The Commonwealth Invades Ukraine

Not putting faith in negotiations with the Polish Sejm which opened on 6 October, Khmelnitsky continued to advance west, and two weeks after the victory at Piliavtsi the Ukrainians were before the walls of Lviv, the major city of Galicia.

The great city of Lviv was dominated by Catholic Poles and their supporters, and all demands for surrender were re­fused. Raising a citizens’ defense force, Lvivbraced itself for an assault, which never came.

The Cossacks had also learned that Prince Wishniowiecki was no longer in Lviv but had fortified himself in Zamosc one third of the way to Warsaw and the Cossacks decided to leave Galicia and Iaysiege to the fortress. IfKhmelnitskywas hoping for a general uprising in Galicia he was sorely disappointed. In spite of isolated revolts the nobility succeeded to maintain con­trol of the medieval principality. This represented a setback for the revolution since Galicia’s adherence to the Ukrainian cause would have gone a Iongway to solving Khmelnitsky’s manpower problem. The Cossacks would return to Galicia eight years later, but again without much success, and for the next three centuries Galicia would remain estranged from Ukraine. After holding out against enemy forces for more than two years Visochan was defeated in 1650-51, and taking the rest of his men he headed east to join Khmelnitsky.

Unrest was beginning to spread to other parts of the Com­monwealth and some colonels such as Krivons, Nechay and Bohun were urging Khmelnitsky to march into Poland and oc­cupy Warsaw. That, however, would have been a rash move, and Khmelnitskynew it. The Polish Commonwealth had more than ten times the population of Ukraine and with much more resources at its disposal.

The ambitions of many Ukrainian petty nobles and landed gentry such as Khmelnitsky himself were also not forgotten. This class did not wish to sever all relations with the Polish Commonwealth or deny the nobility the right to possess landed estates. The slavery of serfdom had been swept away, but of what use was the fertile land without peasants or rank-and-file Cossacks to work it? Besides, being a Cossack officer was a full time job which had to be supported, in large part, by agricultural labor. The recognition of Cossacks as a military class with similar rights to the nobility was not unheard of, for example in 16th century Spain where the Crown declared the “hidal- guia,” or a collective nobility for all Basques, in recognition of the egalitarian nature of their society and the absence of a feudal nobility.

While Khmelnitsky’s army was besieging Zamosc, Jan Casimir was elected King on 17 November 1648 by a unani­mous vote of the Sejm and was crowned on 17 January 1649. He was well acquainted with the Cossacks and was a man of some military experience. While still only 15 years old he took part in the Smolensk campaign of 1624 against Muscovy, and later entered Austrian service where he commanded a 4,00O- man Cossack light cavalry unit against the French. In 1638 he joined the Spanish navy, was captured by the French and held prisoner for two years before being ransomed. He then went to Italyto become a Jesuit priest, resigned from the Order and for a brief time was a Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. He was also considered by some to be unbalanced and unpre­dictable.

To reduce the overall influence of the Polish nobility, the Cossackleadership was hoping that Polish kings would become hereditary, “like other kings” as expressed by Khmelnitsky in a letter to Jan Casimir: “We beseech Almighty God that your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, deign to be an autocrat like Otherkingsandnotlike (your) deceased predecessors... who were actually in bondage (to the nobility).”⁴⁹

Khmelnitsky also pointed out to the newly elected king that much of his support in the Sejm was due to the Cossack advance into southern Poland, since the nobility knew that he was supported by the Cossacks. Ironically, Jan Casimir was elected by the Sejm due to his military experience, as someone who could oppose and defeat the Cossacks. In return for the Cossacks’ support, Khmelnitsky demanded the following five concessions from Jan Casimir:

i) The Cossacks would recognize the King as their sover­eign, but without the presence of officials and the (Polish) nobility.

ii) Traditional Cossack freedoms to be recognized, such as the elections of all officers including the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. The royal registry to be increased.

iii) Open access to the Black Sea without royal forts such as Kodakbarring the way. No crown troops to be stationed in Ukraine.

iv) The Union of Brest to be cancelled and the (“Uniate”) Greek Catholic Church to be abolished. Roman Catholic and Protestant churches to be allowed, but only the Greek Orthodox Church to be the official ecclesiastic institution in Ukraine.

v) A pardon for all who were involved in the uprising.

