The Swedish War and Collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom

The treaty with the tsar came none too soon. TsarAlexei Romanov was informed by Hetman Khmelnitsky’s personal CourierVasil Litvinenko that Polish and Lithuanian armies were advancing from Galicia in the west and Belarus in the north.

The Cossack-Muscovite allies struck first. The tsar had lost the Smolensk province to Lithuania, and the Ukrainian hetman was seeking to expand the Cossack system to southern Belarus where peasants were rising against the land-owning no­bility. A 20,000 man Cossack army under Khmelnitsky’s new brother-in-law Colonel Ivan Zolotarenko, and Tsar Alexei’s Muscovite army attacked Belarus, and on 23 August Homel fell to the tsar’s forces followed by Smolensk, Minsk, Vilnius, and others. Prince Radziwills forces were dislodged from the Orsha region along the Dnipro River by Zolotarenkos Cossacks, who occupied much of southern Belarus and began to introduce the Ukrainian system with the newly formed Mohiliv regiment. Most of the nobility was driven out, but some such as the princes of Slutsk and Chetvertynsk acknowledged Hetman Khmelnytsky’s authority, and Cossack democracy was well ac­cepted by the local population. The fighting resumed when, in January 1655, Zolotarenko was attacked in his headquarters at Novy Bykhovby Prince Radziwill, who unable to take the for­tified town, was forced to retreat. He was pursued and defeated by the acting hetman Zolotakenko who began to establish Cos­sack administration in the conquered Krychov region and by June of the year he was up again at full strength of20,000 with volunteers seeking Cossack status.

With the reinforced army Ivan Zolotarenko began a series of campaigns as far as Vilnius and Kaunas, implementing a secret order from Khmelnitsky to maintain the conquered ter­ritory under Ukrainian control and not allow entry to the tsar’s men. Zolotarenko took a musket ball in the leg and soon died from the wound, an able commander “strong in deed, gentle in manner.” He was replaced by Colonel Ivan Nechai, who promptly began to expel Muscovite troops from the main towns of Mohilov, Homel, and Chuvasy and replace them with Cossack units to establish a Cossack protectorate in southern Belarus. As explained by Nechai: “I did so according to the Het­man’s command. I ordered the soldiers sent from Muscovy (who were manning) the garrisons to be withdrawn and I sta­tioned my garrison of Cossacks.”³⁴ This was Khmelnitsky’s first open defiance of the tsar, but it would not be the last.

Following the fall of Smolensk, a revealing episode oc­curred involving the wages and stipends of the 60,000 regis­tered Cossacks, which the tsar had agreed to maintain. When the required amount arrived he was astonished that Khmel­nitsky and the colonels refused to accept any money. A serious problem had developed—there were now more than 60,000 men under arms in Ukraine, all claiming official Cossack status. A register of 60,000 Cossacks could not be compiled without provoking a major confrontation. When the Cossack army judge Bohdanovich-Zarudny suggested during an officers’ meeting that the regimental colonels might decide who was to be recognized as a Cossack, the Mirhorod colonel shouted back: "Do you want the Cossacks to kill us Colonels? You knowhow unruly our people are!” Leading free men was no easy task.

Before the Muscovite-Ukrainian invasion of Lithuania, in the spring of 1654 a 40,000 man Polish army attacked Ukraine from the west, which included a strong contingent of the Elector of Brandenburg’s Prussians. In spite of local resistance the main towns of Bratslav province fell with a general slaughter of the population, as described by the Polish Crown Hetman Potocki:

Thus I made short shrift of all the towns from Vinnytsia all the way to Nemiriv itself...

Khmelnitskywas preparing the Lithuanian campaign with the tsar and the towns were defended by weak Cossack garri­sons, burghers, and peasants from surrounding areas seeking refuge behind the walls. Strongholds were built beside water­ways such as ponds, marshes, or rivers and had similar con­struction, three wooden palisades surrounding the town with a timber fort inside. The outer wall was designed to bar entry to enemy cavalry and absorb cannon fire while the two inner palisades which usually had a moat between them served to prevent infantry from getting through. Should the three walls fall into enemy hands the last defense was the towns inner fort, which was often defended by artillery. The general idea was to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy.

