The Peasant Uprising and the Destruction of the Great Polish Army at Piliavtsi

Following the annihilation of the Polish army at Korsun the Cossacks rested for a few days and took care of the wounded before heading to Bila Tserkva where a great Cossack “rada” of the rank-and-file was held to decide on future action.

Peasant bands had begun to form after the battle of “Zhovti Vody,” news of which spread like wildfire, and began to attack the nobility and their supporters such as the Jews and others in their service. Now, following the battle of Korsun, Ukraine and southern Rus erupted in a general uprising and a veritable bloodbath as the pent-up hatred of the serfs was un­leashed in a terrible vengeance. The popular movement, in which everyone was claiming to be a Cossack, was described in ballads such as the one recorded by Sofia Lindfors-Rusova in 1872. Although referring to a later campaign the lyrics were composed during the Khmelnitsky uprising:

The Cossackwho had no steel saber,

Nor a seven-foot musket, Tosses a cudgel over his shoulder And rushes to the volunteer army, Following Khmelnitsky.”²³

Former serfs and peasants armed with scythes modified into deadly pikes attacked the nobles’ fortified dwellings, villas and strongholds, where many Catholics and Jews had taken refuge. The boundaries separating friend and foe were not necessarily ethnic or “racial” but mainly ran along class and religious lines both of which tended to coincide—the Greek Orthodox against the Catholic (Roman and Greek Catholic or Uniate) and the Hebrew faiths. By the time of the uprising there were about 100,000 German Jews in the Polish-Lithuanian Common­wealth, mainly settled by the large landowners on their estates where they lived in “kehillas” or communities complete with religious amenities and institutions.²⁴

The Polish nobility was truly a parasitic class. Not only did they prefer to pay ransom to the Crimean Tatars rather than do their martial duty and defend the land, they also refused to manage their own estates (or were incompetent to do so).

Formerly most of the dukes and the ruling nobility adhered to the Greek Orthodox faith.... King [Zygmunt], however, raised the status of the Catholic dukes and princes above those of the Orthodox so that most of the latter abandoned their Greek Or­thodox faith and embraced Catholicism. And the masses that fol­lowed the Greek Orthodox Church became gradually impover­ished. They were looked upon as lowly and inferior beings and became the slaves and the handmaids of the Polish people and of the Jews. Those among them who were trained warriors were conscripted by the king to serve in his army. This group num­bered approximately 30,000 fighting men and they were called Cossacks. Theywere exempt from taxes... their specific task (was) to guard the frontier.... There always existed an abiding enmity between the Tatars and the Greek Orthodox, resulting in continuous warfare between them. The Cossacks therefore en­joyed special privileges like the nobility.... The rest of the Greek Orthodox, however, was a wretched and an enslaved lot, servants to the dukes and the nobles.... The nobles levied upon them heavy taxes, and some even resorted to cruelty and torture with the intent to persuade them to accept Catholicism. So wretched and Iowlyhad they become that all classes of people, even the lowliest among them (the Jewish people) became their over- lords.²⁵

Although Tegularlypersecuted in Otherparts of Europe, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Jews found themselves in a privileged and semi-dominant position.

Some ten days after the battle of Korsun the great Ortho­dox magnate Adam Kysil described the situation:

As soon as the terrible and sorrowful news (came) that the army and the Polish hetmans were no more... immediately all of Ukraine—the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates—fled before such a victory and enemy force, abandoning their homes and cherished possessions. Not only the rural settled areas but all the towns as well—Polonne, Zaslav, Korets, and Hoshcha—became a “kraina” (borderland), while other residents without tarrying here either fled to Olyka, Dubno, and Zamost. Not a single no­bleman was left, only the common people some of whom went to Khmelnitsky, increasing the size of his army from several thou­sand to several tens of thousands, while the others, certain that nothing would happen to them, remained confidently in their homes. But when they emerged from the small towns to wel­come the (Tatar) Horde, it welcomed them in such a manger that in many places it slaughtered them to a man, so that even the peasants began to flee.²⁷

While the population of Ukraine was rising in revolt Khmelnitsky halted his army at Bila Tserkva, the western limit of what was the Cossack “Ukraina ” Now was the time to ad­vance west, liberate Podilia, Volin, Galicia, and other territories of medieval Rus, and strike at the very heart of the nobility’s state which was left defenseless without an army or a command structure. Ignoring the advice of his more radical followers Khmelnitsky did no such thing and instead decided to negotiate. The town burghers and minor Orthodox nobles of southern Rus, many of whom had become Cossack officers, did not wish to see the destruction of the monarchy or the Polish Common­wealth, as is indicated by Khmelnitsky s letter addressing King Wladyslav IV as the “most Serene, Gracious King, our Gracious Lord and Benefactor,” and in which the Zaporozhian Hetman professed Cossack loyalty and service.