Upon receiving news of the election Khmelnitsky sent en­voys with a letter assuring the newly elected King of their loy­alty: “to whom God willing we, too, would render our submis­sions as we rendered our faithful services to his father and his late brother, Wladyslav IV” Jan Casimirwas further assured that the uprising was directed against the nobility, particularly the Polish Hetman Potocki, and not his brother the late King. After a long debate the Polish Senate realized it had little option but to acknowledge the Cossack conditions in return for peace. To give a face-saving impression that the government was not buck­ling under Cossack pressure, the King’s charter promising the demands was predated to before the arrival of Khmelnitsky’s envoys. In return the Cossacks were to dismiss their Crimean allies, return to Ukraine, and send delegates to reaffirm their loyalty and submission to the King. Jan Casimir would then send a royal commission to “straighten everything out in the name of peace.” In actual fact the Polish government had no in­tention of honoring the agreement and was Simplybuying time to prepare for a new invasion of Ukraine. A golden opportunity to implement reform and put its house in order was missed once again by the Polish nobility and the Catholic Church, which would herald the beginning of the end of the Polish Com­monwealth. The fertile Ukrainian fields were simply too lucra­tive to give up without a fight. To the Ukrainians it appeared as if a fresh start had been achieved in their relationship with the Polish government.

Paisios the Patriarch of Jerusalem had gone on a mission in Moscow, and when Hetman Khmelnitsky learned that the Patriarch was to pass through Ukraine he sent word that he wished to meet him in Kyiv. With his officers and an honor guard Khmelnitsky arrived before the city on 23 December, justbefore Christmas by the Julian Calendar. The colorful Cos­sack procession was led by the Hetman, followed by his officers on their best steeds and colonels holding jewel-studded maces, the symbols of their authority. Khmelnitskywas met outside the walls by the Kyiv Metropolitan and the Patriarch, who were leading their own procession of 1,000 horsemen, and was ad­dressed as the “Most Illustrious Ruler.” The Kyiv Academy greeted the Cossack Hetman as “Moses, Savior, Redeemer, and Liberator of the nation (people) of Rus, hence called Bohdan.”⁵⁰ Khmelnitskywas then seated in the Patriarchs sled on his right side, and as the procession entered Kyiv it was greeted by salvoes of cannon fire from the city’s batteries.

A great mass was held in St. Sophia Cathedral, during which Khmelnitsky was given communion by Paisios even though he had not had confession, a rare exception. He was also permitted to marry his great love Helen even though her husband the Catholic nobleman Chaplinski was still alive. In spite of the great praise heaped on the Hetman he maintained an informal and a non self-aggrandizing attitude, for which he was respected and loved by the Cossack rank-and-file. When addressed as “Prince of Rus” and “Most Illustrious Ruler” he always answered that “it was not fitting (for him) to govern a state, he was not a man of that nature.” He was, after all, only elected as Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, and could be de­moted if he went against strongly held Cossack views and values. A clear indication that Khmelnitskywas not seeking to establish a renewed Rus state in Ukraine with its traditional capital in Kyiv is also that he chose the Cossack town of Chi- hirin as the center of his administration, which became the “de facto” capital of Ukraine. It is a remarkable fact about Cossack Ukraine how little continuity there was with medieval Kyivan Rus and its institutions with the exception of the Greek Ortho­dox Church, which didn’t always agree with the Cossack move­ment or its policies, and often favored the Muscovite state. Thus Cossack Ukraine never developed anything that can be called a state, and there is little evidence that Khmelnitsky even at­tempted to build one. Ukraine was simply the “terra Cossaco- rum,” the land of the Cossacks as Khmelnitsky called it in his Latin correspondence, while he himself was officially only the “Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army,” not even of the entire Ukraine or its Cossack movement.

