatar captivity by Khmelnitsky and appointed as General Secretary (Chancellor).
The newly elected hetman had supported Khmelnitsky’s anti-Moscow policy probably due to the fact that in Muscovy the “nobility” was only the tsars serving class, and could not own land or estates outright. Vyhovsky on the other hand, supported by many officers, was seeking to reintroduce the legal status of a nobility, which would give the hetman more independence from rank-and-file Cossacks and greater international prestige. Vyhovsky also realized that Ukraine could be caught between two fires, and like Khmelnitskybefore him, the politically astute hetman understood the treaty signed at Vilnius between TsarAlexei and KingJan Casimir could turn into an antiUkrainian alliance which would force the Cossacks to fight on two fronts against overwhelming odds.
To forestall such an alliance Ukraine had to enter into a treaty with one of the imperial powers while both were still at war with each other, and Vyhovsky decided to approach the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. The time was ripe since both Poland and Lithuania were reeling from “The Flood” invasion and could be expected to yield favorable concessions. The radical changes in policy in favor of the traditional Catholic enemy would introduce a split in the Cossack ranks. Already during his inauguration Vyhovskyhad argued to officially abrogate the Pereiaslav agreement, pointing out that unlike Bohdan Khmelnitsky he, Ivan Vyhovsky had not sworn allegiance to the tsar. He was challenged by the colonel of the Poltava regiment Martyn Pushkar, who pointed out in no uncertain terms that the entire ZaporozhianArmyhad sworn service to the tsar, and by custom he was obliged to follow. Vyhovsky however, carried the day and the Cossack “rada” endorsed an alliance with Poland to replace the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654.
The new hetman was known to have noble antecedents and enjoyed little confidence amongst many rank-and-file Cossacks, whose taxes had been increased, and he was especially disliked in the Sich where Zaporozhian fishing rights were being curtailed.
Khmelnitsky’s death accelerated the social division which was emerging in Ukraine between the officer corps, which to some extent had replaced the Polish nobility, and the rank-and-file Cossacks, those who had little land and were expected to provide labor on the new estates if they were not officially registered in a regiment. Vyhovsky was also accelerating Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s practice of distributing land grants using the hetmans charters in order to gain more support. Town burghers were also opposed to any form of Cossack officer rule, claiming the Magdeburg right to self-government which had been approved by Tsar Alexei. Hostilities began to break into open conflict when Vyhovsky wasn’t recognized as Hetman by the Cossacks “Down Under,” who pointed out correctly that he had not presented himself at the Dnipro Sich for an election as custom and the rules demanded. There were now two distinct Cossack armies—that of the “Down Under” with center at the Zaporozhian Sich and the regiments of settled Ukraine, essentially the army created by Bohdan Khmelnitsky. By tradition, however, the army “Down Under” formed the senior service, and CossackHetmans carried the title “Hetman of the Za- p orozhian Army” and not “Hetman of Ukraine.”Open fighting broke out when Zaporozhian bands began to raid the estates of the more wealthy Cossack officers, some of whom had noble lineage. The Zaporozhian Ataman Barabash declared “loyal support” for Tsar Alexei and the revolt was joined by Colonel Pushkar’s Poltava regiment. The tsar responded by sending an arbitrator to call another election in February 1658 which was Symbolicallyheld in Pereiaslav, where Vyhovsky was again acclaimed as Hetman, but without Za- porozhian support. Colonel Pushkar and Ataman Barabash paid no attention to the outcome of the election and declared an open revolt, to which Vyhovsky responded by mobilizing an army of 20,000 regimental Cossacks, mercenaries, and Tatar detachments, and besieged Pushkar in Poltava.
For the first time a Cossack commander had to rely on paid foreign mercenaries. The siege onlylasted two weeks when Pushkarwas defeated in a pitched battle outside of the city walls where he met his death. Barabash escaped to the Sich while the remaining rebel forces fled to the Mus covite-held towns of Nezhin and Chernihiv. A new Poltava regiment was raised by Vyhovsky’s officers, and several weeks later his supporter Colonel Hulianitsky occupied the left-bank towns of Lubny and Myrhorod, together with the surrounding villages.Vyhovskynowpressed openly for a Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation, and in July 1658 his delegate Colonel Nosach arrived at the Sejm convocation where he explained that if the interests of the Cossack officer corps could be reconciled Ukraine would enter the Polish-Lithuanian union. Domestically, the hetman began to replace officers who opposed his pro-Polish policy, to bring virtually all Ukraine under his control. Now Vyhovsky issued a lengthy declaration (“Universal”) announcing in no uncertain terms that Ukraine was breaking off all ties with Tsar Alexei:
We (the Cossacks) did not accept the protection of the Grand Prince of Moscow (as the Tsarwas known in Ukraine and elsewhere) for any other reason than to preserve and expand our liberty, won by force of arms with Gods help, and regained so many times by the sacrifice of our blood, for ourselves and our descendants.... We expected that, in view of our common faith (religion) and Ourvoluntarysubmission, the Grand Prince of Moscow would be just... and have no design on Ourliberties... (since) in the first year of negotiations between the Liakhs (Poles) and Muscovy it was decided to subdue and enslave us (by the Treaty of Vilnius)... but the war begun in Livonia with the illustrious King of Sweden, our ally and friend... was the first document of this crime.49
The manifesto was followed by the expulsion of Muscovite garrisons in Ukrainian towns, but in Kyiv the hetmans brother DanyloVyhovskywas defeated on 3 September 1658, outside of the city gates by the Muscovite garrison.
