The First Victories

Great optimism permeated the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth following the Cossack capitulation. More Ukrainian land was expropriated by the Polish nobility strong measures were taken to harness the Cossack movement, and the enserfed peasantry was pressed even harder.

We have several documents and eyewitness accounts of the persecution that descended upon the Ukrainian land. Ape­tition submitted to the Sejm Convocation of 1648 by the “Cos­sack Army,” such as it was, lists many of the outstanding abuses:

We are lodging a complaint against the lords (nobility) and the Ukraina (border) administration, that although they have us ac­cording to their will, they do not act towards us as one should treat knightly men and Royal servants, but inflict greater losses and more intolerable wrongs on us than on their slaves, so that we are not free not only in our property but even in our own per­sons.

The petition continues at length to describe additional abuses from their own (appointed) colonels, and the high taxes imposed on those who attempt to make a living from hunting and fishing. The so-called Cossack^aEyewitness Chronicle” fur­ther describes the religious persecution:

There was also a great “obstacle” to the Faith of Rus (Greek Or­thodoxy) on the part of the Uniates (Greek Catholic) and Roman Catholic priests... also in Ukraine, the Union had begun to gain the upper hand... they sealed Orthodox churches in the cities. In this their (the Uniates’) helpers were the nobility, the administration, and the Roman Catholic priests, for by now in Ukraine where there was a city there was a Roman Catholic Church. In Kyiv, too, there was no small oppression of the an­cient Godly (i.e., Orthodox) churches. Janusz Tysziewicz, the palatine at the time, as well as Jesuits, Dominicans, Bernardines and other (monastic) orders, by means of raids and lawsuits, were persecuting the Metropolitan and banning study in schools... but the worst mockery and oppression that the nation of Rus suffered was from those who converted from the Faith of Rus to the Roman.²

The abuses were even noted by some contemporary Polish sources such as Samuel Kuszewicz, who reported the raping of Cossack and peasant wives and daughters by Polish officials and members of the Polish army, and the merciless “extortion” by the Jews in the service of the nobility.³

The great Upheavalwhen it came in 1648 produced some­thing which all previous Cossackrevolts lacked—an outstanding

tactician and strategist who would be able to Outmaneuver and outplan the Commonwealth commanders.

When war began with Turkey in 1620 Mikhailo Khmel­nitsky and his 25-year-old son took part in Hetman Zolkiewski s disastrous Moldavian campaign. Bohdan s father was killed in the battle of Tsitsora, and he himself was taken prisoner to Con­stantinople to be enslaved to a helmsman in the Ottoman navy.

Why did Khmelnitsky and thousands of other Cossacks not join their comrades and the peasants in the uprising of 1637-38? This was a revolt of the have-nots, who had executed senior Cossack officers, men who felt they had too much to lose with the collapse of the Commonwealth. Many others felt the revolt would fail with so many untrained peasants in its ranks, a self-fulfilling prophecy which came true with the defeat of the uprising. The king now appointed the Hetman and all the colonels and senior officers in the same way as provincial starosta-governors, the castellan, and the crown hetmans. Most were ethnic Poles of Roman Catholic backgrounds who were chosen to keep a tight lid on the unruly and “willful” Cossacks. The Commonwealth government was beginning to realize that ethnic and non-Roman Catholic Rusins could not be trusted to implement the repressive measures.

Bohdan Khmelnitsky, however, was gaining the confi­dence of King WladyslavIV, and together with the senior Cos­sack officers Barabash and Illiash was chosen to attend a meet­ing with the King in Warsaw.

The loyalty shown by Khmelnitsky however, would count for naught as personal misfortunes worthy of Job descended upon him.

He is rather taller than average in height, big-boned with a pow­erful build. His speech and command show mature judgment and a keen mind. Although he occasionally drinks a great deal, he does not forsake affairs, hence it seems as if there are two natures in him. One active, unyielding and devoted to his command, the other somnolent, drowned in inebriation. He is gracious and simple in conduct, and thereby earns his soldiers’ affection, but on the other hand he maintains discipline by means of severe punishment.⁹

Khmelnitskywas also simple of dress, which was not very dif­ferent from that of an ordinary Cossack. Rich dress was for the nobility and would have been viewed with great suspicion by the rank-and-file, the “chern.”