Unknown to Khmelnitsky, King Wladyslav had died on 20 May a few days before the battle of Korsun, and the Polish Commonwealth was left not Onlywithout an army or hetmans but also without a king, the supreme commander of all the armed forces. According to the Polish constitution when a king died he was replaced by the head of the Polish Catholic Church (in this case the 70-year-old and ill Archbishop of Gniezno) until the election of the next monarch. The actual management of affairs, however, passed to Chancellor Ossolinski, who realized very quickly the precarious situation in which the Polish Commonwealth found itself. Before a Sejm could be convened Ossolinski appointed the great Orthodox Volinian magnate Adam Kisil to approach Khmelnitsky, and arrange for peaceful negotiations. As the talks began, to the amazement of many Polish nobles Khmelnitsky agreed to Kisils conditions to dismiss his Tatar allies, retreat from Bila Tserkva, and demo­bilize the army, keeping a core of 10,000 of the “best” Cossacks with him, and sending the rest to garrison Cossack towns.

Not to alarm the nobility any further, Khmelnitsky was abstaining from the peasants’ rampage which was sweeping across Ukraine. As reported by Kisils envoy the Reverend Pe- trony Lasko, not only did Khmelnitskynot have anything to do with the peasant violence (which by now had spread to adjoining Volin, west Podilia and Polisia) he was in fact “de­stroying them” so that “they say that the unruly ones—the re­bellious peasants—all want to go beyond the Dnipro and elect another chief. And God forbid... (that) the Cossacks should join the unruly bands.”²⁹ The report is corroborated by Prince Wladyslav Zaslawski who wrote to the Polish Sejm in the spring of 1648. “He (Khmelnitsky) does not accept peasants; on the contrary, he sends them home after giving them a lecture.”³⁰ Nevertheless, some Cossacks were involved in looting and pil­laging of Polish estates and Jewish communities as Khmelnitsky admitted to the vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva, warning him that “we cannot say that (in such an army) there are none who are bad and unruly... among the Cossack people, long known to be impetuous.”³¹ The Cossack Hetman was often perceived as the author of the slaughter of Catholics and Jews following the battle of Korsun as was claimed by the contemporary Rabbi Hanover: “Now I shall begin to record the brutal oppressions caused by Chmiel (Khmelnitsky—may his name be blotted out’) in the lands of Rus, Lithuania, and Poland—in the years 5408 (1648), 5409 (1649), 5410 (1650).... Hewas intelligent to do evil; a man of sinister design, and mighty in war.”³²

The peasant uprising of 1648 had become a cruel blood­bath on both sides. Khmelnitsky’s orders to arrest those respon­sible for the attacks on the Catholic nobility and the Jews in their service, and even the execution of some as an example, did not stop the violence. Nothing could halt the pent-up hatred of the serfs, and the revolts that swept Ukraine were spilling over to the adjoining provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Com­monwealth. The nobility retaliated in a savage manner, which only had the effect of adding fuel to the fire. Many of the dis­banded Cossacks from Khmelnitsky’s army began joining the peasants in the settling of accounts and it was becoming difficult to distinguish peasant bands from Cossackunits, since anyone who could lay his hands on a weapon became an instant “Cos­sack.” The left bank Ukraine where towns did not have Khmel­nitsky’s garrisons was particularly hard hit with terrible con­sequences. Lubny was sacked, followed by others such as Chernihiv, Norivka, Sosnitsia, Baturin and Mina, where “Cos­sacks (were reported) to devise unheard of tortures.” Thou­sands of nobles, their families and those in their service were massacred. A letter has survived, written by an individual in Warsaw, and probably based on the accounts of refugees from Ukraine.