On 6 September 1658, a treaty was signed at Hadiach by two commissions from KingJan Casimir and Hetman Vyhov- sky, attended by the Ukrainian Metropolitan Balaban and the hetmans General SecretaryYuriy Nemyrych, who led the het- man’s delegation.
Nemyrych was an outstanding and a self- interested individual. Born in 1612, he was highly educated, having studied in some of the best European universities. He was also a wealthy aristocrat of Rus, whose estates in the Kyiv and Volin provinces comprised 14 towns and 50 villages. An Arian (anti-trinitarian) Christian he fought against Hetman Khmelnytsky as the colonel of the noble Ievyfrom the province of Kyiv. During the Swedish invasion he changed sides and joined Charles X to support the Protestant Grand Prince Rakoczi of Transylvania. Following the Cossack withdrawal from Poland, Nemyrych converted to Greek Orthodoxy and joined Hetman Vyhovsky as General Secretarywhere he drafted the main clauses of the Treaty of Hadiach.The proposed treaty was far reaching and specified a fundamental restructuring of the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom as a union with a virtually independent Ukraine, “The Grand Principality of Rusf with the three states each sharing a common king elected by the nobility. The new principality was to elect a legislative assembly, to pass its own laws, with executive powers vested in a Cossack Hetman. He was to be elected for life by the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm, chosen from four candidates proposed by the Ukrainian Assembly and confirmed by the king. Ukrainians would have representation in the Senate, including six Greek Orthodox bishops, and “The Principality of Rus” was to have its own courts, treasury, minted currency, and a standing army of 10,000 Cossacks and 30,000 mercenaries, many of whom would be foreigners and indifferent to local issues. Polish or Lithuanian troops could only enter Ukraine with permission, and once across the border would fall under the hetmans authority. Both Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches would have equal legal status, Protestants and Jews would have freedom of worship, but the Greek Catholic (“Uniate”) Church would be banned. Two universities and colleges were to be established, with freedom of speech and of the press to be guaranteed, so long as “the majesty of the King was not insulted.”50
The Treaty ofHadiach was a blueprint for a non-Cossack feudal state, and once again pitted the nobility against the Cossacks. The Polish-Lithuanian Sejm refused to recognize Cossack supremacy, and the “treaty” was a reversal of all that the people had fought for as is clear from the following three clauses:
Real estates, personal properties, Crown lands, and sums of money confiscated from the nobles of the Rus territories, even (from those) who served in the Zaporozhian (i.e., Khmelnitsky Ukrainian) Army and who at present are rejoining the fatherland, shall be returned (to them).
To all property owners from both sides shall be afforded the possibility of safe return to and repossession of (their former holdings), including the (right of the) Roman (Catholic) rite clergy to the bishopries, parishes, rectories, and properties belonging to them that are located in the palatinates (provinces of Kyiv, Bratslav, Chernihiv, and Podilia), as well as in the Grand Principality ofLithuania, (in) Belarus, and Severia.51
The new order would be that of the nobility, with the virtual elimination of the CossackArmy:
The Zaporozhian Army shall number ten thousand or whatever (figure) the honorable Zaporozhian Hetman shall enter in the register. The mercenary army shall number thirty thousand....”
The honorable Hetman of the Rus armies shall recommend to His Majesty (those) being worthy of the coat of arms of nobility. All, without difficulty, shall be enobled and accorded all the liberties (enjoyed) by the nobility (of Poland and Lithuania, in addition)... one hundred shall be enobled from each (Cossack) regiment.”52
At a stroke of the pen a class of more than a thousand hereditary nobles was to be created in the new Rus Ukraine who would have equal status with the Polish and Lithuanian nobles. Bohdan Khmelnitskyhad pursued an independent policy from the tsar, but Vyhovsky was heading for a complete rupture and a military showdown.
