Social Change

A momentous development occurred in Ukrainian social history in the 1960s: during that decade the percentage of Ukrainians living in cities reached 55%, that is, the majority of them had become city dwellers.

What has led Ukrainians to leave their villages in such large numbers and to move to the cities? In general, the reasons are similar to those anywhere in the world: better job opportunities, greater access to higher education, an attractive variety of leisure activities, and more convenient conditions for family life. As a result of this influx of Ukrainians into urban centers, the cities of the land, long the bastions of non-Ukrainians, have finally attained Ukrainian majorities. And the traditional dichotomy between the Ukrainian village and the Russian (or Polish/Jewish) city may possibly begin to fade.

There are, however, noteworthy aspects to the process of urbanization in Ukraine. Although rapid, it has still not moved ahead as quickly as in other parts of the USSR. Thus, urbanization in Russia, which in 1970 reached 62%, has proceeded at a rate comparable to that of Japan and Western Europe; in Ukraine, meanwhile, it has advanced at a rate similar to that of Eastern and Southern Europe. Moreover, urbanization in Ukraine is geographically imbalanced, for it is concentrated primarily in the eastern, heavily industrialized (and Russified) areas of Donetsk, Voroshilovhrad, Dniepropetrovsk, and Zaporozhia.

This development is of immense ideological as well as sociological importance. As the role of the peasant in Ukrainian society has diminished, the populism that was the hallmark of Ukrainian ideologies in the 19th and early 20th centuries has also faded. One can even argue that today the concept of the narod - in the traditional sense of the poor, oppressed peasant masses – no longer occupies a central place in the political thinking of Ukrainians. The economy

Tightly interwoven with that of the Soviet Union as a whole, the economy of Ukraine is highly developed. Ukraine is well endowed with natural resources and has both a very strong agricultural sector and a well-established industrial capacity. How does it compare to the rest of the Soviet Union? As might be expected, it is more oriented to agriculture than the Soviet Union as a whole. The industrial capacity of Ukraine is somewhat less than the Soviet average because of the great imbalance between the highly industrialized provinces and the far less developed western areas.

Ukraine’s industry accounts for a major part of the Soviet Union’s industrial production (17%). Ukraine is an important industrial area on the global scale as well. Producing about 40% of the Soviet Union’s steel, 34% of its coal, and 51% of its pig iron, Ukraine has a GNP comparable to that of Italy. Soviet scholars like to point out that in 1972 Ukraine’s industrial production was 176 times higher than in 1922. But, as might be expected, Ukraine’s industry has had its ups and downs. In the booming 1950s and early 1960s, when the growth rate was an incredible 10% a year, it performed better than the Soviet average; in the 1970s and 1980s, however, when the growth rate plunged to about 2–3% annually, its industrial growth was even below the average.

The economic slowdown in Ukraine, and the Soviet Union as a whole, has made the issue of capital investments more acute than ever. While economic planners in Moscow have emphasized huge, new industrial projects in Siberia, Ukraine’s industries have been generally neglected. In the days of Shelest, Ukraine’s economists were especially vociferous about their republic’s declining share of investment funds. Although Shcherbytsky has been reluctant about raising the issue, it has certainly not gone away. There are, however, some bright spots in Ukraine’s economic future: greater Soviet emphasis on international trade means that the Black Sea ports will continue to grow rapidly and, because of its proximity to Eastern Europe, Western Ukraine will probably be producing more goods geared for export. Agriculture

Despite the fact that industry is now the main occupation of Ukrainians, their land has remained the breadbasket of the Soviet Union. It produces as much grain as Canada (only the United States and Russia produce more), more potatoes than West Germany, and more sugar beets than anywhere else in the world. Ukraine has 19% of the Soviet Union’s population, but produces more than 23% of its agricultural products. Nonetheless, because of government policies, Ukrainians have to cope with frequent food shortages.

In an effort to raise the already high agricultural productivity in Ukraine, the government has invested heavily in farm machinery and fertilizers in the republic. But the chronic problems that have plagued Soviet agriculture persist. Bureaucratic controls and ill-conceived reorganization schemes often bring more havoc than gain. Even though the wages paid to collective farm workers have increased substantially in recent years, they are still at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder and their enthusiasm for working on the collective and state farms has not increased.