The Patriarch, like most men of the Church, had a political role to play and Paisios was no exception. He was attempting to put together an Orthodox alliance between Muscovy, Mol­davia, and Wallachia against the Catholic Commonwealth which he wanted Ukraine to join. This implied a break with Poland and placing Ukraine under the “protection” of the Mos­cow Tsar. As generally accepted at the time, a leader such as Khmelnitskywas not considered to be a legitimate ruler if he was not a crowned monarch and would not be recognized as such by other heads of state. A Hetman of Ukraine had a clear choice; to place himself under the King, the Tsar of Moscow, or the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The republican move­ment with its American and French revolutions was still more than a century in the future.

Khmelnitsky left Kyiv for his capital Chihirin and then headed to Pereiaslav to meet KingJan Casimir’s commission, which was headed by the Polish Commonwealth’s usual envoy to the Cossacks, Prince Adam Kisil. Unknown to the Polish Sejm and the Senate, Chancellor Ossolinski had advised Jan Casimir to agree to all Cossack demands and to present Khmel­nitsky with Royal insignia—a red flag with a white eagle and a turquoise-studded Hetman’s mace, the symbol of authority. The commission arrived on 19 February 1649 and was person­ally greeted by Khmelnitskywith a 20-gun salute and the royal insignia presented on the following day before the assembled Cossacks. Khmelnitsky was officially being recognized by the King as the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, answerable only to royal authority.

The Royal Commission quickly realized that there was no going back to the old order. As recalled by a witness, one Mi- Chalkowskiwho accompanied the commission: “All the masses are arming themselves, savoring freedom from labor and taxes, and they do not want to have lords ever again.”⁵¹ The people of Ukraine and eastern Volin and Podilia did not trust Royal as­surances of peace and were preparing for war. News was arriving of renewed fighting with Lithuanian and Polish troops in south­ern Belarus, Volin and Podilia. The Lithuanian Hetman Prince Radziwill had captured Mozir in southern Belarus where the entire Cossack garrison perished in the fighting with those taken alive impaled on stakes. Next Babruisk fell, where the last sur­viving Cossacks fortified themselves in the town’s wooden tower and, when their ammunition ran out, set the wooden structure on fire rather than surrender to the tender mercies of the enemy. Those who jumped were promptly impaled. A story began to circulate amongst Radziwills men about a Cossack called Piddubsky, who asked the executioners to ring the church bells as he was being impaled. When asked for the reason behind the strange request he answered, not without some Cos­sack humor, that unlike everyone else he would like to hear his own death knell.

Bar was also attacked by Polish forces and the Cossack garrison was forced out, and although Colonel Bohun drove the Poles out of the stronghold it was soon retaken. It was now becoming clear that the Polish authorities were using the com­mission and the talks to stall for time.⁵² Some of the nobles also began to return to their previous properties with private forces and began to seek out and impale those who took part in the uprising. The peasants, however, were now armed, considered themselves as Cossacks, and the impalements and general atroc­ities brought on more bloody reprisals against the nobles, their families and followers, who were attacked and massacred with similar cruelty. Others who only attempted to reintroduce the old taxes and duties were warned that they were “igniting an inextinguishable flame,” and as explained by the Cossack Ata­man Michailo Tisha to Prince Korecki, not without some tongue-in-cheek humor, to stop forcing people to pay taxes since “you yourself know, Your Grace, that the Cossacks need the means for bullets and gunpowder.” The Papal nuncio Juan de Torres who was in Poland at the time summed up the situ­ation:

The peasants in Rus are beginning to rise up once again, and 16,000 of them have banded together already. They say that this springs from the excessive harshness with which the lords and masters are treating them, putting them to death. Unable to en­dure such adversity they have turned once again to Khmelnitsky, and God help us lest this blaze flare up in Rus even worse than before, as it still cannot be extinguished in Lithuania (that is, Be­larus).⁵³

Advised by Chancellor Osselinski, the Polish Senate and King Jan Casimir began to revert to the old policies of at­tempting to suppress by force the revolution that was sweeping through Ukraine and spreading to neighboring regions. While the Royal Commission was negotiating the Polish Common­wealth was raising fresh armies. In May 1649 the King issued an order for a general mobilization in Poland supported by the nobility of Lithuania-Rus. By the spring of 1649 three Com­monwealth armies began to advance on Ukraine; one com­manded by Lanckoronski from Podilia, another under Firley from Volin, and a Lithuanian army led by Prince Radziwill (Radvila) was moving from southeastern Belarus. Khmelnitsky was still gathering his forces without having held a Cossack “rada,” calling instead for a general mobilization of everyone “who could sit on a horse” and collecting four tallers per house­hold for the war effort. He was also waiting for the arrival of his only ally the Crimean Tatars, who were no longer led by his old friend Tughay Beywho had died a few months previously.⁵⁴

While the Ukrainian army was mobilizing, Khmelnitsky sent single regiments against the three Commonwealth armies to slow down their advance and buy time. Colonel Ilia Holota was dispatched with his regiment to northern Ukraine, and crossing the Pripiat River he deployed his men against Radzi- will’s advancing army. Overwhelmed by the Lithuanians the Cossack regiment was annihilated, with all units fighting to the last man. The regiment in the Horin River area in Volin was pushed back by Firley, and two other Cossackregiments com­manded by colonels Donets and Taborenko were defeated and driven back beyond the Slych River. Firley continued to advance south to link up with Lanckoronski, who in the meantime had cleared the Podilia-Volin frontier region of Cossack units. Con­fronted by Nechai s regiment and receiving word that Khmel­nitsky’s main army was moving to meet him, Lanckoronski withdrew to a fortified camp as panic set in amongst his troops. Unless outnumbering the Cossacks by a good margin the Polish units were loath to face Cossack fighters and typically suffered heavy casualties. Order was restored in IateJune with the arrival of Firley s, Ostrorogs, Wishniowiecki’s, and Lanckoronskis forces and the combined army withdrew from eastern Podilia and took up positions at a town called Zbarazh.

In the meantime following the destruction of Holotas reg­iment, Prince Radziwill continued to move south with the ap­parent intention to capture Kyiv and advance towards Khmel­nitsky’s exposed position. The combined Commonwealth strategy called for the Polish army to tie up Khmelnitsky’s main forces at Zbarazhwhile Radziwillwould strike at the Cossacks’ rear. Caught between two fires the main Ukrainian army would be destroyed and the Tatars would have no choice but to renew the old treaties with the Commonwealth. Khmelnitsky received word of Radziwills advance with great alarm, realizing that he could not spare any of his army to meet the Lithuanian threat. The general mobilization of the sparse Ukrainian population, which stood at no more than one million, had exhausted the supply of young men fit and willing for military duty, with only the old and the very young remaining to assist the women in bringing in the crucial autumn harvest.⁵⁵

