Notes

Introduction

1 Martin Malia, History’s Locomotives: Revolutions and the Making of the Modern World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 5. Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010) generally follows Malia’s model of ever-spiralling violence, but the author starts his argument with the 1920s in the USSR, not Europe in 1914.

2 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 303-11.

3 Richard Overy, “Total War II: The Second World War,” in The Oxford History of Modern War, ed. Charles Townshend, new updated ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 139.

4 General Erich Ludendorff, the German First Quartermaster General in 1918, coined the term “total war.” See his Der totale Krieg (Munich: Ludendorffs Verlag s.m.b.h., 1935). A.S. Rappoport’s translation, The Nation at War (London: Hutchinson, 1936), mistranslates “totalitarian” for the German word “totale” (total). For short review of total war, see Jeremy Black, The Age

of Total War, 1860-1945 (Lanham, MD, and Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

5 Michael Mann, “The Role of Nationalism in the Two World Wars,” in Nationalism and War, ed. John A. Hall and Sinisa Malesevic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 173.

6 R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Martin C.J. Bootsma and Neil M. Ferguson, “The Effect of Public Health Measures on the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in U.S. Cities,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 18 (1 May 2007): 7588; Geoff Eley, “Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923,” in Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 218.

7 Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1968), 264. In the Second World War, “the civilian casualties exceeded the military.” Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms:

A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 894. Alexander B. Downs, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1:259, claims that the two world wars killed approximately forty-three to fifty-four million non-combatants, comprising between 50 to 62 per cent of all war-related deaths. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 9, provides a total number of forty­eight million civilian deaths in both world wars.

8 C.R. Nordstrom, “War: Anthropological Aspects,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Amsterdam-Paris-New York: Elsevier, 2001), 24:16,352-3.

9 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremities: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914­1991 (New York: Vintage, 1994), 51; cited in Ian Kershaw, “War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe,” Contemporary European History 14, no. 1 (2005): 109.

10 Hans Speier, “The Effect of War on the Social Order,” Annals of the American Academy Political and Social Science 216 (1941): 88; and Hans Speier, “Class Structure and ‘Total War,’” American Sociological Review 4, no. 3 (1939): 371.

11 Harry Eckstein, “Introduction: Toward a Theoretical Study of Internal War,” in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, ed. H. Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), 3; and idem, “On the Etiology of Internal Wars,” History and Theory 4, no. 2 (1965): 133.

12 Black, The Age of Total War, 9.

13 Arthur Marwick, “Introduction,” in Total War and Social Change, ed. A. Marwick (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1988), xiv; A. Marwick, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study of Britain, France, and Germany (London: Macmillan, 1974), 13; and A.

14 Andriy Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History, A Historians’ War,” Ab Imperio, no. 1 (2015): 470.

15 Michael Zantovsky, Havel: A Life (New York: Grove Press, 2014), 317, in describing the actions of Czech and Slovak dissidents after the end of the Prague Spring and before the Velvet Revolution of 1989.

16 These ideas came from Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in his The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 75; C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 20-8; C. Tilly, “War in History,” Sociological Forum 7,

no. 1 (1992): 187-95; Simon Philpott, “Call and Response: Violence and the Making of Modern Nations,” Political Theory 33, no. 3 (2005): 432-6; and Mark Von Hagen, “‘U viinakh tvoriat’sia natsii’: natsiotvorennia v Ukraini pid chas Pershoi svitovoi viiny,” Ukraina: Protsesy natsiotvorennia, ed. Andreas Kappeler (Kyiv: K.I.S., 2011), 271-84; Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Nationalism and War, ed. John A. Hall and Sinisa Malesevic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

17 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/html (accessed 31 July 2015).

18 Jacques Vallin, France Mesle, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pyrozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s,” Population Studies 56, no. 3 (2002): 249-64; Ella Libanova, Natalia Levchuk, Emelian Rudnyts’kyi, Natalia Runhach, Svetlana Poniakina, and Pavel Shevchuk, “Smernost naseleniia Ukrainy v trudoak- tivnom vozraste,” Demoskop Weekly, 31 March-13 April 2008, http:// demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0327/tema01.php (accessed 28 March 2012); “Naibil’she poterpily lisostepovi raiony Kyivshchyny i Kharkivshchyny, iaki ne vidihravaly providnoi roli u khlibozativliakh,” Uriadovyi kur’ier,

22 November 2013, 6-7.

19 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 40, 41.

20 Ibid., 41.

21 Ibid.

22 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ukraine’s Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space,” Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1998), 4-5.

23 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996), 137-8. Also see Ivan

Katchanovski, Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova (Stuttgart-Hannover: ibidem-Verlag, 2006).

24 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 137.

25 Ibid., 138.

26 Ibid., 165.

27 “We make up selves from a tool kit of options made available by our culture and society. We do make choices, but we do not determine the options among which we choose.” K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Charles Taylor et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 155. These ideas follow those of Karl Marx, who wrote in 1852: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circum­stances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in cre­ating something entirely new, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their services and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed lan­guage.” Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonoparte,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C.

28 See William H. McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

29 See Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

30 Omeljan Pritsak, The Origin of Rus’ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981); Serhii Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Ihor Sevcenko, Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century, 2nd rev. ed. (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2009); Natalia M. Iakovenko, Paralel’nyi svit: Doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlen’ ta idei v Ukraini XVI-XVII st. (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2002); Borys A. Gudziak, Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2001); Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Frank E. Sysyn, Between Poland and Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600-1653 (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1985); Zenon E. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988); Zenon E. Kohut, Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies Press, 2011); Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Jan Kozik, The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia, 1815-1849, ed.

31 Sevienko, Ukraine between East and West, 187-96.

32 Kohut, Making Ukraine, 1-57.

33 Subtelny, Ukraine: A History; Magocsi, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples; Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation; Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); and Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

34 Snyder, Bloodlands.

35 Norman Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), and Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Chapter 1

1 Milan Kundera, Les testament trahis (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 25; cited in Uriel Abulof, “‘Small Peoples’: The Existential Uncertainty of Ethnonational Communities,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2009), 227.

Oleksandr Dovzhenko, “Zapysni knyzhky,” in O. Dovzhenko, Tvory v p”iaty tomakh (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1966), 5:106-7; cited in Ivan Koszeliwec, Oleksander Dovzhenko: Sproba tvorchoi biohrafii (Munich: Suchasnist, 1980), 32-4; and Alexander Dovzhenko, The Poet as Filmmaker: Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Marco Carynnyk (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973), 198-9. Serhyi Chornyi, Natsional’nyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy v XX storichchi: Dovidnyk (Kyiv: Kartohrafiia, 2001), 48.

For the Russian Empire in 1897, see Demoscope Weekly, no. 647-648 (15­30 June 2015), http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97_uezd_eng. php?reg=0 (accessed 1 August 2015), and for the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1910, Peter F. Sugar, “The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule,” Slavic Review 22, no. 1 (1963): 9.

Donald Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); and Vsevolod Naulko, “Foreward,” in Ukrainians in the Eastern Diaspora: An Atlas, comp. Vsevolod Naulko, Ihor Vynnychenko, and Rostyslav Sossa (Kyiv/Edmonton/Toronto: Mapa Ltd. and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1993), 2.

See Ewa T. Morawska, For Bread with Butter: The Life-Stories of East Central Europeans in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1890-1940 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Vsevolod Naulko, Khto i vidkoly zhyve v Ukraini (Kiev: Holovna spetsial’na redaktsiia lit-ry movamy nats. menshyn Ukrainy, 1998), 12.

See David Saunders, “What Makes a Nation a Nation? Ukrainians since 1600,” Ethnic Groups 10, vol. 1 (1993):101-24.

John A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 5; cited in ibid., 119.

See John-Paul Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1988). Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Charles Taylor et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 31.

Ibid., 31-2.

Charles Tilly, “Political Identities in Changing Polities,” Social Research 70, no. 2 (2003): 608.

Alfred J. Rieber, “Struggle over the Borderlands,” in The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY, and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 62. On the Normanist-Anti-Normanist debate, see Omeljan Pritsak, The Origin of Rus’ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981), 1:3-8; on the disagreements between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers, see Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), and A. Walicki, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979).

15 See Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For the autobiographies of prominent members of the Ukrainian national movement, such as Taras Shevchenko, Panteleimon Kulish, Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Volodymyr Antonovych, Oleksandr Barvins’kyi, Sofia Rusova, Konstantyn Mykhal’chuk, Oleksandr Potebnia, Ivan Nechui-Levyts’kyi, Halyna Zhurba, Ivan Franko, Bohdan Lepkyi, and Stepan Smal’-Stots’kyi, see Sami pro sebe: Avtobiohrafii vydatnykh ukraintsiv XlX-ho stolittia, ed. lurii Luts’kyi (George Luckyj) (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, 1989). Also see Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, “Spomyny,” Kyiv, nos. 8-12 (1988) and nos. 8-11 (1989). For a selection of their important writings in English, see Fashioning Modern Ukraine: Selected Writings of Mykola Kostomarov, Volodymyr Antonovych, and Mykhailo Drahomanov, ed. Serhiy Bilenky (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2014).

16 Tilly, “Political Identities,” 613-14.

17 Joseph Rothschild, “Observations on Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe,” Political Science Quarterly 92, no. 3 (1977): 496.

18 Jack P. Greene, “Paine, America, and the ‘Modernization’ of Political Consciousness,” Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 1 (1978): 91.

19 Tilly, “Political Identities,” 609.

20 Ukrainian speakers constituted 47.4 per cent of the Kuban Oblast’s total pop­ulation, and less in the other neighbouring majority Russian-speaking prov­inces: Stavropol (36.6 per cent), Voronezh (36.2), the Don Cossack Oblast (28), Grodno (22.6), Kursk (22.3), and Bessarabia (19.6). See N.A. Troinitskii, ed., Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g. (Saint Petersburg: Izd. Tsentral’nogo statisticheskago komiteta Ministerstva vnu- trennikh del, 1899-1905), table 13, vols. 3, 9, 11, 12, 45, and 47.

21 Ibid., vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, and 48.

22 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (New York: Penguin, 1996), 80.

23 The information in these two paragraphs on the Pale of Settlement comes from H.R., “Pale of Settlement,” Jewish Encyclopedia (1906), http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/11862-pale-of-settlement (accessed

27 July 2012); B.D. Brutskus, compiler, Statistika evreiskago naselenia.

Raspredielenie po territorii, demograficheskie i kul’turnye priznaki evreikago naselenia po dannym perepisi 1897 g. (SPB: Tip. „Sever,” 1909), table 2; John Klier, “Pale of Settlement,” The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, http://www.yivoenclopedia.org/article.aspx/Pale_of_Settlement (accessed 27 July 2012); Peter Potichnyj, “Pale of Settlement,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine (1985), 3:755-6; and Henry Abramson, “Ukraine,” YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/ article.aspx/Ukraine (accessed 4 August 2012). For S. An-Ski’s ethnographic study of the Pale in the first decade of the twentieth century, see Nathaniel Deutsch, The Jewish Dark Continent: Life and Death in the Russian Pale of Settlement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). For An-Ski’s record of his efforts to provide relief for Jews caught between the warring armies of Russia, Germany, and Austria during the Great War, see S. Ansky, The Enemy at His Pleasure: A Journey through the Jewish Pale of Settlement during World War I, ed. and trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002).

24 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule.” Nation­Building and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 23. These seven Hungarian counties included Spish (Hungarian: Szepes), Sarysh (H: Saros), Zemplyn (H: Zemplen), Uzh (H: Ung), Ugocha (H: Ugocsa), Maramorosh (H: Maramaros), and Bereg.

25 In Galicia, the Polish speakers constituted 58.6 per cent of the total popula­tion, and the German speakers 1.1 per cent. In Bukovina, Romanian speakers constituted 34.4 per cent and German speakers 21.4 per cent of the total pop­ulation. Robert A. Kann, The Multi-National Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918 (New York: Octagon Books, 1964), 2:302. Large numbers of Magyar speakers (413,485), Slovaks (365,240), and Germans (40,535) also lived in Transcarpathia. S. Tomashivs’kyi, “Etnohrafichna karta Uhors’koi Rusi,” Stat’ipo slavianove- deniiu (Saint Petersburg: Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk, 1910), 3:254-5.

26 Kann, The Multi-National Empire, 2:299-300; and Tomashivs’kyi, “Etnohrafichna,” 254-5.

27 Chornyi, National’nyi sklad, 48.

28 Robert Edelman, Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia’s Southwest (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 39-40.

29 Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar Jr suggest a five-stage model, which in­cludes the Novhorod-Siversk, Kharkiv, Kiev, Geneva, and Galician stages. See their “Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,” Slavic Review 23, no. 2 (1963): 5-36.

30 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 22-3. Hroch defined these three stages as Phase A, B, and C. Roman Szporluk renamed these phases as the academic, cultural, and political stages of all national movements. See Roman Szporluk, Ukraine: A Brief History (Detroit: Ukrainian Festival Committee, 1979), 41-54.

31 On this iron distinction, see Pritsak and Reshetar, “Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building.”

32 See George S.N. Luckyj, Between Gogol and Sevcenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine, 1798-1847 (Munich: W. Fink, 1971), and Edyta M. Bojanowska, Nikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

33 J.-P Himka and B. Krawchenko, “Intelligentsia,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 2:337.

34 Ibid., 337-8; and Stephen Velychenko, “Local Officialdom and National Movements in Imperial Russia: Administrative Shortcomings and Under­Government,” in Ethnic and National Issues in Russian and East European History: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995, ed. John Morrison (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 80. Of the 127,000 people the census counted as having occupa­tions involving intellectual labour, less than a third identified themselves as Ukrainians. For example, only 16 per cent of the lawyers, less than a quarter of the teachers, and only 10 per cent of the writers and artists in Ukraine claimed Ukrainian nationality. Himka and Krawchenko, “Intelligentsia,” 337-8.

35 Elena Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii 1920-1930-e gody (Moscow: Evropa, 2006), 33.

36 For excellent explorations of the development of these processes in the nine­teenth century, see Serhiy Bilenky, Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian Political Imaginations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); and Faith Hillis, Children of Rus’: Right Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). Also see Aleksei I. Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.) (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000), which is better read in the original, not the English translation: The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century (Budapest and New York: Central European University, 2003).

37 This paragraph is inspired by Milan Kundera, “The Czech Wager,” New York Review of Books, 22 January 1981, 21.

Vasyl Markus, “Kharkiv University,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 2:458, 459. Paul Robert Magocsi, “The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework,” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 16, nos. 1-2 (1989): 51.

George G. Grabowicz, The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Sevcenko (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 1; cited in Matthew D. Pauly, Breaking the Tongue: Language, Education, and Power in Soviet Ukraine, 1923-1934 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 63.

See Thomas M. Prymak, Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), and Serhii Plokhy, Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (Edmonton, Alberta) is in the pro­cess of publishing all ten volumes of Hrushevshky’s magnum opus, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi, into English.

On recent examples of dignity playing a critical role in radical social change, see Leon Aron, “Everything You Think You Know about the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2011), and Leon Aron, Roads to the Temple: Memory, Truth, Ideals, and Ideas in the Making of the Russian Revolution, 1987-1991 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012). Rieber, “Struggle over the Borderlands,” 68.

These ideas come from Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4-5.

Marc Raeff, “Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy toward the Nationalities,” in Soviet Nationality Policies, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 26.

Ibid., 30.

See Zenon E. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988).

Raeff, “Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy,” 31-2.

Ibid., 32.

Edward C. Thaden, “Introduction,” in Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914, ed. Edward C. Thaden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 9.

David Saunders, “Russia’s Nationality Policy: The Case of Ukraine (1847­1941),” in Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut, ed.

Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 406.

See Fedir Savcenko, The Suppression of the Ukrainian Activities in 1876 (Munich: W. Fink, 1970).

Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, Ob otmene stesnenii malorusskago pechat- nogo slova (St Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, 1910). Oleksandr Lotots’kyi, Storinky munyloho (Warsaw: Ukrains’kyi naukovyi institute, 1933), 2:224.

By the end of the nineteenth century, many tsarist officials recognized that the Ukrainian-speaking populations of the Habsburg and Romanov empires were related, but considered the Greek Catholics religious renegades. In their view of the world, the Ukrainian-speaking population left the Orthodox Church in 1596 under Polish pressure and began to consider themselves sepa­rate from the Russians only then.

Theodore R. Weeks, “National Minorities in the Russian Empire, 1897­1917,” in Russia under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion, 1894-1917, ed. Anna Geifman (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 118, 119.

Ibid., 118.

Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1985), 31. Saunders, “Russia’s Nationality Policy,” 408.

Geroid Tanquary Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 120.

Robert Edelman, Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia’s Southwest (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 63-5. Also see H.R. Weinstein, “Land Hunger and Nationalism in the Ukraine, 1905-1917,” Journal of Economic History 2, no. 1 (1942): 24-35.

Ibid., 100.

P.P. Telichuk, Ekonomichni osnovy ahrarnoi revoliutsii na Ukraini (Kiev, 1971), 39, 15; Lewis Siegelbaum, “The Odessa Grain Trade: A Case Study in Urban Growth and Development in Tsarist Russia,” Journal of European Economic History 9 (Spring 1980): 113-51; cited in Edelman, Proletarian Peasants, 39-40.

Edelman, Proletarian Peasants, 41-3.

Frank Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), 13, 67.

Olga Andriewsky, “The Making of the Generation of 1917: Towards a Collective Biography,” in Plokhy and Sysyn, Synopsis, 22.

Saunders, “Russia’s Nationality Policy,” 409.

David Saunders, “Russia, the Balkans, and Ukraine,” in Russia and the Wider World in Historical Perspective: Essays for Paul Dukes, ed. Cathryn Brennan and Murray Frame (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 101.

Ronald Wardbaugh, Languages in Competition: Dominance, Diversity, and Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 19.

The phrase comes from Thomas W. Laqueur, “Toward a Cultural Ecology of Literacy in England, 1600-1850,” in Literacy in Historical Perspective, ed. Daniel P. Resnick (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1983), 55. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Essays in Modern Ukrainian History (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), 377.

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1991).

Jan Kozik, The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia, 1815-1849 (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 251. Ann Sirka, The Nationality Question in Austrian Education: The Case of Ukrainians in Galicia, 1867-1914 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1980), 168. Document 174, Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. lurii Slyvka et al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1995), vol. 1 (1939-1953): 378.

Sirka, The Nationality Question, 19.

Sugar, “The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies,” 17. “Bukovina,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 1:317; Himka and Krawchenko, “Intelligentsia,” 338.

Sugar, “The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies,” 16-17; Himka and Krawchenko, “Intelligentsia,” 338.

“Properly understood, civil society... encompass[es] all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the state (including political parties) and the market. It includes the gamut of organizations that political scientists traditionally label interest groups - not just advocacy NGOs, but also labor unions, professional associations (such as those of doctors and lawyers), chambers of commerce, ethnic associations, and others. It also incorporates the many other associations that exist for purposes other than advancing spe­cific or political agendas, such as religious organizations, student groups, cultural organizations (from choral societies to bird-watching clubs), sports clubs, and informal community groups.” Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 100.

Sirka, The Nationality Question, 5. Ibid., 5.

83 Quoted in Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 43. Article 19 of the Austrian constitution, published on 31 December 1867, recognized the equality of all national groups in Austria and the right of each nationality to preserve its language. This constitution also contained an extensive bill of rights. Hans Kohn, The Habsburg Empire, 1804-1918 (Princeton, NJ: D. van Nostrand, 1961), 47. But, according to Robert A. Kann, Article 19 did not recognize Yiddish as a national language. As a consequence, a “large majority of Jews... registered as Poles” in the Galician censuses and “after 1900 they registered in ever-increasing numbers as Ruthenians.” In Bukovina, they registered uniformly as Germans, and, af­ter 1910, as a separate part of the German national group. Kann, The Multi­National Empire, 2:299-300.

84 These characteristics come from Robert Dahl’s “Democracy,” International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences, as interpreted by Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 107-8.

85 John-Paul Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1988).

86 Henryk Sienkiewicz, a Polish journalist and historical novelist, published With Fire and Sword (Ogniem i mieczem) in 1884. It quickly became a widely read Polish classic. In its depictions of the brutalities of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, it popularized stereotypes of the uncivilized Cossacks and the civi­lized Poles. This book, more any other, negatively defined “the Ukrainian Other” to Poles in Austria-Hungary, then later in post-1918 Poland. This novel also antagonized the Ukrainians, creating an unbridgeable gulf between the Ukrainians and Poles. See Henryk Sienkiewicz, With Fire and Sword, trans. W.S. Kuniczak (New York: Collier Books, Macmillan, 1993). He won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1905.

87 Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia, ed. Andrei Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982).

88 Roman Szporluk, “The Making of Modern Ukraine: The Western Dimension,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 25, nos. 1-2 (2001): 65.

89 Interestingly, under the leadership of Dr Julian Romanchuk, the Ukrainian National Democrats called for a national Jewish curia and for equal rights for Jews as a nationality within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Lila P. Everett, “The Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia,” in Markovits and Sysyn, Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism, 162.

90 W.A. Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of1907 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).

Sirka, The Nationality Question, 14.

Ibid., 14-15, 149; Everett, “The Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia,” 173 (quote).

Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 307.

lulian Bachynsky, Ukraina irredenta, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Vyd. Ukrains’koi molodi, 1924), 95, 97.

Andriewsky, “The Making of the Generation of 1917,” in Plokhy and Sysyn, Synopsis, 20, 21, 22, 24.

Mykola Mikhnovsky, Samostiina Ukraina, introduction by lurii Kollard (Na chuzhyni: Vyd-vo “Ukrains’kii patriot,” 1948), 25, 28-9, 29.

Ibid., 30.

The number of cooperative organizations, primarily consumer cooperatives and credit unions, grew from 450 in 1900 to 6,510 in 1914. By the early 1920s, approximately 20,000 cooperatives and 270 credit unions enrolled nearly six million members. Historical Dictionary of Ukraine, 2nd ed., ed. Ivan Katchanovski, Zenon E. Kohut, Bohdan Y. Nebesio, and Myroslav Yurkevych (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013), 93, 94. Also see Alexander Dillon, “The Rural Cooperative Movement and the Problems of Modernizing in Tsarist and Post-Tsarist Ukraine (New Russia), 1871-1920” (unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of History, Harvard University, 2003). Andreas Kappeler, “A ‘Small People’ of Twenty-five Million: The Ukrainians circa 1900,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (1993), 85-92.

Ibid., 87.

Ibid., 88. Socio-linguists define those who easily shift between two or more languages in conversation as “code switchers.”

Ibid., 86.

George Y. Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, 1900-1941 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1989), 18.

Ibid., 19.

Kappeler, “A ‘Small People’ of Twenty-five Million,” 87.

Document 174, Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli, 379.

Chapter 2

Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution (New York: Viking, 2015), 1.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, edited and with a forward by James Clavell (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), 13.

Fritz Stern, cited by William Anthony Hay, “On the Origins of World War I: When the Lamps Went Out,” Wall Street Journal, 28 March 2013.

Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 159.