Highly effective against Tatar raids, many defensive strong­holds could fall to the better-armed and equipped Polish armies, such as the famous defense of Busha. In the autumn of 1654 as the Polish and Moldavian armies were ravaging southwestern Podilia the Polish commander Czarniecki was instructed to take the heavily fortified town of Busha on the eastern bank of the Dnister River facing Moldavia. All other major towns such as Krasne and Chernivtsi had already surrendered and it was imperative that Busha be captured to safeguard the Polish rear. The attack began early in the morning of 28 November and continued for the entire day as Czarniecki threw all he had against Bushas walls, to no avail. Attempts at negotiations also failed, the Polish Crown not having a good reputation for hon­oring agreements. The assault on Busha resumed with fresh troops, but unable to sustain further losses Czarniecki ordered the trumpet to sound the retreat.

The Polish army settled down to what appeared to be a long siege when a closer examination of the fortifications re­vealed a weakly defended section of the walls on the side facing a shallow pond. Evidentlythe defenders didn’t have sufficient manpower for the entire perimeter, or else felt safe because of the water. During the night a Polish squad waded across the pond, set fire to the palisade and as the fire spread Czarniecki ordered an all-out assault. As the wooden walls crumbled, Polish units poured into Busha, forcing the defenders into the main fortified citadel. What followed provides a rare glimpse of the Ukrainian determination to defend their freedom known to us through the accounts of the Polish chronicler Wespazian Kochowski. As the main fort came under heavy attack and with the walls succumbing to fire the defenders—both men and women—swore a death oath not to be taken alive. Fierce hand- to-hand combat broke out as those with weapons continued to resist, and those without threw themselves into the flames or attacked the enemy with bare hands.

Soon Bushas commander, the Cossack captain Zavistny was killed, and taking several Cossacks his young wife Irene made her way into the cellar where the gunpowder was stored. Attaching fuses to the barrels they waited until the din of the fighting ceased, and as the fort began to fill with enemy troops Irene lit the fuse. The great explosion reduced most of the citadel to rubble killing many of the enemy as the rest of the town burned to the ground, and all who could not escape were slaughtered. In his report to the king the Polish commander ad­mitted to having suffered heavy casualties but observed that it was no cause for regret since this was the price which had to be paid for the destruction of “the unruly den of thieves.” Czar- niecki was clearly not a man to acknowledge or respect an enemy’s bravery.

Busha was the key stronghold of the southwestern region, and with its destruction the entire territory between the Dnister and Boh rivers fell into the hands of the Polish, Moldavian, and Hungarian allies who had jointed Potocki and who were now reinforced by the Crimean Khan, Mehmet Giray.

Arriving at Uman the Polish army launched an all-out as­sault on the defensive walls, but after a day s fighting it was re­pelled with heavy losses. On receiving word that Khmelnitsky was approaching, reinforced by 6,000 Muscovite troops, Potocki broke off the siege and set out to confront the Ukrainian- Muscovite force, which had established a defensive camp at Dryzhypil near Okhmativ. It was already dark when on 29 Jan­uary a Polish-Tatar army reached Khmelnitsky s positions, and not waiting for daybreak began an artillery barrage. The Cossack batteries responded and the Polish dragoons launched a cavalry charge on the Cossack guns, followed by the infantry which struck Sheremetev s Muscovites and broke into the main camp.

Following the unsuccessful night battle the Polish Field Hetman Potocki experienced another reversal, the betrayal of the Crimean Khan. The main Tatar army had stood by during the battle, on the pretext that they were unaccustomed to night fighting, but a tidy sum paid by Khmelnitsky may have played a role. Had they joined in the assault Khmelnitskys outnum­bered force would have been destroyed. This is probably what the khan was trying to avoid while still following a policy of balancing power between Greek Orthodox Ukraine and the Roman Catholic Commonwealth. Besides, the Tatars were there mainly for the looting and human captives on which the Crimean economy depended, and did not wish to take heavy casualties such as those suffered by Potockis and Khmelnitsky s men, some 15,000 killed on both sides.

The next two days were spent in minor skirmishes and one-on-one mounted duels which interrupted the continuous artillery fire, particularly the volleys coming from the Polish batteries. The Cossack camp had been hastily chosen, without a good supply of water or timber to build defenses, and frozen enemy corpses were used to improvise barricades. Receiving the khans word they would not be attacked, Khmelnitsky or­dered the Cossack camp be moved to nearby Okhmativ, and as the Cossack regiments began to pull out they were attacked by Potocki s infantry which suffered heavy casualties from Cossack artillery and musket fire, and was forced to pull back.