They (the rebels) went to Chernihiv and came upon a large party of noblewomen who were fleeing to Chernihiv with their chil­dren: seizing them all they threw them into wells and heaped rocks and soil on them. Theyhave already been storming the cas­tle in Chernihiv for two weeks—the city has now surrendered to them, and one cannot expect the castle to hold out. The neigh­boring towns near Chernihiv have surrendered, handing over the nobility, Catholics and Jews to them for torture. In one town Mo- hyla (unknown) 800 nobles were slaughtered with their wives and children, as well as 700 Jews with their wives and children. Some were slaughtered, others were first told to dig a pit, then they threw the Jewish women and children in alive and covered them with earth, and then they ordered the Jewish men to kill one another, giving them muskets.³³

Much of the account does not ring true, although unde­niably many massacres did occur. Most stories were retold sev­eral times, and inevitably altered in the process. It is not likely, for example, that noblewomen and their children would have been sent away by themselves in such a dangerous time without an escort. Also it is not probable that prisoners were given loaded muskets and “ordered” to shoot each other. The most extensive account of the violence is provided by the Volinian rabbi Nathan Hanover, in a book published in Venice in 1654. It is also exaggerated for effect, and is based on second or third- hand accounts, but it does convey the general and bloody at­mosphere of the conflict. He writes:

Many (Jewish) communities beyond the Dnieper, and close to the battlefield, such as Pereyaslav, Barishivka, Piriatin, Borispole, Lubny and Liakhivtsi and their neighbors, who were unable to escape, perished for the name of God. These people died cruel and bitter deaths. Some were skinned alive and their flesh was thrown to the dogs; some had their hands and limbs chopped off, and their bodies thrown on the highway only to be trampled by wagons and crushed by horses.... Manywere taken by the Tatars into captivity. Women and virgins were ravished... in the pres­ence of their husbands. Also these cruelties were perpetuated against the Polish people, especially against the priests and bish­ops.... Westwards of the Dnieper thousands of Jewish persons perished and several hundred were forced to change their faith.³⁴

A Muscovite emissary to Adam Kisil who was in Ukraine in June 1648 also related that “manyJews, it is said, are being bap­tized and are joining their (rebel) forces, but as for the Poles it is said that even if they wish to be baptized they do not accept them but kill them all.”³⁵

It would be a mistake to assume that young Jewish men joined only Polish Catholic forces. Jews were also at times ac­cepted into Cossack units, and some rose to become officers. The treatment ofjews often depended on local conditions and attitudes towards them, particularly if they agreed to be baptized to Orthodox Christianity. At times the baptism was purely for­mal to save the Jewish families, and many in fact remained true to their faith at times openly so.

Many Catholics and Jews were also rescued by PrinceJe- TemiWishniowiecki, who at the head of his 6,000 man private army was still on the east side of the Dnipro, unable to cross because all boats and rafts had been destroyed on Khmelnitsky s orders. A haughty man, he lived frugally and was known for his frequent demands that the King transfer even more land to his vast holdings in Volin and left bank Ukraine. With an unpleasant personality he was disliked by many of his peers who envied his wealth. He also had a great disdain for the “common rabble,” as was Usualwith most members of his class, and had declared that “it would be better for us to die than have the pagans (Or­thodox Christians) and knaves rule over us.” By the summer of 1648 Wishniowiecki had the only viable force in Ukraine which could fend off the rebels, particularly Colonel Krivonos^, Cos­sacks and peasants that Khmelnitskyhad sent against him. Hav­ing lost his left bank possessions Wishniowiecki was trying to cross to the west bank and reach his other estates in Volin. He first headed north to Chernihiv picking up many gentry and Jewish refugees and his force quickly swelled to some 10,000 men, not counting the civilians. Leaving the Chernihiv nobility behind, who had decided to defend the city, Wishniowiecki s army crossed to the right bank and headed for Bratslav towards the Zbarasky estates of his brothers-in-law.

As Wishniowiecki proceeded west he continued his bloody reprisals against the “Cossack” peasants, his route marked by hundreds of impaled bodies. Aparticipant in his march has left us with a description of a particular but probably typical inci­dent: “Marching through Pohrebishche they cut off the hands of traitors (the rebels), impale them, and behead them—mostly for offending God, for despoiling Roman Catholic churches. It is terrible to relate and write what they did there.”³⁶

A known massacre also occurred in Nemiriv, a town be- Iongeing to Wishniowiecki. A detachment of his men ap­proached the town but found the gates locked and the defenders defiant. The Princes men cut their way through the wooden palisade with axes, fell upon the town and “massacred a larger number of men and women,” as recounted by one Twardowski, a participant in the action. The survivors were tortured to death using some OfWishniowieckis own methods, “so that they would feel that they were truly dying,” as he put it. As the troops were settling in their new quarters a rebel force arrived and began to storm the town stronghold which fell after five days of fighting. As all revolutions the conflict had become a civil war to some extent, as was noted by one OfWishniowieckis men who commented that the Polish dragoons although re­cruited from Ukraine fought so zealously “that one perished on top of another.” No doubt the Ukrainians Icnewwhat to ex­pect if they were captured by the rebels, who probably knew many of them personally. A 1,500 cavalry force sent to recapture Nemiriv failed and Wishniowiecki abandoned all future action and began to withdraw towards his estates in Volin.