Joshua A. Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905-1925 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 4, 8 (quote).

Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, 160-2, develop this phrase.

Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to

Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991 (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland, 1991), 2:705-89.

Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918 (Seattle, WA: Donald W. Treadgold Studies on Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia, University of Washington, 2007), 19.

Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 62.

Ibid., 51, 61.

For the February Revolution, see Marc Ferro, The Russian Revolution of February 1917 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The February Revolution, Petrograd, 1917 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981); and E.N. Burdzhalov, Russia’s Second Revolution: The February 1917 Uprising in Petrograd (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

For a thorough discussion of the role of Russian nationalism and the radical and nationalizing consequences of the Great War, see Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Howard, The First World War, 62.

Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, 69.

Stanislas Kohn and Alexander F. Meyendorff, The Cost of the War to Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1932), 17, 13, 19.

Ibid., 145-6. Based the census of 1897, Ukrainians constituted 73 per cent of the total population of the nine provinces.

Kohn and Meyendorff, The Cost of the War to Russia, 181-2.

Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow, England: Pearson Education, 2005), 72, 73.

Ibid., 167.

Kohn and Meyendorff, The Cost of War to Russia, 138. Stephan G. Prociuk estimated that the total number of Russian military losses, including soldiers who died from epidemics, diseases, and accidents, amounted to 2.5 million. S.G. Prociuk, “Human Losses in the Ukraine in World War I and II,” Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. 13, nos. 35-6 (1973-7): 30.

Prociuk, “Human Losses in the Ukraine,” 31-5.

Ella Libanova, Natalia Levchuk, Emelian Rudnyts’kyi, Natalia Runhach, Svetlana Poniakina, and Pavel Shevchuk, “Smernost naseleniia Ukrainy v tru- doaktivnom vozraste,” Demoskop Weekly, 31 March-13 April 2008, http:// demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0327/tema01.php (accessed 28 March 2012). Prociuk, in contrast, estimated that the Romanov and Habsburg Ukrainian­speaking provinces suffered a total human loss of some six million people during the First World War. Prociuk, “Human Losses in the Ukraine,” 30. See Mark von Hagen, “The Russian Imperial Army and the Ukrainian National Movement in 1917,” Ukrainian Quarterly 54, nos. 3-4 (1998): 220-56.

Cited in Raymond Smith, “Editor’s Note,” in Vincent Shandor, Carpatho- Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1997), ix-x.

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans., ed., and with an introduction by Daniel Donno (New York: Bantam, 2003), 66.

Andriy Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History, A Historians’ War,” Ab Imperio no. 1 (2015): 474.

Von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 25.

Alexander V. Prusin, “The Russian Military and the Jews in Galicia, 1914­1915,” The Military and Society in Russia, 1450-1917, ed. Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe (Boston, Leiden, and Cologne: Brill, 2002), 536-7.

Gatrell, Russia’s First World War, 29; von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 29; and Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, 17, 142-50. Prusin, “The Russian Military and the Jews,” 532.

Dmytro Doroshenko, Moi spomyny pro nedavnie-mynule (1914-1920), 2nd ed. (Munich: Ukrains’ke vydavnytstvo, 1969), 27.

Ibid., 24.

On the Russian administration’s attempts to convert Greek Catholic Ruthenians to the Russian Orthodox faith, see A. Iu. Bakhturina, Politika Rossiiskoi imperii v vostochnoi Galitsii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Assotsiiatsiia issledovatelei rossiiskogo obshchestva XX veka, 2000), 142-83. For an excellent overview of the first Russian occupation of Galicia, see von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, chap. 2. Also see Doroshenko, Moi spomyny, 24-8.

von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 49fn65.

Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 20.

Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 16.

Prusin, “The Russian Military and the Jews,” 540.

Mark von Hagen, “The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire,” in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and Nation­Building, ed. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 35-6.

See von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, chap. 4; Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 466.

Von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 77-9.

For Doroshenko’s memoirs of his governor-generalship, see Doroshenko, Moi spomyny, 96-151.

Arthur J. May, The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), 2:557-8.

Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 282; von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 81-3.

Von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 85.

Von Hagen, “The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity,” 41. Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History, A Historians’ War,” 475. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 3.

Ibid., 143.

Ibid., 183-4; quote from 169-70.

Ibid., 170.

Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 4, 200.

Von Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 17, 65; and Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, intro. Hajo Holborn and James Joll (New York: Norton, 1967). Von Hagen believes that Germany’s policies in the east evolved in an ad hoc manner. See von Hagen, “The Russian Imperial Army and the Ukrainian National Movement in 1917.”

Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 145, 146; Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, chap. 4 and 141.

Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 24; Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, chap. 5.

For an example of the Ukrainian movement’s public declaration of loyalty to Russia, see Symon Petliura’s “Voina i ukraintsi,” Ukrainskaia zhizn, July 1914; republished in Ukrains’ka suspil’no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. Taras Hunczak and Roman Solchanyk (Munich: Suchasnist, 1983), 1:207-10 (cited hereafter as US-PD).

Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 168.

“Manifest Holovnoi ukrains’koi rady,” US-PD, 1:212.

Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History, A Historians’ War,” 475-6. “Holovna ukrains’ka rada do vseho ukrains’koho narodu,” US-PD, 1:213. “Dekliaratsiia Zahal’noi ukrains’koi rady,” US-PD, 1:222-3.

“Do vsikh kul’turnykh narodov svita,” US- PD, 1:226. This vague and highly contested claim included lands larger than today’s Ukraine, with its 603,628 square kilometres.

Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, “Nasha pliatforma,” US-PD, 1:216, 217. SVU’s call for a constitutional monarch most likely reflected this organization’s real­politik. (All of the potential international supporters of an independent Ukraine [the Central Powers] possessed monarchical forms of government.) For a superb biography of one of these potential monarchs, Wilhelm von Habsburg, see Timothy Snyder, The Red Prince: The Secret Lives of a Habsburg Archduke (New York: Basic Books, 2008). For a recent history of the SVU, see Ivan Pater, Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy: Problemy derzhavnosti i sobornosti (Lviv: Natsional’na Akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Institut Ukrainoznavstva im. I. Kryp’iakevycha, 2000).

See the protests by the General Ukrainian Rada (US-PD, 1:231-2) and the Ukrainian parliamentary caucus (US-PD, 1:232-6).

May, The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy, 2:680-1.

Mark Cornwall, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 19, 20, 23.

For a comparative overview of the fall of these empires, see Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923 (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, 205; and Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire.

Cornwall, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary, 34, 35.

Ibid., 23.

Chapter 3

William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming,” The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats, rev., ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 187.

This phrase comes from “Economic chaos drove Russia towards Bolshevism, sometimes despite the Bolsheviks.” Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914­1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 284.

See Ronald Grigor Suny, “Nationalism and Class in the Russian Revolution: A Comparative Discussion,” in Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917, ed. Edith Rogovin Frankel, Jonathan Frankel, and Baruch Knei-Paz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 219-46; and John-Paul Himka, “The National and the Social in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920,” Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, no. 34 (1994): 95-110.

Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (New York: Penguin, 1996), 71.

Quoted in Visnyk Soiuza Vyzvolennia Ukrainy 4, no. 22 (27 May 1917): 351; and in Henryk Jablonski, Polska Autonomiia Narodowa na Ukrainie, 1917­1918 (Warsaw: Nakl. Milosnikow Historii, 1948), 30.

M. Hrushevs’kyi, “lakoi my khochemo avtonomii i federatsii?” in his Vybrani pratsi (New York: Nakladom Holovnoi upravy OURDP v SShA, 1960), 148.

According to Roman Szporluk, Poltava ranked “tenth in size among Ukrainian cities in the Russian Ukraine alone and twelfth if those under Austria are included.” Roman Szporluk, “Kiev as Ukraine’s Primate City,” in Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3-4, part 2 (1979-80): 845.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928): 206-7.

Pavlo Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrains’koi revoliutsii, 1917­1920 (Vienna: Druk J.N. Vernay, 1921), 1:134n.

Steven L. Guthier, “The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917,” in Slavic Review 38, no. 1 (1979): 30-47; and Mykola Kovalevsky, Pry dzherelakh borot’by (Innsbruck, 1960).

Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 79.

1917 god na Kievshchine: khronika sobytii, ed. V. Manilov (Kiev: Gos. Izd-vo Ukrainy, 1928), 72.

Quoted in John Reshetar, Jr, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), 109.

For the text of the First Universal, see Khrystiuk, Zamitky, 1:72-4; Dmytro Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917-1923 (Uzhhorod, 1932; reprint: New York: Bulava, 1954), 1:89-92; Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia nat- sii (Vienna, 1920), 1:219-24; and lakiv Zozulia, Velyka Ukrains’ka revoliutsiia (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1967), 65-8. M. Rafes, Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: evoliutsiia i raskol “Bunda” (Moscow: Gos. Izd-vo, 1920), 38.

For a text of the Second Universal, see Khrystiuk, Zamitky, 1:92-3; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, 1:279-82; Doroshenko, Istoriia, 1:115­16; Zozulia, Velyka, 68-70; Visti z Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady, no. 10 (June 1917): 1.

For the text of the Provisional Government’s instruction, see Doroshenko, Istoriia, 1:128-9; Zozulia, Velyka, 77-9; and Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, rev. ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 64-5.

Zozulia, Velyka, 31.

Finland proclaimed its independence on 4 December 1917, quickly followed by Ukraine (25 January 1918), Lithuania (16 February 1918), Estonia (24 February 1918), Transcaucasia (22 April 1918), Poland (11 November 1918), and Latvia (30 December 1918).

“Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada,” in Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), 388.

For the text of the Third Universal, see Hunczak, Ukraine, 1917-1921, 387­91; Doroshenko, Istoriia, 1:179-81; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, 2:74-80; Zozulia, Velyka, 70-3; Khrystiuk, Zamitky, 2:51-3.

Mark von Hagen, “The Entangled Eastern Front and the Making of the Ukrainian State: A Forgotten Peace, A Forgotten War and Nation-Building, 1917-1918” (unpublished conference paper), 9, 10; and B. Halaichuk, V. Markus, and I. Vytanovych, “Diplomacy,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 1:673. See Stalin’s articles and speeches attacking the Rada in December 1917 and January 1918 in J.V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 4:6-22 and 29-30.

Henry Abramson, A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Harvard Center for Jewish Studies, 1999), 65. “Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada,” in Hunczak, Ukraine, 1917­1921, 394. For the text of the Fourth Universal, see ibid., 391-5; Doroshenko, Istoriia, 1:264-68; Zozulia, Velyka, 73-7; Khrystiuk, Zamitky, 2:103-6. For the text of the law on national-personal autonomy, see Zozulia, Velyka, 77-81. For an analysis of this law, see George O. Liber, “Ukrainian Nationalism and the 1918 Law on National-Personal Autonomy,” Nationalities Papers 15, no. 1 (1987): 22-42, and Abramson, A Prayer for the Government.

Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc; (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 1:745-6.

Oliver H. Radkey, Russia Goes to the Polls: The Election to the All-Russian Constitutent Assembly, 1917 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 20 and table 1, 148-51. Ukrainian political parties also won votes from those Ukrainians serving in the western front (85,602), on the southwestern front (168,354), and on the Romanian front (186,219). On the northern front, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries allied themselves with Muslim socialists on a joint list and attracted 88,956 votes. Ibid., 160.

Zozulia, Velyka, 45.

Manilov, 1917 god, 415; Doroshenko, Istoriia, 1:143.

30 Compare the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Poltava province, where 93 per cent of the population spoke Ukrainian in 1897, and where the Ukrainian parties received approximately 83.3 per cent of

the November 1917 vote. See Oliver H. Radkey, The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917 (Cambridge, MA, 1950), 29n, 30. Of the 8,201,163 votes cast in the Ukrainian provinces, 5,557,560 or approximately 67.7 per cent of the voters voted for Ukrainian parties or joint-SR-Ukrainian lists. Calculated from ibid., 79.

31 For an important assessment of how “market-dominant minorities” and “politically-dominant minorities” interact with “indigenous majorities” envi­ronments during periods of radical social change, see Amy Chua, The World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Anchor, 2004).

32 I.L. Claude, Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1956), 137-8; quot­ed in Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 331.

33 Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia, 1:258.

34 Ibid., 1:256. Stephen Velychenko disputes this assertion. He claims that how­ever “supposedly ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘incomplete’ Ukrainian society might have been, it did have a pool of educated men and women (approximately 30,000), who could be administrators, and while national leaders did some­times fail to understand the importance of bureaucracy and bureaucrats and tried to mobilize the resources that were at their disposal... the main prob­lem with the Ukrainian (nationalist) governments during the revolutionary years was not a shortage of educated men or those with administrative skill, but of competent leaders.” Stephen Velychenko, State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine: A Comparative Study of Governments and Bureaucrats, 1917-1922 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 247.

35 John Channon, “The Peasantry in the Revolutions of 1917,” in Revolution in Russia, ed. Frankel, Frankel, and Knei-Paz, 109.

36 See Ilia Vytanovych, “Ahrarna polityka ukrains’kykh uriadiv rokiv revoliut- sii vyzvol’nykh zmahan’ (1917-1920),” Ukrains’kyi istoryk 4, nos. 3-4 (1967): 5-69.

37 V.I. Lenin, “The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/dec/16. htm (accessed 21 August 2012).

38 Mark von Hagen, “The Russian Imperial Army and the Ukrainian National Movement in 1917,” Ukrainian Quarterly 54, nos. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1998): 225, 229.

Ibid., 255.

Ibid., 222.

Ibid., 255.

Ibid.

“The Treaty of Peace between Ukraine and the Central Powers (Signed at Brest-Litovsk, 9 February 1918),” in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), 393. Arthur J. May, The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), 2:509, 619.

“The Peace of Brest-Litovsk - The Treaty of Peace between Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey (Signed at Brest-Litovsk, 3 March 1918),” in Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, 405.

May, The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 2:624.

I.F. Beckett, “Total War,” in War, Peace and Social Change in Twentieth Century Europe, ed. C.M. Emsley, A. Marwick, and W. Simpson (Milton Keyes and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1989), 37.

Michael Mann, “The Role of Nationalism in the Two World Wars,” Nationalism and War, ed. John A. Hall and Sinisa Malesevic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 173; Avner Offer, World War One: An Agrarian Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). See Oleh S. Fedyshyn, Germany’s Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1918 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971); and Taras Hunczak, “The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky,” in Hunczak, Ukraine, 1917-1921, 61-82; and Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupational Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918 (Seattle: Herbert J. Ellison Center for Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies, University of Washington, 2007), chap. 5. For a brief overview of the Directory, see Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, “The Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic,” in Hunczak, The Ukraine, 1917-1921, 82-102.

Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 81.

N. Gergel, “Di pogromen in Ukraine in di yorn 1918-1921,” in Shriftn far ekonomik un statistik, ed. Yaakov (Jakob) Lestschinsky (Berlin: Judisches Wissenshaftliches Institut, Sektion für Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1928), 1:110; cited in Zvi Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-1930 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 161. Henry Abramson, “Jewish Representation in the Independent Ukrainian Governments of 1917-1920,” Slavic Review 50 (Fall 1991): 548, cited in Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 81.

54 Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 81.

55 Elias Tcherikower, Antisemitizm i pogromy na Ukraine 1917 -1918 gg. (Berlin: Ostjudisches Historisches Archiv, 1923), 216-18; Abramson, A Prayer for the Government, chap. 4.

56 Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 679.

57 Abramson, A Prayer for the Government, 110. In an earlier study, Zvi Gitel- man estimated that “the direct loss of Jewish life easily exceeded 30,000, and together with those who died from wounds or as a result of illnesses contract­ed during the pogroms the number of Jewish dead probably reached 150,000, or ten percent of the Jewish population.” Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, 162. For a nuanced assessment of the 1919 pogroms in Ukraine, see Abramson, A Prayer for the Government, chap. 4. For other important works on the 1917-21 period, see Elias Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919 (New York: T. Seltzer, 1921); Arnold D. Margolin, The Jews of Eastern Europe (New York: T. Seltzer, 1926), esp. 126-52; Les pogroms en Ukraine sous les gouvernements ukrainiens, 1917-1920, ed. Leo Motzkin (Coeuvres-et-Valsery, France: Ressouvenances, 2010 [1927]); N. Gergel, “The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918-21,” YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 6 (1951): 237-52; Taras Hunczak, “A Reappraisal of Simon Petliura and Jewish- Ukrainian Relations, 1917-1921,” and Zosa Szajkowski, “A Rebuttal,” Jewish SocialStudies 31 (1969): 163-213; Saul S. Friedman, Pogromchik (New York: Hart, 1976); H. Abramson, “Historiography on the Jews and the Ukrainian Revolution,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 15, no. 2 (1990): 33-45; and Lars Fischer, “The Pogromshchina and the Directory: A New Historiographical Synthesis?” Revolutionary Russia 16, no. 2 (2003): 47-93.

58 For the evolution of the Bolshevik views on the national question in the Russian Empire, see Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, rev. ed. (New York: Atheneum 1968), chap. 1; Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), chaps 1-2; and Jeremy Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917­1923 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), chap. 2.

59 I. Kulyk, “Kievskaia organizatsiia v fevrale-oktiabre 1917 g.,” Letopis Revoliutsii 6, no. 1 (1924): 197. See, especially, V.I. Lenin, “Speech on the National Question, (29 April [12 May] 1917),” in V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1964), 24:298, 301; and V.I. Lenin, “The Ukraine, (17 [30] June 1917),” in his Collected Works, 25:91-2.

60 Quoted in Jurij Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination, rev. ed. (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 136.

See Stephen Velychenko, Painting Imperialism and Nationalism Red: The Ukrainian Marxist Critique of Russian Communist Rule in Ukraine, 1918­1925 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

Vsesoiuznaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (bol’shevikov), Sotsial’nyi i natsional’nyi sostav VKP(b): Itogi vsesoiuznoi partiinoi perepisi 1927 g. (Moscow, 1928), 158; cited in George Y. Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900-1941): Its State and Status (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1989), 90.

Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 130-1.

Quote comes from V.I. Lenin, “Manifesto to the Ukrainian People with an Ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada,” in V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, 26:361-3. Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 123.

Geoffrey Swain, The Origins of the Russian Civil War (London and New York: Longman, 1996), 97.

Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 130.

Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1:797.

Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 131-2.

Ibid., 132.

See Andrea Graziosi, The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1996), and A. Graziosi, Bol’sheviki i krestiane na Ukraine: 1918-1919 gody: Ocherk o bol’shevizmakh, national-sotsialistizmakh i krestianskikh dvizheniiakh (Moscow: Airo-XX, 1997).

Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 134, 146. On the Borotbists, see Iwan Majstrenko, Borotbism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954).

Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 139, 140, 143.

Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 70; Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 278-80. The statis­tics concerning the Ukrainian population of the Kuban come from the 1926 Soviet census.

N. Popov, Narys Istorii Komunistychnoi partii (bil’shovykiv) Ukrainy, 5th ed. (Kharkiv, 1931), 176.

Ibid., 180; Elena Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii 1920-1930-e gody (Moscow: Evropa, 2006), 51.

Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii 1920-1930-e gody, 51. Majstrenko, Borotbism, 103.

Arthur E. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918­1919 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), 31.

M. Ravich-Cherkasskii, Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy (Kharkov, 1923), 123-4.

Vladimir Lenin, “Pis’mo k rabochim i krest’ianam Ukrainy po povodu pobe- dy nad Denikinym,” in V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia (Moscow, 1950), 30:267-73. Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1:604.

Ibid., 1:804-5.

Ibid., 1:805.

Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 254.

Ibid., 263. According to Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1:807, the Ukrainian SSR “was recognized de jure as a sovereign state by Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Turkey, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; de facto by Great Britain, Bulgaria, Romania, and the League of Nations. The Ukrainian SSR had diplomatic relations with at least six foreign countries and was party to several international conventions of the League of Nations.”

For these developments, see Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 263-5 and 269-70; and Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, chap. 7. Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 270-1.

Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii, 76.

Elmira Brodskaia, quoted in Tanya Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 82.

Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 273; Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1:808.

Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1:809. Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, 276.

According to Pipes, the Soviet Union “as it emerged in 1923, was a compro­mise between doctrine and reality: an attempt to reconcile the Bolshevik striv­ings for absolute unity and centralization of all power in the hands of the party, with the recognition of the empirical fact that nationalism did survive the collapse of the old order. It was viewed as a temporary solution only, as a transitional stage to a completely centralized and supra-national world-wide Soviet state. From the point of view of self-rule the communist government was even less generous to the minorities than its tsarist predecessor had been: it destroyed independent parties, tribal self-rule, religious and cultural institu­tions. It was a unitary, centralized, totalitarian state such as the tsarist state had never been. On the other hand, by granting the minorities extensive lin­guistic autonomy and by placing the national-territorial principle as the base of the party’s political administration, the Communists gave constitutional recognition to the multinational structure of the Soviet population. In view

of the importance which language and territory have for the development of national consciousness - particularly for people who, like the Russian minori­ties during the Revolution, have had some experience of self-rule - this purely formal feature of the Soviet constitution may well prove to have been histori­cally one of the most consequential aspects of the formation of the Soviet Union.” Ibid., 296-7. The term “subversive institution” comes from Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Geoff Eley, “Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923,” in Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 207.

Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). Vtoroi s’ezd KP(b)U. Protokoly (Kharkiv, 1927), 94-5; cited in Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 205.

The quote comes from Budivnytstvo Radians’koi Ukrainy: Zbirnyk, No. 1 (Kharkiv: Derzhavne vyd. Ukrainy, s.a.); cited in Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, 87.

Chapter 4

Charles de Gaulle, “La limitation des armements,” Lettres, notes et carnets, 1905-1918 (Paris: Plon, 1980), 536; cited in Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 234.

The Supreme Ukrainian Council (Holovna Ukrains’ka Rada, or HUR); the Western Ukrainian National Republic (Zakhidna Ukrains’ka Narodna Respublika, or ZUNR).

Estimated from Serhii Chornyi, Natsional’nyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy v XX storichchi (Kyiv: Kartohrafiia, 2001), 48-9.

Alison Fleig Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 207, 263.

Vasyl Kuchabsky, Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918-1923, trans. Gus Fagan (Toronto and Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2009), xv, 69-70.

Frank, Oil Empire, 228.

On the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-19, see Maciej Kozlowski, Miedzy Sanem a Zbruczem: Walki o Lwow i Galicje Wschodnia 1918-1919 (Cracow: Znak, 1990); idem, Zapomniana wojna. Walki o Lwow i Galicje Wschodnia 1918-1919 (Bydgoszcz: Instytut Wydawniczy Swiadectwo, 1999); Mykola Lytvyn and Kim Naumenko, Istoriia ZUNR (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. Ivana Kryp’iakevycha Natsional’noi Akakemii Nauk Ukrainy, 1995); Mykola Lytvyn, Ukrains’ko-pol’s’ka viina 1918-1919 rr. (Lviv: Instytut ukrai­noznavstva im. I. Kryp’iakevycha Natsional’noi Akademii Nauk Ukrainy and Instytut Skhidno-Tsentral’nyi Ievropy, 1998); Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Ukrainian- Polish Relations in Galicia in 1918-1919,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 1-23; Michal Klimecki, Polsko-ukrainska wojna o Lwow i Galicje Wschodnia 1918-1919 (Warsaw: Oficyjna Wydawnicza Volumen, 2000); and Rafal Galuba “Niech nas rozsadzi miecz i krew...”: Konflikt polsko-ukrainski o Galicje Wschodnia w latach 1918-1919 (Poznan: Wydawn. Poznarnkie, 2004).