The Polish army and its allies were also being harassed and attacked by small but mobile Cossack “vataha” bands, when they sortied in search of provisions and winter forage for the horses, and Colonel Bohun continued to repulse enemy attacks on the strategic town of Uman. The joint Polish-Moldavian- Hungarian offensive to capture Kyiv and link up with the Lithuanians had ground to a halt, and responding to Zapo- rozhian and Don Cossack attacks on the Crimean Peninsula the khan began to pull out from Ukraine. Khmelnitsky contin­ued heading west to relieve the fort at Okhmativ, which was being besieged by a Polish detachment. It was caught in a cross­fire from the advancing Cossacks and the defenders, and when Czarniecki tried to reinforce the detachment he was attacked by Khmelnitsky^,s Cossacks, and the town defenders, who had sortied from behind the walls. As described by Czarniecki in his report: “we fought a great battle once again, with consider­able losses to our army. More than a hundred comrades in my regiment died... as did a great many of my dragoons.... Then the enemy... followed us in tabor (camp) formation for two days as substantial new forces had reached him.”³⁶ The Polish infantry had been decimated, and what remained of it began to vacate Ukrainian territory.

Dark clouds were also gathering on the northern border of the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. Its King Zygmunt III had inherited the Swedish Crown from his father John Vasa, but tu­tored by a Jesuit he grew up as a devout Roman Catholic and was rejected by the Protestant Swedish nobility. Zygmunt re­sponded by invading Sweden in 1594, but after initial successes he was defeated four years later in the battle of Linkoping. Nei­ther Zygmunt nor his son Jan Casimir renounced the Swedish throne, however, and there the matter stood until Charles X be­came King of Sweden in 1654.

Poland and Sweden were also vying for control of the lu­crative Baltic trade, and matters came to a head when Jan Casimir refused to renounce his claim to the Swedish throne. Charles X declared war on the Polish king, and in February 1655 the Swedish commander in Livonia laid siege to Duna- burg, the key Polish fortress on the Dvina River. The main Polish army, supported by the Elector of Brandenburg^,s Prus­sians and the Moldavians, was fighting the Cossacks in western Ukraine, Radziwills Lithuanians were tied up in Belarus, and in April a Swedish force landed in Polish Pomerania while on 21 July a Swedish army commanded by Arvid Wittenberg was allowed free passage by the Elector OfBrandenberg into Poland. Four days later the governors of the Poznan and Kalisz pro­vinces recognized Charles X as their King, and on 18 August at Klejdany in the part of Lithuania not yet occupied by Muscovite troops and the Cossacks, Prince Radziwill acknowledged the Swedish king as his sovereign. InJune a 13,000 man Polish Crown army had been defeated at Ujscie by a Swedish force of similar size under Wittenberg, and reinforced by a fresh corps led by Charles X himself following victories at Piatek and Nisko the Swedes occupied most of Greater Poland.

Warsawfell on 8 September 1655, abandoned by KingJan Casimir, who fled to Silesia, but a week later with the defeat at Zarnow it was the king s turn to be abandoned by the nobility of Little Polandwhich recognized Charles X as their sovereign. Cracow surrendered following a two-week siege, and except for Galicia (and parts of western Ukraine) all of Poland was in Swedish hands. Swedish foreign policy was not only directed against the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom but was also influenced by a desire to stop Muscovywhich was threatening the Swedish Baltic possessions. In need of support, Charles X turned to Ukraine as his only anti-Polish ally, and as informed by Khmel­nitsky a potentially anti-Muscovite supporter as well. For Ukraine, Sweden was a more distant and safer ally than either Muscovy or the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom, and in case of war could easily strike at either one of Ukraine s neighbors.