It is to these boys and men that Khmelnitsky now turned, sendinghis old friend Colonel Krichevsky to northern Ukraine with a small detachment of frontline Cossacks and a simple order; halt Radziwills advance at all cost, and prevent him from taking Kyiv. Upon arrival Krichevsky raised two detachments from Chornobyl and the surrounding areas, probably no more than 5,000 older men and youths, with several hundred Cossack veterans as support. One detachment was commanded by Krichevsky himself while the other was led by the Chernihiv Colonel Podobailo, as one of the most singular encounters of the Ukrainian revolutionary wars took place near today’s Belarus village of Loiv. Crossing the Pripet River, Krichevsky’s mounted men attacked and defeated the Lithuanian forward units, and the next day proceeded to launch a surprise attack on Radziwills main cavalry force. The battle raged for several hours as the Lithuanians began to give way, when the Prince’s reserve cavalry emerged from a wooded area and struck Krichevsky in the flank and rear. Outnumbered and sustaining heavy losses the Ukrainians broke away, and dismounting, suc­ceeded in setting up a defensive position in a wooded area. The fighting continued for several days but after several all-out as­saults Krichevsky’s defenses were over-run. Krichevskyhimself was fatally wounded in the hand-to-hand fighting and was brought to Radziwills camp where he died several hours later. Recognizing Krichevsky, the Prince was reportedly amazed that a high-ranking nobleman of Rus and still a Roman Catholic would give his life for the cause of “the rabble.” Radziwill had won the battle of Loivbut his was a Pyrrhic victory. He had lost many men, and unable to continue the advance on Kyiy Radzi- will decided to turn back. His army was also somewhat demor­alized by the experience of the battle—if older men and youths could inflict such damage to a regular army what was waiting for them deeper in Ukraine where they would have to face battle-hardened Cossack regiments? As a Cossack captain ad­mitted when captured by a Polish scouting party: “peoples tongues will sooner turn backwards than the Liakhs will rule over us.”

Khmelnitsky now had a free hand to confront the Polish forces led by Lanckoronski, Firley Ostrorog, and Wishno- wiecki, which had gathered at Zbarazh, a fortified town on the Volin-Podilia border. The combined forces had settled down to wait for yet another Polish army under KingJan Casimir him­self. Khmelnitsky in the meantime was also waiting for Tatar reinforcements, without which he had no hope of halting the Polish invasion. He was outnumbered and too many of his men still consisted of poorly armed and trained peasants. With the arrival of the Tatars the Cossack army began to move towards Zbarazh but the enemy had enough time to fortify their camp with a mile-long trench and strong defensive positions. The Ukrainians were especially eager for battle when it became known that the Polish army was under the overall command of the much-hated Prince Wishniowiecki. On 29 June, Polish re­connaissance reported the approach of the Ukrainian army, which without pausing for rest launched a major assault on the Polish positions, hoping to breach the enemy trenches and drive Wishniowiecki inside Zbarazh. The Polish commanders, how­ever, had made good preparations, and the attack was repulsed. Estimates for the sizes of both armies vary and are not very re­liable. The main written accounts of the siege of Zbarazh that have survived are Polish, and they invariably overestimate the Ukrainian forces. A courier from the Tsar estimated Khmelnit­sky’s total force at 70,000 regular Cossacks, peasants turned Cossacks, peasant bands, and Tatars, and the besieged Polish army was probably of similar size but more professional and better armed. The Ukrainian forces were not as well equipped and consisted almost entirely of all able-bodied males of Ukraine. A defeat would have had catastrophic results, and would have meant the end of Ukrainian freedom. As was ad­mitted by a Cossack prisoner captured in early August: “...no men at all fit for warfare were left in the garrisons throughout Ukraine, and only captains of the fortified towns were left to keep order.”⁵⁶

Following their unsuccessful assault on the Polish posi­tions, the Ukrainians settled down to a siege. A high rampart was built around the defenders’ trenches, and a heavy artillery barrage commenced from the high circular earthen mound. The bombardment forced the Poles to pull back to shorter and better dug-in trenches but the withdrawal was followed by an­other Cossack earthen mound surrounding the besieged Polish army. The Cossacks dug tunnels towards the enemy positions, which were discovered when counter-trenches were dug to pre­vent the placing of mines. The Tatars took little part in the siege and mainly restricted their activities to sparring with the Polish armored hussars and mounted dragoons when these rode out to attack Cossack positions. The two-month siege was de­scribed by the Polish Royal histographer Kochowski, who lists the many encounters and mentions the death of the aged Cos­sack colonel Burlai.⁵⁷ He had been a renowned sea campaigner against the Ottoman Empire and was Creditedwith the capture and destruction of Sinope. The popular Cossack Colonel Mo- rozenko was also killed in the fighting and is survived by the sad lament still sung to this very day.⁵⁸ On occasion the Cos­sacks gained control of sections of the Polish defensive trenches, only to be driven back by concerted counter-attacks.