Colonel Ivan Hyria was sent at the head of5,000 Cossacks to intercept and destroy Wishniowie cki’s army, after having linked up with Krivonos’ 1,000 man cavalry detachment. Reaching Kyiv Province they were forced to withdraw by the Prince s powerful army who continued to head towards Volin. Following the enemy the Cossack-peasant force captured Makhnivka, as other rebel forces were besieging Polonne in southern Volin. This was a great and important fortress de­fended by strong artillery batteries, a double wall and a moat, and had become the destination of many Catholic and Jewish refugees. When Wishniowiecki withdrew in the direction of his estates Polonne s fate was sealed as the rebels began to storm the walls of the fortress. Polonne was garrisoned by a mixed force of Crown troops and serving men of the local lords, and after beating back several assaults the Orthodox defenders en­tered into an agreement with the rebels and allowed them into the fortress, which quickly fell on 12 July 1648. The fall of Polonne had cost the Cossacks and the peasants heavy casual­ties, and with its fall a vicious bloodbath took place as hundreds of nobles and Jews were massacred without mercy. According to the Warsaw correspondent Tyszkiewich who wrote at the time, some 700 nobles were killed with the women, children and servants, and 2,000Jews. The main reason for the capture of the citadel was the great amount of equipment, arms and supplies that were stored there. According to later accounts some 60-80 cannons, great stores of gunpowder, and weapons estimated at 4 million Polish gold zlotys fell into the rebels’ hands.

The Polish Sejm, which had convened to elect a new king took advantage of Khmelnitsky’s willingness to negotiate and began raising fresh forces and stationing them in Galicia under the triple command of old Zaslawski, the young and inexperi­enced Koniecpolski, and the bookish Ostrorog. A major weak­ness of the well-armed and equipped Polish armies was the low morale of the troops. The professional soldiers, the core of the army, often went unpaid for long periods of time, and the com­mand structure was inept and enjoyed little confidence and re­spect amongst the men. Not only were the aristocratic magnates bad managers of their estates, they were also poor leaders of men. In haughty aristocratic manner they refused to recognize the authority of the Crown, objected to serving under each other’s command, and conducted their flamboyant quarrels in public, on occasion even on the battlefield. Such behavior was not uncommon in European armies, and was the way in which great nobles were expected to act.

Khmelnitsky’s suspicions as to Polish intentions were quickly aroused when the envoys to the Sejm failed to return, without any explanation as to their detention. Fighting was al­ready going on in Podilia and Volin where Krivonos had de­clared a personal vendetta against Prince Wishniowiecki for having “perpetrated merciless tyranny against my brothers in Nemiriv and elsewhere... had brought me to this.... I will not cease to seek him everywhere... until I get him” as he wrote to Prince Zaslawski, warning him that “there are all kinds of people in my army and one should not rely on them (not to loot).” Wishniowiecki in the meantime continued his retreat westwards, beating off attacks by Krivonos’ men and impaling local supporters of what was becoming a general revolution. The newly raised Polish army that had advanced eastward to a base in Starokostiantinov decided to vacate the town, which was quickly occupied by Krivonos and accompanied with the usual massacre of Catholics and Jews.

Next on Krivonos’ agenda was the impregnable fortress of Bar in eastern Podilia. Not only was it strategically located on the Boh River it was also another important supply depot for weapons, ammunition, gunpower, and Othermilitary equip­ment, as well as large stores of provisions. The defenders had dammed the Boh River, Creatinglarge bodies of water to impede access to the city walls, and fresh reinforcements had been sent by Prince Zaslawski. The Ukrainian force which surrounded Bar consisted of five detachments, one commanded by an Or­thodoxpriest and another by an Orthodoxnobleman. Some of Bar’s burghers attempted to help the besiegers by opening some of the gates, but to no avail and it was the assault units which finally took the city by storm, attacking the walls by both water and land. Rafts had been built from the dismantled houses of the surrounding region, as well as siege towers on wheels called “hulai-horody” (wandering forts) which were armed with ar­tillery and manned by sharpshooters. Protection was provided by layers of dried rawhides stretched over the beams and planks of the towers. As they approached the walls platforms were thrown out, and under cover of cannon and musket fire the at­tackers leaped on the walls with sabers, pistols and scythe-pikes. The city walls fell after heavy fighting and the surviving garrison took refuge in the citadel, which also fell on 4 August. Some of the defenders were held for ransom while many others were slaughtered. Bar was considered to be a safe destination and had attracted thousands of Catholic and Jewish refugees. Its fall caused great panic in the Polish Commonwealth as thousands of muskets and great stores of gunpowder and lead fell into Kri­vonos’ hands, together with all the artillery of the great fortress.