Avoiding the registered Cossack guards along the Dnipro River, Khmelnitsky arrived at the Sich in late 1647 with his eldest son Tymish, finding only 250 Cossacks in residence, whom he had little difficulty in convincing to go on a war foot­ing. Once elected as the commanding officer of the Sich, the “koshovy ataman,” his first step was to gather men and move against the Cherkasy and Korsun Registered Cossackregiments that had been stationed in the vicinity to enforce the Polish conditions of 1638. Dissatisfaction at the Shabbytreatmentby the appointed Polish colonels had penetrated into the ranks of the King’s Cossacks, and when approached by Khmelnitsky s envoys they attacked and drove out the commanding officers and their dragoon bodyguards. By 30 January 1648 Khmelnit­sky was in control of the Sich and the surrounding areas. Other Zaporozhians who were away hunting and fishing began to trickle in, having gotten word that the once General Secretary of the Registered Cossacks was raising the standard of revolt against the Polish Commonwealth.

At the first news of the rebellion the Polish Hetman Potocki began to move south into Ukraine, and anticipating an attack Khmelnitsky established a stronghold on Butsk Island. By early 1648 he had 2,500 Cossacks and 500 Tatars, the latter sent by the Crimean Khan in response to the Hetmans request. As reported by Potocki, Khmelnitsky “had the audacity to trans­port several hundred of them (Tatars) to this side (of the Dnipro River) so that they might chase away our guards who are sta­tioned on various routes... to prevent the unruly from rallying to him.”¹⁰

Khmelnitsky was also assured that with the first spring grass he would receive more Tatar support. He also didn’t forget the serfs and the town burghers, sending traveling minstrels to the towns and villages to announce the uprising and the coming of the Cossacks. Written announcements were posted such as the one declaring that “you whose fathers recognized no (state) laws, who never subjected themselves to kings, be slaves no longer!”¹¹

Greek Orthodox nobles were also contacted for support, often by priests and monks acting as clandestine emissaries. To convince those who hesitated to become involved in what were illegal activities, Khmelnitskyused his meeting with KingWla- dyslav to spread rumors that the King supported the Cossacks and “The Greek Faith of Rus” against the arbitrariness of the Liakh nobility; he was fleeing Warsaw to join the Cossacks; the revolt was really against the powerful and wealthy magnates and the king’s misguided government officials and not against Wladyslav, and so forth. Khmelnitsky’s defiance of the Polish Commonwealth would strike a popular chord with members of all Ukrainian social groups and classes, not just the serfs as was the case in the previous uprisings. The oppression of the Greek Orthodox Church had emerged as a major factor and ethnicity began to play a role with nobility being identified as “Liakhs” as opposed to the native “Rusins.” Many Greek Or­thodox nobles had been deprived of land by their powerful

Catholic neighbors, who continued to reap great fortunes from the export of wheat and other agricultural commodities.

By the spring of 1648 Khmelnitsky already had 6,000 men divided into 8 regiments, but not nearly enough to challenge the might of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He des­perately needed Crimean support, at least their guaranteed neu­trality so as to secure his rear and and keep him from being caught between two fronts. The Polish Hetman Potocki was also not wasting time. Although he had acknowledged the wrongs done to the Cossacks in a letter to King Wladyslav and urged strong action against the Ukrainian (border) starostas, once the revolt began to spread he set himself the task of suppressing it as quickly as possible. Potocki s promise to Khmelnitsky that “not a single hair” would fall from his head if he submitted to gov­ernment authority fell on deaf ears, and the Cossack Hetman responded with three demands: the repeal of the oppressive regulations of 1638, the restoration of full Cossackliberties and rights, and the withdrawal of all Crown troops from Cossack territory. Potocki s reply was that the measures could only be implemented by the Sejm, and he himself had no authority over such matters. He, after all, was just a soldier.

Cossack skirmishers testing an enemy position.