8 Frank, Oil Empire, 214.

9 Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925: French- Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 105-7.

10 Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 329.

11 “The First World War had convinced France, like all the other belligerents, of the significance of petroleum... throughout the 1920s, the French took steps to ensure that in the event of another European conflict, their supply of pe­troleum would be secure. The French owned 55 per cent of the Polish oil in­dustry by 1920 and 75 per cent by 1923.” Frank, Oil Empire, 234.

12 Marc Bloch best characterized this environment shortly after Nazi Germany defeated France in June 1940: “We find ourselves in this appalling situation - that the fate of France no longer depends upon the French.” M. Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 (New York: Octagon, 1968), 174; cited in Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2009), 416.

13 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, 235-6; 166 (quote).

14 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 42.

15 The 1921 Ukrainian population in Poland comes from Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918 (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 158 (table 1), and Rothschild, East Central Europe, 36 (table 1). The population of Finland and the Baltic states in the 1920s comes from B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000, 5th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3, 4, 6.

16 Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (With Special Reference to East Central Europe) (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 111; and Piotr Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups and Population Changes in Twentieth­Century Central-Eastern Europe: History, Data, and Analysis (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 449.

The Polish Minority Treaty of 28 June 1919, the model for all the other mi­nority treaties, appears in C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), 510-14.

David J. Smith and John Hiden, Ethnic Diversity and the Nation-State: National Cultural Autonomy Revisited (New York: Routledge, 2012). Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4-5.

Ibid., 57. On Poland, see Antony Polonsky, “The Breakdown of Parliamentary Government,” in The History of Poland since 1863, ed. R.F. Leslie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 148. On Romania, see Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 192-3.

John-Paul Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 34, no. 4, 1992): 397, 398.

Ibid., 399.

Ibid., 400.

Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of the Modern Russian Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, ed. Kevin M.F. Platt and David Brandenberger (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, (1962), 413; Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities, 111, provides a figure of 32,372,200 for 1931.

I. Korovytsky and M. Trukhan, “Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 4:99. Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2002), 226-8; and Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-Revolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968). On France’s alliances with Czechoslovakia and Poland in the interwar period, see Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925, and Piotr S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936: French-Czechoslovak- Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine: The Land and the Peoples, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 626.

Polonsky, The Little Dictators, 164 (table 11).

Between 1921 and 1937, “Poland experienced an increase of seven million people, bringing the total to 34.2 million; this 26 percent growth rate aver­aged about 454,000 new mouths to feed annually. Nowhere was this problem more evident than in the rural areas, where the population was crowded in on land that was incapable of supporting it. Various estimates of the surplus population in rural regions have ranged from two to eight million persons, of which three-fifths were of an age to work in industry.” Edward D. Wynot, Jr, Polish Politics in Transition: The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935-1939 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974), 11-12. Polonsky, The Little Dictators, 33.

Wynot, Polish Politics in Transition, 22.

Celia S. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the Two Wars (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

Laurence Weinbaum, A Marriage of Convenience: The New Zionist Organization and the Polish Government, 1936-1939 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1993), 5.

Ibid., 6. For how Polish society represented the Jews, see Joanna B. Michlic, Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), chaps 3-4.

Heller, On the Edge of Destruction, 132.

See Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup d’Etat (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups, 113, 121, 212. The 5.3 million figure comes from Piotr Ebehardt, Zminy natsional’noi struktury naselennia Ukrainy v XX sto- litti (Warsaw: PAN IFiPZ, 2006), 122. These statistics are highly problematic. Many Ukrainians refused to participate in the official Polish censuses. Miroslawa Papierzyiiska-Turek, Sprawa ukraihska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922-1926 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1979), 20; cited in Himka, “Western Ukraine,” 394.

Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups, 210-12. According to Volodymyr Kubijovyc, Ukrainians were the plurality group in many small towns, but certainly not the majority. In Galician towns with five thousand or more inhabitants, they comprised a 50 per cent or more only in Borshchiv, Melnytsia, Skala,

Horodenka, Yavoriv, Pechenizhyn, Kosiv, Sudova Vyshnia, Deliatyn, Hlyniany, Lopatyn, Staryi Sambir, Zabolotiv, Bohorodchany, Synievidsko Vyzhnie, Terebovlia, Budzaniv, Tysmenytsia, Pomoriany, Zaliztsi, Olesko, and Zhydachiv. Volodymyr Kubijovyc, Etnichni hrupy pivdenno-zakhidn’oi Ukrainy (Halychyny) na 1. 1. 1939 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983). I am grateful to Roman Senkus, who provided me with this information.

41 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 152-3.

42 Polonsky, The Little Dictators, 148.

43 Ibid., 200-1.

44 Frank Golczewski, “Civil War in Occupied Territories: The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict during the Interwar Years and the Second World War,” in Territorial Revisionism and the Allies of Germany in the Second World War: Goals, Expectations, Practices, ed. Marina Cattoruzza, Stefan Dyroff, and Dieter Langewiesche (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 146.

45 Janusz Radziejowski, The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1929 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 4-7; cited in Frank, Oil Empire, 228-9.

46 Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 210.

47 Document 138, Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli, ed. Iurii Slyvka et al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1995), 1:316.

48 Ievhen Iulian Pelens’kyi, “Suchasne ukrains’ke serednie i vysoke shkil’nytstvo v Halychyni i na Volyni,” in Dvadtsiat’piat’littia tovarystva “Uchytel’s’ka hromada”: luvileinyi naukovyi zbirnyk (Lviv, 1935), 169. I am grateful to Roman Senkus, who provided me with this citation.

49 S. Vytvytsky and S. Baran, “Western Ukraine under Poland,” in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 1:847-8.

50 Radziejowski, The Communist Party of Western Ukraine 4-7; and Frank, Oil Empire, 228-9. For a history of the Union of Ukrainian Women, see Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Feminists despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884-1939 (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1988), or Martha Bohachevsky- Chomiak, Bilym po bilomu: zhinky v hromads’komu zhytti Ukrainy, 1884­1939 (Kyiv: Lybid, 1995); and Myroslava Diadiuk, Ukrains’kyi zhinochyi rukh u mizhvoiennii Halychyni: Mizh hendernoiu identychnistiu ta natsional’noiu zaanhazovanistiu (Lviv: Astroliabia, 2011). For a popular his­tory of Plast, see Al’manakh 100-littia Plastu (New York, Toronto, and L’viv: Vydannia Holovnoi plastovoi bylavy, 2012).

51 On the soil and this region’s poverty, see Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 227.

52 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 629. Also see Stella Hryniuk, Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1880-1900 (Edmonton, AB: CIUS Press, 1991); and Stella Hryniuk and Jeffrey Picknicki, The Land They Left Behind (Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer, 1995).

53 For a succinct assessment of the impact of the Great Depression on East Central Europe, see Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 344-63.

54 “Slightly fewer than 68,000 migrated,” according to Orest T. Martynowych’s forthcoming volume on the history of Ukrainians in Canada during the inter­war years (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2016); Wsevolod W. Isajiw and Andrij Makuch, “Ukrainians in Canada,” in Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the World, ed. Ann Lencyk Pawliczko (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 333, state that sixty-five to seventy thou­sand migrated; and Frances A. Swyripa, “Ukrainian Canadians (last edited

4 March 2015),” http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ ukrainian-canadians (accessed 28 April 2015), asserts that “some 70,000 Ukrainians” immigrated to Canada for political and economic reasons.

55 See Bohdan Budurowycz, Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); and Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

56 Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 29­30, 73; Radziejowski, Communist Party of Western Ukraine; and Roman Solchanyk, “The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1938” (unpub­lished PhD dissertation, Department of History, University of Michigan, 1973).

57 Himka, “Western Ukraine,” 407.

58 For what the readers of Dilo, the oldest (established in 1880) and most popu­lar Ukrainian-language daily in Eastern Galicia, learned about Soviet Ukrainian politics, forced collectivization, the Holodomor, and anti­Ukrainian arrests and purges in the 1920s and 1930s, see the overview of its contents in Iu. H. Shapoval, “Dilo” (1880-1939 rr.): Postup ukrains’koi suspil’noi dumky (Lviv: Naukovo-doslidnyi tsentr periodyky L’vivs’koi nau- kovoi biblioteky im. V. Stefanyka, and Fakul’tet zhurnalistyky L’vivs’koho derzhavnoho universytetu im. Ivana Franka, 1999), 229-339.

Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 150.

Himka, “Western Ukraine,” 409.

John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); and Alexander J. Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and the Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919­1929 (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly Monographs, 1980); and Oleksandr Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm (1920-1930-ti roky): Narysy intelektual’noi istorii (Kiev: Krytyka, 2013).

See Lucyna Kulinska, Dzialnosc terrorystyczna i sabotazowa nacjonalistyc- znych organizacji ukrainskich w Polsce w latach 1922-1939 (Cracow: Ksiegarnia Akademicka, 2009).

The quote comes from Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 443.

For a biography of Dontsov, see Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyi portret (New York: Trident International, 1974). For an excellent analysis of the evolution of Dontsov’s political ideas and of his uneasy rela­tionship with the OUN, see Myroslav Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 79-131.

Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 308-26 (citation 325). Thomas Perry Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), 73. For a thorough explanation of this term, see 73-8. The phrase “epidemic of sabotage” comes from Roman Skakun, “Patsyfikatsiia”: Pol’s’ki represii 1930 roku v Halychyni (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Ukrains’koho katolyts’koho universytetu, 2012), 19. For a list of the 303 “acts of terror” Ukrainian nationalists committed (as recorded by the Polish authorities of the day) in 1922 and 1923 and the 191 they committed in July-November 1930, see Kulinska, Dzialnosc terrorystyczna, 161-73, 211.

On this Pacification Campaign, see Emil Revyuk, Polish Atrocities in Ukraine (New York: Svoboda Press, 1931); Andrzej Chojnowski, Koncepcje polityki narodowosciowej rzadow polskich w latach 1921-1939 (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolmskich, 1979); M.N. Shvaguliak, Patsyfikatsiia: Pol’s’ka represyvna aktsiia v Halychyni 1930 r. i ukrains’ka suspil’nist’ (L’viv: Natsional’na Akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Instytut ukrainoznavstva, 1993); and Skakun, “Patsyfikatsiia.”

The estimate of eight to nine thousand OUN members in 1939 comes from: Roman Wysocki, Organizacja ukrainskich nacjonalistow w Polsce w latach 1929-1939: Geneza, struktura, program, ideologia (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curii-Sklodowskiej, 2003), 337; cited in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3. Other scholars have claimed a higher membership of twenty thousand: Bohdan Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation, 1941-1944,” in Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 19; and Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement,” Kritika 12, no. 1 (2011): 92.

70 Thomas L. Friedman, “Who Are We?” New York Times, 15 November 2014, citing Abdullah Hamidaddin, an adviser to the Dubai-based Al-Meshar Studies and Research Center, which tracks Islamist movements and works to promote a more pluralistic culture.

71 Maria Savchyn Pyskir, Thousands of Roads: A Memoir of a Young Woman's Life in the Ukrainian Underground during and after World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2001), 12-13 (my emphases).

72 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 27.

73 According to Skakun, “Patsyfikatsiia,” 82-3, the Polish authorities arrested over 1,700 men and women and sent 909 cases to trial. The courts released 700 of those detained. Twenty trials took place. Of the 212 defendants, 28 were sentenced to a total of nearly 45 years.

74 See Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 308-26.

75 Andriy Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History, A Historians’ War,” Ab Imperio, no. 1 (2015): 463.

76 For an analysis of the relationship between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the OUN, see Oleksandr Zaitsev, Oleh Behen, and Vasyl’ Stefaniiv, Natsionalizm i relihiia: Hreko-katolyts’ka Tserkva i ukrains’kyi national’nyi rukh u Halychyni (1920-1930-ti roky) (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Ukrains’koho katolyts’koho universytetu, 2011).

77 Bohdan Budurowycz, “Sheptyts’kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement After 1914,” in Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrii Sheptyts’kyi, ed. Paul R. Magocsi (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1989), 56-7, and John-Paul Himka, “Christianity and Radical Nationalism: Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Bandera Movement,” in State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, ed. Catherine Wanner (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 93-116 (esp. 93-7).

78 This slight paraphrase comes from David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2009), 253. Kilcullen did not cover conflicts in Ukraine, but in Iraq, Indonesia, Thailand, East Timor, and Pakistan during “the war on terror.” Nevertheless, his book is intellectually very provocative.

The phrase comes from ibid., 53.

See Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 144-9.

Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 522; Snyder, Sketches, 285fn14.

Snyder, Sketches, 77; M. Stech, “Henryk Jozewski,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 2:395.

Snyder, Sketches, 137. Between 1919 and 1939, Wolyn received approximately 260,000 Polish colonists, Polesie at least 40,000, and Malopolska Wschodnia at least 70,000. See Bohdan Hud’, Ukrains’ko-pol’ski konflikty novitn’oi doby: Etnosotsial’nyi aspekt (Kharkiv: Akta, 2011), 339.

Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 149. For a biography of Jozewski, see Snyder’s Sketches. For a thorough overview of the contentious relationship between the Polish state and Ukrainians in the interwar Wolyn, see Cornelia Schenke, Nationalstaat und Nationale Frage: Polen und die Ukrainer 1921­1939 (Hamburg-Munich: Dolling und Galitz Verlag, 2004).

The quote comes from Wlodzimierz Dabrowski, “Ekspozytura z Oddz[ial] II,” 2 March 1940, reprinted in Zeszyty Historyczne, no. 140 (2002): 107; cit­ed in Snyder, Sketches, 44. The phrase “self-appointed guardian” comes from Bideleux and Jeffries, who characterized Pilsudski as “the self-appointed cus­todian of Polish independence.” Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 313.

The Soviet Union became a member of the League of Nations on

18 September 1934 and was expelled from the organization on 14 December 1939 for its invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939. The Winter War end­ed with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty on 13 March 1940.

For an outline of the treaty, see M.K. Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 1918-1922 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 270-2. For a good account of the cooperation between Poland and Petliura, see Jan Jacek Bruski, “Petlurowcy”: Centrum Panstwowe Ukraihskiej Republiki Ludowej na wychodzstwie (1919-1924) (Cracow: Arcana, 2004). Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski, 326.

Compare the list of leading Ukrainian Prometheans in Arkadii Zhukovsky, “Promethean Movement,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine (1993), 5:238, and their biographies in that encyclopedia.

The quoted words come from “Tadeusz Holowko,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine (1988), 2:211. For an overview of his assassination, see Kulinska, Dzialnosc terrorystyczna, 250-4. For a biography of Holowko, see Iwo

Werschler, Tadeusz Holowko:zycie i dzialalnosc (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1984).

Snyder, Sketches, 109-14.

The phrase comes from David D. Kirkpatrick and Mayy El-Sheikh, “Once upon a Revolution: A Story with No End,” New York Times, 7 February 2014.

Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 415; Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities, 111, provides a figure of 18,024,269 for 1930.

Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 329.

Polonsky, The Little Dictators, 164 (table 11).

Between 500,000 and 600,000 Ukrainians, according to official sources pro­vided by Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 529, 532; and Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups, 299; 900,000 Ukrainians (unofficially), according to D. Pruts’kyi, “Ukraintsi v ‘Velykii Rumunii,’” Nova hromada (Vienna) 1, nos 3-4 (1923): 16; cited in Himka, “Western Ukraine,” 394.

Polonsky, The Little Dictators, 80.

Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 51.

“Bessarabia” and “Bukovina,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine (1984), 1:213, 317.

Himka, “Western Ukraine,” 402.

Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 65.

Cited in Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 645.

Polonsky, The Little Dictators, 164 (table 11).

Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 414.

Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 525-7.

Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 164.

Ibid., 169.

Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups, 127.

Ibid., 127.

Robert Paul Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’: 1848-1948 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 354;

Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 526-7, provides a figure of 375,000 in Carpatho-Ruthenia and 212,000 in Slovakia.

On the Czechoslovak censuses and their definition of “Ruski,” see Taras Kuzio, “The Rusyn Question in Ukraine: Sorting out Fact from Fiction,” Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism, 32 (2005): 7.

Quote comes from Magocsi, Shaping, 275.

Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups, 291; Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 526.

Quoted in Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 202. Magosci, Shaping, 647.

Himka, “Western Ukraine,” 402.

Magocsi, Shaping, 649.

See ibid., chaps. 5-11.

Ibid., 221.

Ibid., 175.

Ibid., 274.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928): 203; and Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 522, 526-7, 530.

Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Wars, 42; Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 630; cited in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 22. Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups, 212, 213, 214.

The “orphans” phrase comes from the Kurdish leader Mullah Mustapha Barzani, cited in “The State That Never Was,” The Economist (US), 24 June 1989, 38-9.

Chapter 5

L. Trotsky, Between Red and White: A Study of Some Fundamental Questions of Revolution, with particular reference to Georgia (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1922), 86; cited in M.K. Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 1918-1922 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 202.

Joseph Stalin, “Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B),” in his Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), 13:4-5.

This estimate of the total number of deaths from direct combat, anti-White and anti-Red repressions, pogroms, conflicts in the non-Russian areas, dis­ease, and famine from late 1917 to March 1921 comes from R.J. Rummel, Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1990), 47.

Robert Service, A History of Twentieth Century Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 123.

Ibid. The statistics on enrolment in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union come from T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 52.

William B. Husband, “The New Economic Policy (NEP) and the Revolutionary Experiment, 1921-1929,” in Russia: A History, ed. Gregory L. Freeze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 265.

Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991, new and final ed. (New York: Penguin, 1992), 74.

Husband, “New Economic Policy,” 265.

Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 105. Nove, Economic History of the USSR, 129.

Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo soiuza v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s”ezdov, konferentsii iplenumov TsK (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. Lit-ry, 1973), 2:45-6. Kommunisticheskaia Akademiia, Natsional’naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Kommunisticheskoi akademii, 1930), 36. The Soviet censuses of 1920, 1923, and 1926 present data in a form different from the Russian Imperial Census of 1897. Whereas the earlier census indicated the na­tive language of the respondents, the census takers of the 1920s asked the per­son to which nationality he belonged, as well as his native language. The Soviet censuses of 1939, 1959, 1970, and 1979 also collected data for both na­tive language and nationality by self identification. Because native language and national self-identification do not necessarily coincide, I will consider as Ukrainians those who identified themselves as “Ukrainian” in the Soviet cen­suses of the 1920s. For a comparison of the questionnaires in the 1897, 1920, 1923, and 1926 censuses, see N. Ya.Vorob’ev, Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1926 g., 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gos. Statisticheskoe izd-vo, 1957), 83-104; and Ralph Clem, ed., Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

Rossiskaia Kommunisticheskaia partiia, Desiatyi s”ezd RKP(b), mart 1921 g. (Moscow: Partiinoe izd-vo, 1933), 580.

T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 367.

The Communist Party of Ukraine (CP[b]U) was subordinate to the RKP(b), then to the renamed All-Union Communist Party (VKP[b]) in 1925 and to the renamed Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1952).

Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 366.

See Liliana Riga, The Bolsheviks and the Russian Empire (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

See “V natsional’nomu pytanni. Rezoliutsii XII z’izdu RKP(b) vid 25 kvitnia 1923 r.,” in Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukrains’kii RSR: Naivazhlyvishi rish- ennia komunistychnoipartii i radians’koho uriadu: Zbirnyk dokumentiv (Kiev: Derzhavne vyd-vo politychnoi literatury URSR, 1959), 1:206-7.

Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 369.

On the growth of party organizations in the non-Russian regions of the USSR in the 1920s, see Sotsial’nyi i natsional’nyi sostav VKP(b): Itogi vseso- iuznoi partiinoi perepisi 1927 goda (Moscow-Leningrad: Giz, 1928).

George S.N. Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 45.

D. Lebed, “Rech na kievskoi konferentsii,” Kommunist (Kharkiv), 23 March 1923; quoted in N.N. Popov, Narys istorii Komunistychnoi Partii (bil’shovykiv) Ukrainy (Kharkiv: Vydavnytstvo Proletarii, 1928), 281; le. F. Girchak, Na dva fronta v bor’be s natsionalizmom, (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1930), 20-1; and Robert S. Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917­1957 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 351-2.

“Proekt dekreta o sodeistvii razvitiiu kul’tury ukrainskogo naroda,” in K razresheniiu natsional’nogo voprosa, 2nd rev. ed. (Kiev, 1920), 15-20; quoted in Iwan Majstrenko, Borotbism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), 271-6. See “V natsional’nomu pytanni,” in Kul’turne budivnytstvo v Ukrains’kii RSR: vazhlyvishi rishennia Komunistychnoipartii i Radians’koho uriadu, 1917-1959: Zbirnyk dokumentov (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politych- noi literatury URSR, 1959-1960), 1:201-10.

Elena Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii, 1920-1930-e gody (Moscow: Evropa, 2006), 86-7, 163.

“Pro zakhody zabezpechennia rivnopravnosti mov i pro dopomohu rozvyt- kovi ukrains’koi movy,” in Kul’turne budivnytstvo Ukrains’kii RSR, 1:242-7; Luckyj, Literary Politics, 44; Sullivant, Soviet Politics, 109.

Matthew D. Pauly, Breaking the Tongue: Language, Education, and Power in Soviet Ukraine, 1923-1934 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 296. Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrains’kyi RSR, 1:348; cited in Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974), 181.

Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 88.

Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 160.

For an excellent analysis of Ukrainization as a modernizing mission, see ibid., 73-5.

See Mykola Skrypnyk, “USRR - Piedmont ukrains’kykh trudiashchykh mas,” in his Statti i promovy z natsional’noho pytannia (Munich: Suchasnist’, 1974), 153-9. As of 9 December 1931, there were over 5,917,000 Ukrainians in Poland, 780,000 in Romania, and 525,000 in Czechoslovakia. Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 1:210-11, table 2.

Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 5-6.

Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 77; Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 315. Also see Elena Borisenok’s accounts of Russian chauvinist opposition to the im­plementation of Ukrainization in her Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii 1920 - 1930-e gody, 127-60.

George Y. Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900-1941): Its State and Status (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1989), 127.

Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing, 1947), 63-4. See Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii, 140-2.

Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 202.

Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 95.

Ibid., 75.

Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii, 137, 158.

Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 85.

Calculated by the author from Ukrainia: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk 1929 (Kharkiv: Tsentralne statystychne upravlinnia, 1929), 22, table 4 (abbreviated hereafter as USS 1929). Only 11 per cent of the total Ukrainian population lived in the cities, while 87.5 per cent lived in the rural areas.

USS 1929, 22.

