The Ukraine Invaded

Following the destruction of Tsar Alexeis army at Konotop, Hetman Vyhovskypursued the remnants of the Mus­covite army to Putivl and to the Seim River. Romen, Hadiach, Lokhvitsia, and other Ukrainian towns were still in enemy hands, and Vyhovsky turned back to clear the left bank Ukraine of hostile forces.

Vyhovsky decided to seek support in a general Cossack “rada.” He was greeted with violent hostility and was shouted down when he tried to speak. Worse, the delegates to the Sejm who had signed the Hadiach document were attacked and killed, including its main author Yurij Nemirich. Vyhovsky fled, another “rada” was held in Bila Tserkva and for the second time the 18-year-old Yuras Khmelnitsky was elected Hetman of Ukraine, supported by Ivan Sirko and his Zaporozhian Cos­sacks. The young hetman was clearly expected to follow his fa­ther s anti-Polish and pro-Muscovy policy.

With Ukraine seemingly under his control,¹ Tsar Alexei decided to invade Podilia, Volin and Galicia, supported by Ukrainian Cossack regiments, while the Zaporozhians attacked the Tatars to keep them busy. In a preliminary strike against KingJan Casimirs allies a strong Zaporozhian detachment stormed and captured the Ottoman fortress of Arslan in the spring of 1660, while the KoshovyAtaman Ivan Sirko devas­tated the suburbs of the Ochakov fortress, causing much damage and capturing prisoners to be used in exchange for en­slaved Christians or for outright ransom.

Tatars and Turks, with only two defeats. In popular folk tales he was considered a ⁱ characternik,” or a wizard endowed with uncommon and mysterious powers. A religious Christian, he spent much of his military life in fighting the Muslims. KingJan Casimir described Ivan Sirko as of a quiet nature, approachable, and chivalrous towards his enemies while the Polish chronicler Vespian Kokhovski—not known for his pro-Cossack views— wrote:

A terror to the Crimean Horde, experienced in military matters and a brave cavalier..., of a warrior’s nature, not afraid of hail, frost or the sun’s heat. He was sensitive, careful, suffered hunger with patience, decisive when facing dangerous military situa­tions, and what was rare among Cossacks, was always sober. Dur­ing the summer he was in Zaporozhia, while during the winter he stayed close to the Ukrainian border.... He had a red birthmark on his face.²

Warbetween the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy was approaching, in which Sirko would play an im­portant role. Breaking his treaty with KingJan Casimir, Tsar Alexei invaded Volin in July 1660 with a well trained 20,000 man Muscovite army led by foreign officers and commanded by Prince Sheremetev, who was joined by a similar force of 11 Cossack regiments under acting hetman Tsitsora. Hetman Yuras Khmelnitsky remained behind to gather a second Cossack army, which was to follow and link up with Sheremetev and Tsitsora. While Yuras Khmelnitsky was gathering the supporting force Sheremetevwas confronted by superior Polish and Tatar armies, and was forced to retreat to a village called Chudniv where he established defensive positions. The former hetman Ivan Vy- hovsky had also joined the Polish force with several thousand Cossacks but in the meantime a Zaporozhian force led by Sirko attacked the Crimea, and 8,000 Cossacks under Ataman Sy- Idiovywere coming from the Sich to Sheremetev’s aid.

The young and inexperienced Khmelnitsky had none of his father’s abilities or temperament, and attacked by Lubo- mirski he retreated to what he thought was a safer location. The fighting continued and during the peak of the battle Yuras Khmelnitsky broke down in his tent and, falling to his knees, began to pray for salvation, rather than mount a counter-attack. His Cossack officers decided to send Petro Doroshenko to ne­gotiate, and on 18 OctoberYuras Khmelnitskysigned the Treaty of Chudniv and swore allegiance to KingJan Casimir. Ukraine was to become an autonomous component of the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the right bank was to pass to the control of the Polish King. This is not what most Cossacks were expecting.