Khmelnitsky’s greatest victories were yet to come. Careful not to provoke Lithuania-Rus he began to move west along the Podilia-Volin border, and by the end of July the main Ukrainian army was already west of Bila Tserka, while Krivonos was storm­ing Bar. The objective was to prevent the fresh Polish army from joining Wishniowiecki’s force, a combination which could greatly outnumber the Iargelyunseasoned Ukrainian army. Za- slawski and his co-commanders were also reinforced by fresh provincial regiments as they continued eastwards, and by August the main army had merged with Wishniowiecki s men at Chowhansky Kamin in Volin. Ajoint meeting of the now four commanders endorsed Wishniowiecki as the overall head and decided to move against Khmelnitsky, who was camped by the Piliava River. News had come to the Polish commanders that Khmelnitsky had sent for the Tatars and they decided to destroy the Ukrainian force before their arrival. The Polish Commonwealth now fielded an army never seen before, even during the battle of Khotin against the Turks in 1621. Contem­porary estimates vary widely, but it seems that the combined Polish force had a core of at least 50,000 professional troops, not counting the tens of thousands of armed auxiliaries and armed serving men (“servants”) who accompanied the nobility. Far from being an exclusively “Polish” army it included German and other mercenaries, Jewish volunteers, and Rusins from Gali­cia.

The Polish nobility had lost none of its arrogance and con­tinued to boast that Khmelnitsky s “rabble” would be dispersed with whips, without having to draw sabers. Not to be deprived of their usual comforts, and to impress all with their great wealth, many nobles came to the battle as if to an outing, as was recorded by the hussar Mashiewicz in his diary:

The Iordlings set out not so much with iron as with silver and gold. They shipped in tableware from the whole Kingdom.... The Crown lords set out with such luxury, with purple traveling coaches with gold braid, with magnificent garments, silver in­signia and upholstery so that it was a rare comrade who did not measure up to the wealth of the great lords.³⁷

The Protestant Prince Radziwill also noted with some disap­proval that the Polish nobility had learned nothing from the disaster at Korsun, arriving with great wealth in gold, silver, pre­cious gems, luxurious tents, gilded armor and other items of luxury, not to mention the expensive food, drink, and camp fol­lowers disguised in men’s clothing.

The first contact with Khmelnitsky s men came when a Polish regiment commanded by the young Koniecpolski forced a Cossack garrison to abandon the fortified town of Starokos- tiantinov and drove Cossack reconnaissance detachments off the field. Encouraged by the successes, the Polish commanders decided to move against Khmelnitsky’s main force. The Cos­sacks had entrenched themselves in a Virtuallyimpregnable po­sition by the Piliava (today the Ikva) River, and two other rivers, ponds and wetlands, in a terrain with scattered gullies and ravines, which prevented the enemy from concentrating a large force against their flanks and rear. The camp itself was sur­rounded by wagons six deep, which were held together by chains. The only open access was to the north towards Starokos- tiantinov from where the Polish army was expected to come. Even then it would have to cross a small river running east-west not far from the Cossack camp. To hamper any crossings the Cossacks had dug trenches on their side, just to the south of a shallow ford. Krivonos and his peasant bands camped sepa­rately, off to the side of both the Cossack and Polish camps. This enabled them to attack the Polish flank, but made the peas­ants vulnerable to the strong enemy cavalry.

The composition of the two opposing armies could not have differed more. The Polish army was of a mixed type, with a large part (probably half) being identical to most other Eu­ropean armies made up of foreign mercenaries and Crown troops drawn from all parts of the kingdom. A unique feature, however, no longer practiced in the rest of Europe was a call­up system whereby the nobles provided levies in times of emer­gency. It was complemented by the magnates’ private armies, each of which ran into several thousand men, as well as smaller forces from more minor nobles. The Polish Commonwealth placed a heavy emphasis on cavalry, one of the best in Europe, and which had given the Cossacks much trouble in the early uprisings and was largely responsible for the suppression of the revolts.