Calculated from table 6-A, USS 1929, 18-19. Of the three most populous na­tional groups in Ukraine, 6,468,799 Ukrainians were literate in Ukrainian and 4,719,898 in Russian; 1,419,444 Russians were literate in Russian and 213,215 in Ukrainian; while 935,784 Jews were literate in Russian and 241,151 in Ukrainian. See USS 1929, 18-19.

M. Skrypnyk, Rekonstruktsiia krainy iperebudova shkoly (Kharkiv, 1932), 123; quoted in S. Siropolko, Narodna osvita na Soviet’sii Ukraini (Warsaw: Ukrains’kyi naukovy instytut, 1934), 157.

“Pro zakhody v spravi ukrainizatsii shkil’no-vykhovnykh ustanov,” in Kul’turne budivnystvo, 1:239-42.

Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 274, 307, 275.

Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 79, 84.

Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1:811.

“Pro stan narodnoi osvity na Ukraini,” in Kul’turne budivnystvo, 1:340-5. The decree was issued in January 1927.

Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 173.

Ibid., 407.

“Pro pryvedennia zahal’noho navchannia na Ukraini,” in Kul’turne budiv- nystvo, 1:300-3.

Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 173.

Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1:811.

Ivan Bakalo, Natsional’na polityka Lenina (Munich: Suchasnist’, 1974), 111. Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 564. Also see Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1985), chapters 2-3; 46-153.

Tsentral’noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri sovete ministrov SSSR, Itogi Vsesoiuznoiperepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainskaia SSR (Moscow: Gostatizdat, 1963), 65, table 25. According to Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk, Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1939 goda: Osnovnye itogi (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 45, table 10, the percentage of literates in Ukraine at nine years of age and above reached 90.4 by 17 January 1939.

Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 77, 92-4.

KP(b)U, Itogipartperepisi 1922 goda (Kharkiv, 1922), 1:xii, 116; also cited in Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, rev. ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 278.

VKP(b), Tsenral’nyi komiteet, Statisticheskii otdel, Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia perepis’ 1927 goda, 7-ii vypusk. Narodnost’ i rodnoi iazyk chlenov VKP(b) i kandidatov chleny. II. Sostav kommunistov korennoi narodnosti v natsional’nykh respublikakh i oblastiakh SSSR (Moscow: VKP(b), Tsenral’nyi komiteet, Statisticheskii otdel, 1927), 51; cited in Basil Dmytryshyn, “National and Social Composition of the Membership of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, 1918-1928,” Journal of Central European Affairs 17, no. 3 (1957): 257.

Vsevolod Holubnychy, “Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine,” in V. Holubnychy, Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy, ed. Iwan S. Koropeckyj (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982), 128-9, table 1.

Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 574.

Natsional’naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh, 177, tables 17 and 19. Natsional’naia politika VKP(b), 230-1, table 33.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928): 4.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928): 4-9. On the complexity of ascertaining and assigning national identities in the Right Bank, see Kate Brown’s pioneering work, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

In the 1923, 1926, and 1931 censuses the term “urban centre” was defined as “all official cities, small towns, and populated points - even though they did not possess an urban or rural soviet - which met the following conditions: (1) more than five hundred people lived there, and (2) more than half of those considered to be ‘economically independent’ worked in non-agricultural oc­cupations.” Natsional’naia politika VKP(b), v. Nevertheless, many “urban centres” which did not meet these criteria were included in the Soviet census­es of the 1920s. Thus, we should view these censuses with caution.

Nevertheless, while they are not as accurate and reliable in all instances as one would desire, the data do provide in varying degrees a reasonable approxima­tion to reality upon which general trends can be analysed.

TsGANKh SSSR, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 145, l. 94; and Rossiskaia Akademiia nauk, Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1939 goda, 22.

Suchasna statystyka naselennya Ukrainy (Kharkiv: Tsentral’ne statystychne upravlinnia USRR, 1929), 2-3, 33-5.

Naselenie Ukrainy po dannym perepisi 1920 goda (Kharkiv: Tsentral’ne stat­ystychne upravlinnia USRR, 1923); Naselennia v mistakh Ukrainy za dany- my Vsesoyuznoho mis’koho perepysu 15 bereznya 1923 roku (Kharkiv: Tsentral’ne statystychne upravlinnia USRR, 1925); and Korotki pidsumky perepysu naselennia Ukrainy 17 hrudnya roku 1926 (Kharkiv: Tsentral’ne statystychne upravlinnia USRR, 1928).

Naselenie Ukrainy po dannym perepisi 1920 goda, 32-35; and Mis’ki selysh- cha USRR. Zbirnyk stat.-ekonomichnykh vidomostei (Kharkiv: Tsentral’ne statystychne upravlinnia USRR, 1929), 2-17.

Korotkipidsumky perepysu naselennia Ukrainy, 4-9.

Harvard University Refugee Interview Project (Harvard University), box 5, no. 190 AD/AP, 17.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 86 (1925), 1, 4.

Mark Jefferson, “The Law of the Primate City,” Geographical Review 29 (1939): 227. On the application of this law to Ukraine, see Roman Szporluk, “Kiev as the Ukraine’s Primate City,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3-4 (1979­80): part 2, 843-9.

Szporluk, “Kiev as the Ukraine’s Primate City,” 847.

Ibid., 849.

TsGAOR Ukrainian SSR, f. 337, op. 1, d. 5038, 1. 92; cited in F.G. Turchenko, “Onovnye izmeneniia v sotsial’no-klassovoi strukture gorodsk- ogo naseleniia Sovetskoi Ukrainy v 1920-e gody” (kandidat diss., Kharkiv State University, 1976), 99.

81 For calculations supporting these assertions, see George Liber, “Urban Growth and Ethnic Change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923-1933,” Soviet Studies 41, no. 4 (1989): 588-9.

82 Stenograficheskii otchet X s”ezda Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii 8-16 marta 1921 (Petrograd: Gos. Izd-vo, 1921), 93.

83 Andrew C. Janos, “Ethnicity, Communism, and Political Change in Eastern Europe,” World Politics 23, no. 3 (1971): 493-521.

84 See James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983); Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness; and George O. Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 7; and Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, chap. 6.

85 The clause, “who feared a split in the party along national lines,” comes from Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii, 74.

Chapter 6

1 Joseph Stalin, “The Tasks of Business Executives: Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry,

4 February 1931,” in J.V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), 13:40-1.

2 On the international situation in this period, see Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, vol. 1 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1960); Xenia J. Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934: Documents and Materials (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1967); Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Co-Existence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974); and Jonathan Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-1933: The Impact of the Depression (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1983); Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991 (London and New York: Arnold, 1998), chaps. 1-2.

3 Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941): 455, 458.

4 James E. Mace, “Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine,” Problems of Communism, May-June 1984, 49.

5 Andrea Graziosi, “‘The Uses of Hunger’: Stalin’s Solution of the Peasant and National Questions in Soviet Ukraine, 1932-1933,” in Famines in European Economic History: The Last Great European Famines Reconsidered, ed. Declan Curran, Lubomyr Luciuk, and Andrew G. Newby (New York: Routledge, 2014), 10.

6 Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 206. In iron, steel, and petroleum pro­duction, according to Jacobson, the USSR “had lost ground relative to Europe and the United States, and while the manufacture of automobiles, trucks, and tractors had led the United States in particular into a new period of economic expansion based on the introduction of new technologies and methods of production, Soviet industry depended almost completely on pre­revolutionary plants, machinery, and methods. With the USSR cut off from advanced technology and unable to make substantial new investment, and with a comparatively low level of labor skills available, industrial productivi­ty in the USSR remained one-half of what it was in Britain and only one- seventh that of the United States” (206-7).

7 Ibid., 212-13. On the Frunze Commission and the context of its reforms, see Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 4.

8 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics, 218.

9 J. Stalin, “The Threat of War,” Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages, 1954), 9:328.

10 Raymond W. Leonard, Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918-1933 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 86-8; and Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics, chap. 9. On the war scare crisis of 1927 and its precursors, see Alfred G. Meyer, “The War Scare of 1927,” Soviet Union/Union Sovietique 5 (1978): 1-25; John P. Sontag, “The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27,” Russian Review 34 (1975): 66-77; Sheila Fitzpatrick, “The Foreign Threat during the First Five Year Plan,” Soviet Union/Union Sovietique 5 (1978): 26-35; Valeri A. Shishkin, “The External Factor in the Country’s Socioeconomic Development,” in “The Soviet Union in the 1920s: A Roundtable,” Soviet Studies in History 28 (1989); L.N. Nezhinskii, “Byla li voennaia ugroza SSSR v kontse 20-kh - nachale 30-kh godov?” Istoriia SSSR, no. 6 (1990): 14-30; and James Harris, “Intelligence and the Threat Perception: Defending the Revolution, 1917-1937,” in The Anatomy of Terror: Political Violence Under Stalin, ed. James Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 29-43.

11 See Mykola Doroshko, Nomenklatura: Kerivna verkhivka Radians’koi Ukrainy (1917-1938 rr.) (Kiev: Nyka-Tsentr, 2008); and Hennadii Yefimenko, Natsional’no-kul-turnapolityka VKP(b) shchodo radians’koi Ukrainy (1932­1938) (Kiev: In-t istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 2001).

I.S. Koropeckyj, “Industry,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 2:314.

V.A. Smolii, ed., Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994), 2:220; cited in Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105.

Stanislav Kulchytsky, Ukraina mizh dvoma viinamy, 1921-1938 rr. (Kyiv: Vydavnychyi dim Al’ternatyvy, 1999), 222; cited in Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 105. On Dniprohes, see Anne D. Rassweiler, The Generation of Power: The History of Dneprostroi (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 105. On the Soviet fears of an invasion from Poland and Germany, see Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Na­tionalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 36, 225-8, 265, 301, 322, 328-9, and 352; and Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 90, 97, 98, 107, 121, 122, 158, and 167. Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1985), 118-19; Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 106.

I.S. Koropeckyj, Location Problems in Soviet Industry before World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).

See M. Volobuev, “Do problemy ukrains’koi ekonomiky,” Bil’shovyk Ukrainy, 30 January 1928 and 15 February 1928. These articles were repub­lished in Dokumenty ukrains’koho komunizmu (New York: Proloh, 1962), 132-230.

V. Holubnychy, “History of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,” in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 1:826.

Ibid., 818.

V.M. Molotov, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993), 241.

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown, 2012), 76.

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 210.

In 1925, according to statistics provided by Soviet Ukraine’s Central Statistical Administration, nearly two-thirds (68.9 per cent) of peasant house­holds in Ukraine’s northern region produced only enough grain to feed their own households. Even in the south’s richer steppe region, 27.3 per cent of all households were subsistence farmers. Cited in Liudmyla Hrynevych, Khronika kolektyvizatsii ta Holodomoru v Ukraini 1927-1933 rr. (Kiev: Krytyka, 2012), vol. 1, book 3, 17-18.

The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, comp. and ed. Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012), xxxiv. The constraints imposed by Russian serfdom before 1861 differed from those dictated by Soviet collectivization after 1928, but the term “second serfdom” provided the peasants a convenient phrase to characterize their hatred of the new system.

R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 (New York and Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 93.

Robert O. Paxton, French Peasant Fascism: Henry Dorgere’s Greenshirts and the Crises of French Agriculture, 1929-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 1.

Dietmar Rothermund, The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929­1939 (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 39-40.

Paxton, French Peasant Fascism, chap. 1.

Volodymyr Serhiichuk, “Ukrains’kyi khlibnyi eksport iak odyn z holovnykh chynnykiv Holodomoru-hentsydu v 1932-33 rokakh,” in Ukrains’kyi khlib na eksport: 1932-33, ed. Volodymyr Serhiichuk (Kyiv: PP Serhiichuk M.I., 2006), 8.

Joseph Stalin, “Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U. (B.): Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. (B.) in April 1929,” in his Works (New York: Foreign Languages Publication, 1954), 12:1-113.

Roman Serbyn, “The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 and the United Nations Convention on Genocide,” in Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933: Genocide by Other Means, ed. Taras Hunczak and Roman Serbyn (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society in the U.S., 2007), 53-4. According to Holubnychy, 90.6 per cent of these alleged kulaks did not employ more than one worker. Holubnychy, “History of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,” 815. Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 108. For an assessment of the income of the collective farmer, see Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 375-99.

Andrea Graziosi, “The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917-1933,” in Stalinism, Collectivization and the Great Famine, ed. Andrea Graziosi (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Studies Fund, 2009).

Hrynevych, Khronika kolektyvizatsii ta Holodomoru, vol. 1, book 3, 119.

R.W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 47, 60; R.W. Davies, The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 72; Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1992), 155; The War against the Peasantry, 1927-1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside, ed. Lynne Viola, V. P. Danilov, N.A. Ivnitskii, and Denis Kozlov (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 35-6, 69, 111-12, and 115.

N. Osinsky coined the phrase “natural saboteurs” in a letter to Lenin in 1921, shortly after the Bolshevik Party introduced the NEP. Cited in Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 33.

Ibid., 38.

The War against the Peasantry, 1927-1930, document 5, 33-4.

V.M. Molotov, “Doklad V.M. Molotova v TsK VKP(b) i STO o poezdke na Ukrainu, Ural i v Bashkiriiu po delam khlebozagotovok (25 January 1928),” Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie: dokumenty i materially, ed. Viktor Danilov, Roberta Manning, Lynne Viola, et al. (Moscow: Rossiiskaia pol. entsiklopediia, 1999), 1:185 (quote), 186. Molotov Remembers, 241.

Ibid., 242.

Ibid.

Alec Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. (Baltimore and London: Penguin, 1969), 152.

Moshe Lewin, “The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization,” in The Making of the Soviet System, ed. M. Lewin (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 110; cited in The War against the Peasantry, 118.

Liudmyla Hrynevych, Holod 1928-1929 rr. u Radian’skii Ukraini (Kiev: Natsional’na Akademiia Nauk Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2013), 24-6. Ibid., 90, 155, 167.

Ibid., 27.

Mark Tauger, “Crisis or Famine? The Ukrainian State Commission for Aid to Crop-Failure Victims and the Ukrainian Famine of 1928-29,” in Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 170.

Hrynevych, Holod, 167, 249-50. Even A.I. Rykov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and a member of the pro-peasant Bukharin faction in the central Politburo, emphasized in late September 1928 in Kharkiv that grain collections in Ukraine had to supply the crop-failure okrugs as well as workers and townspeople. Visti, 27 September 1928, 2; cited in Tauger, “Crisis or Famine?” 156.

Tauger, “Crisis or Famine?” 168.

The first quote comes from ibid., 163; the second from ibid., 168.

Hrynevych, Holod 1928-1929 rr., 168.

Ibid., 90, 333.

Ibid., 339.

Ibid., 309, 310.

Graziosi, “The Great Soviet Peasant War,” 40-1.

Cited in Liudmyla Hrynevych, “Stalin’s Revolution from Above and the Famine of 1933 as Factors in the Politicization of Ukrainian Society,” in Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 13.

Cited in ibid., 14.

Hrynevych, Holod 1928-1929 rr., 314-15, 317.

Ibid., 339. See lurii Shapoval and Vadym Zolotar’ov, “levrei v kerivnytstvi orhaniv DPU-NKVD-USRR-URSR u 1920-1930-kh rr.,” Z arkhiviv VUChK/GPU/NKVD/KGB 17, no. 1 (2010): 53-93, which discusses the complexity of the inclusion and the motivations of the large number of mem­bers of the Ukrainian security services with a Jewish background.

Stalin, Works, 12:474; Dokumenty svidetel’stvuiut: Iz istorii derevni nakanune i v khode kollektivizatsii 1927-1932, ed. V.P Danilov and N.A. Ivnitskii (Moscow: Izd. Politicheskoi literatury, 1991), 295.

Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, vol. 3, document 47.

Cited in Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 41. For a history of the Bolshevik struggle against the Don Cossacks, see Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

Quote comes from Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 41.

Ibid., 41-2.

Serbyn, “Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33,” 55.

Mace, “Famine and Nationalism,” 39; V.N. Zemskov, Spetsposelentsy v SSSR, 1930-1960 (Moscow: Nauka, 2003), 17; and Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195.

From a letter to M. Kalinin on the deportation of families from Ukraine and Kursk, cited in Aleksander N. Yakovlev, A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 35.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 22.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928), appendix table 1, 203.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 96 (1927), v; Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928), table 2, 4.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 96 (1927), table 3, xvi-xix.

Calculated from Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928), table 1, 2. Kommunisticheskaia akademiia, Komissiia po izucheniiu natsional’nogo voprosa, Natsional’naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Moscow: Izd. Kommunisticheskoi Akademii, 1930), table 1, 59.

On grain reserves, see Hrynevych, Holod 1928-1929, 23, 336; for quote, Hiroaki Kuromiya, “The Soviet Famine of 1932-1933 Reconsidered,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 4 (2008): 667.

Ibid.

Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 107.

Lev Kopelev, I sotvoril sebe kumira (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1978), 249; and Lev Kopelev, The Education of a True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 226. Gary Kern’s translation of Kopelev’s memoir into English renders the word “nesoznatel’nosti” as “unconscientiousness.” In this context, this word is best translated as “political backwardness.” Serbyn, “Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933,” 55, 56.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 44.

Ibid., 45; Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 7-8.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 46; Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 8.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 46; quote comes from Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 4.

Pravda, 2 March 1930; I. Stalin, “Golovokruzhenie ot uspekhov,” in his Sochinenniia, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1952), 12:191-9.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 46.

Serbyn, “Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33,” 56, 57; S.I. Bilokin et al., eds, Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: Prychyny ta naslidky (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2003).

Calculated from Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 107 (for 1928); Serbyn, “Ukrainian Famine,” 55-6 (for 1 March 1930), and 56-7 (for 1 October 1930).

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 32.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 10.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 30, 29.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 10.

V. Holubnychy, “Collectivization,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 1:539; and Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 109.

Serbyn, “Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933,” 58. Natsional’naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh, 144, 148.

Hrynevych, Khronika kolektyvizatsiia, vol. 1, book 1, 24.

Institut Politychnykh doslidzhen’, Komunistychnapartiia Ukrainy: z’izdy i konferentsii (Kiev: Vyd. “Ukraina,” 1991), 149 (on the number of Komsomol and party members); Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 6 (on the urban visitors to the countryside).

Matthew D. Pauly, Breaking the Tongue: Language, Education, and Power in Soviet Ukraine, 1923-1934 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 30, 233, 256.

See Hrynevych, Khronika kolektyvizatsii, vol. 1, book 1, 24.

Lynne Viola, “The Second Coming: Class Enemies in the Soviet Countryside, 1927-1935,” in Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, ed. J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 69-70. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 136, l. 2; d.137, l. 4; cited in Elena Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii 1920 - 1930-e gody (Moscow: Evropa, 2006), 210.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 76, 79-80, 101, 103, 105, 126, 136, 225, 231, 443-6, 448-9, 463-4.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 49.

Nicholas Werth, “Strategies of Violence in the Stalinist USSR,” in Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared, ed. Henry Russo (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 80; cited in Norman M. Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 71. Snyder, Bloodlands, 34.

Leone Sircana, the Italian vice-consul in Novorossisk; cited in Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 52.

Ibid., 50.

See The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936, ed. R.W. Davies et al. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

Serbyn, “Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933,” 61.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 136.

Michael Ellman, “The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934,” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 6 (2005): 823; Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, xxxvi.

“Zi shchodennyka vchytel’ky Oleksandry Radchenko,” in Rozsekrechena pam’iat’: Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini v dokumentakh GPU- NKVD, ed. V. Borysenko, V. Danylenko, S. Kokin, O. Stasiuk, and lu. Shapoval (Kiev: Stylis, 2007), 546; excerpts in Kild and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 181.

See Omelian Rudnytskyi, Nataliia Levchuk, Oleh Wolowyna, Pavlo Shevchuk, and Alla Savchak, “Demography of a Man-Made Human

Catastrophe: The Case of Massive Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933,” Canadian Studies in Population 42, nos. 1-2 (2015), 65 (table 6).

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 152-4.

“Lyst H. Petrovs’koho do V. Molotova ta I. Stalina pro vazhke prodovol’che stanovyshche ta holod v USRR,” in Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. Ruslan Pyrih (Kyiv: Vyd. Dim “Kyievo- Mohylians’ka akademiia, 2007), documents 138, 139; also see Chubar’s letter in Komandyry velykoho holodu: poizdky V Molotova i L. Kaganovycha v Ukraini ta na pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 1932-1933 rr., ed. Valerii Vasiliev and Yurii Shapoval (Kiev: Heneza, 2001), 206-15.

Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936, 107; see doc. 51 (25 July 1932). Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 162.

“Stalin to Kaganovich (15 June 1932),” in Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 136.

Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 12; see doc. 35.

“Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov (for Members of the Politburo),” Stalin- Kaganovich Correspondence, 139.

“Stalin to Kaganovich (15 June 1932),” Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 137. Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 156. For an analysis of this party con­ference, see “III Konferentsiia KP(b)U: Proloh trahedii holodu,” in Vasiliev and Shapoval, Komandyry Velykoho holodu, 152-64 (in Ukrainian); 165-78 (in Russian).

In 1988, the Ukrainian writer Oleksa Musiienko coined the term Holodomor, which fused the words holod (hunger, famine) with moryty (to destroy by starvation) to describe the famine of 1932-3. The concept means an “intentionally set famine.”

Pyrih, Holodomor, documents 192 and 210; H.M. Mikhalychenko and le. P. Shatalina, comps., Kolektivizatsiia i holod na Ukraini, 1929-1933 (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1992), document 278; Tragediia sovetskoi derevne, 3:477-9. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 168. Of course, the authorities could arbitrarily define a “one-time” theft as “systematic” theft.

Ibid., 169-171.

Tragediia sovetskoi derevni (2001), 420-1; excerpts appear in Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 238.

Pyrih, Holodomor, document 293, 388-395; Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 35.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 43.

On 1929 and August 1932, see Davis and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 169; on late 1932, see Heorhii Papakin, “Blacklists as a Tool of the Soviet Genocide in Ukraine,” Holodomor Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 75.

Papakin, “Blacklists as a Tool,” 67, 74.

“Zones of death” comes from Snyder, Bloodlands, 43.

F.M. Rudych et al., eds, Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: Ochyma isto- rykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (Kiev: Vyd. Politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1990), document 121; Pyrih, Holodomor, document 354; Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, 3:576-7.

Ibid.

Papakin, “Blacklists as a Tool,” 74.

Kopelev, Education of a True Believer, 235.

Ibid. The last sentence comes from 265.

See Alain Blum, Naitre: Vivre et mourir en URSS: 1917-1991 (Paris: Plon, 1994), 102-3, for the rates of mortality in this period; cited in Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 53.

For the brutality against the peasants in the cities, see Sergio Gradenigo’s “Report to the Royal Embassy of Italy and to the Royal Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July 1933,” in U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), appendix 2, 439. For a full collection of Italian diplomatic reports, including Gradenigo’s, dealing with the situation in Ukraine, see Lettere da Kharkov: La carestia in Ukraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rerapporti del diplomatici italiani, 1923-1933 (Turin: Einaudi, 1991); and Lysty z Kharkova: Holod v Ukrainita ta na Pivnichnomu Kavkazi v povi- domlenniah italiis’kykh diplomativ 1932-1933 rokiv, ed. Iurii Shapoval and Andrea Graziosi (Kharkiv: Folio, 2007).

Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 19.

According to Graziosi, “In the first quarter of 1933, for example, the Soviet capital received 165,000 tons of grain, plus 86,000 for its surround­ing province. In contrast, the entire Soviet Ukrainian Republic, with a far larger population, welcomed only 280,000 tons.” Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 19.

Ibid.

Pyrih, Holodomor, document 365, 496-513. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 195.

Pyrih, Holodomor, documents 440, 442, 443; Rudych, Holod 1932-1933, document 150, 151; Also see Tragedia sovetskoi derevni, 3:634-6; and Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 306-307.

Andrea Graziosi, “The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a New Interpretation Possible, and What Would Its

Consequences Be?” in Andrea Graziosi, Stalinism, Collectivization and the Great Famine (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Studies Fund, 2009), 78.

For a well-written memoir of collectivization and the famine in a village in Cherkasy okruh between 1929 and 1933, see Miron Dolot, Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985).

Ibid., 150.

Pitirim Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity: The Effects of War, Revolution, Famine, Pestilence upon Human Mind, Behavior, Social Organization, and Cultural Life (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1942), 51.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 59.

Vasily Grossman, Everything Flows, translated from the Russian by Robert and Elizabeth Chandler with Anna Aslanyan (New York: New York Review Books, 2009), 136.

Ibid., 133.

William Henry Chamberlin, Russia’s Iron Age (London: Duckworth, 1935), 85; cited in Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 140.

Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR (Moscow, 1935), 222; cited in Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, rev. and ex­panded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 243 Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 221.

Viktor Kondrashin, “Hunger in 1932-1933: A Tragedy of the Peoples of the USSR,” Holodomor Studies 1, no. 2 (2009): 16-21; Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 51.

Medvedev, Let History Judge, 243. According to Snyder, Stalin might have saved millions of lives. “He could have suspended food exports for a few months, released grain reserves (three million tons), or just given peasant ac­cess to local grain storage areas. Such simple measures, pursued as late as November 1932, could have kept the death toll to hundreds of thousands rather than the millions.” Snyder, Bloodlands, 41-2. But in light of his ideo­logical predispositions, Stalin did not choose this option.

Michael Ellman, “Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-1933 Revisited,” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 4 (2007): 679.

Kuromiya, “The Soviet Famine of 1932-1933 Reconsidered,” 665.

Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 22.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 230.

Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 20-1.

165 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 334.

166 Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 23.

167 Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 231, 241.

168 Davies, Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 187.

169 Goldman, Terror and Democracy, 23.

170 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 93. In 1930, for example, the USSR exported 4.76 million tons of grain for 702 million rubles, and in 1931 it shipped 5.1 million tons for 523.3 million rubles. See Serhiichuk, Ukrains’kyi khlib na eksport: 1932-33, 9.

171 Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 15. The statistics in the first lines of the paragraph come from Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR (Moscow, 1935), 222; cited in Medvedev, Let History Judge, 243.

172 Roy Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 75; Medvedev, Let History Judge, 240.

173 Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 110, 108. Also see Sarah I. Cameron, “The Hungry Steppe: Soviet Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Famine, 1921-1934” (PhD dis­sertation, Department of History, Yale University, 2010).

174 Statistics on the number of victims of the famine in Ukraine in 1932-3 vary greatly. Pitirim Sorokin claimed that “two to three millions perished in the Russian famine of 1933-1934.” Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity, 91. Robert Conquest estimated a loss of five million in Ukraine and two million in Russia, of whom, he estimated, probably one million were Ukrainians in the North Caucasus. He also suggested one million Kazakh losses in 1932. Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow, 306. James E. Mace asserted that a five

to seven million loss was “a conservative figure.” James Mace “The Famine of 1933: A Survey of Sources,” in Famine in Ukraine, 1932-33, ed. Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 50. Although he did not provide absolute figures for Ukraine, Stephen Wheatcroft estimated the loss of four to five million throughout the USSR. S. Wheatcroft, “More Light on the Scale of Repression and Excessive Mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1930s,” in Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, ed. J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 280. Alec Nove viewed Conquest’s statistics as essentially correct, but “somewhat too high for Ukraine, but somewhat too low for Kazakhstan.” A. Nove, “Victims of Stalinism: How Many?” in Getty and Manning, Stalinist Terror, 266, 274. According to Stanislav Kulchytsky, the leading economic historian of twentieth-century Ukraine, between 3 and 3.5 million people in the republic died of starvation and malnutrition-related diseases. He estimated that the total demographic losses, including a reduction in the number of children born, totalled between 4.5 and 4.8 million people. S. Kulchytsky, “Teror holodom iak instrument kolektyvizatsii,” in Holodomor 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraini: prychyny i naslidky (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1995), 34; cited in Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 112. According to Timothy Snyder, approx­imately 3.3 million died by starvation and hunger-related disease in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-3. “Of these people, some three million would have been Ukrainians, and the rest Russians, Poles, Germans, Jews, and others. Among the million or so dead in the Soviet Russian Republic were probably at least two hundred thousand Ukrainians, since the famine struck heavily in regions where Ukrainians lived. Perhaps as many as a hundred thousand more Ukrainians were among the 1.3 million people who died in the earlier famine in Kazakhstan. All in all, no fewer than 3.3 million Soviet citizens died in Soviet Ukraine of starvation and hunger-related diseases; and about the same number of Ukrainians by nationality died in the Soviet Union as a whole.” Snyder, Bloodlands, 53.

175 Jacques Vallin, France Mesle, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pyrozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s,” Population Studies 56, no. 3 (2002): 249-64; Oleh Wolowyna, “The Famine-Genocide of 1932-33: Estimation of Losses and Demographic Impact” (paper presented to the UNC Conference on the Famine-Genocide in Ukraine, 1932-33, 12 September 2008, Chapel Hill, NC); Rudnytskyi, Levchuk, Wolowyna, Shevchuk, and Savchak, “Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe,” 69.

176 Rudnytskyi et al., “Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe,” 69. The five authors calculate “excess deaths” (or “direct losses”) by estimating all of the deaths which occurred during the famine period, then subtracting the “normal” deaths expected to have occurred had there been no famine. They define “indirect losses” as “the difference between the expected births had there been no famine and actual births” (64).

177 Ibid., 69.

178 In 1933, “the number of deaths reached a value approximately seven times the number of births, that is, there were seven times more deaths than births. In 1933 the life expectancy at birth was 11 years for males and 15 years for females, while in 1942 - the deadliest year of World War Two in Ukraine, life expectancy at birth for males was 18 years and 26 years for females. In other words, in spite of the fact that more persons died in Ukraine in 1942 than in 1933, the impact of the Holodomor (death by starvation) was signifi­cantly larger. Close to half of all deaths due to the Holodomor were for persons under 25 years of age, and in 1933 more than 40 percent of all births died within one year.” Wolowyna, “The Famine-Genocide,” 11; and Rudnytskyi et al., “Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe,” 65. Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 20. According to Rudnytskyi et al., “Demog­raphy of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe,” 70, the majority of excess deaths occurred in a six-month period, between March and August 1933, with a 77.5 per cent increase in the urban areas and 90.0 per cent in the rural areas. Rudnytskyi et al., “Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe,” 65, 66. Ibid., 66.

Gradenigo, “Report,” 427.

Rossiiski Gosudarstennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE), fond 1562, op. 329, d. 145, l. 8, in V' sesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1939 goda/Vsesoiuznaiperepis’ naseleniia 1937 goda (Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications (Primary Source Media); and Moscow: Federal Archival Service of Russia, 2000, reel 2 (cited hereafter as VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda).

RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 199, l. 3, in ibid.; Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928), xiii.

Natsional’naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh, 45; Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1937 g. Korotki itogi (Moscow: Institut isto- rii SSSR AN SSSR, 1991), 28. Kazakhstan’s dramatic population loss in this period included (1) large numbers of Kazakhs who fled the republic during collectivization, contributing to the republic’s overall population loss, and (2) large numbers of people who resettled in the republic during 1926-37, including special settlers, free agricultural colonists, and labourers with KarLag, thus boosting the republic’s overall population numbers. The num­bers for Kazakhstan’s losses are difficult to measure. See “Introduction,” Cameron, “The Hungry Steppe,” 1-24.

Graziosi, “The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines,” 80.

The statistics come from: (1926): Natsional’naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh, 36; (1937): Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1937 g., 83; and RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 145, l. 8; and (1939): RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 4537, l. 62, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 2; and Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk and Upravlenie statistiki naseleniia Goskomstata, Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleni­ia 1939 goda: Osnovnye itogi (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 57.

For 1926: Natsional’naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh, table 5, 44; for 1937: RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 145, l. 2, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 2. Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1937 g., 96.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928), xiii; RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 145, l. 1; RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 4535, l. 72, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 2; Vsesoiuznaia perepisaseleniia 1939 goda, 68.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928), xiii; RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 199, ll. 3, 96-7, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 2.

Statystyka Ukrainy, no. 124 (1928), xiii; RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 145, l. 1; and RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 4535, l. 72, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 2; Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1939 goda, 68.

Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 11.

See Cameron, “The Hungry Steppe.”

In 1930-4, Kazakhstan suffered the loss of 1,258,200 in excess deaths and 227,900 in lost births. Rudnytskyi et al., “Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe,” tables 8.5 and 8.6. The Kazakhs started dying as early as the fall of 1930, with most perishing in the winter of 1931-2. Of the 1.5 million who passed away, approximately 1.3 million were Kazakh men, women, and children; the authorities identified the remaining 200,000 as members of other national groups. See Cameron, “The Hungry Steppe.” Graziosi, “Uses of Hunger,” 20.

TsGANKh SSSR, fond 1562, op. 329, d.145, l. 15, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 2.

Martha Brill Olcott made this point in 1981. See her “The Collectivization Drive in Kazakhstan,” The Russian Review 40, no. 2 (1981): 136. According to RGAE, f. 1562, op. 336, d. 221, l. 13, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 9, the number of Ukrainians living in the USSR in 1939 (28,070,404) constitut­ed 90 per cent of their 1926 population; the number of Kazakhs living in the USSR in 1939 (3,098,764) comprised 78.1 per cent of their 1926 population. The Moldovans also lost a substantial number in this period. Their 1939 population constituted 93 per cent of their 1926 population. Of the largest Soviet national groups (those with a population over 250,000), only the Kazakhs, Ukrainians, and Moldovans possessed a smaller population in 1939 than in 1926.

Graziosi, “Uses of Hunger,” 20.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 68, 119, 120, 123 (weather), 69 (insect infestation), and 132 (fungal disease).

See Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 209; Mark B. Tauger, Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1933 (Pittsburgh, PA: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2001); and Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, especially 400-41, who make this argument.

On the planned harvests of 1929 to 1932, see Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 123.

Ibid., 235, 355.

Ibid., 263.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 48.

On crop rotation, see Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 56, 57, 110, 231-2, 234, 268; on weeding, see 67, 68, 124, 128, 240, 272, 466.

Pyrih, Holodomor 1932-1933; Rozsekrechena pam’iat’; and Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 69.

Ibid., 69-70.

Ibid., 93, 117.

Also see Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 134-5.

Graziosi, “Great Soviet Peasant War,” 56.

“Stalin to Kaganovich (no later than 11 August 1931),” in Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 54.

Cited in Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 237.

Quoted in Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1946), 130; also cited in Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 261.

The term “highest level of extremism” comes from Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, 196.

“Absolute triumph,” in Grossman, Everything Flows, 154; “political emas­culation,” in Scott, Seeing Like a State, 202-3.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 210.

Stalin, “Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.),” 1-113.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 187.

Andrea Graziosi called this “negative selection.” Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 17.

Cited in Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 249.

Cited in ibid., 250.

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 155 (Kosior quote); and Sobranie zakonov, 1932, Article 521 (17 December); cited in Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 244 (Soviet law quote). Kosior’s speech appeared in Pravda, 15 February 1933.

Pravda, 6 February 1933; cited in Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 209.

Pyrih, Holodomor 1932-1933, 771.

Quoted in Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 215 (my emphasis). Andrea Graziosi, “The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines,” 65.

Raphael Lemkin, who persuaded the United Nations to adopt the 1948 Convention on Genocide, asserted that the famine represented “a case of genocide, of the destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and

a nation.” R. Lemkin, “Soviet Genocide in Ukraine,” Raphael Lemkin Papers, 2L-273, reel 3, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations, published in Holodomor Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 3-8.

See Document No. 47 in Rozsekrechenapam”iat, 511-16; excerpts appeared in Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 256.

“Vyshe znamia proletarskogo internatsionalizma!,” Pravda, 10 March 1933, 1; excerpts in Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 259.

In late November 1932, Molotov wrote: “A Bolshevik who has thought out and checked the scale and the situation as a whole, must place the satisfac­tion of the needs of the proletarian state over and above all other priorities.” Cited in Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 150.

Ibid., 435.

Chapter 7

Delo Naroda, no. 227 (8 December 1917); cited in Oliver Radkey, Sickle un­der the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 310.

I. Stalin, “Rech na vypuske akademikov Krasnoi Armii” (4 May 1935), in I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1967), 1 (14): 61; cited in Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939,” Slavic Review 38, no. 3 (1979): 377. Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Cultural Revolution as Class War,” in Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1926-1931, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 10-11.

For analyses of the trials of the Shakhty engineers and of the Industrial Party, see Kendall E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917-1941 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), chaps. 3-4.

Fitzpatrick, “Cultural Revolution as Class War,” 18.

Ibid., 25.

Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Introduction,” in Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1926­1931, 3.

Not all who claimed the status of “workers” were actually workers. Fitzpatrick, “Stalin and the Making of a New Elite”; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934 (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Milovan Djilas coined the phrase “the new class,” but Fitzpatrick uses it in a slightly differ­ent way than Djilas does. See Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Praeger, 1957). For an excellent de­scription of the lifestyles of the upper ranks of this new elite, see Vera Dunham, In Stalin’s Time: Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

10 According to Fitzpatrick, the “old [Russian] intelligentsia as a whole had not been subject to mass arrest, like priests, or mass deportations, like peasants. Its members (except for a relatively small number of engineers working as convict specialists) were not sent out of the capitals to the new construction sites or to the countryside to teach in rural schools.” Fitzpatrick, “Cultural Revolution as Class War,” 37.

11 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 345.

12 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 89.

13 George Y. Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900-1941): Its State and Status (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1989), 126.

14 Ukrains’ka kontrrevoliutsiia sama pro svoiu robotu: za stenohramoiu sudu nad “SVU,” 4 vols. (Kharkiv: Derzh. Vyd-vo Ukrainy, 1930); and Volodymyr Prystaiko and lurii Shapoval, Sprava “spilky vyzvolennia Ukrainy”: Nevidomi dokumenty i fakty (Kiev: INTEL, 1995).

15 Andrea Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger: Stalin’s Solution of the Peasant and National Questions in Soviet Ukraine, 1932-1933,” in Famines in European Economic History: The Last Great European Famines Reconsidered, ed. Declan Curran, Lubomyr Luciuk, and Andrew Newby (New York: Routledge, 2014), 6.

16 Approximately fifty thousand Galician Ukrainians remained in Eastern Ukraine after the First World War or emigrated to Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s. Olga Bertelsen and Myroslav Shkandrij, “The Secret Police and the Campaign against Galicians in Soviet Ukraine, 1929-1934,” Nationalities Papers 42, no. 1 (2014): 38. The Soviet political leadership viewed Western Ukrainians as a group “with a strong sense of national identity and internal unity. Whatever their culture, even if they were prepared to work within a proletarian or Soviet state; they were therefore categorized as ‘nationalists’ and potential separatists” (39).

17 Matthew D. Pauly, Breaking the Tongue: Language, Education, and Power in Soviet Ukraine, 1923-1934 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 33, 303, 380, 381.

For a thorough analysis of these waves of arrests and of those arrested, see Myroslav Shkandrij and Olga Bertelsen, “The Soviet Regime’s National Operations in Ukraine, 1929-1934,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 55, nos. 3-4 (2013): 417-47.

See R. la. Pyrih, Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs’koho: ostannie desiatylittia (1924-1934) (Kiev: Instytut ukrains’koi arkheohrafii AN Ukrainy, 1993); and V. Prystaiko and lu. Shapoval, Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi i HPU - NKVD: Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924-1934 (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo “Ukraina,” 1996). Shkandrij and Bertelsen, “The Soviet Regime’s National Operations,” 420. James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983), and George O. Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 7. Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 103.

Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie: dokumenty i materially, ed. Viktor Danilov, Roberta Manning, Lynne Viola et al. (Moscow: Rossiiskaia pol. entsiklopediia, 1999), 3:576-7.

Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. Ruslan Pyrih (Kyiv: Vyd. Dim “Kyievo-Mohylians’ka akademiia, 2007), document 354; Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: Ochyma istorykiv, movoiu doku- mentiv, ed. F.M. Rudych et al. (Kiev: Vyd. Politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1990), document 121; and Komandyry velykoho holodu: poizdky V Molotova i L. Kaganovycha v Ukraini ta na pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 1932-1933 rr., ed. Valerii Vasiliev and Yurii Shapoval (Kiev: Heneza, 2001), document 58. Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 113.

Pyrih, Holodomor 1932-1933, document 357; Vasiliev and Shapoval, Komandyry velykoho holodu, document 59.

Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, chaps. 7 and 10. On Ukrainization outside the Ukrainian SSR, see Hennadii Yefimenko, Natsional’no-kul’turna polityka VKP(b) shchodo Radians’koi Ukrainy (1932-1938 rr.) (Kiev: Natsional’na Akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Institut istorii Ukrainy, 2001), 113-40.

Pyrih, Holodomor 1932-1933, document 357; Vasiliev and Shapoval, Komandyry velykoho holodu, document 59.

Mykola Skrypnyk, Balitsky’s future victim, made this assertion. Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotar’ov, ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraini: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty (Kiev: Abris, 1997), 73.

Postyshev started to work as a member of the Kiev province party committee in 1923, then became a secretary of the CP(b)U’s Central Committee in 1925.

As a member of the Ukrainian Politburo and Organizational Bureau (1926­30), he served as the secretary of the Kharkiv district and city party commit­tees, where he actively purged Trotskyists and Ukrainian national-communists and participated in the industrialization and collectivization campaigns. From January 1930 to January 1933, he became one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow. Balitsky served in the leadership of the Ukrainian Cheka in 1918-22, then became the first head of the GPU in Ukraine from September 1923 to the end of July 1931. On Postyshev: Keenan Hohol and Bohdan Krawchenko, “Pavel Postyshev,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4 (1993); on Balitsky: Shkandrij and Bertelsen, “The Soviet Regime’s National Operations,” 419. Also see lurii Shapoval and Vadym Zolotar’ov, Vsevolod Balitskii: osoba, chas, oto- chennia (Kiev: Stylos, 2002), and Volodymyr Lozyts’kyi, Politbiuro TsK Kompartii Ukrainy, 1918-1991: Istoriia, osoby, stosunky (Kiev: Heneza, 2005), 246 (Postyshev) and 148 (Balitsky).

31 Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 114; Yefimenko, Natsional’no-kul’turnapolityka VKP(b), 52-112; E. Boris¸nok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii 1920- 1930-e gody (Moscow: Evropa, 2006), 225.

32 Valerii Vasiliev, “The Great Terror in the Ukraine, 1936-38,” in Stalin’s Terror Revisited, ed. Melanie Ilic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 142.

33 For Skrypnyk’s views, see Mykola Skrypnyk, Statti ipromovy z natsional’noho pytannia (Munich: Suchasnist, 1974), and Mykola Skrypnyk, Vybrani tvory (Kyiv: Vyd. “Ukraina,” 1990). For analyses of the evolution of his political assessments, see James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983); George O. Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 7; and V.F. Soldatenko, Nezlamnyi: zhyttia i smert’ Mykoly Skrypnyka (Kiev: Knyha pamiatu Ukrainy, 2002).

34 See Stanislav Kosior’s 22 November 1933 speech delivered at the CP(b)U’s Central Committee and Central Control Commission, Izvestiia, 2 December 1933; Hennadii Yefimenko, “The Soviet Nationalities Policy Change of 1933, or Why ‘Ukrainian Nationalism’ Became the Main Threat to Stalin in Ukraine,” Holodomor Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 27.

35 N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 172; cited in Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 15.

36 Quoted from Oleksander Loshytskyi, “Laboratoria: Novi dokumenty i svid- chennia pro masovi represii 1937-1938 rokiv na Vinnychchyni,” Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB, nos. 1-2 (1998): 215; cited in Kuromiya, Voices, 15.

Quoted from Loshytskyi, “Laboratoria,” 215; cited in Kuromiya, Voices, 15. Lev Kopelev, The Education of a True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 277.

See V.G. Makarov and V.S. Khristoforov, “Predislovie,” in Vysylka vmesto rasstrela: Deportatsiia intelligentsia v dokumentakh VChK-GPU, ed. V.G. Makarov and V.S. Khristoforov (Moscow: Russkii put’, 2005), 5-48.

For the political outlook of the Russian non-Bolshevik intellectuals in the revolutionary period, see Jane Burbank, Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917-1922 (New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1986).

See documents 84 and 86 in Makarov and Khristoforov, “Predislovie,” 131-8; 139-64. They are based on reports written by the GPU’s informants and ac­tive agents, as well as general observations.

Vasyl Danylenko, “Politychnyi kontrol’ dukhovnoho zhyttia v Ukraini 1920-kh rokiv,” in his Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia i vlada: Zvernennia Sekretnoho viddilu DPU USRR 1927-1929 rr. (Kiev: Tempora, 2012), 20-1. Tsirkuliarnoe pis’mo Gosudarsvennogo politicheskogo upravleniia (Sekretnyi otdel) ob ukrainskom separatizme (Kharkov, 4 September 1926), appended in full at the end of an article by Yuri Shapoval, “‘On Ukrainian Separatism’: A GPU Circular of 1926,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 3-4 (1994): 301. V.A. Hrechenko and O.N. larmysh, Ukraina u dobu “rann’oho” totalita- rizmu (20-ti roku XX st.) (Kharkiv: Vyd. NUVS, 2001), 114; cited in Danylenko, Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia, 25.

J.V. Stalin, “To Comrade Kaganovich and Other Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Ukrainian C.P.(B.),” in J.V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), 8:157.

Ibid., 158.

Ibid., 159.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 160.

Ibid., 160, 161.

Ibid., 162, 160.

Agitation on behalf of peasant unions in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus also appeared in OGPU analyses in December 1927 and January 1928. See The War against the Peasantry, 1927-1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside, ed. Lynn Viola, V.P. Danilov, N.A. Ivnytskii, and Denis Kozlov (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 38-9, 40.

54 Tsirkuliarnoe pis’mo Gosudarsvennogo politicheskogo upravleniia (Sekretnyi otdel) ob ukrainskom separatizme, 275-302.

55 See Danylenko, Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia i vlada, a collection of 140 GPU weekly reports on the activities and attitudes of the Ukrainian intelligentsia from 1 January 1927 to 31 December 1929.