The Cossack regiments with Prince Sheremetevbegan to pull out, leaving the surrounded Muscovites to fend for them­selves (“nobody invited them to Ukraine”). Outnumbered by the Poles and Tatars, the Tsars commander decided to capitulate as well, on the promise of safe conduct for himself and his men. The agreement was promptly broken when the Tatars saw valuable war booty slip through their fingers, par­ticularly the disarmed Tsars men who would fetch a good price on the Crimean slave markets. Those who resisted were killed, and the rest taken into captivity, including Sheremetevhimself, who would spend the next 20 years in the Crimea. Tsar Alexei was clearly in no hurry to ransom a commander who had cost him a well-equipped 20,000 man army. The treasury was nearly empty, and the Tsar had to renounce all claims to Ukrainian territory. On receiving news that Ataman Sirko was devastating Tatar villages Khan Girei began to withdraw his forces from Chudniv, but many detachments were now attacked by Sykhovys Zaporozhians, who were on their way to relieve the surrounded Muscovites, and destroyed.

Jan Casimir’s plans to occupy Ukraine in accordance with the Treaty of Chudniv fell through when Lubomirski s men re­fused to march any further. They had not been paid for some time, and Simplywalked away and returned to Galicia and other parts of the Polish Commonwealth. The Muscovite army that was being assembled in Kyiv to replace the one lost by Shereme­tev had learned of the debacle at Chudniv and now took ven­geance on the unarmed Ukrainian population by looting and destroying the surrounding countryside and slaughtering some 15,000 civilians.³ The Treaty of Chudniv also sparked the start of another civil war amongst the Cossacks. The Treatywas rat­ified by a Cossack “rada” held in Korsun, but Yuras Khmel­nitsky’s pledge of loyalty to KingJan Casimirwas unacceptable and besides the hetman had sworn an oath to Tsar Alexei. The first opposition appeared on the left bank and in Zaporozhia, where three rivals appeared, each seeking the hetmans mace and claiming allegiance to the Tsar; Yuras’ uncle Yakim Somko, his father’s brother-in-law Vasil Zolotarenko, and the once “Koshovy Ataman” of the Sich, Ivan Brukhovetsky. To ensure another “successful” election for hetman a Muscovite army was sent to Pereiaslav under Prince Romodanovsky to support Somko, while Yuras Khmelnitsky and KingJan Casimir re­sponded by sending an army of right-bank Cossacks, Poles, and Tatars across the Dnipro River. Following a series of engage­ments Somko and Romodanovsky were badly defeated at the battle of Buzhin in the summer of 1662. However, IikeVyhovsky before him, Yuras Khmelnitskyhad become identified with Pol­ish serfdom and was becoming a puppet in the hands of the no­bility. A widespread anti-feudal Uprisingbroke out in right bank

Ukraine; Khmelnitsky resigned, and returned to the peace and quiet of the monastery.

A Cossack “rada” was held in 1663 following Yuras Khmel­nitsky’s resignation and his brother-in-law Pavlo Teteria was elected as Hetman of the right bank Cossack regiments. Born as Pavlo Morjkhovsky into a minor Orthodox noble family he became known by his Cossack name. He was an educated man with legal training, had served Bohdan Khmelnitsky as a diplo­mat in his general staff and is credited with many of Khmelnit­sky s documents.⁴ Teteria was no stranger to the Polish estab­lishment. After Khmelnitsky’s death and following an audience with KingJan Casimir in 1658, he moved to Warsaw and took a stipend as the Kings advisor on Ukrainian affairs, with the Sejm recognizing his status as a nobleman. In 1660 he married Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s daughter Olena, who was also Ivan Vy- hovsky’s sister-in-law. Already a wealthy man, Pavlo Teteria claimed his wife’s inheritance from both her father and her hus­band Danilo Vyhovsky executed by the Tsar. The deposed het­man Ivan Vyhovsky who had joined Polish service as well, also claimed the inheritance resulting in a bitter feud between the two men, one which would be resolved by treachery.