Another problem is the rapid decline in the rural labor force brought about by urbanization: in 1965 there were 7.2 million agricultural workers in Ukraine, in 1975 the figure sank to 6.4 million, and in 1980 it stood at 5.8 million. Thus, the Ukrainian countryside, where living conditions have improved markedly, continues to lose its young people to the cities. On many collective farms it is the weathered old women who provide the main source of manual labor. The issue of economic exploitation

A perennial issue in discussions of Ukrainian economic history, the question of whether Ukraine is economically exploited by Moscow is exceedingly complex. On the one hand, it is obvious that Ukraine has experienced tremendous economic growth during Soviet rule. And, on the other, there is strong evidence that it has consistently contributed more to the budget of the USSR than it has received in return. The Soviets refuse to make available statistics that might elucidate this issue.

Soviet spokesmen stress Ukraine’s rapid economic progress, arguing that it would have been impossible to achieve without the huge investments, technical expertise, and labor that the “fraternal peoples” of the USSR, most notably the Russians, provided. By implication, they take the position that it is now the turn of Ukrainians to provide economic assistance to other, less-developed regions of the USSR. From the Soviet point of view, there is, therefore, no basis to even raise the issue of economic exploitation.

Some Western economists view the matter very differently. They acknowledge the impressive economic progress that Soviet rule has brought to Ukraine. And they agree that Moscow is intent on developing such relatively poor areas as Central Asia or resource-rich regions as Siberia. But they argue that Ukraine has contributed and continues to contribute more than its share to the economic growth of the USSR. The American economist Holland Hunter states: “The siphoning off of current income from Ukraine for use elsewhere in the USSR is a basic feature of Ukrainian economic history.”¹³ And the British scholar Peter Wiles estimates that Ukraine regularly contributes 10% more to the Soviet budget than it receives in return.¹⁴ Thus, Volodymyr Bandera and Ivan Koropeckyj argue that while Ukraine continues to make economic progress in absolute terms, relative to Moscow, to other regions of the USSR, and to neighboring countries, it is falling behind economically.¹⁵

Regardless of the position one takes in the debate over exploitation, the discussion highlights the fundamental question regarding Ukraine’s experience under Soviet rule: Who makes the decisions regarding the economic future of Ukraine and whose interests are primarily taken into account when these decisions are made? On this point, at least, the answers are more conclusive: it is clear that the economic fate of Ukraine is decided in Moscow, where Ukraine’s economic interests are not a primary consideration. Demographic conditions

In modern times, the tempo of population growth in Ukraine has changed dramatically. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Ukraine’s population was among the fastest growing in Europe. Then came two disastrous demographic setbacks: between 3 and 6 million lives were lost in the Famine of 1932–33, purges, and deportations of the 1930s and about 5.3 million inhabitants of Ukraine died during the Second World War. Thus, within little more than a decade, about 25% of Ukraine’s population – the mortality rate was especially high among men – perished.

In part, Ukraine’s slow population growth results from demographic disasters: there are simply fewer people to have children. However, the impact of urbanization has also been great. Living in extremely cramped quarters and with the vast majority of women working full-time, urban Ukrainians have opted for small families of one or, at most, two children. In many respects Ukraine’s population resembles that of other developed countries: aging and growing slowly, it has a steadily increasing percentage of retirees and a decreasing percentage of full-time workers. But there are also striking demographic particularities in Ukraine and the USSR as a whole. In stark contrast to other industrialized countries, the life span of males has become shorter and infant mortality has risen in recent years. Experts speculate that this is related to widespread alcoholism among both males and females.