56 Leonid Maximenkov, “Stalin’s Meeting with a Delegation of Ukrainian Writers on 12 February 1929,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 16, nos. 3-4 (1992): 403.

57 Ibid., 404.

58 All quotes in this paragraph come from ibid., 410.

59 On 12 December 1930, Stalin wrote a letter to the Soviet Russian writer Demyan Bedny admonishing him for slandering the USSR and its “Russian” working class. He asserted: “The whole world now admits that the centre of the revolutionary movement has shifted from Western Europe to Russia. The revolutionaries of all countries look with hope to the USSR as centre of the liberation struggle of the working people throughout the world and recognize it as their only Motherland. In all countries the revolutionary workers unani­mously applaud the Soviet working class, and first and foremost the Russian working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, as their recognized leader that is carrying out the most revolutionary and active policy ever dreamed of by the proletarians of other countries. The leaders of the revolutionary work­ers in all countries are eagerly studying the highly instructive history of Russia’s working class, its past and the past of Russia, knowing that besides reactionary Russia there existed also revolutionary Russia... All this fills (cannot but fill!) the hearts of Russian workers with a feeling of revolutionary national pride that can move mountains and perform miracles.” J.V. Stalin, “To Comrade Demyan Bedny (Excerpts from a Letter),” in J.V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), 13:25-6.

60 Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Days of the Turbins (Dni Turbinykh) became one of the most popular plays ever produced by the Moscow Art Theater. Based in part on the playwright’s novel The White Guard (which did not appear in print in the USSR until 1966), the play concerned the fate of the Turbins,

a Russian family sympathetic to the anti-Bolshevik Whites, as they encounter Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, the Imperial German Army, the Reds, and the Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev. In the course of the play, the Turbins and their friends demean Ukrainians, Ukrainian culture, and Skoropadsky’s limited Ukrainization. By depicting the Whites as normal human beings, not de­mons, Bulgakov earned the wrath of critics. But theatregoers wanted to see the play. In March 1929, one month after Ukrainian writers met with Stalin, the Soviet government banned the performance of all of his plays and prohib­ited the publication of his other works. After Bulgakov appealed to Stalin, the Soviet government ordered the Moscow Art Theater to revive the play in 1932. All in all, The Days of the Turbins had 987 performances between 1926 and 1941; Stalin saw it more than twenty times. Evgeny Dobrenko, “Introduction,” in Mikhail Bulgakov, The White Guard, trans. Marian Schwartz (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), xix; Will Self, “The White Guard by Mikhail Bulgakov,” The Guardian, 19 March 2010.

Maximenkov, “Stalin’s Meeting with a Delegation of Ukrainian Writers,” 420. Ibid., 421.

Ibid., 422.

Ibid., 424.

Ibid., 424-5.

Ibid., 425.

Dobrenko, “Introduction,” xxvi.

Maximenkov, “Stalin’s Meeting with a Delegation of Ukrainian Writers,” 426. Stalin, Works, 13:368-9.

RGASPI, f. 558, l. 11, d. 1132, fols. 119-20; cited in Hennadiii Yefimenko, “The Kremlin’s Nationality Policy in Ukraine after the Holodomor of 1932­1933,” in After the Holodomor: The Enduring Impact of the Great Famine of Ukraine, ed. Andrea Graziosi, Lubomyr A. Hajda, and Halyna Hryn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2013), 77.

Stalin’s changes to Kosior’s theses and his entire speech were published in Komunist Ukrainy, no. 4 (2004); cited in Yefimenko, “The Kremlin’s Nationality Policy,” 81 Stalin, Works, 13:369.

On Ukrainization in 1923, see Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 2.

On this attempt, see Yefimenko, “The Kremlin’s Nationality Policy,” 89-90. Quote from Institute politychnykh doslidzhen’, Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy: z”izdy i konferentsii (Kiev: Vyd. “Ukraina,” 1991), 168.

The quote comes from Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language, 142-3.

Hryhory Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror, 1929-1939 (New York: Praeger, 1960).

This statement was inspired by Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language, 143, who wrote his survey in the 1980s, before the collapse of the USSR.

Andrea Graziosi employed this term in his “The New Soviet Archival Sources: Hypotheses for a Critical Assessment,” Cahiers du Monde Russe 40, nos. 1-2 (1999): 16; the phrase reappears in his “The Uses of Hunger,” 17. Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 24-5.

V. Holubnychy, “History of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,” in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 1:825.

Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1985), 134-41; cited in Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 116.

Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 336, 337.

Yefimenko, Natsional’no-kul’turna polityka VKP(b), 142.

Peter A. Blitstein, “Nation-Building or Russification? Obligatory Russian Instruction in the Soviet Non-Russian Schools, 1938-1953,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Building in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 253.

“Pro reorhanizatsiiu natsional’nykh shkil na Ukraini” (10 April 1938), TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 6, d. 463, ll. 2-4; and “Pro obov’iazkove navchannia rossiiskoi movy v nerosiiskykh shkolakh Ukrainy” (20 April 1938), TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 6, d. 478, ll. 115-21.

H. H. Yefimenko, Natsional’na polityka kerivnytstva VKP(b) v Ukraini 1932-1938 gg. (osvita ta nauka) (Kiev: Instityt istorii Ukrainy, 2000), 26, 34; cited in Pauly, Breaking the Tongue, 336. Elena Borisenok disputes that this “new course” represented a policy of Russification. She claims that the poli­cies which emerged in the 1930s represented an intense centralization drive with the goal of creating a new socialist culture, with internationalism at its core. E. Borisenok, Fenomenon Sovetskoi ukrainizatsii 1920-1930-e gody (Moscow: Evropa, 2006), 232.

See, for example, Sylvia Gilliam, “The Nationality Questionnaire,” in The Nationality Problem in the Soviet Union: The Ukrainian Case, ed. Sylvia Gilliam, Irving Rostow, and John S. Reshetar (Project on the Soviet Social System [AF No. 33(038)-12909], Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954), 11.

On 16 May 2006, I spoke with Ivan Dziuba (born in 1931), a prominent Soviet Ukrainian dissident and the second minister of culture (1992-1994) in Ukraine’s post-communist government. According to my notes from that day, “When I asked about his life in the Donbass in his youth, he mentioned how he went to a Russian-language school, inasmuch as there were no Ukrainian- language ones in his area. The Russian school had compulsory courses in Ukrainian and, he said, the school authorities took it seriously.” That’s how he learned Ukrainian in one of the most Russified areas of Ukraine.

Gilliam, “The Nationality Questionnaire,” 11.

Ibid.

The citation comes from ibid., 46. She defines the better-educated as those “who had eight or more years (of schooling), including partial technicums; the less educated - those with seven years or less of education” (93).

Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 272; Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 803; and Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 114.

Norman M. Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 81.

Barry McLoughlin, “Mass Operations of the NKVD, 1937-1938: A Survey,” in Stalin’s Terror: High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union, ed. Barry McLoughlin and Kevin McDermott (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 123; and Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 146. For an assessment of the official repression of the Poles, see Nikita Petrov and Arsenii Roginskii, “The ‘Polish Operation’ of the NKVD, 1937-38,” in McLoughlin and McDermott, 53-172.

Brown, A Biography of No Place, 42-3.

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 91. Brown, A Biography of No Place, 133, provides a smaller number. Also see her chap. 5.

Ibid.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 93.

N.V. Petrov and A. Roginskii, “‘Pol’skaia operatsiia’ NKVD 1937-1938 gg.,” in Represiiprotiv poliakov, ed. A.E. Gur’ianov (Moscow, 1997), 28; cit­ed in Brown, A Biography of No Place, 155.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 99.

See “Pro reorhanizatsiiu natsional’nykh raioniv ta sil’rad URSR v zvychaini raiony ta silrady,” Protokoly No. 11-19 zasedanii Politbiuro TsKKP(b) Ukrainy (3 January-25 March 1938), TsDAHOU, f. 1 op. 6, d. 462, ll. 62-5.; and “Pro reorhanizatsiiu natsional’nykkh shkil na Ukraini,” Protokoly No. 20-24 zasedanii Politbiuro TsKKP(b) Ukrainy (10 April-17 June 1938), TsDAHOU, f. 1 op. 6, d. 463, ll. 2-4.

“Pro zaminy latyns’koho shryfta rosiis’kym po Moldavs’kii ARSR (25 March 1938),” TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 6, d. 462, l. 140.

Vasiliev, “The Great Terror in the Ukraine, 1936-38,” 142.

Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-2. Ivan Bilas, Represyvno-karal’na systema v Ukraini, 1917-1953: Suspil’no- politychnyi ta istoryko-pravovyi analiz (Kyiv: Lybid-Viis’ko Ukrainy, 1994), 1:379; cited in Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 115. Kuromiya, Voices, 13, provides a figure of 123,421 people sentenced to be shot during these years.

Vasiliev, “The Great Terror in the Ukraine, 1936-38,” 151.

Kuromiya, Voices, 258.

McLoughlin, “Mass Operations of the NKVD,” 120, 121.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 84, 81.

See Ukraina v dobu “Velykoho teroru”: 1936-1938 roky, ed. lurii Shapoval and Hiroaki Kuromiya (Kiev: Lybid’, 2009).

Gr. Pevzner, “Kto rukovodit radioveshchaniem na Ukraine?” Pravda, 9 July 1937, 6; E. Fomenko, “Eshche raz ob ukrainskom radioveshchanii,” Pravda, 15 July 1937, 6; “Ot redaktsii,” Pravda, 15 July 1937, 6; Pravda, 17 July 1937; “Chto eto - neitralitet?, Pravda, 20 July 1937, 2; “Navesti bol’shevistskii poriadok v radioveshchanii (lead editorial),” Pravda, 22 July 1937, 1; Gr. Pevzner, “Tak bol’sheviki ne podbiraiut kadry (g. Vinnitsia),” Pravda, 22 July 1937, 4; A. Vadimov, “Na plenume TsK Komsomola Ukrainy,” Pravda, 25 July 1937, 2; “Ne ostanovlivat’sia na polputi! (o Proletarskoipravde v Kieve),” Pravda, 24 July 1937, 4.

See, for example, “O sostoianii radioveshchaniia na Ukraine. Postanovlianie TsK KP(b)U po stat’iam, napechatannym v Pravde,” Pravda, 21 July 1937, 2. Lozyts’kyi, Politbiuro: TsK Kompartii, 219.

Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language, 147-8.

William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 116.

Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language, 149.

“M.I. Bondarenko - Predsedatel’ Sovnarkoma USSR,” Pravda, 2 September 1937, 6. For a brief overview of his career, see Lozyts’kyi, Politbiuro: TsK Kompartii, 149.

First quote taken from Institute politychnykh doslidzhen’, Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy: z”izdy i konferentsii, 177; second quote from Taubman, Khrushchev, 120.

Quote from Institute politychnykh doslidzhen’, Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy: z”izdy i konferentsii, 180.

lurii Shapoval, “The Ukrainian Years,” Nikita Khrushchev, ed. William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 8, 9.

I. D. Nazarenko, Ocherkipo istorii Kommunisticheskoipartii Ukrainy (Kiev: Izd-vo polit. Lit-ry Ukrainy, 1964); cited in Medvedev, Let History Judge, 412.

Conquest, The Great Terror, 224; Medvedev, Let History Judge, 195; Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 117.

Goldman, Terror and Democracy, 259.

Taubman, Khrushchev, 116.

N.A. Barsukov, A.P. Shaidullin, and I.N. ludin, “KPSS - Partiia internatsional’naia,” Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 7 (July 1966), 12; cited in T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 371n11.

Sheila Fitzpatrick, “The Civil War as a Formative Experience,” in Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution, ed. Abbot Gleason, Peter Kenez, and Richard Stites (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), 74.

See ibid. 57-76; and David Joravsky, “Cultural Revolution and the Fortress Mentality,” in Gleason, Kenez, and Stites, Bolshevik Culture, 93-113. Fitzpatrick, “The Civil War,” 57.

Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: The Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism,” in Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth­Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework, ed. Amir Weiner (Stanford, CA: Stanford, University Press, 2003), 20.

Ibid., 27.

Taken from an interview with Roman Werfel in Teresa Toranska, “Them”: Stalin’s Polish Puppets (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 102. Andrea Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,”8.

Holquist, “State Violence,” 42.

Moshe Lewin, “Who Was the Soviet Kulak?” Soviet Studies 18, no. 2 (1966): 189-212, and his The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (New York: New Press, 1994), 121-41; R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 21-5.

Fitzpatrick, “The Civil War,” 61. For an early (1919) Ukrainian communist criticism of the connections between Bolshevism and Russian imperialism, see Vasyl Shakhrai and Serhii Mazlakh, On the Current Situation in Ukraine, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970). Also see Stephen Velychenko, Painting Imperialism and Nationalism Red: The Ukrainian Marxist Critique of Russian Communist Rule in Ukraine, 1918-1925 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). For an assessment of the seven crucial policies that applied only or mainly in Soviet Ukraine in late 1932 and early 1933, see Snyder, Bloodlands, 42-6. “The party’s geopolitical calculations,” according to Andrea Graziosi, “heavily influenced the indigenization programs in each non-Russian area. Since Moscow concentrated its attention on the security of the USSR’s west­ern borderlands and on Ukraine, in particular, its leaders reacted against all internal opposition to collectivization and manifestations of ‘Ukrainian na­tionalism’ far more brutally than in the Caucasus, Central Asia, or the Far North, regions geographically distant from the sources of the threat they perceived.” Andrea Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 10.

139 In a letter to Mikhail Sholokhov, dated 6 May 1933, Stalin responded to Sholokhov’s complaints about the lawlessness of the collectivization drive in the North Caucasus, and asserted that “ the respected peasants of your re­gion (and not only your region) carried out a sitdown strike (sabotage!) and would not have objected to leaving the workers and the Red Army without bread. The fact that this sabotage was quiet and apparently harmless (blood­less) does not alter the fact that the respected peasants waged a silent war against Soviet power. [This is] a war by starvation, dear Comrade Sholokhov... the respected peasants are not as innocent as it might appear from afar.” “Sholokhov i Stalin. Perepiska nachala 30-x godov (Stupitel’naia stat’ia lu. G. Murina),” Voprosy istorii, no. 3 (1994): 22.

140 Snyder, Bloodlands, 42.

141 Michael Ellman, “The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934,” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 6 (2005): 832.

142 Ibid., 839fn49.

143 Stalin to Kaganovich, 11 August 1932, The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-36, ed. R.W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, E.A. Rees, Liudmila P. Kosheleva, and Larisa A. Rogovaya (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 179-81. According to Stalin, “The most important issue right now is Ukraine. Things in Ukraine have hit rock bottom. Things are bad in regard to the party. There is talk that in two regions of Ukraine

(I think it is the Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk regions) about 50 percent district party committees have spoken out against the grain procurement plan, deeming it unrealistic. The situation in the other district party committees, people say, is no better. What does this look like? This is not a party but a parliament, a caricature of a parliament. Instead of leading the districts, Kosior keeps maneuvering between the directives of the CC of the VKP and the demands of the district committees - and now he has maneuvered him­self into a total mess. Lenin was right in saying that a person who does not have the courage to swim against the current when necessary cannot be a real Bolshevik leader. Things are bad with the Soviets. Chubar is no leader. Things are bad with the GPU. Redens is not up to leading the fight against the counterrevolution in such a large and distinctive republic as Ukraine.

Unless we begin to straighten out the situation in Ukraine, we may lose Ukraine. Keep in mind that Pilsudski is not daydreaming, and his agents in Ukraine are many times stronger than Redens or Kosior thinks. Keep in mind, too, that the Ukrainian Communist Party (500,000 members, ha-ha) has quite a lot (yes, quite a lot!) of rotten elements, conscious and unconscious Petliura adherents, and, finally, direct agents of Pilsudski. As soon as things get worse, these elements will waste no time opening a front inside (and outside) the party against the party. The worst aspect is that the Ukraine leadership does not see these dangers. Things cannot go on this way.” The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-36, 180. Since the USSR and Poland had actually signed a non-aggression pact on 25 July 1932, less than three weeks before this outburst, “Stalin was exploiting a non­existent foreign threat to justify the liquidation of his internal enemies, using this tactic to further consolidate his position, as he had done in the past, more than once, most famously against Trotsky in 1927.” Andrea Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 14.

Ellman, “The Role of Leadership Perceptions,” 833.

Raphael Lemkin, “Soviet Genocide in Ukraine,” Holodomor Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 4.

According to Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adapted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, genocide “means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” Blackstone’s Statutes: International Human Rights Documents, ed. P.R. Ghandhi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 19.

J. V. Stalin, “Concerning the National Question in Yugoslavia,” Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), 7:71-2. Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger,” 18.

Ibid., 21.

Frank E. Sysyn, “The Famine of 1932-1933 in the Discussion of Russian- Ukrainian Relations,” The Harriman Review 15, nos. 2-3 (May 2005): 81. David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of the Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

Kuromiya, Voices, 124.

Seweryn Bialer, “Comment - The Impact of Common RSFSR/USSR Institutions,” in Ethnic Russia in the USSR: The Dilemma of Dominance, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Praeger, 1980), 198-9.

Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem (New York: Monad Press, 1974).

Chapter 8

Cited in Wyatt Mason, “The Revelations of Marilynne Robinson,” New York Times Magazine, 1 October 2014.

George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Plume, 2003), 276, 277. See Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1565-1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). For a history and collection of documents concerning Poland’s intervention in Carpatho-Ukraine in the fall of 1938 and spring of 1939, see Akcja “Bom”: Polskie dzialania dywersyjne na Rusi Zakarpackiej w swietle dokumentow Oddzialu II Sztabu Glownego WP, ed. Pawel Samus, Kazimierz Badziak, and Giennadij Matwiejew (Warsaw: Adiutor, 1998).

Vincent Shandor, Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1997), 166.

Ibid., 167.

Ibid., 168.

On the history of Carpatho-Ukraine and the Hungarian invasion, see ibid., chaps. 5-8.

V.S. Kozhurin, “O chislennosti naselennia SSSR nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Neizvestnye dokumenty),” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 2 (1991): 23; Halik Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 96.

Stephen Fischer-Galati, “Moldavia and the Moldavians,” in Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, ed. Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers, and Frederic Harned (New York: Free Press, 1975), 415, 418.

Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 206, 205. On the trau­matization of the war, see Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth Century Russia (New York: Viking, 2000), and Orlando Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Picador, 2007), chap. 6.

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Free Press, 2010), 128.

Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed, 120. The term “revolution from abroad” comes from Jan Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 3, 17.

15 Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 34.

16 Gross claims that “thousands of Poles were killed” but does not provide a more detailed number or the circumstances. For a description and analysis of these atrocities, see Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 35-41, 50-3. As is al­ways the case in an environment of chaotic hostilities at the confluence of war, long-standing national struggles, and the collapse of states, the precise numbers of victims and the assignation of responsibility are difficult to deter­mine. Ewa Siemaszko estimated that OUN-led violence took the lives of at least 1,036 Poles in Volhynia and 2,242 in Galicia in 1939. Ewa Siemaszko, “Bilans zbrodni,” Biuletyn Instytut Pamieci Narodowej 7-8, nos. 116-17 (2010): 80-1; cited in John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 53, nos. 2-4 (2011): 214n128. Also see Grzegorz Motyka, Od Rzezi Wolynskiej do Akcji “Wisla”: Konflikt polsko-ukraihski 1943-1947 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011), 45-51. Many of those Poles killed by Ukrainian nationalists may have been Polish soldiers or fully armed de­serters who sought to avenge their military defeat by the Germans on the local Ukrainian population. Many refused to disarm. See Ivan Patryliak, “Peremoha abo smert'”: Ukrains'kyi vyzvol'nyi rukh u 1939-1960 rr. (L’viv: Chasopys, 2012), 26-32.

17 Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 371.

18 For a descriptive analysis of how the Soviets organized these elections, see Gross, Revolution from Abroad, chap. 2.

19 Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed, 123.

20 Kozhurin, “O chislennosti naselennia SSSR,” 23.

21 Orest Subtelny, “The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine, 1939-1941: An Overview,” in Ukraine during World War Two: History and Its Aftermath, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 9.

22 Shimon Redlich, Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 81. On how the Soviets took over the Shevchenko Scientific Society and trans­formed it into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSSR, see document 258, Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli, ed. lurii Slyvka et al (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1995), 1:588-92.

23 Andriy Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History, A Historians’ War,” Ab Imperio 1 (2015): 463.

24 Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed, 124.

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 150. In late 1939 or early 1940, I.S. Serov, the head of the Ukrainian NKVD, described the following scene to Nikita S. Khrushchev, who recorded it in his memoirs: “There are long lines standing outside the place where people register for permission to return to Polish ter­ritory. When I took a closer look, I was shocked to see that most of the peo­ple in line were members of the Jewish population. They were bribing the Gestapo agents to let them leave as soon as possible to return to their original homes.” N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, with an introduction, commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw; trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 141.

The citation concerning crowds comes from Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 20, 29, 42; cited in Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 39.

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 33. Gross provided a different interpretation in his Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), and in his “Themes for a Social History of War Experience and Collaboration,” and his “A Tangled Web: Confronting Stereotypes Concerning Poles, Germans, Jews, and Communists,” in The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath, ed. Istvan Deak, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15-35, 74-129.

Redlich, Together and Apart, 87.

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 206. Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed, 108, 107.

Redlich, Together and Apart, 86. Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed, 121.

Redlich, Together and Apart, 80.

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 33, 45.

Volodymyr Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, 1942-1947: Dokumenty (Kiev: Vydavnychyi dim “Kyievo-Mohylians’ka akademiia,” 2011), 46.

Patryliak, “Peremoha abo smert’,” 25.

Redlich, Together and Apart, 88.

See chap. 4, note 65. Also see Maria Savchyn Pyskir, Thousands of Roads: A Memoir of a Young Woman’s Life in the Ukrainian Underground during and after World War II, trans. Ania Savage (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2001). Iu. A. Kyrychuk, “Radians’kyi terror 1939-1941 rr.,” Politychnyi terror i terroryzm v Ukraini, XIX-XX st.: Istorychni narysy (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2002), 576-95; cited in The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941: A Sourcebook, ed. Ksenya Kiebuzinski and Alexander J. Motyl (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 28-33.

Myroslav Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 41. Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 42.

On the deportations, see Gross, Revolution from Abroad, chap. 6. Stanislaw Ciesielski, Grzegorz Hryciuk, and Aleksander Srebrakowski, Masowe deportacje ludnosci w Zwiqzku Radzieckim (Toruii: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek, 2004), 246-7; Wysiedlenia, wypedzenia i ucieczki 1939-1959: Atlas ziem polskich, Polacy, Zydzi, Niemcy, Ukraincy, ed. Witold Syenkiewicz and Grzegorz Hryciuk (Warsaw: Demart, 2008), 37-41, 107-9, 205-7; Albin Glowacki, “Deportowani w latach 1940-1941,” in Polska 1939-1945: Straty osobowe i ofiary represjipod dwiema okupacjami, ed. Wojciech Materski and Tomasz Szarota (Warsaw: Instytut Pamieci Narodowej, 2009), 243-5.