The left bank territory of Ukraine was also experiencing turmoil and civil strife. The acting hetman Somko was a wealthy noble, involved in commerce and trade, and drew his support from the better-off landed Cossacks. The rank-and-file, partic­ularly the Zaporozhian Brotherhood from Down Under, con­sidered him as nothing more than another wealthy landowner no different from the old-style magnates who had oppressed the people. InJune 1663 a general Cossack Yada” was held in Nizhin and Ivan Brukhovetsky was elected as Hetman sup­ported by the Zaporozhians. Brukhovetsky s election was ap­proved by the Tsar, and in a precedent-setting move the newly elected hetman had Somko and his close collaborators arrested and executed. Now for the first time the Cossacks had two rival hetmans claiming authority over all Ukraine, but in reality each restricted to his own territory; Teteria on the right bank under KingJan Casimir, and Brukhovetsky on the left bank territory paying allegiance to TsarAlexei. As time went on Brukhovetsky began to pursue unpredictable and contradictory policies, which can only be explained by mental illness. He became deeply suspicious of people around him and began arresting anyone he thought was plotting against him. To everyone’s amazement he began burning “witches” at the stake, a big mis­take since they were considered to be healers, knowledgeable of herbs, and were under customary Cossackprotection.⁵

Soon conflict broke out between left bank and right bank Ukraine. Jan Casimir gathered a large army of Poles, Lithua­nians, and German mercenaries, and with the Khan’s Tatars and Hetman Teterias Cossacks crossed the frozen Dnipro in the winter of 1664 and invaded left bank Ukraine. Mauled by the Zaporozhians, Jan Casimir’s army continued to advance on Hlukhiv and lay siege to Brukhovetsky’s capital. Before they could penetrate the capital’s defenses they were attacked by a joint force of Romodanovsky’s Muscovites and left-bank Cos­sacks and were forced to retreat north towards Belarus. They were defeated again near Novhorod-Siversk and by February the King had withdrawn to the safety of Lithuania-Rus territory. Attacked by a detachment sent by Sirko to the Crimea, the Khan was unable to send his cavalry to the King’s support while Tete- ria’s Cossacks were forced to retreat from the Poltava region by Brukhovetsky s regiments.

Teteria was followed across the Dnipro by the left-bank Cossack regiments, which was a signal for a general uprising against the feudal serfdom, which was being reintroduced by the Poles and Hetman Teteria. A fresh army under Field Het­man Stefan Charniecki arrived to secure the Polish hold on the right-bank territory, and supported by the Tatars he began a savage repression. One of Charnieckis more ignoble acts was to dig up Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s remains from the church in Subotiv and have them burned in the town square. The savage repression, however, was of little use, as Charniecki himself admitted in a report written just before his death as he was returning to Poland: “The whole Ukraine decided to die rather than acknowledge the Poles,”⁶ as Cossack and peasant guerrilla bands roamed right-bank Ukraine, Volin and Podilia, attacking and inflicting much damage to Polish outposts and the military units sent out to secure provisions.

Faced with popular anger, the right-bank Hetman Teteria resigned and, taking much of the army treasury and symbols of Cossack authority, he headed for Poland where he received an appointment from Jan Casimir as advisor on Ukrainian affairs. Before leaving, however, Teteria committed an act of treachery for which he would be remembered. He called a conference with the Polish commanders in Olkhivka to which he invited Ivan Vyhovsky A Polish colonel by the name of Makhovski had defeated a Ukrainian guerrilla band led by one Sylimenko, who under torture “revealed” that Ivan Vyhovsky was the leader of an anti-Teteria and anti-Polish Cossack officers plot. As un­likely as this appeared Vyhovsky was arrested on Teterias orders and shot by a firing squad, without a trial or the King’s knowl­edge, a highly unusual event given that Ivan Vyhovsky had been made a member of the Polish-Lithuanian Senate. The large in­heritance contested by Teteria and Vyhovsky was always sus­pected to have been the cause for the unusual “execution.” Teteria resigned from Polish service and was poisoned in Edirne where he had been received by Sultan Mohammed IV, probably by a Polish agent who had been sent for the purpose.