Both sides were beginning to feel the effects of the siege, which was dragging on into its second month. Prince Wish- niowiecki tried to negotiate with the Khan but was met with a refusal to desert Khmelnitsky. When Adam Kisils son was sent to the Cossack camp to negotiate he was told by Khmelnitsky that the Cossacks would settle for nothing short of a total sur­render, in return for which “the Liakhs would receive safe pas­sage” with the exception of Prince Wishnowiecki and lord het­man Koniecpolski who were to be handed over and tried by a Cossack court. The ultimatum was refused, and the Polish com­manders decided to wait for the arrival of King Jan Casimir’s relief army. The king’s attitude towards Khmelnitsky had changed during the summer, now that the Poles had enough troops to defeat the Ukrainian army. Ifhe had not previously been a pawn in the hands of Chancellor Osselinski and the no­bility, he now became one as is clear from his general procla­mation of 5 August as he was marching into Ukraine: “...how many people of Rus have been taken into pagan captivity (by Tatar bands), how many have been killed—not because of you (peasants and Cossacks) but because of that traitor Khmelnit­sky....”⁵⁹

Clearly neither gratitude nor honesty were Jan Casimir’s strong points. He went on to complain to Khmelnitsky that “we never expected that you would raise your hand against us, your lord and one anointed by God!”⁶⁰ The King and the nobility had learned nothing, but then without the exploitation of the serfs most of the landed nobility in Ukraine and many in Galicia and Poland would not possess the wealth and privileges for which they were now fighting. For them, as for the population of Ukraine, this was a fight to the finish. For if the serfs became free in Ukraine, where next?

Jan Casimir continued his advance eastwards, oblivious to the danger which was facing him. He had underestimated Khmelnitsky and his Cossacks, and he was a poor strategist to boot. Reaching a town called Zboriv on the Stripa River at the head of some 25,000 men Jan Casimir began to cross the river on 15 August in a leisurely manner, unaware that his every move was being watched by Cossack “plastoons” (scouts). Rather than wait for the arrival of the King’s fresh army, which would have tipped the balance in Polish favor, Khmelnitsky and Khan Islam Giray decided to divide their forces and attack the King s column, while maintaining the pressure on Zbarazh.

Autumn weather was setting in and Jan Casimir’s men found themselves crossing the river in fog and rain, the wagons and the cavalry column strung out for 3 kilometers along a muddy trail. Half of the column had not yet crossed when it was suddenly attacked by Cossack and Tatar cavalry. The Polish troops were caught in the open, cut off from the units which already had crossed, and began to take heavy casualties. Now the front of the column, already on the other side of the river, also came under attack; desperately rallying the remnants of his army, Jan Casimir managed to reach the Zboriv stronghold and establish defensive positions outside of the town walls. If Khmelnitskyhad larger forces the Polish army would have been surrounded and annihilated. As it was, two Polish armies—or what was left of them—were now under siege with the King and his top commanders trapped in both camps from which there was no escape. The Polish noble Miaskowski, who took part in the siege of Zboriv, left a dramatic account of the initial Cossack assault on the hastily established Polish positions:

Zealously, with all their forces the Cossacks stormed the town of Zboriv... the dragoons could no Iongerhold out. The command was given to sound the trumpet for various servants, who were not coming very willingly but those who went made quite a courageous stand.... He (the King) was extremely agitated, for the camp was also being desperately stormed... the King no longer even had any strength and could not shout, he only signed. “Do not abandon me and our fatherland.”⁶¹

It was now only a question of time before Zbarazh and Zborivwould fall, the divided Polish armies destroyed, and the King taken prisoner, something which had never occurred in Polish history. As a bonus, the Cossacks would capture Wish- niowiecki, an event which was eagerly anticipated. The “rabble” had achieved what not long ago was unthinkable—they had forced the powerful Polish and Lithuanian states to their knees, and had humiliated the proud nobility and its entire feudal order.