Ciesielski, Hryciuk, and Srebrakowski, Masowe deportacje ludnosci w Zwiazku Radzieckim, 246-7; Wysiedlenia, wypedzenia i ucieczki 1939-1959, 37-41; 107-9, 205-7; and Glowacki, “Deportowani w latach 1940-1941,” 243-5. Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 177. Wysiedlenia, wypedzenia i ucieczki 1939-1959, 207.

See J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962). For the recently published documents concerning Katyn, see Katyn: A Crime with­out Punishment, ed. Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2007). Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 155, made these estimates. He also provided a compelling argument that the NKVD arrested approximately 500,000 men and women in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in 1939-41.

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 179; Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed, 129. Subtelny, “The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine,” 11, 12; Kiebuzinski and Motyl, The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre, 8, and especially notes 20-4.

Kiebuzinski and Motyl, The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre, 8, and 13-14; Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941,” 211.

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 181.

“Many Victims of Soviet Terror in Western Ukraine Identified: More than 14,000 Executed by the Reds,” Ukrainian Weekly, 2 September 1941. Kiebuzinski and Motyl, The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre, 14. Raul Hilberg defined pogroms as “short, violent outbursts by a community against its Jewish population,” in his The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), 203; cited in Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941,” 211-12.

Ibid., 221; and Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement,” Kritika 12, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 102. Myroslav Shkandrij provided a more nuanced assessment of the OUN’s complicity in the anti-Jewish pogrom during the first days of the war. See Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 65-6.

Subtelny, “Soviet Occupation,” 11. Jan Gross provides a slightly lower figure: “Together with POWs and those arrested in the intervals, about 1.25 million Polish citizens (of a total of roughly 13.5 million) found themselves in the summer of 1941 residing in the labor camps, in prisons, and in forced settle­ments all over the Soviet Union.” Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 146. Nevertheless, this, as Gross reminds us, is “a staggering number for a popula­tion of 13.5 to 14 million (including refugees from central and western Poland)” (155).

Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 67, 68 (quote from Nazi propaganda pamphlet). Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2008), 139.

Snyder, Bloodlands, x, 159-60.

On Ukrainian attitudes in Western Ukraine between 1939 and 1941, see Vladyslav Hrynevych, Nepryborkane riznoholossia: Druha svitova viina i suspil’no-politychni nastroi v Ukraini, 1939 - cherven’ 1941 rr. (Kiev: “Lira,” 2012).

Rossolinski-Liebe, “‘Ukrainian National Revolution,’” 104, 105.

Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 59.

Ryszard Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraihcy: Sprawa ukraihska w czasie II Wojny Swiatowej na terenie II Rzeczyspopolitej (Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo Nauke, 1993), 247; cited in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 60.

Myroslav Yurkevych, “Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations and in the German Administration,” in Boshyk, Ukraine during World War Two, 83; cited in Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 56, 60.

See Alexander J. Motyl, “The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews: Theoretical Reflections on Nationalism, Fascism, Rationality, Primordialism, and History,” Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry 26 (2014): 275-95.

John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

Norman Davies, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945 (New York: Penguin, 2008), 165.

Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 134; Snyder, Bloodlands, 161.

These statistics come from John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, 1941-1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in

World War II (London: Longman, 1991), 29-30. The surrender of over three million Soviet soldiers in a six-month period represented the largest capture of soldiers in the history of warfare. For an assessment of the frustra­tions of front-line German soldiers, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-1945: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

71 Edward C. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 67.

72 Bohdan Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation,” in Boshyk, Ukraine during World War Two, 16. The Soviet leadership, unfortunately, did not evacuate the Jews. For an analysis of these evacuations, see Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station: Evacuations and Survival in the Soviet Union at War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

73 During its campaign in Western Europe in 1940, the German army lost ap­proximately 156,000 men, including 30,000 dead. By December 1941, six months into Operation Barbarossa, it experienced heavier losses on the east­ern front: 750,000, including 200,000 dead. Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, 28.

74 On the haunting parallels between the German soldiers on the steppe in the First World War and the Second World War, see Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also see Theo J. Shulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1989).

75 From an article about “subhumans,” edited by the SS Main Office and pre­pared primarily for the indoctrination of SS recruits, “Document No. 1805,” International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, 1946); cited in Ihor Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies (New Haven, CT: College and University Press, 1961), 38-9; and in R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction, 1994), 118-19. For the complete article, see Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plans, appendix 2, 189-92.

76 Yitzhak Arad, “The Destruction of the Jews in German-Occupied Territories of the USSR,” in The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German- Occupied Soviet Territories, ed. Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya Altman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), xiv-xv.

77 Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belarus and Ukraine (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 27, 60.

78 Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 42.

Dieter Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte bim Mord an den Juden,” in Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche? ed. Gerhard Paul (Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2000), 219; cited in John-Paul Himka, “The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine,” in Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe, ed. with intro. by John-Paul Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 631.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 201.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 202, 408. M.I. Koval, “The Nazi Genocide of the Jews and the Ukrainian Population,” in Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR, ed. Zvi Gitelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 59n, claims that fifty-two thousand Jews were shot at Babyn Yar from 29 September to 3 October 1941.

Wendy Morgan Lower, “From Berlin to Babi Yar: The Nazi War against the Jews, 1941-1944,” Journal of Religion and Society 9 (2007): 1-14.

Redlich, Together and Apart, 132.

Arad, The Holocaust, 125. For an overview of the Holocaust in Ukraine, see chaps. 10, 12-17, 19-22, and 24-5.

Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte,” 219; cited in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 67.

The statistic, 2.6 million Soviet Jews, comes from Snyder, Bloodlands, 221. Arad, The Holocaust, 518-25; and Jacques Vallin, France Mesle, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pyrozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s,” Population Studies 56, no. 3 (2002): 249-64 (citation on 263).

Arad, The Holocaust, 518-25. According to John-Paul Himka, approximately “2.5 million people whom the invading Germans would have deemed Jews” lived in the territory of present-day Ukraine on the eve of the Second World War. Under a million were evacuated east when the Germans attacked. About 1.5 million Jews were murdered in the Holocaust.” Himka, “The Reception of the Holocaust,” 628.

Arad, The Holocaust, 531.

Ibid., 345, 346.

Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 164, 177.

Ibid., 165.

Richard J. Overy, Russia’s War (New York: Penguin, 1998), 135. As Lower pointed out, “According to the racial hierarchy of Nazi ideology in which the Germans ranked supreme, Ukrainians fell under the Baltic peoples but above those slated for immediate destruction - the Jews, the Gypsies, and other ‘Asiatics,’ followed by Poles and to a lesser extent the Great Russians and Belorussians.” Lower, Nazi Empire-Building, 27. Also see Bohdan Wytwycky (Vitvitsky), The Other Holocaust: Many Circles of Hell: A Brief Account of 9-10 Million Persons Who Died with the 6 Million Jews under Nazi Racism (Washington, DC: Novak Report on the New Ethnicity, 1980). Lower, Nazi Empire-Building, 65.

Quoted in Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 188.

Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, 21; Overy, Russia’s War, 133. Snyder, Bloodlands, 176-7.

Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, 28. “In German prisoner-of-war camps for Red Army soldiers, the death rate over the course of the war was 57.5 percent... In German prisoner-of-war camps for soldiers of the Western Allies, the death rate was less than five percent. As many Soviet prisoners-of-war died on a single day in autumn 1941 as the British and American prisoners-of-war in the course of the entire Second World War.” Snyder, Bloodlands, 181-2 (his emphasis).

Homze, Foreign Labor, 81; Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 161; and Krakivski visti, 11 November 1941, and Oborona Ukrainy, 1 August 1942; cited in Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation,” 16. Of the millions the German captured, they “shot, on a conservative estimate, half a million Soviet prisoners-of-war. By way of starvation or mistreatment during transit, they killed about 2.6 million more. All in all, perhaps 3.1 mil­lion Soviet prisoners-of-war were killed.” Snyder, Bloodlands, 184.

Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 2004), 37, 39.

Quoted in ibid., 37.

Quoted in Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 458.

Quoted in Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 47.

Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (New York: Dutton, 1964), 602. See Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

Redlich, Together and Apart, 99.

Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed, 263-4.

Jan T. Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 1939-1944 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 188-9; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair; and Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 458-9.

George H. Stein, The Waffen-SS: Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), xxx, xxxi, and xxxii (quote).

Notes from the 12 April 1943 meeting of German administrators concerning the formation of a division from the Ukrainian population of Galica, in Taras Hunczak, On the Horns of a Dilemma: The Story of the Ukrainian Division Halychyna (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), 186. From the appeal by Dr Otto Wachter, governor of Galicia, “To the Con­scriptable Youth of Galicia” in Hunczak, On the Horns of a Dilemma, 184. Stein, The Waffen-SS, 185.

Hunczak, On the Horns of a Dilemma, 64.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid., 27-8.

Ibid., 55. Koch’s racist reaction did not differ very much from Hitler’s. During the night of 23-4 March 1945, with Soviet troops less than 160 kilo­metres (100 miles) from Berlin, Hitler asserted: “One never knows what’s floating around. I’ve just heard, to my surprise, that a Ukrainian SS-Division has suddenly turned up. I knew absolutely nothing about this Ukrainian SS- Division... If it is comprised of (former) Austrian Ruthenians, one can do nothing other than immediately to take away their weapons. The Austrian Ruthenians were pacifists. They were lambs, not wolves. They were miserable even in the Austrian Army. The whole business is a delusion.” Stein, The Waffen-SS, 194, 195.

Hunczak, On the Horns of a Dilemma, 86; and Stein, The Waffen-SS, 187. On the Battle of Brody, see Brody: zbirnyk stattei i narysiv, ed. Oleh Lysiak (Drohobych-Lviv: Vidrodzhennia, 2003).

Hunczak, On the Horns of a Dilemma, 128-9.

Stein, The Waffen-SS, 187. After extensive screenings in internment camps in Rimini, the British determined that these men had not engaged in crimes against humanity. See Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals: Report - Part I: Public (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1986), 251; cited in Hunczak, On the Horns of a Dilemma, 163.

A. Zhukovsky, “Transnistria,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ed. Danylo H. Struk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 5:274-5.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 280.

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 226-31.

Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 308.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 65.

Lev Shankovs’kyi, Pokhidni hrupy OUN: Prychyny do istoriipokhidnykh hrup OUN na tsentral’nykh i skhidnykh zemliakh Ukrainy v 1941-1943 rr. (Munich: Vyd. “Ukrains’kyi samostiinyk,” 1958), 7.

Ibid., 7-8.

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 41.

Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, 2nd, rev., ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 114, 375; Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation,” 27; cited in Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 63.

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 99.

Ibid., 136, 132 (quote on 140); Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation,” 27.

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 227.

According to Sylvia Gilliam, members of the well-educated younger genera­tion were “consistently less anti-Russian, had less anti-semitism, and [were] also less likely to condemn the nationality policies of the regime... there is a striking correspondence here between the goals of the regime - cultural pride devoid of national independence aspirations, - and the expressed atti­tudes of the best educated younger respondent.” Sylvia Gilliam, “The Nationality Questionnaire,” in The Nationality Problem in the Soviet Union: The Ukrainian Case, ed. Sylvia Gilliam, Irving Rostow, and John S. Reshetar (Project on the Soviet Social System [AF No. 33(038)-12909], Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954), x.

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 227-9.

Ibid., 104-5.

The figures for Kiev in 1941 come from Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 169; for 1943 from Alexander Dovzhenko, The Poet as Filmmaker: Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Marco Carynnyk (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973), 93; and for Kharkiv from Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation,” 27.

Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 1.

Ibid., 165; Homze, Foreign Labor, 172-3; Myroslav Yurkevich, “Ostarbeiter,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ed. Danylo Husar Struk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 3:729.

The figure of 200,000 is from Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 197; 400,000 is from Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 452; David R. Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), 52; cited in Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 63.

Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 1.

Ibid., 317.

Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation,” 28. Homze, Foreign Labor, 309.

Earl Ziemke, “Composition and Morale of the Partisan Movement,” in Soviet Partisans in World War II, ed. John A. Armstrong (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 150.

Armstrong, Soviet Partisans, 44.

Ibid., 745.

Alexander Dallin, Ralph Mavrogordato, and Wilhelm Moll, “Partisan Psychological Warfare and Popular Attitudes,” in Armstrong, Soviet Partisans, 337.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 74.

Shankovs’kyi, Pokhidni hrupy OUN, 47-8; Dallin, Mavrogordato, and Moll, “Partisan Psychological Warfare and Popular Attitudes,” 222; Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 74, 157, 160; and Aleksandr Gogun, Stalinskie kommandos: Ukrainskie partyzanskie formirovaniia 1941-1944 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012), 376-89, 486, 487.

Compare Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 81, and Kochanski, Eagle Unbowed.

See Anna M. Ciencala, “General Sikorski and the Conclusion of the Polish­Soviet Agreement of 30 July 1941: A Reasssessment,” Polish Review 41, no. 4 (1996): 413, 414.

Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2:272.

Anita Prazmowska, Poland: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 141-2.

Ibid., 142.

Davies, God’s Playground, 2:522.

The information on Kholm and the Kholm Region in this paragraph and in the preceding three paragraphs comes from Volodymyr Kubijovic, “Kholm Gubernia” and “Kholm Region,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 2:480-5.

See Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, 60, 61.

Joseph Poprzeczny, Odilo Globocnik: Hitler’s Man in the East (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004), 182; Patryliak, “Peremoha abo smert’,” 334; Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, document 11 (“Ohliad sytuat- sii na Kholmshchyni na vesni 1943 r.”), 163.

Patryliak, “Peremoha abo smert’,” 336.

Ibid., 364-7.

Patryliak asserted that 5,000 to 6,000 Ukrainians were killed and 20,000 fled the Kholm and neighbouring Hrubyshev Regions between 1942 and mid- 1944. Ibid., 364.

Document 26 (“Zaiava Orhanizasii ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv [samostiinykiv-derzhavnykiv] z pryvodu podii na Volyni vlitku 1943 roku”) (July 1943), Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, 226.

Ibid., 77.

For a nuanced assessment of the start of this critical event, see Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 69.

Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, 66.

“In the ethnically mixed areas of the kresy, the Germans generally staffed the police with men who were not Poles.” Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, 65.

Ibid., 71.

Ibid., 60, 67.

Ibid., 61.

Ibid., 73.

Ibid., 71.

Ibid.

Ibid., 69; Armstrong, Soviet Partisans, 147-8.

Armstrong, Soviet Partisans, 148.

Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, 145.

Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 173.

The precise number of Poles in Volhynia in 1941-5 is unknown. The last Polish census of 1931 recorded 346,640 Poles (or 16.6 per cent of the total population) in this province. Serhii Chornyi, Natsional’nyi sklad naseleniia Ukrainy v XX storichchi: Dovidnyk (Kyiv: Kartohrafiia, 2001), 62. From 1931 Volhynia experienced a population growth, but also extensive Soviet deportations and executions during the years 1939-41. After 22 June 1941, Volhynia also experienced German executions and deportations and labour conscriptions to Germany. Iaroslav Dashkevych estimates that in 1943 ap­proximately 220,000 Poles lived in this province. See his article, “Tretii front u mizhnarodnii hri v mynulomu i teper,” in Ukrains’kyi vyzvol’nyi rukh, ed. V. Viatrovych (Lviv: Ms, 2003), 2:139; cited in Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, 100.

Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, 146, made this analogy.

For estimates of the number of Poles killed by Ukrainians and Ukrainians killed by Poles during the Second World War and immediately after, see: Aleksandr Gogun, Mezhdu Gitlerom i Stalinom: ukrainskie povstantsy, 2nd ed. (Moscow: ZAO “OLMA Media Group,” 2012); Alexander Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos: Ukrainian Partisan Forces on the Eastern Front (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015); Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraihska partyzantka 1942-1960: DzialalnosC Organizacji Ukraihskich Nacjonalistow i Ukraihskiej Powstahczej Armii (Warsaw: Instytut Studiow Politycznych PAN: RYTM, 2006); G. Motyka, Od rzezi wolyhskiej do Akcji “Wisla”; G. Motyka, Antypolska akcja OUN-UPA 1943-1944: Fakty i interpretacje (Warsaw: Instytut Pamieci Narodowej, 2002); Marek Jasiak, “Overcoming Ukrainian Resistance: The Deportation of Ukrainians within Poland in 1947,” in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East Central Europe, 1944-1948, ed. Phillip Ther and Ana Siljak (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 178-95; Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraihcy; Timothy Snyder, “The Causes of Ukrainian Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943,” Past and Present, no. 179 (2008): 221; Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations; Snyder, Bloodlands; Grzegorz Hryciuk, Przemiany narodowosciowe i ludnosciowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wolyniu w latach 1931-1948 (Torun: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszafek, 2005), 279, 315; Per Anders Rudling, “Theory and Practice: Historical Representation of Wartime Accounts of the Activities of the OUN-UPA,” East European Jewish Affairs 36, no. 2 (December 2006): 163-79; Rossolinski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941,” 83-114; Ahonen Pertti, People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and Its Aftermath (New York: Berg, 2008); Ewa Siemaszko, “Bilans Zbrodni,” 77-90; Davies, God’s Playground; Lucyna Kulinska, Dzieci Kresow (Cracow: Echo, 2009): 467; Antypolska ak­cja nacjonalistow ukrainskich w Malopolsce Wschodniej i na Wolyniu w swia- tle dokumentow Rady Glowniej Oprekuhczej 1943-1944: Zestawienie ofiar, ed. Lucyna Kulinska and Adam Rolrnski (Cracow: Fundajca Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodleglosciowego, 2012); and John-Paul Himka, “Interventions: Challenging the Myths of Twentieth Century Ukrainian History,” in The Convolutions of Historical Politics, ed. Alexei Miller and Maria Lipmann (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2012); Patryliak, “Peremoha abo smert’”; and Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina.

180 Motyl, “The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews,” 288.

181 Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, 108.

182 Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 168-78.

183 For a history of the Soviet passport system, see Marc Garcelon, “Colonizing the Subject: The Genealogy and Legacy of the Soviet Internal Passport,” in Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 83-100.

See Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation.” Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, provides a more cautious assessment.

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 194, 199, 195-6, 200.

Rossolinski-Liebe, “‘Ukrainian National Revolution,’” 92, claims that 750 to 7,000 OUN-B members joined the expeditionary groups.

See Weiner, Making Sense of War, chap. 5.

Shankovs’kyi, Pokhidni hrupy OUN, 185.

“Materiialy III nadzvychainoho velykoho zbory Orhanizatsii ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv,” in Ukrains’ka suspil’no -politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: Dokumenty i materially, ed. Taras Hunczak and Roman Solchanyk (Munich: Suchasnist, 1983), 3:65-73; and Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).

According to Alexander J. Motyl, “nationalism can possess liberal and dem­ocratic aspirations as it can have fascist and authoritarian aspirations” (“The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews,” 278). For a documentary overview of the evolution of the views of the OUN-B and of the UPA, see Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground; and Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism.

Motyl, “The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews,” 281.

Ibid.

On the impact of the experiences of the OUN’s expeditionary groups in the 1943 OUN program, see Shankovs’kyi, Pokhidni hrupy OUN, 317.

Ibid., 15.

Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian- Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

Armstrong, Soviet Partisans in World War II, 4.

The passage in quotes comes from Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995), 26. Interview with Dmytro Bartkiw (London, October 1997), in Redlich, Together and Apart, 130.

John-Paul Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during the Second World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors,” in The Fate of the European Jews, 1939-1945: Continuity or Contingency? ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 179.

See Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

These ideas come from Alexander J. Motyl, who reviewed the 2013 and 2014 drafts of this book.

Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation, 117.

Stefan Korbonski, Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State, 1939-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), 116, 117-19. Document 5 (“Vytiah iz ‘Ohliadu zhyttia na pivnichno-zakhidnykh ukrains’kykh zemliakh (za misiatsi kviten’-traven’ 1942 roku”), in Viatrovych, Druha Pol’s’ko ukrains’ka viina, 127.

Ibid., 127.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 100.

Motyl, “The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews,” 283.

Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration,” 173.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 186.

George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, part III, chap. 3.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 186.

Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration,” 184.

This partial quote comes from Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History,” 472. The point about the relative impact of these three total wars on the citizens of Ukraine is mine, not Zayarnyuk’s.

Aleksander M. Nekrich, Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of World War Two (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978); Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, 115; Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), chap. 3. The statistics come from Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 102, 103. Snyder, Bloodlands, 330-1, asserts that the NKVD deported 180,014 Crimean Tatars.

The figure of 203,662 is from Ihor Vynnychenko, Ukraina 1920-1980-kh: Deportatsii, zaslannia, vyslannia (Kyiv: Vydavntstvo “Radu,” 1994), 82; the figure of 300,000 is from Richard Overy, Russia’s War: A History of the Soviet War Effort (New York: Penguin, 1998), 311-12.

Compare Marius Broekmeyer, Stalin, the Russians, and Their War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 178-9; and N.L. Pobol’ and P.M. Polian, comps., Stalinskie deportatsii 1928-1953 gg. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratiia” and “Materik,” 2005), 781-2. For the full text of this alleged order deporting Ukrainians, see ibid., 787-8.

For the quote from Khrushchev, see Broekmeyer, Stalin, the Russians, and Their War, 178-9.

Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 216-217. According to Yitzhak Arad, Stalin and his closest comrades downplayed the Soviet Jewish role in the Great Fatherland War and in the Holocaust because Nazi anti-Judeo-Bolshevist propaganda “fell on fertile ground. Many Soviet civilians and soldiers were tainted by anti-Semitism, and many of them would have been pleased to see the Jews disappear, even if this involved cruelty and murder. To counter this propaganda, the Soviet authorities presented Germany as striving to exterminate the Russians and other Slavic nations, while downplaying the murder of Jews and their singular fate under German occupation. The objective of Soviet propaganda was to increase the Soviet soldiers’ motivation to fight the German enemy and increase the war effort among the Soviet people in the rear area.” Arad, The Holocaust, 543-4. On this point, see Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 542­3. Snyder asserts that the Holocaust could never become part of the Soviet history of the war because it raised the issue of the involvement of Soviet citizens with the Germans in the mass murder of the Jews. Snyder claims that “collaboration undermined the myth of a united Soviet population de­fending the honor of the fatherland by resisting the hated fascist invader.” Snyder, Bloodlands, 342-3.

219 Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 78.

220 Gogun, Stalinskie commandos, 342; and Alexander Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos: Ukrainian Partisan Forces on the Eastern Front (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

221 See Weiner, Making Sense of War.

222 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerillas, 216-17.

Chapter 9

1 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), ix; cited in David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xxi.

2 For overviews of these Allied negotiations, see S.M. Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace (New York: Penguin, 2011); Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967); and James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy, 1945-1947 (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1990).

3 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962), 114.

4 Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1,041; as cited in Mark Kramer, “Introduction,” in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East Central Europe, 1944-1948, ed. Phillip Ther and Ana Siljak (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), xii, 5.