Compared to other areas of the USSR, Ukraine is a densely settled land. While in the European parts of the Soviet Union there is an average of 34 inhabitants per square kilometer, in Ukraine the figure is 82 per sq. km. But population is unevenly distributed in the republic. It is dense and growing rapidly in the eastern industrial regions and especially in the Crimea, the “Florida” of the USSR, whose balmy climate is especially appealing to Russians. In Western Ukraine, population growth is about average; but in the Right and Left Bank it is far below average and there are oblasti (regions) where the population is decreasing steadily. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the demographic condition of Ukraine is satisfactory: the republic’s population, which in 1987, numbered 50.8 million, is not so small as to hamper economic development and not so large as to stifle it. Changes in social structure

As we have seen, industrialization, urbanization, and modernization in general have greatly altered the traditional class structure of Ukraine. In 1970, out of a total work force of 16 million people, about two-thirds were classified as industrial workers. From being a distinct minority, blue-collar workers became the overwhelming majority of Ukraine’s workers within a single generation. Not only has the proletariat in Ukraine grown rapidly but it has become more Ukrainian in terms of ethnic composition: while in 1959 Ukrainians made up 70% of the industrial work force, in 1970 this figure rose to 74%. Russians are no longer disproportionately numerous among the blue-collar rank and file.

White-collar workers in Ukraine have also greatly increased, especially in recent decades. Between i960 and 1970, their number doubled, rising from 700,000 to 1.4 million. But here the Russians maintained their disproportionately large presence, accounting for more than one-third of this social group. Thus, while the Soviet educational boom has raised the number of highly trained specialists in Ukraine to levels comparable to and even higher than those in most West European countries, Ukrainians as a nationality have not benefited as much as might be expected. While Ukrainians constitute 74% of the population in their republic, they make up only 60% of the student body in institutions of higher learning.

What are the reasons for this Ukrainian underrepresentation in higher education and among the technical and cultural intelligentsia? Some Western specialists argue that because many Ukrainian youths still obtain their elementary and secondary education in the countryside, where the schools are often of inferior quality, they are handicapped in comparison to city-bred Russians in the fierce competition for places in institutes and universities. Because many Ukrainians have an imperfect command of Russian, they are at a further disadvantage. Finally, since it is government policy to encourage Ukrainian specialists to seek employment outside their republic – and an estimated 25% have done so – the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Ukraine is smaller than it might be. And so is the number of their children who usually obtain a higher education. Meanwhile, those children of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who are educated outside their republic are often Russified. The standard of living

As we have frequently noted, Soviet Ukraine is a major industrial power, richly endowed with natural resources. Yet the living standards of its people are far below those in other industrialized countries. Granted, comparing living standards is exceedingly difficult. What a Soviet Ukrainian may lack in cars, videos, or fashionable clothes, he might have in free higher education and medical care that is unavailable to his American counterpart. Nonetheless, according to a variety of elaborate measurements set up by Western economists, it is evident that the Soviet economic system is unable to satisfy material wants and needs as well as the Western economies do for their people. Thus, in 1970 the per capita consumption in the Soviet Union was about one-half that of the United States. This statistic does not take into account the generally lower quality of goods and services that one receives in the USSR. Put another way, in 1982 a typical weekly shopping basket that cost 18 hours of work in Washington, DC, required approximately 53 hours of work in Kiev. Although rents in the USSR are among the lowest in the world, housing is so difficult to come by that often three generations of one family live in a two-room apartment. The Kremlin’s preference for investment in heavy industry and military spending and its habitual neglect of the consumer industry are largely responsible for this state of affairs.

Optimism regarding the Soviet ability to catch up with Western living standards ran high in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the economic productivity of the country was impressive. But when Soviet economic performance plummeted in the 1980s, so did hopes for rapidly raising living standards.

Within the USSR itself, Ukraine occupies fifth place in terms of consumer spending: Russia and the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania rank higher. Because Ukraine has a surplus of labor, wages in the republic are about 10% lower than the Soviet average. However, prices are also relatively low. In the last two decades, Soviet wage policies have brought noteworthy benefits to many Ukrainians. Intent on reducing the wage differences between rural and urban workers, the government awarded collective farmers a hefty pay increase. Consequently, between 1960 and 1970, farmers’ salaries rose by 182%, while those of industrial workers increased by only 38%. Because disproportionately many Ukrainians are farmers, they benefited from this attempt to equalize earnings among Soviet workers. But despite ongoing attempts by the government to improve the plight of Soviet consumers, citizens must still deal with shoddy goods, poor service, and cramped quarters. The living standards of the average Soviet Ukrainian are far below those of West Europeans and North Americans and even lag behind those of Communist Eastern Europe. Soviet Ukrainian attitudes