With the end of the fighting Brukhovetskyleft for Moscow in September 1665 with a large retinue of Cossacks, Church clerics and town burghers, something which no Cossack hetman had done before. There he was presented with a “char­ter” from the Tsar, which the corrupt Brukhovetsky signed in spite of its damaging clauses to Ukraine and which effectively eliminated Ukrainian autonomy. Two of the eight points of the “charter” stipulated that Ukraine was to be garrisoned by Mus­covite troops and administered directly by the Tsars “voivodas” instead of Cossack colonels, and all taxes paid by the town pop­ulation, the hetmans state monopolies, and the custom duties were to be deposited directly into the Tsar’s coffers.⁷ In return, Hetman Brukhovetsky was made an offer which he could not refuse: he obtained rich land in Sloboda Ukraine with his close supporters, a large Muscovite bodyguard for his protection. Bruchovetsky s crowning glory was when he received Prince Dolgoruky s daughter in marriage, and on 31 December 1665 he was made a “boyar” of the realm by TsarAlexei. His charter, which he had signed with the Tsar, was met with great hostility when it began to be implemented, and in July 1666 a Cossack revolt had to be suppressed in Pereiaslav, with the help of Mus­covite troops. The Tsarwas also beginning to lose faith in Bru­ch ovetsky s unpredictable behavior and began to hold secret talks with the new right-bank Hetman Petro Doroshenko.

Brukhovetsky was becoming increasingly unstable and was ready to break with Tsar Alexei. In the same year he called a Cossack officers’ “rada” in Hadiach where he declared his in­tention to revive Bohdan Khmelnitsky s policy and seek support from the Ottoman Sultan, and in league with Doroshenko es­tablish Ukrainian independence from both Poland and Muscovy. Declarations were sent to call for a break with Mos­cow, and in February 1668 a popular uprising on the left bank expelled most of the Tsar s men. Doroshenko seized the occa­sion to cross the Dnipro and attack Romodanovsky s Muscovite corps, but InexplicablyBrukhovetsky tried to block his advance and was arrested by his own men and killed, with Doroshenko proclaimed Hetman of all Ukraine.

Petro Doroshenko was born in 1627 in Chihirin in a prominent Cossack officer family and was a member of the little band that accompanied Bohdan Khmelnitsky to seek refuge in the Sich in 1647. Following the battles of Zbarazh and Zboriv the young Doroshenko was appointed to Khmelnitsky s general staff and took part in diplomatic missions to Tsar Alexei and King Gustaf of Sweden. He was promoted to colonel, married Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s cousin, and took part in Hetman Ivan Vihovsky s campaigns including the great victory at Konotop. Doroshenko was appointed Acting Hetman by Pavlo Teteria, and in August 1665 following Hetman Teterias flight to Poland was confirmed as Hetman of Ukraine by a right bank officers’ “rada.” Doroshenko’s election was not unanimous, and the struggle for the “Bulava” mace only ended on the right bank when his rival, colonel Drozhdenko of the Bratslav regiment, was arrested by Doroshenko and shot.

Ukraine was sliding into a disorganized state of anarchy where rivals struggled for leadership and where without the stabilizing influence of state institutions power was temporary, and hetmans followed each other in rapid succession. There was still hope that an able and popular hetman would emerge and unite Ukraine, and once again beat off and destroy the in­vading foreign armies. But what Bohdan Khmelnitsky feared, and was attempting to prevent, now came to pass—an anti­Cossack alliance between Poland and Muscovy. The bitter struggle in Ukraine against the feudal oppressive despotism and state corruption was beginning to reach serfs in both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, and the Cos­sack movement had to be destroyed at any cost. Neither the nobles’ Commonwealth nor Tsarist Muscovyhad been able to defeat the Cossacks by themselves, on the contrary both had suffered humiliating defeats, and the two great powers decided to join forces. On 17 January 1667 in a village near Smolensk called Andrussovo, KingJan Casimir and TsarAlexei signed a treaty which divided their claims of influence in Ukraine along the Dnipro River: the Tsar recognized Polish claims to the right bank while the King acknowledged Muscovite preponderance in left bank Ukraine, including the city of Kyiv (for a limited period). From now on Ukraine could be invaded simultane­ously from the east and west, by armies against which it couldn’t possibly raise enough men given Ukraine’s population. Neither the left nor the right bank Cossack hetman was permitted to attend the talks, from which they were excluded by armed guards.