What the King and the nobility could not achieve by force of arms was accomplished by treachery. Warsawwas again in a state of shock and panic but raising fresh forces could not be achieved in time before both Zbarazh and Zboriv fell to the Ukrainian army. It was Chancellor Osselinskiwho arrived at a solution to what seemed an impossible situation. The Kingwas advised through a courier, who succeeded in slipping through the Cossack lines, to contact the Crimean Khan and propose to renew the old alliance and restore the rich tribute with an up-front payment of200,000 gold “zlotys.” Islam Giray III was by this time probably also having second thoughts about a weakened Polish kingdom and the prospect of the emergence of a powerful Cossack Ukraine, extending from the Dnipro re­gion to the Vistula River, “where our tongue is spoken,” as Khmelnitsky stated to the Royal Commission. There was the further scenario of a Ukrainian alliance with the neighboring Greek Orthodox states which would have posed a serious threat to the Crimean Khanate, upset the balance of power, and forced the Khan into a greater reliance on the Ottoman Sultan.

Khmelnitskywas informed by the Khan that their alliance would be terminated if he did not open talks with the King. Islam Giray was threatening to switch sides, and the divided Ukrainian army now faced the worst possible scenario, short of an outright defeat: it would be trapped between the en­trenched Polish armies and the Tatar cavalry. There was little choice but to open negotiations with the King, with the terms of an agreement subject to the Khans approval. The result was the SO-CalledAgreement of Zboriv, a document issued in August 1649 in the form of a Royal Declaration in order for the King to save face. The agreement satisfied most of the Cossacks’ civil and religious demands. The three Cossackprovinces of Bratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihivwere to become an independent part of the Commonwealth, with Jan Casimir as the common mon­arch; Ukrainewouldbe administered exclusively by the Cossack Army, and Polish forces forbidden to establish residence in Ukraine, although Roman Catholic worship and Jewish trade were permitted; the OrthodoxMetropolitan of Kyiv was to be given a seat in the Polish Sejm, and all Ukrainian nobles and others who took part in the fighting against the King were to be amnestied. The pivotal issue, however, was the fundamental demand of the great magnates and other nobles that they be al­lowed to reclaim their estates, and the return of serfdom. This was an impossible demand since it meant the reversal of the Ukrainian revolution and the abolishment of the entire social, economic, and political order that had arisen in Ukraine. The condition was supported by the Khan, and Khmelnitsky and his colonels had little choice but to agree to the return of the Polish nobility. Worse, all Cossacks who were not entered on the King’s register were to be enserfed, subjected to “their usual submission.” Tens of thousands of men under arms would be affected since the line separating Cossack and many armed peas­ants had become blurred.