On hearing of the treaty signed at Hadiach, TsarAlexei issued his own manifesto proclaiming Vyhovsky a traitor, and declared war while in October a revolt broke out again in Poltava led by Martyn Pushkar s son Kirik. Supported by the Zaporozhians, the left-bank towns of Piriatin, Lubny, Myrhorod, and Holtva joined the uprising, accusing Vyhovsky of having forgotten Bohdan Khmelnitsky s legacy. ByJanuary 1659 Vy- hovsky was ready with a Cossack-mercenary army and a Tatar detachment, and by March both Poltava and Myrhorod had fallen to his men. Polish support, however, was not forthcoming, since the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm had forbidden King Jan Casimir to send Vyhovsky military support, even though it had ratified the Hadiach treaty.53 A Cossack detachment under Jakiv Nemyrych proceeded to Lokhvytsia to block a Muscovite army commanded by prince Romodanovsky and on 21 March Vyhovsky,s men attacked the Zaporozhians in the village of Zenkovo defended by legendary Ataman Sirko, but after four weeks were forced to abandon the siege.
Prince Romodanovskywas now joined by two other forces under Princes Pozharsky and Trubetskoy and in the spring of 1659 a 100,000-man Muscovite army advanced into Chihirin province where they were reinforced by Ivan Bespalys anti- Vyhovsky Cossacks. We know from Muscovite sources that the Unusuallylarge army was also the tsar s best, sent with the mission to conquer both the left and right-bank provinces of Ukraine. The Muscovite advance was blocked by the fortified town of Konotop on the Lesuch River which was defended by earthen ramparts, a wide moat, and an oak palisade on three sides with the fourth facing the river. It was garrisoned by Colonel Hulianitsky s Nizhen regiment and supported by the town burghers and peasants from the surrounding villages, some 5,000 men in all. The siege began 11 May and lasted 70 days as time and time again waves of Muscovite infantry were beaten back by Cossackmusket fire. The Muscovite army had left devastation in its wake as it advanced into Ukraine with a massive destruction of the Konotop region, and all offers of surrender were rejected by the garrison, which anticipated a similar fate.
The Nizhen regiment s stubborn resistance gave Hetman Vyhovsky the time to gather Cossacks who were still loyal to him, and with several thousand mercenaries and a detachment of Crimean Tatars he moved towards Konotop, with about 60,000 men in all. Vyhovskywas a talented strategist in command of battle hardened Cossackregiments, and what occurred on the field of Konotop would be one of the greatest triumphs of Cossack arms. Arriving in early June, Vyhovsky took stock of the situation and, realizing he was outnumbered, proceeded according to a Carefullylaid plan. First, on 24 June the Cossacks attacked the Muscovite forces at Shapovalivka, inflicting losses and relieving the siege of Konotop. This increased Vyhovsky s manpower and gave him a better defensive position for the outnumbered Cossack army. The main plan, however, was to strike first. On 9 July, following skirmishes and diversionary engagements, Vihovsky stationed Tatar cavalry on both flanks of a Cossack cavalry detachment and attacked the Muscovite camp. Seeing the small size of the Cossack-Tatar force, Prince Pozharsky launched a massed cavalry counterattack in order to crush the enemy in a single blow, and by following through attack and destroy the Cossack camp. The Muscovite charge sent the Cossacks retreating rapidly followed by Pozharsky s cavalry, which the Cossacks drew into a well-prepared trap. As the Muscovites crossed the shallow Sosnivka river they were attacked on both sides by hidden Cossack regiments, while those in retreat with the Tatars regrouped and launched a counterattack. Surrounded and hemmed in on all sides, unable to maneuver, the flower of the tsar s cavalrywas annihilated, and while deprived of cavalry protection the helpless Muscovite infantry was attacked and cut down by a Cossack-Tatar assault. The disaster was on an unprecedented scale, with 40,000 Muscovite casualties and 15,000 taken prisoner by the Tatars as payment for their support, including Pozharsky himself and 50 notables. Vy- hovsky s casualties were light, with some 4,000 Cossacks killed on the battlefield. The Ukrainian Victorywas described by the Russian historian Soloviov:
The flower ofMuscovite cavalry, which was so successful in the campaigns of 1654 and 1655 perished in one day, and never again was the Muscovite Tsar able to muster such brilliant troops in the field. TsarAlexeiMikhailovich came out to the people in mourning dress, and Moscow was seized with panic.... Trubetskoy... had now lost a great army in one day... the Tsar’s capital Moscow trembled for safety.... Vyhovsky was expected to go directly to Moscow.54
The battle of Konotop ranks as one of the great battles of 17th CenturyEurope and matches Bohdan Khmelnitsky s great victories against the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. At the time the armies of democratic Switzerland and Ukraine were some of the best fighting forces in Europe, with military training beginning at ten years of age and continuing past middle age. A united Cossack army would have established Ukrainian independence, and with a Swedish alliance become a military power in Eastern Europe.