It would be some time before the slavery of serfdom could be reintroduced. Following the Treaty of Andrussovo and Brukhovetsky s death Hetman Doroshenko obtained Crimean support and began to attack and clear the western lands of Polish troops. Field Hetman Sobieski found himself surrounded in Galicia, but the Cossacks were far from united. The Za- porozhians from Down Under launched one of their raids on the Tatars and the Khan had to head back to protect his towns and villages. Outnumbered, Doroshenko had little choice but to recognize the king’s authority. KingJan Casimir, however, was losing his grip on power. Lubomirski had launched a revolt, and faced with lack of support, Jan Casimir abdicated in 1668 and was replaced by Michal Wishniowiecki, who was crowned King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Doroshenko had realized the obvious implications of the Andrussovo treaty and reacted by activating Bohdan Khmel­nitsky’s old policy by seeking an alliance with the Ottoman Em­pire, to be put under the “protection” of the Turkish Sultan by which Ukraine would be recognized as an autonomous protec­torate of the Porte. Not all Cossacks supported the policy of an alliance with “the heathens” and the divisions in the ranks con­tinued to grow. The Zaporozhians elected Petro Sukhovy, who opposed all rapproachment with the Porte, and in August 1669 six right-bank regiments elected Mikhailo Khanenko to chal­lenge Doroshenko’s hetmancy. The Cossacks now had four het­mans vying for authority, two on the right-bank, one in Za- porozhia, and the colonel of the Chernihiv regiment, Damian Mnohohrishny, “Man of Many Sins,” who would live up to his name. In a general officers’ “rada” held in March 1669 near Ko- rsun Hetman Doroshenko obtained support to conclude a treaty with Sultan Mohammed IV. His rival Khanenko was de­feated and sought refuge in the Zaporozhian Sich, where he was elected as ^uKoshovyAtamanf and in the following year recog­nized by King Michal Wishniowiecki as Hetman of the right­bank Ukraine. By October 1671 Doroshenko was driven out of Bratslav Province by Khanenkos Cossacks and the Zaporozhi- ans.

The Sultan now saw an opportunity to strike a blow against Poland and began to prepare a campaign into Podilia, with a declared policy of establishing Cossack independence on the right bank of Ukraine. Doroshenko had also assembled an army of some 27,000 Cossacks, and defeating Khanenko and his Polish allies at Chetvertivka he joined the Sultan in the siege of the great fortress at Kamianets-Podilskywhich surrendered after only three weeks of siege. Followed by the Ottoman army, Doroshenko advanced on Lviv forcing the Polish commander Jan Sobieski to sue for peace. The Treaty of Buchach was signed on 16 October 1672, by which the Sultan was paid an indemnity of22,000 zloty, Podilia became an Ottoman province, and Het­man Doroshenko was recognized as head of an independent right-bank Ukraine.

The Polish-Lithuanian Sejm refused to ratify the Treaty and war broke out again. With Podilia in Ottoman hands King Wishniowiecki was voted large sums by the Polish Sejm and he began to assemble an army the size of which had not been seen for a long time; 40,000 Crown and mercenary troops, 12,000 Lithuanians, and a large number of armed “servants.” Com­mander Jan Sobieski also had the support of Khanenkos Cos­sacks and the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia even though both “hospodars” owed allegiance to Sultan Mohammed. In November the Polish king advanced towards Moldavia and at­tacked and defeated the vanguard of the Ottoman army at Khotin, capturing the strategic fortress. The Victorywas limited though it gained Jan Sobieski fame throughout the Common­wealth. A few days before the battle King Wishniowiecki had died, and on 10 NovemberJan Sobieskiwas elected as Jan III. The main Ottoman army was still intact but the great army of the Commonwealth began to break up, due to poor manage­ment and political conflict. First the Lithuanian-Rus contingent decided to head home, and hearing of King Wishniowiecki s death many nobles returned to their estates. The Crown army also began to breakup due to the usual non-payment of wages.