The ZborivAgreement was ratified by the Sejm of the Commonwealth in the winter of 1649, and became a legal treaty with the first recognition of an independent “Ukraina, Terra Cossacorum.” The treaty recognized a new socially and politi­cally independent Ukraine—somewhat similar to the case of Switzerland, a federation of democratic cantons that recognized the sovereignty of the Holy Roman Emperor while in practice maintaining its independence. With Khmelnitsky in power, a freedom of religion was established and Roman Catholic churches and synagogues were reopened as many Jewish refu­gees began to return, so that by 1654 Muscovite troops were astonished to find many cities and towns in Ukraine with large Jewish populations⁶² (Muscovy did not permit Jews to settle within its borders, and some Jews were robbed and murdered by Muscovite troops when they entered Ukraine).⁶³ The stip­ulated rights of the (mainly Polish) landlords to reclaim their estates were largely ignored by the Ukrainian population, and Khmelnitsky continued to put into place a Cossack adminis­tration, based on an egalitarian democracy. A general “rada” gathering was no longer possible due to the ten-fold increase in Cossack numbers, nor was it conducive to long-term plan­ning and strategy. Khmelnitskybegan to use only officers’ "rada” councils for major decisions and operations, but many local "atamans” were still subject to popular “radas” of the rank-and- file where all major decisions were made. Polish sources report the difficulties they had after 1648 in obtaining information on Khmelnitsky’s plans from captured Cossacks—there had been no "rada” assemblies and they did not know Khmelnitsky’s next move.

Cossack democracy had also been exercised through an officers’ assembly, which however was subordinate to that of the rank-and-file. Under Khmelnitsky major decision making, although still democratic, became more centralized to include himself, his SecretaryVyhovsky, and the officers, colonels and captains of the regular Cossack regiments. This officer ""rada” council became the administrative body of Ukraine, with its capital in Chihirin, and it elected the SeniorArmy officers; the secretary, the master of ordinances, the master of the insignia standards and army organization, an inspector-general, and the judges. These had a free hand to exercise their duties and the authority of each was separated from the others. The system of separation of powers was probably not by design but arose due to the fact that all officers including the Hetman were elected by Cossack assemblies, and were theoretically answerable only to the rank-and-file. Under Khmelnitsky, Ukraine was divided into ""regiments” each with defined borders and placed under the administrative rule of the regimental colonel—nine regi­mental territories on the right bank and seven on the left bank of the Dnipro. A regiment was further subdivided into smaller ""counties” under company captains. The size of the regiments varied between 1,000 and 3,200 men, with a total strength of some 40,000 regular Cossacks, both infantry and cavalry. Some cities had been granted self-administration by the Lithuanian princes and Polish kings, and these were mainly exempt from direct Cossack authority.⁶⁴

The population of Ukraine was experiencing democratic freedom as practiced nowhere in the neighboring lands, and all attempts by the ejected nobility to regain ""their” possessions were met with great hostility and armed resistance. Khmelnitsky himself came under severe criticism, particularly from the Za- porozhian Sich and the Cossacks ""Down Under.” Although the Zboriv Treatyhad recognized the nobles’ rights to their previ­ous estates, this was not enforceable in practice, as Khmelnitsky and his officers had realized even during the negotiations. Fight­ing soon broke out again as nobles who could afford to hire pri­vate armies returned and began to institute a reign of vengeance and terror in their former estates. This was contrary to the Zboriv Treaty, which had granted amnesty to all who were involved in the uprising. Colonel Daniel Nechai of the Bratslav regiment, himself a man of some possessions, emerged as the popular leader of the peasant bands, inflicting a major defeat on Prince Koreckis forces in Volin. This was Contraryto Khmel­nitsky’s orders since he was bound bylaw to enforce the Zboriv Treaty. Tatar bands—against whom the Cossack Hetman was powerless since they were his only allies—were also attacking the peasants to carry off captives to be sold in the Muslim slave markets. Peasants and Cossacks began to migrate to the left­bank regions, many of which were free of landlords and beyond the reach of most Tatar raids. Other Cossack bands were al­lowed to settle in Muscovite “slobodas” or free villages in return for border guard duty against Tatars.

The situation was becoming critical once again. During the Zboriv negotiations both parties had to accept each other’s fundamental demands in order to arrive at an agreement under pressure from the Crimean Khan, who emerged as holding the balance of power. These demands were incompatible, in fact inconsistent, and left both sides dissatisfied. The door for future conflict was being opened once again, and it was not long in coming.