Khmelnitsky^,s Cossacks and the Muscovite corps had driven the Poles and their allies out of western Ukraine and were laying siege to the fortress of Kamianets-Podilsky when Charles Xs envoy Alexander Torkvat arrived seeking a military agreement with Khmelnitsky. An alliance was concluded and towards the end of August the Ukrainian-Muscovite army en­tered Galicia, capturing the main urban centers of Ternopil, Terebovlia, Halych, and towns and villages within a distance of 30-60 miles. The main objective was Lviv, and most stone cas­tles were bypassed to save time and manpower, although at least 28 forts and towns were captured during the advance. As in Be­larus, Hetman Khmelnitsky ensured that towns which surren­dered would pledge allegiance to the Cossack Zaporozhian Army and not to the tsar, to the point of expelling Muscovite troops from the captured towns. We have a Tsar s letter to the Hetman, with the complaint that when

... you arrived at the first town, Husiatyn, and soldiers from the boyar’s (Buturlin’s) regiment began to advance and entered the town, you ordered those men to be repelled from the town, and in repelling them many were cut down, and cannons were fired at those who had advanced into the town.”³⁷

While the Ukrainian-Muscovite army was driving the Poles out ofVolinia, Podilia, and Galicia, a Cossack-Muscovite force of several thousand led by Prince Volkonskyleft Kyiv, ad­vanced into Belarus, crossed the Pripet River and entered Turov which surrendered without a fight. Sailing up the Pripet the force took Stolin, which was defended by a garrison of 300 Lithuanian cavalry, 400 regular infantry, and 500Jewish militia. In late September Pinsk fell to the Cossacks following a stubborn resistance by the regular garrison and a 3,000 man Jewish militia, recruited from the town burghers.

The Polish Crown Army retreated before the Cossack- Muscovite force, and, refused entry into Lviv, the Poles sought refuge behind the walls of Horodok. The town was captured by the Ukrainian colonel of Myrhorod and the tsars com­mander Romodanovsky, with the Polish Army destroyed by Cossack infantry. Khmelnitsky established his headquarters on St. Georges Mound and for the next several weeks besieged Lviv, but once again refusing to take it by storm. Detachments were sent over a wide area in search of supplies and to establish Cossack order, with many local troops going over to the Hetman for the "usual pay.” The forays were limited, no doubt on orders OfKhmelnitsky, who was seeking to win over the local population for support, but it seems the Muscovites were under no such constraint, as was recorded by a local observer: ""Khmel­nitsky was stationed (at Lviv) for several weeks sending out de­tachments beyond the Dnister (river) and Peremyshl, Halych, and Iaroslav.... Muscovites carried out great depredations against the unfortunate people, outdoing the Cossack bandits twice over... ”³⁸

We know from German and Polish sources of the capture of Lublin, a Iargelyundefended city which surrendered to the Cossack-Muscovite force without a struggle. The town was made to agree to grant more rights to the Greek Orthodox pop­ulation and surrender war materiel and cash, often from the looted Roman Catholic nobility and Jews. The written reports are somewhat Contradictorybut it seems some nobles and Jews lost their lives, but more were spared—""Muscovy killed and murdered, but the Cossacks had a ban against this: they killed those who defended themselves but mainly released them alive.”³⁹ Khmelnitsky had instructed the regimental colonels that all captured towns were to swear loyalty to the Cossack Zaporozhian Army and not to the tsar.

Lviv, on the other hand, had declared itself for Polish Royal authority and refused to surrender, reminding the hetman of his previous benevolent behavior towards the city. Khmelnitsky and his officer corps were seeking to expand Ukrainian territory and population, and all previous lands of Rus up to the Vistula River were considered a part of their domain, where the Greek religion and their language were still used. It seems fairly certain that a compromise had been reached at Kamianets-Podilsky, whereas Charles X recognized all lands east of Lviv as Cossack territory to be beyond any future claims. With the fall of Cracow on 17 October, however, the political situation underwent a drastic change. The Polish nobility, palatine governors, and the Crown Army swore loyalty to Charles X as the Protector of the Kingdom of Poland, and demanded the restoration of all eastern boundaries and territories. The new King of Poland now reneged on his agreement with Hetman Khmelnitsky and demanded the Cossacks withdraw from Galicia and the western regions of Podilia and Volynia, all of which became a part of his domain. Moreover, documents indicate that al­though Charles X was prepared to maintain Khmelnitsky’s Ukraine as a semi-autonomous region, it was to be held firmly under Swedish control. Charles Xs betrayal sent a wave of re­sentment across the Cossack ranks, expressed by a secretary from Romny:

“As for the Swedish king—a curse on his mother—he took Lublin which had sworn an oath to us. In taking Zamosc as well, he had to storm it four times, and he is heading directly for Lviv to capture it... they (the Polish nobility) are boasting about marching against us to take back their estates.”⁴⁰

Once again the inhabitants of Galicia failed to support the Ukrainian Hetman, and now on 6 November word came that Khan Mehmet Mirza was moving into the Ukrainian steppe with a large Crimean army. Tsar Alexei and Nechais Cossack regiments were busy fighting in Belarus and Lithuania, and the Swedes and Poles under Charles X were advancing into Galicia. Unable to fight on three fronts, on 8 November Khmelnitsky ordered a withdrawal from Lviv, ending a seven week siege. De­manding a ransom of400,OOO pieces of gold, the hetman settled for 60,000 as the Cossack-Muscovite army began to move out to confront the Tatars and avoid a confrontation with the Swedes. Khmelnitsky was reminded once again not to put his trust in princes.

KingJan Casimir’s Polish and Galician territory was now occupied by the Swedes and their Prussian allies, except for the key port of Gdansk and the fortified monastery of Jasna Gora near Chestekova. Besieged by the Swedes, the monastery held out in a heroic defense, forcing General Burchard Muller to withdraw. The victory was considered a miracle attributed to what was originally a Greek Orthodox icon of the Mother of God, painted in Constantinople and presented to the prince of Galicia in the 14th century. In the meantime Jan Casimir was seeking allies wherever he could, even requesting Khmelnitsky s old friend and godfather to his children Stanislaw Lubowicki to approach the hetman with a suggestion for a Polish-Ukrainian alliance. The proposal ended without issue, and is of little in­terest except for Khmelnitsky’s letter, which illustrates the com­plete and irreversible rupture which by now existed between the two countries.

Just remember, Mister Godfather, what was promised to us at Zamostia, at Zboriv, at Bila Tserka and other occasions, and what actually came of that?... it was immediately said that “there is no need to keep oaths to schismatics (Greek Orthodox)!” The king’s soldiers abused (Cossack) hospitality, called them churls, beat them, seized all their valuables.... When the Cossacks as­sembled... Ieavingtheirwivesandchildrenathome... the Pol­ish soldiers first raped the Cossackwives, and on departing locked them together with their children in their houses and burned them like rats.... Nor did they have pity on our priests, they executed countless numbers of them.... The King now begs us for help in vain, and anyone who tries to reconcile the Cos­sacks with the Poles would also try in vain.⁴¹

Poland was Ukraine’s most implacable enemy and the greatest threat to its independence, and the powerful Polish magnates had not renounced their previous possessions in Cossack Ukraine.

The successful defense of Jasna Gora in December 1655 became a symbol of anti-Swedish and Roman Catholic resist­ance as the Swedes began the usual confiscations, which in­cluded the looting of Catholic churches. In December 1655 the Polish Field Hetman Stanislaw Potocki renounced his oath to Charles X and organized a nobles’ anti-Swedish coalition at Tyszowce, while towards the end of the year the Lithuanian governor of Vitebsk, Paul Sapiega, raised an anti-Swedish force. Then in the spring of 1656 Jan Casimir returned to Lviv and on 30 June following a short siege Warsawwas recovered with Tatar help. Popular guerrilla bands were also disrupting Swedish lines of communication and attacking supply requisitioning parties. The civilian population however, suffered from both sides and when not paid (which was often the case), Polish sol­diers also looted civilians.

Hard pressed, the Swedes began to retreat towards the Baltic coast and the situation continued to deteriorate, as Tsar Alexei declared war and as a Polish ally invaded Swedish Livo­nia. Austria also agreed to send Jan Casimir help and Charles X now realized that betraying the Ukrainian Cossacks was a major error. He had few allies left except for Khmelnitskywho, in the meantime, was developing alliances with Greek Orthodox Moldavia and Wallachia while in June 1655 he had opened ne­gotiations with Transylvania. Khmelnitskywas not included in the tsar’s peace talks with Poland, and when the hetman’s del­egates returned with news that they were prevented from at­tending the negotiations Khmelnitsky flew into a rage, calling the tsar names “not fit for a Christian.” A part of the Pereiaslav rapprochement between Muscovy and Ukraine was of a re­ligious nature in defense of the Greek Orthodox Church, which was perceived to be in danger as rumors circulated that the tsar was prepared to hand over western Ukraine to Catholic Poland. Apart of the deal was the Polish Council of Nobles’ announce­ment that they could accept TsarAlexei as King of Poland and Lithuania, an illusory offer made under desperate circum­stances, but one that the tsar was eager to accept.