There were two general types of Polish cavalry facing Khmelnitsky; heavy armored men on big horses, and a light mobile cavalry. Heavy cavalry formed the core of the army— the famed winged Hussars, and the iron-clad reiters. Hussars were the more common of the two and after 1630 formed about 30 percent of the entire cavalry force. They were normally nobles who were paid for their services and each hussar received money to equip two retainers, known as “pacholiks.” They re­ceived little pay, if any, even though they took part in the fighting and were responsible for camp duties, such as cleaning and maintaining the hussars’ weapons and equipment. Their own weapons, equipment, and horses, however, were owned by the hussar. “Pacholiks” were never counted in the rolls as a part of a hussar company, which gave a wrong tally for the actual sizes of Polish forces, and false claims by some historians that Polish armies were always outnumbered.³⁸ A hussar also hired camp servants to perform the more usual domestic duties, such as preparing the food and serving at tables. They also took part in the fighting, particularly “mopping-up” operations in the wake of a successful battle, and were likewise not included as a part of the armed forces. Hussars wore full armor and helmet— or at least an upper body breastplate. They wielded 5 meter- long medieval lances and their main job was to break through enemy lines to allow other troops to pour through the gaps. When the lance broke, it was replaced by a broadsword or a saber, and a wheel-lock pistol was also carried for self defense. Before a charge by the massed hussars the enemy would be soft­ened up by iron-clad reiters, who (besides a small defensive sword) only carried two wheel-lock pistols which were dis­charged at the enemy from a solid rectangular formation, in a complex maneuver called a “caracole.”³⁹

The second branch of the Polish cavalry consisted of light cavalry which had originated with Cossack cavalry formations in the king’s service. Even though the Cossacks no longer served the king the light Cavalrywere still referred to as “armored Cos­sacks” since some units wore chain mail and helmets. They were mainly used in fighting the Tatars and Cossacks, and for vanguard/rearguard duties as well as reconnaissance. The no­bles’ levies and private forces also included light cavalry, and the nobility could raise anywhere between 40,000 and 100,000 men.⁴⁰ These would also consist of dragoons, who were highly mobile mounted infantry, rode into battle on horseback, and fought on foot with muskets and swords. The king s crown army also included dragoons, mostly raised in Orthodox Galicia. A substantial part of the army consisted of infantry many of who were foreign mercenaries, particularly Germans. There were also the volunteer Haiducks who were almost exclusively equipped with muskets with the best companies coming from the Carpathian Mountains, as well as the drafted infantry from Poland with one soldier for each 20 Polish acres of Crown land.

The Cossack forces that had defeated the Poles at Zhovti Vody and Korsun were very different from conventional Euro­pean armies and had little in common with the armed forces of the Commonwealth although their innovative cavalry tactics would influence European warfare for many years. All were free volunteers, none received pay, and mercenaries were not ac­cepted. Although not always as well armed as the Common­wealth troops, Khmelnitsky’s men were fighting for freedom, to enjoy their own land, the hunting and fishing rights, and had a much higher level of commitment than the Polish troops. As Napoleon Bonaparte remarked a century and a half later, morale stood in the ratio of 3 to 1 as compared to physical strength of an army. Because the Cossack art of war had developed in com­bination with fighting the mobile Tatars on the vast Ukrainian steppe, Muscovite feudal troops, and modern European armies it represented a unique blend of tactics. A particular difficulty was their numerical inferiority, which the Cossacks tried to overcome by heavy infantry musket firepower and the highly prized artillery. The infantry in turn was reinforced by a highly mobile cavalry and could be protected by wagon “tabor” camps, which acted as mobile forts. They could serve both offensive and defensive functions by providing refuge when facing defeat as well as a launching pad for an attack. Many Cossack tactics were adopted by Polish armies, and the Swedes seem to have followed suit when Gustav Adolphus introduced heavy fire­power in the first half of the 17th century.