The left-bank territory of Ukraine was also in turmoil. The new hetman Mnohohrishny had alienated the officer corps by his violent temper and besides he was not of noble background but the son of a common Cossack. Denounced for disloyalty and plots against the Tsar, his house in Baturin was surrounded one morning on 13 September 1672 by the Muscovite “streltsi,” and wounded in the fight which followed, he was arrested and taken to Moscow. There, subjected to torture, he refused to ac­knowledge any hostile activities against the Tsar and together with his brother was sentenced to death. At the last minute as their heads lay on the chopping block a pardon arrived from the Tsar, commuting their sentence to exile in Siberia. Mno- hohrishny^,s place was taken by Ivan Samoilovich, who was elected hetman of the left bank, with the Tsar^,s approval. He was the first hetman who had not fought under Bohdan Khmel­nitsky, had come from a Church rather than a Cossack back­ground as a son of a priest, and was known to be in favor of closer ties with Muscovy. To demonstrate his Tsarist loyalty Samoilovich sent his sons to be raised in Moscow, and his daughter married the Kyiv “voevoida” Fedor Sheremetev. To ensure a more “professional” army which would be less prone to political (and ideological) influence he extended Doro­shenkos practice of forming regiments of paid mercenaries, both Cossack and foreign such as Orthodox Serbs. To gain some control over the territory of Down Under he garrisoned the Kodak Fort with his own men, and tried to prevent the Zapor- ozhian Sich from conducting negotiations with foreign powers.

On the right-bank Ukraine Doroshenko was still hetman, but he was losing support from his alliance with the Ottoman Sultan. As KingJan Sobieski was attempting to follow through with his victory at Khotin, Samoilovich convinced the Tsar to declare war on Doroshenko. InJanuary 1674 Samoilovichs troops, with Muscovite support, crossed the frozen Dnipro and defeated Doroshenkos 2,000 man force led by his brother Hri- hory, and in June Doroshenko himself was besieged in Chihirin. Samoilovichs attack provoked a massive response from Sultan Mohammed and the Crimean Khan Selim Girey, who broke off their engagement with King Sobieski and invaded Ukraine to rescue Hetman Doroshenko s meager force. The invading armies brought devastation and destruction, and outnumbered, Samoilovichs and Romodanovsky s men retreated to the left bank. The Grand Visier Mustapha and Hetman Doroshenko began to clear the right bank of enemy opposition, particularly the territory under Khanenko, which was conquered with much bloodshed. His capital was razed to the ground by the Turkish army and much of the population slaughtered, although those taken into captivity were released on Doroshenkos personal request to the Sultan. Doroshenko was left with a devastated territory made worse by his bloody reprisals against those who had supported Samoilovich when he invaded the right-bank.

The following year, again leading a large army this time fi­nanced in part by King Louis XIV of France, Jan Sobieski in­vaded Turkish-occupied Podilia, leaving an empty and desolate landscape. The conflict ended in 1676 in a negotiated peace, but the right bank was invaded again by Samoilovich and his Muscovite allies who found little opposition from the popula­tion, which had turned against Doroshenko and his Turkish al­lies. With nowhere to turn for support with the Sultan busy in Podilia, Hetman Doroshenko surrendered with his tiny band of supporters and laid down the hetman s mace and other Cos­sack insignias of office, with regimental colors seized by Ro­modanovsky and sent to Moscow. There they were dragged through the streets, placed at the feet of the new Tsar Fedor and were exhibited for three days in public. Defeated by his en­emies and to save his family, on 27 September 1676 Petro Doroshenko swore loyalty to the Tsar and entered his service. He and his family were exiled to Muscovy where the 14-year- old Tsar Fedor made him a “voevoda,” and in 1677 Doroshenko received property with a thousand serf households for his in­come. During 1679-82 he was on the Tsar s service in Viatka on the Kazan border, after which he was transferred to a place called Khlimov. His wife and family, however, returned to Ukraine, and in 1688 at the age of 61 he married for a third time, to a boyar^,s young daughter with whom he had three sons. Doroshenko died in Muscovy in 1698, without ever being al­lowed to meet other Cossacks or to see his native land again.⁸