Awide breach had opened between Ukriane and Muscovy, one that would not soon be healed. Moscow’s deal with Poland- Lithuania demonstrated to Khmelnitskythat the tsar was treat­ing him as a simple subject and was seeking total domination of Ukraine. The tsar’s alliance was still needed to avoid another war on the eastern border and, in his correspondence with the tsar Khmelnitsky continued to pay lip service to his “high hand” and to acknowledge Alexei as the protector of the Greek Or­thodox faith.

Therefore you, great sovereign, the sole champion of the Ortho­dox faith and Church, beholding such perfidy on the part of these enemies (the Catholics) of ours, do not abandon us to the abuse of people of alien faith, but keep us constantly in your favor and our liberties [emphasis mine].⁴²

Aparticular enmity was reserved for the Greek Catholic (“Uni­ate”) Church: “Because the Union is an affront to almighty God, it must be eradicated everywhere at once, without using any royal privileges as excuses.”⁴³ The tsar s double dealing was lead­ing Khmelnitsky and the Cossack officer corps to repudiate the allegiance sworn to Tsar Alexei at Pereiaslav.

Cossack social order was maintained in Homel and most of southern Belarus, and in another direct challenge to the tsar, Hetman Khmelnitsky concluded a military treaty with Tran­sylvania in September 1656 sponsoring the Protestant Prince Rakoczi, who was a direct descendant of Stefan Batory for the Polish Crown. This was a direct challenge to Tsar Alexei, who was also considered for the Polish-Lithuanian throne. In return, Prince Rakoczi recognized Podilia, Volynia, and Polisia as an integral part of Cossack Ukraine. The treaty seems to have been debated amongst the Cossacks for some time, due mainly to Ukrainian democratic practices as was explained to the im­patient Rakoczi by his delegate Ferenc Sebesi, who provides us with an interesting comparison between the Cossack and the general royal decision making:

... we should confirm our friendship not only with our writing but also with our oath (as is Cossack custom), you can answer them that concerning this we are an absolute ruler; with God’s help, nothing but death can change our situation, and we rule personally. Their situation is different: the maintenance or change of the hetmancy depends on the free will of the subjects, and the hetman does not have (absolute) personal authority... they (the Cossacks) have a custom of swearing an oath, and not just the hetman himself; but in our land and among other Christian rulers only a diploma is issued, with a reference to the ruler’s word....⁴⁴

In December of the same year Sweden, Brandenburg, and Transylvania signed a treaty for the annexation of Polish lands, by which Sweden was to obtain Baltic Pomerania, West Prussia, Courland, Livonia and parts of Lithuania with the remaining territory to become an autonomous principality; Brandenburg was to receive Poznan and Kalish, while Little Poland with cap­ital Cracowwould go to Transylvania. The fate of Galicia seems to have been indeterminate and was probably used as bait to draw Ukraine into the alliance.

The military agreement reached at Kamianets-Podilsky between Khmelnitsky and Charles X was still in force, but was meeting some resistance among the Cossacks at being con­verted into a binding military alliance, the Swedish king’s be­trayal still being fresh in their minds. Charles X, however, had come to realize the importance of Cossack support as he pointed out on 17 July 1656 in a report to the Swedish State Council: “In future the Cossacks must be our principal bulwark in these lands. Therefore in making peace with the Poles we in­tend to take the interests of the Cossacks under our protection... for the Cossack force may be more important to us than the Poles.”⁴⁵ Polish resistance was stiffening and on 30 June 1656, Warsawwas liberated by KingJan Casimir. A month later thun­derous battles began near Warsaw with the Poles supported by Crimean Tatars and the Swedes by a 3,000 man Cossack de­tachment sent by Khmelnitsky as a sign of good will, and in de­fiance of the tsar. As winter was approaching the Cossacks learned that on 3 November the tsar and Poland-Lithuania had signed a military treaty in Vilnius.