What are the views and attitudes of Soviet Ukrainians toward the Soviet political and socioeconomic system? A question such as this is, of course, always difficult to deal with, especially in the case of a society that is only now beginning to publicize the results of public opinion polls dealing with carefully selected issues. Nonetheless, numerous articles and discussions in the Soviet media, interviews with Soviet emigres, and accounts of travelers to the USSR allow one to establish certain salient features that characterize the mood and thinking of Soviet Ukrainians.

By and large, it seems that most Soviet Ukrainians accept the Soviet regime as their legitimate government and identify with it. Because of the government’s monopoly on information and intensive propaganda, they are, at best, only vaguely aware of the hardships that Ukrainians have suffered at Soviet hands in the “ancient” past. Much more influential in shaping their attitudes is the fact that the Soviet system has brought large increases in their income, imposed relative equality among socioeconomic groups, greatly improved social services and access to education, and created numerous opportunities for upward mobility. Many Soviet Ukrainians take pride in the power and prestige of the USSR of which they are an important part.

Intermixed with these generally positive attitudes towards the Soviet system are elements, real and potential, of dissatisfaction. The current economic slowdown has raised such sensitive issues as the economic favoritism of Siberia and Central Asia at the expense of Ukraine. Opportunities for social advancement are less numerous now. Ukrainian party leaders, bureaucrats, and economic managers are increasingly resentful of Moscow’s monopoly over decision making. Furthermore, the Ukrainian cultural elite has again begun to protest Russification. According to a 1984 Soviet sociological study, researchers reported that the level of dissatisfaction in Ukraine is higher than in the USSR as a whole. To the question why this is so, the scholars could only reply: “We can give no definite answer.”¹⁶

Especially unsettling for the Soviet leadership is the growing disinterest in Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout Ukraine and the USSR as a whole. Since the 1960s, Western intellectuals have been discussing the “death of ideology” and the coming of a “post-ideological age” in the industrialized West. It appears that a similar ideological waning is now evident in the Soviet Union. Although Soviet authorities are loath to acknowledge this phenomenon, Western analysts have attempted to provide an explanation. Put simply, it argues that the process of modernization, which occurred in Europe during the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, was accompanied by tumultuous transformations. The resulting insecurity and confusion created the need for ideological analyses, explanations, and guidelines. But, judging by the social climate in industrialized societies, once modernity arrived, it brought with it relative stability. Consequently, the need for an ideology which served to orient adherents in times of rapid change became less pressing.

Be that as it may, it is clear that, despite constant indoctrination, the influence of Marxism-Leninism on the thinking of Soviet Ukrainians is fading. Of course, Ukrainian nationalism, especially of the extreme, integral variety, had been expunged from the Ukrainian worldview decades earlier. Thus, the two main ideological currents in modern Ukrainian history are no longer as influential as they once were.

Because the ideological commitment of its people is a major requirement of the Soviet system, the waning of this commitment has led to a perceptible loss of optimism, purpose, and sense of direction among thoughtful Soviet citizens. To fill the void, the government has redoubled its efforts to instill Soviet patriotism. Hence the recent all-pervasive emphasis on heroic Soviet exploits in the Second World War. But for many, religion has become a more satisfying means of filling the spiritual and ideological void that confronts them in the 1980s.

Among the vast majority, however, there is a growing commitment to what in the West is called middle-class or bourgeois values and consumerism. Instead of building a new society, Soviet surveys indicate that its youth are generally interested in obtaining lucrative, prestigious professional jobs and would like to be engineers (the most popular), factory managers, scientists, and physicians. Few want to be proletarians. Most young people’s thoughts and many of their efforts are committed to obtaining high-quality Western consumer goods. Whether this means that the attitudes, values, and goals of Soviet Ukrainian youth are becoming ever more similar to those of their counterparts in the West is still unclear. But it is obvious that they are far from becoming what Lenin wanted them to be.