With Doroshenko in the hands of the Tsar, the Porte needed another Cossack ally and decided to bring back Yuras Khmelnitsky. Following his resignation the young hetman had been imprisoned by the Poles, but following his release he was captured by Tatars and handed over to the Sultan, who estab­lished him in a comfortable confinement in Edicul castle near Constantinople, where he was proclaimed as “Prince of Sarmatia and Ukraine.” Much of the west bank was occupied by Samoilovichs Cossacks and Romodanovsky s Muscovites, and in anticipation of a Turkish attack the territory was rein­forced by 30,000 men. They did not have long to wait. In August 1677, an Ottoman and a Crimean army, proclaiming the son of Bohdan Khmelnitsky as the rightful ruler of Ukraine, laid siege to Chihirin and Buzhin. Three weeks later, it was forced to withdraw when Samoilovich and Romodanovsky ar­rived with a relief force and Sirko sent several thousand Za- porozhians to help in the defense of Buzhin. The Porte had un­derestimated Chihirins defenses and the following year the Turks were back, this time with powerful siege guns and a con­siderable force commanded by Kara-Mustapha. The city’s de­fenses had been strengthened by the Scottish engineer Patrick Gordon and reinforced by Muscovite troops under Prince Rzhevsky.⁹

As the siege was reaching its critical stage it became clear that no more men would be committed to Chihirins defense, since forces under Romodanovsky and Samoilovich stationed nearby were ordered not to risk any relief action since their de­feat would have opened the way for the invasion of east bank Ukraine. On 15 August Rzhevsky was killed and Gordon as­sumed command of the city defenses, but seeing relief was not forthcoming he ordered Chihirin be set on fire, and gathering the remaining defenders he fought his way through enemy lines to Romodanovsky s positions. Chihirin had large stores of gun­powder that could not be taken, and Gordon had the citadel mined before withdrawing which caused the enemy further losses in manpower. The massive Ottoman invasion achieved nothing and had suffered high casualties, including the elite Janissary corps. Chihirin (or what remained of it) was retaken a year later by Polish and Cossack forces when Samoilovich and his Muscovite allies retired to the left-bank. Poland, Muscovy, the Porte, and the Ukrainian Cossacks now found themselves in a deadlock, and the Sultan decided to switch his attention to the west, to the Austrian Empire ruled by Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor. Following the destruction of Chihirin Yuras Khmelnitskybegan to lead a desolate life, styling himself as the “Prince of Rus.” Finally he overstepped his bounds when he had the wife of the Sultans main procurer for his harem exe­cuted. He had outlived his usefulness, and arrested on the Sul­tan s orders he was executed, probably in Kaminets-Podilsk.

In October 1678, KingJan Sobieski signed a peace treaty with Sultan Mohammed in Zhuravna, Galicia, by which the King renounced all claims to Podilia but the territory in the southern Kyiv province was to remain in Ottoman hands. InJuly 1678 KingJan Casimir and Tsar Fedor renewed the Treaty of An- drusovo and in the spring of 1681 the tsar signed the Treaty of Bakhchisarai with the Porte, a 20-year truce by which the border between Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire was set to be the Dnipro River, with the region between the Dnister and Buh rivers to become a no-mans land. The Zaporozhians were to have free navigation along the Dnipro to pursue fishing and hunting, while the nomad steppe Tatars could graze their herds on both sides of the Dnipro. The Zaporozhians also inserted an impor­tant clause which gave them the freedom to buy salt in the Crimea, at the time a strategic commodity and crucial for their fishing and hunting industry. As expressed by Lazar Baranovich the Archbishop of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siversky in 1680 who urged Ukrainians to acknowledge the Greek-Orthodox Tsar: “As a ship is heavily rocked on the water so it is with our poor Ukraine. Nay, even worse: the ship sails on water but Ukraine on blood, because it is in discord. O Lord, you rule the winds, you rule the waters—let there be peace among us.”¹⁰