5 G.F. Krivosheev et al., Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books, and Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997), 83-4. Also see A.A. Sheviakov, “Gitlerovskii genotsid na terri- toriskh SSSR,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no. 12 (1991), and “Zhertvy sredi mirnogo naseleniia v gody Otechestvennoi voiny,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovanie, no. 11 (1992).

6 Krivosheev et al., Soviet Casualties, 83-5. For political reasons, Soviet leaders have always massaged the actual number of deaths the Soviet Union experi­enced between 1941 and 1945. In February 1946 Stalin presented a figure of seven million Soviet war losses. In April 1965, Marshal Konev, one of the bat­tlefront commanders in the Great Patriotic War, announced that ten million soldiers and sailors died in the war but did not provide the number of civil­ians lost. In the 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev asserted “an excess of 20 million,” including military and civilian losses. In 1985, Army General M.M. Kozlov claimed that more than twenty million Soviet citizens, “part of them civil­ians,” perished in the war. With Gorbachev’s glasnost, new studies of the war revised these statistics upward. John Erickson, “Foreward,” in ibid., vii.

7 Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 46.

8 V.I. Zemskov, “K voprosu o repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan 1944-1951 gody,” Istoriia SSSR, no. 4 (1990): 26.

9 Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 297.

10 Norman Davies, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006), 356. On losses in Belarus, see Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina, 1941-1945, ed. V.A. Zolotarev and G.N. Sevost’ianov (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 4:267; cited in Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 64.

11 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 251.

12 David Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1992), 54; Davies, No Simple Victory, 301; Povidomlennia nadzvychainoi derzhavnoi komisiipo vstanovlenniu i rozsliduvanniu zlo- chyniv nimetsko-fashysytskykh zaharbnykiv (Kiev, 1945), 2; cited in Vsevolod Holubnychy,”Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine,” in his Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1984), 112.

Davies, No Simple Victory, 20.

Jacques Vallin, France Mesle, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pyrozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s,” Population Studies 56, no. 3 (2002): 249-64 (citation on 263); and Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 518-25 (see table 8.1).

Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine, 63; Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, “Demographic Consequences of World War II on the Non-Russian Nationalities of the USSR,” in The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, ed. Susan J. Linz (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), 208. Snyder, Bloodlands, 342.

Although most of the Ukrainian foreign workers in occupied Germany re­turned to the USSR after the war, approximately 750,000 foreign workers, mostly those from territories claimed by the Soviet Union, refused repatria­tion to their homelands. Edward C. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 298.

Anderson and Silver, “Demographic Consequences,” 208.

Figures for 1939: TsGANKh, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 4535, l. 72 in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 5; Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk and Upravlenie statistiki naseleniia Goskomstata, Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1939 goda: Osnovnye itogi (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 68; for 1959: Soviet Union, Tsentral’noe statis- ticheskoe upravlenie, Itogi Vsesoiuznoiperepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainskaia SSR (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1963), 168. The Russian population in Western Ukraine in the interwar period was negligible.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 330-1.

Phillip Ther, “A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Conse­quences of ‘Ethnic Cleansing,’” in Ther and Siljak, Redrawing Nations, 44. Ther and Siljak, Redrawing Nations, xii, 5, claim “approximately 12 million” Germans; R.M. Douglas asserts the twelve to fourteen million figure. See R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 1. Mark Kramer cites a figure of 1.4 million victims: M. Kramer, “Introduction,” in Ther and Siljak, Redrawing Nations, 27n6. R.M. Douglas presents a mortality range of 500,000 to 1.5 million. As all statistics dealing with war losses, this figure is contested. Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 1. Teresa Toranska, “Them”: Stalin’s Polish Puppets (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 250.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 326.

“By Soviet-Polish agreements of 1944 and 1945, ethnic Poles and Jews (but not other nationalities) who had been citizens before 17 September 1939 and who resided in the eastern provinces that were now incorporated into the Soviet Union, had the option of moving from the Soviet Union to Poland. Conversely, Ukrainians, Russians, Belarussians, and Lithuanians (but not Jews) had the option of moving to the Soviet Union. More than half a million Ukrainians, Russians, Belarussians, and Lithuanians actually moved from Poland to the Soviet Union under this agreement - probably involuntarily in many cases, since they evidently constituted the great majority of the popula­tion eligible for transfer. Two million Poles, or about half those eligible for transfer, made the journey in the opposite direction. In addition, a substantial group of Jews got out of the Soviet Union via the Polish-Soviet exchange though a high proportion of them subsequently left Poland for Palestine and other destinations.” Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Postwar Soviet Society: The ‘Return to Normalcy,’ 1945-1953,” in Linz, The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, 133. Piotr Eberhardt provided the statistics: Piotr Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups and Population Changes in Twentieth-Century Central-Eastern Europe: History, Data, Analysis (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 140.

27 Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups and Population Change, 140.

28 Snyder, Bloodlands, 326.

29 Ther, “A Century of Forced Migration,” 56; Ivan Bilas, Represyvno-karal’na systema v Ukraini 1917-1953 (Kiev: Lybid’-Viis’ko Ukrainy, 1994), 1:229, 230: and Ihor Vynnychenko, Ukraina 1920-1980-kh: Deportatsii, zaslannia, vyslannia (Kiev: vyd. “Radu,” 1994), 66. Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups and Population Change, 140, provides a figure of 481,000 Ukrainians and 34,000 Belarussians. Marek Jasniak, “Overcoming Ukrainian Resistance: The Deportation of Ukrainians within Poland in 1947,” in Ther and Siljak, Redrawing Nations, 181, lists 80,000 Belarusans. Also see Timothy Snyder’s article, “‘To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All’: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 2 (1999): 86-120; and Orest Subtelny, “Expulsion, Resettlement, Civil Strife: The Fate of Poland’s Ukrainians, 1944-1947,” in Ther and Siljak, Redrawing Nations, 155-72.

30 Vynnychenko, Ukraina 1920-1980-kh, 67.

31 Anatolny Rusnachenko, Zburenyi narod: Natsional’no-vyzvol’nyi rukh v Ukraini i natsional’ni rukhy opory v Bilorusii, Lytvii, Latvii, Estonii (Kiev: Pul’sary, 2002), 183.

32 Ibid., 188.

33 On the Ukrainian national movement and the OUN-B/UPA in Zakerzonnia between 1939 and and 1948, see ibid., chap. 3.

34 Kramer, “Introduction,” 13.

35 Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups and Population Change, 142, 143.

Snyder, Bloodlands, 325.

Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 337-8.

According to the 1939 census (taken before the annexation of Ukrainian ter­ritories from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia), 23,667,509 individuals (or 76 per cent of the total population of the Ukrainian SSR) identified them­selves as Ukrainians. According to the 1959 census, the first since the end of the war, 32,158,493 people (or 77 per cent of the total population) identified themselves as Ukrainians. Source for 1939: TsGANKh, f. 1562, op. 529, d. 4535, l. 72 in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 5; for 1959: Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainskaia SSR, 168.

In the 1930s, 63.4 per cent of the population of the territories annexed to the Soviet Union from Poland, 61.6 per cent of the population from Czechoslovakia, and 43.4 per cent of the population from Romania identi­fied themselves as Ukrainians (see Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups and Population Change, 212, 213, 214). According to the Soviet census of 1959, Ukrainians comprised 91 per cent of the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil oblasts (which constituted Poland’s interwar Galicia) and 94 per cent of the Volyn and Rivne oblasts (which comprised Poland’s interwar Volhynia); 75 per cent of the Zakarpats’ka Oblast (Czechoslovakia’s former Transcarpathia); and 67 per cent of the Chernivtsi Oblast (Romania’s interwar Bukovina). See Itogi Vsesoiuznoiperepisi nadeleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainskaia SSR, 176-8. Source for 1939: TsGANKh, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 4535, ll. 72-4, in VPN 1939 goda/1937 goda, reel 5; for 1959: Itogi Vsesoiuznoiperepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainskaia SSR, 174-9.

Ibid.

On tipping points in post-war Ukraine, see my “Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926-1994,” Nations and Nationalism 4, no. 2 (1998): 187-206.

Roman Szporluk, “Kiev as the Ukraine’s Primate City,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3-4 (1979-80), part 2: 848-9.

See Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). Serhy Yekelchyk, Everyday Politics in the Wake of Total War: Kyiv, 1943­1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Konstantin Simonov, “Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia: razmyshleniia o I. V. Staline,” Znamia, no. 3 (1988): 48; cited in Zubkova, Russia after the War, 18.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 318n5.

Ibid., 106n27.

Ivan Patryliak, “Peremoha abo smert’”: Ukrains’kyi vyzvol’nyi rukh u 1939­1960 rr. (L’viv: Chasopys, 2012), 188.

Ibid., 223.

Ibid., 208.

See Volodymyr Semystyaha, “New Documentary Information about Maksym Bernats’kyi, a Leader of the Ukrainian Underground in Eastern Ukraine during World War II,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 3-4 (1994): 303-26. Bernats’kyi was the editor-in-chief of Nove zhyttia, a regional Ukrainian-language newspaper in Voroshylovhrad (today’s Luhansk), published three times weekly between 18 August 1942 and 31 January 1943, with a circulation of three to twenty thousand copies. Also see Ievhen Stakhiv, Kriz’ tiurmy, pidpillia i kordony: Povist’ moho zhyttia (Kiev: Rada, 1995).

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 100. In 1946, in Lviv Oblast, 58.2 per cent of peasant households possessed less than two hectares of arable land and were regarded as poor; 39.2 per cent held two to five hectares and were identi­fied as middle peasants; and only 2.6 per cent owned more than five hectares and were labelled kulaks (100). According to Statiev, “More of the middle peasants resented rather than supported the new Soviet administration be­cause their social status had dropped relative to their poorer neighbors, and the few benefits they had received from Soviet reforms often were outweighed by higher taxes and the fear of collectivization and deportation. The border­line between kulaks and middle peasants has always been blurred” (153). Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, xiv, 75.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 104.

Ibid., 116.

Ibid., 110, table 4.4; 125.

Ibid., 132.

Ibid., 8

Vladyslav Hrynevych, “Stalins’ka imperiia v borot’bi z ukrains’kym povstans’kym rukhom,” in “Osobye papki” Stalina i Molotova pro natsional’no-vyzvol’nu borot’bu v Zakhidnii Ukraini u 1944-1948 rr.: zbirnyk dokumentiv, comp. Iaroslav Dashkevych and Vasyl’ Kuk (L’viv: Literaturna agentsiia Piramida, 2010), 43.

See “Osobyepapki” Stalina i Molotova. Vynnychenko, Ukraina 1920-1980-kh, 82. Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 199-200.

Ibid., 202.

Ibid., 204.

Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, 30.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 5.

Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, 52.

Roman Shukhevych u dokumentakh radians’kykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpe- ky (1940-1950), ed. Volodymyr Serhiichuk (Kiev: PP Serhiichuk M.I., 2007). Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 134.

Ibid., 338.

Document 64, “Osobyepapki” Stalina i Molotova, 216-20.

Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine, 163.

Ibid., 114.

Ibid., 129.

Quote taken from Harvey Fireside, Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 52; cited in Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 270. Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 42.

On the complexities of Sheptytsky’s moral stance, see John-Paul Himka, “Christianity and Radical Nationalism: Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Bandera Movement,” in State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, ed. Catherine Wanner (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 93-116.

The Greek Catholic Church did not collaborate with the Nazis or the Ukrainian nationalists. Metropolitan Sheptytsky opposed both. See Andrii Kravchuk, Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: The Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1997); and Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1989).

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 265.

For documents concerning the pressure on the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and its “conversion” to Russian Orthodoxy, see documents 114-18, 120, 121, 124, 128, 129, 131, 139, and 233, in Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli, ed. Iurii Slyvka et al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1995), 1:259-546.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 267.

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950) (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996), 245; cited in Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 268.

Document no. 246 in Pravda pro Uniiu. Dokumenty i materialy, ed. V. Malanchuk et al. (Lviv: Kameniar, 1968), 365; cited in Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 268.

See document 121, Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini, 280-2.

Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, 268, 269.

Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

Vsevolod Holubnychy, “Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine,” in Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy, ed. Iwan S. Koropeckyj (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1982), table 1, 128-9; T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 371.

Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 264, 265; Y. Bilinsky and V. Holubnychy, “Communist Party of Ukraine,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 1: 551. Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 376n. According to the source Rigby cites, 87 per cent of the 1,784,015 members and candidate-members of the CPSU recruited between 1941 and 1944 identified themselves as Russians and only 7 per cent as Ukrainians. V.K. Molochko, “Kommunisticheskaia partiia i massy v period stroitel’stva sotsializma,” in Partiia i massy, ed. K.I. Suvorov, I.G. Riabtsev, and A.F. ludenkov (Moscow: Mysl, 1966), 82.

Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 2000), 44.

Pravda, 23 August 1946; cited in Holubnychy, “Outline History,” 115-17. Ibid.

Gennadii Kostyrchenko, Out of the Red Shadows: Anti-Semitism in Stalin’s Russia (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1995); Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, eds, Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). The term “heinously” comes from an official source cited in Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot against Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 288.

These included the Volyn, Drohobych, Lviv, Rivne, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil’, Izmail, and Chernivtsi oblasts.

Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli, vol. 1, document 107, 243, 242. I. Bakalo, T. Pliushch, and B. Struminsky, “Education,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 1:802.

The OUN issued a short brochure, “Vkazivky bat’kam u vykhovani ditei,” in 1950 providing instructions on how parents could neutralize the lessons their children learned in school. See document 284, Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini, 646-51.

A slogan from the German Young Pioneers, founded after 1945. Quoted in Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944­1956 (New York: Doubleday, 2012), 148.

On 1 January 1939, the three Polish provinces of Lwow, Stanisfawow, and Tarnopol, possessed a population of 5,824,100. Ukrainians constituted 64.4 per cent of the population, Poles 25.0 per cent, Jews 9.8 per cent;

49,200 (0.8 per cent) belonged to other groups, mainly Germans. Volodymyr Kubijovic, Etnichni hrupy pivdennozakhidnoi Ukrainy (Halychyny) na 1.1. 1939 (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), xiv, xxiii.

Itogi Vsesoiuznoiperepisi naselennia 1959 goda: Ukrainskaia SSR, 188-9. Bakalo, Pliushch, and Struminsky, “Education,” in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 1:802.

Ibid.

TsDAHOU, 1/24/ 2743, l. 3.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 3:421-2. Surrounded by those who wept, Solzhenitsyn recorded his reaction to hearing of Stalin’s death: “My face, trained to meet all occa­sions, assumed a frown of mournful attention” (421).

For a history of the evolution of the “friendship of peoples,” see Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). See, for example, “Neporyshna iednist’ i druzhba narodiv Radians’koi Ukrainy,” Radians’ka Ukraina, 14 March 1953, 1 (editorial). For Stalin’s im­portance to Ukrainians, see R. Symonenko, “Stalin-vyzvolytel’ ukrains’koho narodu,” Radians’ka Ukraina, 14 March 1953, 2.

Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr, “National Cadres as a Force in the Soviet System: The Evidence of Beria’s Career, 1949-1953,” in Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael (New York: Praeger, 1978), 155.

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR under Gorbachev,” Problems of Communism (November-December 1990): 3; cited in Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 189.

Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, 3.

Knight, Beria, 189.

“Resolution on the Criminal Anti-Party and Anti-Government Activities of Beria of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” in The Beria Affair: The Secret Transcripts of the Meeting Signalling the End of Stalinism, ed. S.M. Stickle (New York: Nova Science, 1992), 188.

This treaty is very controversial. Various ideological movements have inter­preted this treaty in different ways. At the heart of the disagreement is the issue of whether the treaty was a temporary military alliance or a permanent absorption of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. See M. lu. Braichevskyi, Pryiednannia chy vozz’iednannia? Krytychni zauvahy z pryvodu odniiei kontseptsii (Toronto: Novi dni, 1972); John Basarab, Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982); and Pereiaslavs’ka rada 1654: Istoriohrafiia ta doslidzhennia, ed. Pavlo Sokhan et al. (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2003).

114 Z.T. Serdiuk, in Beria Affair, 53.

115 O. Khablo, “Mohutnii zasib vykhovannia pobuttia druzhby narodiv: Do 15-richchia kyivs’koho filialu Tsentral’noho muzeiu V. I. Lenina,” Radians’ka Ukraina, 29 August 1953, 3.

116 “Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine and Russia (1654-1954),” Pravda and Izvestiia, 12 January 1954, 2; cited in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) 6, no. 51 (1954): 3. Also pub­lished in Radians’ka Ukraina, 12 January 1954, 3-4.

117 For an account of the planned celebrations in Warsaw, Prague, and Sofia, see “Trudiashchi krain narodnoi demokratii vidznachaiut’ 300-richchia vozz’iednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu,” Radians’ka Ukraina, 19 January 1954, 3.

118 “Pidhotovka do sviatkuvannia 300-richchia vozz’iednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu,” Radians’ka Ukraina, 15 January 1954, 4.

119 Cited in “In the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,” Pravda and Izvestiia, 27 February 1954, 2; cited in CDSP 6, no. 9 (1954): 23.

120 A.I. Kirichenko, “On the 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” Pravda and Izvestiia, 23 May 1954, 2-4; cited in CDSP 6, no. 21 (1954): 17.

121 Gwendolyn Sasse, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2007), 110, 125.

122 According to Bill Taubman, Khrushchev “was promoted from ordinary Central Committee secretary to First Secretary in September 1953, a move that allowed him to mobilize the party machinery.” William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 258. By the end of 1953, “Khrushchev’s approval was required for all major deci­sions. After February 1954, Khrushchev occupied the seat of honor when the Presidium gathered for ceremonial occasions in the Great Kremlin pal­ace. In March 1954, Khrushchev’s protege, Ivan Serov, took charge of the KGB” (264). For the most thorough assessment of the nuances of the Crimean transfer, see Sasse, The Crimea Question, chap. 5.

123 Yaroslav Bilinsky coined this phrase in his The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964).

124 For the Crimea, compare the censuses of 1939 and 1959: Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1939 goda, 67; and Itogi Vsesoiuznoiperepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrains’kaia SSR, 184.

125 Stalin, on 12 February 1929, asserted to an audience of Ukrainian writers that “it makes no difference, of course, where one district or another of Ukraine or the RSFSR belongs.” Leonid Maximenkov, “Stalin’s Meeting with a Delegation of Ukrainian Writers on 12 February 1929,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 16, nos. 3-4 (1992): 403 (see chap. 7).

126 See Konstantyn Sawczuk, The Ukraine in the United Nations Organization: A Study in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1944-1950 (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly Press, 1975).

127 See Vernon A. Aspaturian, The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy: A Study of Soviet Federalism in the Service of Soviet Foreign Policy (Geneva: E. Droz, 1960), chaps. 4-5; and Sawczuk, The Ukraine in the United Nations Organization, chap. 8.

Conclusion

1 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961), 16, 18.

2 Peter A. Gourevitch, “Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s,” International Organization 38, no. 1 (1984): 99; cited in Grzegorz Ekiert, The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 305-6.

3 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 89, quote on 88.

4 Mark Roseman, “War and the People: The Social Impact of Total War,” in The Oxford History of Modern War, ed. Charles Townshend (Oxford, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 299.

5 The term “critical junctures” comes from Ekiert, The State against Society, xi.

6 See Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

7 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 284-5, 286, 288.

8 Ibid., 300, 299.

9 Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 45.

10 Stone, The Eastern Front, 144.

Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow, England: Pearson Education, 2005), 229.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Russia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), 1:490; cited in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), 269.

See Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics 24, no. 3 (1972): 319-55; Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 2; Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (London: Macmillan, 1970); Robert Conquest, Stalin - Breaker of Nations (New York: Viking, 1991).

Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 8. The people of Ukraine attained slightly higher percentages: 57.5 per cent in 1926 and 85.3 per cent in 1939. Both sets of statistics come from TsGANKh SSSR, f. 162, op. 329, d. 4535, l. 28.

According to the 1970 Soviet census, the first after 1959, 56 per cent of the Soviet population lived in urban areas, as did 55 per cent of the Soviet Ukrainian population. Russia (1923- USSR), Tsentral’noe statisticheskoe up- ravlenie, Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, tom IV (Moscow: Statistika, 1973), 20, 27 (USSR); 152, 158 (Ukrainian SSR).

Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 273.

Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 1, 9. Ibid., 1, 3.

Ibid., 13.

Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Nationalism and Communism, 1917-1923, rev. ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 296-7. Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 8-9.

Ibid., 14.

Ibid., 15.

Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Piotr Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 287; Yitzhak Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, chap. 10; David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, ed. Kevin M.F. Platt and David Brandenberger (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). On the persecution of the Poles and Germans, see Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 8; and Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, chap. 8.

Landscaping the Human Garden: 20th Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework, ed. Amir Weiner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

Sylvia Gilliam, “The Nationality Questionnaire” (unpublished ms. of the Project on the Soviet Social System, Harvard University, 1954), 47. “Nationalism is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individu­al is felt to be due the nation-state.” Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1955), 9.

Connor, “Nation-Building or Destroying?” 337; Connor, Ethnonationalism, 43.

Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Quoted in Alex J. Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder, Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940­1941 (Oxford: Berghahn, 2006), 39-40; cited in Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (New York: Penguin, 2012), 37. Collingham, Taste of War, 180.

Ibid., 183.

Ibid., 182.

Ibid., 185-6.

See Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds, Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Ella Libanova, Natalia Levchuk, Emelian Rudnyts’kyi, Natalia Runhach, Svetlana Poniakina, and Pavel Shevchuk, “Smertnost naseleniia Ukrainy v trudoaktivnom vozraste,” Demoskop Weekly, March 31-April 13, 2008, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0327/tema01.php (accessed 28 March 2012); Jacques Vallin, France Mesle, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pyrozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s,” Population Studies 56, no. 3 (2002): 249-64 (citation on 263); Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 518-25 (see table 8.1 in this volume).

See Gwendolyn Sasse, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2007) and Karl D. Qualls, From Ruins to Reconstruction: Urban Identity in Soviet Sevastopol after World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

40 John-Paul Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 34, no. 4 (1992): 392.

41 Ibid., 393.

42 Marc Raeff, “Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy toward the Nationalities,” in Soviet Nationality Policies, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 21-40.

43 See Yaroslav Bilinsky, “The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine,” in The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR, ed. Roman Szporluk (New York: Praeger, 1975), 180-228 ; Roman Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000); and William Jay Risch, The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

44 Thomas Masaryk’s dictum that Europe after the First World War had become “a laboratory atop a vast graveyard” inspired this sentence. Cited in Maurice Baumant, La faillite de la paix, 1918-1939, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses universita- ires de France, 1946), 8; Erik Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916­1920 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1991), 4; Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999); and Volker R. Berghahn, Europe in the Era of Two World Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 2.

45 David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 4 and passim.

46 This phrase comes from Charles Tilly, “Introduction,” in Citizenship, Identity, and Social History, ed. Charles Tilly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12.

47 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 344.

48 The components of this “wager” come from Zayarnyuk, “A Revolution’s History,” 475; and Roman Szporluk, “From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” Daedalus 126, no. 3 (1997): 85-119; republished in his Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), chap. 15, 361-94.

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