The cavalry played a key role in operations. Historically, Cossackcavalryhad developed against Tatars and other prairie cavalry and depended on small, hardy steppe horses that could swim rivers and survive on their own during a Ukrainian prairie winter. Armed with lance and saber, Cossacks wore no armor, and initially did not do too well against armored Polish cavalry mounted on heavy chargers. The situation, however, had changed following the victory at Korsun. Now Khmelnitsky had crack cavalry units consisting of Registered Cossacks and troops who had deserted the nobility and the Crown, all mounted on good steeds. Although Cossacks still wore no armor many were armed with pistols in addition to lance and saber, which proved very effective against breastplates. Cossack cavalry was light and maneuverable, and a battle began with a two-rank “lava” charge with lances. Although the hussars’ long 5 meter lances could take a toll of Cossack ranks once at close quarters, they became vulnerable to pistols and hand-to-hand combat with saber, Turkish “yatahans,” or broadswords. The Cossacks had learned that the best defense was an offense, particularly with cavalry when a sustained charge could decide the outcome of a battle right at the outset limiting losses in men and equipment. As remarked by Paul of Allepo during his trip through Ukraine; “the Cossacks are mighty in war, they never retreat or flee.”

Infantrywas also an important part of Khmelnitsky’s army. The Cossacks kept the Zaporozhian musket firing line, which had such a devastating effect on advancing enemy troops par­ticularly when reinforced by artillery.⁴¹ They were supported by the peasant bands armed with farming implements turned into weapons—axes, pitchforks, and particularly their chief weapon, the scythe. It took a village blacksmith but a few min­utes to straighten the blade and convert a scythe into a deadly pike. When lacking scythes they armed themselves with literally anything they could lay their hands on—even cudgels and flails, used for thrashing wheat! What they lacked in training was made up by motivation and a deep hatred of the nobility. They soon learned the importance of self-discipline from the town and Zaporozhian Cossacks, together with the military crafts, which very quickly began to transform bands of serfs into Cos­sack regiments, as described in the eyewitness account of Paul of Aleppo:

They are thoroughly experienced in all kinds of martial arts, and some 100,000 brave young warriors who ride well are with the Hetman. Earlier, these soldiers were simple peasants with no mil­itary experience whatsoever, Autgraduallytheylearned... the youths learning to ride, shoot shoulder guns (flintlock muskets) and bows, and show courage since childhood. It should be known that all these soldiers receive no wages but sow as much grain as they wish, then harvest and gather it and no one takes ei­ther a tithe or anything else from them; they are free of every­thing. And all the subjects of the Cossack land live this way, they know neither taxes, tributes, nor tithes. Khmelnitsky simply leases all the customs duties of merchants on the borders of his country to leaseholders, as well as the income from mead, beer and spirits, for 100 dinars for the right to collect the duty and sell alcohol... and he takes nothing more.⁴²

An important Cossack defensive Strategyincluded the vir­tually impregnable “tabor” positions, reinforced with earth­works. Following the early unsuccessful uprisings it was realized that a wagon formation, even when reinforced by field artillery, was no match for long-range siege guns. A modification was in­troduced by surrounding the wagons with earthen ramparts and a trench, which provided cover for the wagons and Cossack musketeers. Sometimes foxholes were dug to provide additional cover as explained by Paul of Aleppo.

They are great craftsmen in building camps... (which are) bul­warks of heaped-up earth. They are heaped around the troops so that no one can attack the Cossacks by surprise. Each one has his own shelter—a hole in the ground. Rising to their feet they fire shoulder guns... and when the enemy shoots they hide in their shelters and no bullet can hit them.... On campaigns they are content with remarkably little. Except for a rye cracker and water they know nothing else... yet their endurance is very great.⁴³

The entire Polish army arrived at Piliavtsi on 19 September and on the following day began attacking the Cossack trenches to clear an access to the river ford. The fighting went on for three days, with the Polish infantry and dragoons capturing the position only to be driven back by Cossack counterattacks. Fi­nally a strong Polish cavalry charge knocked the defenders out of the trenches and drove them back to their camp and the way lay open for an assault on the main Cossackposition. The three- day delay, however, gave Khmelnitskytime to send scouts and assess the strength and composition of the Polish army, with the aid of spies inside the enemy camp. Word was brought back that the enemy had a large cavalry component and some IOO pieces of artillery, including heavy siege guns, but the impressive Polish army had an Achilles heel; it was led by vain princely no­bles, who bickered among themselves without arriving at a co­herent strategy.