There matters stood, with Polish resistance beginning to assume the form of guerrilla warfare with a larger force besieging Cracow. Charles X was running out of manpower and in need of support from the Hungarians and Ukrainian Cos­sacks. ByJanuary 1657 Rakoczi was ready to move, and a month later, joined by Acting Hetman Anton Zhdanovychs 20,000 Cossacks in Peremyshl and Iaroslav, the Prince set out for Cra­cow at the head of 18,000 Hungarian cavalry, 5,000 infantry, and 6,000 Moldavians, as reported by Charles Xs envoy at Rakoczis camp, Heinrich Sternbach. The Swede also made it a point to report that all Cossacks and serving men were equipped with shoulder-held muskets, a practice peculiar to Ukrainians.⁴⁶ Cracowwas not only King Batory s symbolic cap­ital but the citywas also of great importance as the center for the lucrative salt mines and was known for its stockpiles of the valuable mineral. A Polish army under Stanislaw Potocki was routed at Zamosc and in March Cracow’s besieged Swedish de­fenders were relieved from a long siege. Hearing of Rakoczi s advance and the relief of Cracow, Charles X left his winter quarters in Prussia and by April had jointed the Hungarian- Ukrainian army at Sandomierz. The war rapidly had become a rout for Poland and is known in Polish history as “The Flood,” since, except for Gdansk and the monastery at Jasna Gora, the entire Polish kingdom was overrun by the enemy. Zhdanovych had entered Polisia capturing Brest, whose nobility and burghers swore loyalty to the Cossack Zaporozhian Army, while northern and central Poland were in the hands of Swedish and Rakoczis Hungarian troops and Zhdanovychs Ukrainian Cossacks.

Podilia and Volynia were also under Ukrainian control, but although occupied by Rakoczis and Zhdanovychs forces Galicia remained aloof and the Cossacks received little support. Many Cossacks had lost family and dear ones during the 1655 Polish destruction of Bratslav province, and it was now the Polish population which began to suffer the devastation and cruelty of war. As described by a Ukrainian chronicler who signed himself simply as “Eyewitness”:

... having followed the Carpathian foothills to Sambor (the Cos­sacks) joined up with the Hungarian (Transylvanian) armies, and then with the Swedish ones, and they laid waste to Poland all the way to Prussia, for they had even taken Warsaw. Very great devas­tation befell Poland then, for having begun in winter (of 1657) they pillaged there almost the whole summer.⁴⁷

The success of the invading armies was not to last. Faced with widespread sacking and looting of cities, towns, and vil­lages, accompanied by the destruction of Roman Catholic churches and monasteries, the Polish people began to fight back in support of KingJan Casimir. External help was also not long in coming. A peace treaty had been signed with Tsar Alexei; Leopold I of Bohemia and Hungary (then Holy Roman Em­peror) sent an army of 30,000 men; the Duke OfBrandenberg changed sides to support the Poles; and in May the Crimean khan came to Jan Casimir’s rescue. Then a Danish army invaded Sweden to recover the province of Skania and Polish troops at­tacked Charles Xs possessions in Germany. Without informing his allies by Mid-June of 1657 the Swedish king had withdrawn the bulk of his forces to face the Danes. The crucial factor was Prince Rakoczis poor leadership. He was a bad commander, refusing to listen to advice, was willing to accept heavy casualties and replaced discipline with a preferential treatment of Hun­garians compared to the Cossacks. Not consulted on crucial strategies, the experienced Zhdanovych accepted the demands of his Cossacks, who Sawtheywere in a difficult and dangerous position and refused to obey orders. By mid-June they began to head for Ukraine, no doubt sharing the Cossack Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky s disdainful opinion of the prince—“we do not like to associate our weapons with those of a soldier trained be­hind a stove.”

InJuly Rakoczi was defeated by a Polish-Lithuanian army at Czarny Ostrow and compelled to break off his alliance with Charles X. Following the Cossacks into Ukraine, Rakoczi was surrounded by a Polish-Tatar force near Medzybozh in Volynia, and forced to capitulate in return for free passage. True to form, the Poles and Tatars failed to keep the agreement. Reluctant to lose so much booty the Tatars stormed the unsuspecting Tran­sylvanian camp, followed by the Polish soldiers. The inept Rakoczi himself managed to escape and gain the safety of his domain while Zhdanovych continued heading to Ukraine, with the army and individual Cossacks loaded with spoils of war.