Khmelnitsky realized he was a sitting duck before the pow­erful enemy and while the four Polish commanders deliberated on their move, he struck. Early on the morning of 23 September Khmelnitsky personally drew his cavalry before the Cossack camp and charged the Polish forces on the river crossing, quickly destroying most of the enemy cavalry and sending the survivors in flight to the safety of the Polish camp. Giving chase, the Cossack and Tatar horsemen were met by Polish dragoons and armored hussars but after several hours of fierce fighting the Polish cavalry—including the much vaunted hussars—were driven back, having suffered heavy losses. Cossack losses were also not light but with the enemy cavalry cleared from the bat­tlefield, Cossack infantry and the peasants struck the Polish ranks, which were drawn up before the camp wagons. Not able to withstand the fierce assault, the Polish infantry began to give way and was only saved by the fall of darkness as Khmelnitsky gave the signal to disengage from the bloody hand-to-hand fighting. A great dread now swept the Polish army following the savage fighting of the day. Realizing that daybreak would bring another attack, the desperate Polish commanders pan­icked, and not to lose time began to withdraw under the cover of darkness. The first were Princes Zaslawski and Koniecpolski, who, deciding not to wait for the other commanders, slipped out of the camp together with their nobles and began to flee. News of the desertion quickly spread through the Polish camp and not wishing to face another battle most of the Polish army joined in the flight. It was every man for himself as the nobility abandoned their men, supplies, military equipment, and entire wagon trains loaded with personal possessions. Once in the open field, Hetman Koniecpolski headed to his estate at Brody disguised as a Ukrainian peasant; Ostrorog fled to Olesko, and the proud Prince Wishniowiecki set out for Zbarazh in an or­dinary peasant cart and common dress, having discarded his rich robes and vestments. The defeat and shame of the once haughty nobility was complete.

It was only in the morning that Cossack scouts brought back news that the mighty army of the Polish Commonwealth had fled, leaving all behind. Two brave Polish artillery com­manders, Osinski and Arciszewski, who were the last to leave with their men, had stuck burning torches on the ramparts to give the impression that the camp was occupied, giving the army time to flee. A Polish participant in the battle, one Mia- skowski, described the shameful and stunning defeat in a letter of 2 October: “He (Khmelnitsky) gazed and wondered at such a vast booty and riches that our sins and cruel fate had brought him.... For such fear, such panic gripped our troops that they galloped just as long as their horses were able... ”⁴⁴

Vast indeed were the spoils of war captured at Piliavtsy on 23 September 1648. Great quantities of weapons, ammunition, and 80 pieces of artillery fell into Ukrainian hands, together with the nobility s personal wealth. From now on, the Ukrainian army would be well-armed Cossacks with a well-funded Army Treasury. By contemporary accounts, the victors found 6,460 wagons abandoned in the Polish camp, many loaded with treas­ure. There were garments lined with sable fur and fringes sewn with diamonds worth some 80,000 gold zlotys; horse halters studded with diamonds and other precious stones valued at 100,000 gold zlotys; and much gold, silver and other valuables, beyond the wildest dream of any Cossack, peasant, or Tatar warrior. Later estimates placed the value of the booty at the stunning sum of 7 million gold zlotys! At last the wealth was returning to those who had produced it at such great hardship.

The great Ukrainian revolutionary upheaval has at times been described in terms of a national liberation movement of Ukraine from Polish oppression. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although most people did identify with linguistic and ethnic affiliations, the main battle lines were drawn along religious and class lines, with economic self-interest playing a major role. This is not to say, of course, that many individuals in Ukraine were not willing to fight for the common good of their families and communities. Quite the contrary—concepts and feelings of justice and equality permeated the Ukrainian revolution. But although many of the minor Orthodox nobles of Rus had joined the Cossack and peasant forces, those with substantial estates such as the great magnates Adam Kisil, Prince Ostrohsky and others supported the Commonwealth, fought in the Polish army and took an active part in the suppression of serfs and peasants. Ukrainian history cannot be understood on the basis of nationalism unless the deep social class hostilities and antagonisms are taken into account.⁴⁵

The battle ofPiliavtsi was the turning point in the Ukrain­ian revolution. News of the rout of the Polish army spread far and wide, drawing attention to the Cossack movement in foreign lands, and boosting the peoples pride and self­confidence. Zhovti Vody and Korsun were not isolated victories, and the revolution could be sustained. We have a stir­ring Ukrainian campaign march, sung to this very day, which was composed after the battle of Piliavtsy, beginning with the verse:

Hey, the red cranberry bush in the field is bending low; Whyhas our renowned Ukraine saddened so?

Hey, we shall raise the red cranberry bough high,

Hey, we shall bring cheer to our renowned Ukraine!