The main Polish army was concentrating in Korsun some 5,000 strong, and other regiments were arriving under the com­mand of the district starostas Seniawski, Zaslawski, and Lubomirski, with additional troops expected. At the same time a force of4,000 men—1,500 Polish Crown troops and 2,500 registered Cossacks—were sent toward the Dnipro rapids to establish an advance position in the vicinity of the Kodak fortress, which at the time was garrisoned by 600 loyal troops. To expedite matters, and not expecting strong opposition so early in the campaign, Potocki divided his army into two groups. The first consisted of three infantry Cossack regiments under the appointed colonels Krichevsky, Wadowski and Gorski, seven troops of dragoons (mounted infantry), and four troops of light cavalry supported by 12 pieces of artillery, all under the command of Commissioner Szemberg. Ivan Barabash and Illiash Karaimovich in the meantime sailed down the Dnipro towards the Kodak fortress with several companies of Regis­tered Cossacks.

Departing on 21 April 1648, within a week the Polish land force was 12 miles south of Chihirn in the watershed of the Dnipro and its tributary the Inhulets. It had attracted many young men from some of the best noble Polish families seeking adventure and eager to make a name for them­selves in what was to be an easy victory over “rabble.” Hetman Potockis 26- year-old son Stefan the starosta of Dorozhnia served as the second in command to the experienced Szem- berg. The young nobles had brought a plentiful supply of wine, spirits and good food and the expedition pro­ceeded in a pleasant atmosphere, with servants setting festive tables at the end of the day under great marquis tents.

Khmelnitsky s first target was the flotilla sailing down the Dnipro River. When on 3 May the barges of the Reg­istered Cossacks pulled up to shore at Kamiany Zaton to establish camp they were approached by Khmelnitskys agents and incited to revolt. When the officers tried to interfere they were all killed with the exception of Michailo Krichevsky, who was recognized as Khmelnitsky s comrade. An election for new officers was held on the spot with Filon Dzedzally elected colonel, and one Krivulia as his “osaul.” Although a Roman Catholic, Krichevsky was also a Rusian nobleman who had decided to throw in his lot with the Cossacks against the Polish Com­monwealth, which was increasingly seen by the nobility of Rus as a foreign and oppressive power. With the Registered Cos­sacks on his side Khmelnitsky next positioned the regiments on the west shore of the Dnipro to block the advance of the main 6,000 man Polish army, which under Hetman Potocki and the Field Hetman Kalinowski was following Szemberg s advance detachment. Having learned of the registered Cossack revolt and not hearing news from Szemberg (whose messengers were being intercepted by Cossack scouts) the main Polish army halted, and began to pull back. This gave Khmelnitsky a free hand to deal with Szemberg, who in the meantime had entrenched himself behind an encircled wagon “tabor” by the “Zhovti Vody” (YellowWaters) River to wait for Potockis relief force. Surrounded on three sides with the river at their backs, for the next two weeks the Polish force succeeded in beating back several Cossack and Tatar attacks. Seeing little hope Szemberg s Reg­istered Cossacks also revolted and went over to Khmelnitsky. They were joined by the dragoons, who were mainly recruited in Galicia and were Greek Orthodox Rusins described by the Poles as “natione Roxolani, religione Graeci, habitu Germani.”¹² Realizing the hopelessness of his position, Szemberg sent an envoy to negotiate terms. Although the Polish force was now much reduced it was nevertheless dug-in a strong position de­fended by 12 pieces of artillery, and to avoid further Cossack casualties Khmelnitsky agreed to lift the siege. The Poles would be allowed to leave with their camp intact, but on condition they surrender the field artillery, of which Khmelnitsky had none. As the Poles were pulling out, they were attacked by Tugai Bey s Tatars, who could not endure to see such a rich prize slip through their fingers. Refusing to surrender, the whole Polish contingent was massacred with a single noble s serving man managing to bring back news of the disaster. Chaplinski and his envoys who had been sent to Khmelnitsky for negotiations also survived. The young Stefan Potocki was badly wounded and soon died in Tatar captivity. The commander Szemberg, who was hated by the Registered Cossacks for his abusive treat­ment, was tortured to death and his head nailed to a pole on Khmelnitskys orders. The battle of “Zhovti Vody” was over, its memory kept alive in Ukrainian ballads:

Oi, from the YellowWaters to the Prince’s Ravine,

The green field is strewn with many colors.

Not with spring flowers, but with the nobles’ corpses.” and

An eagle flies o’er a ranch, weaving in the wind.

Oi, there the poor Cossack is fighting with the Poles.

Oi, ’tis time to cease drinking the blood of Rus!

Not just a single young Liakh has orphaned his children!¹³

Did Khmelnitsky need the Tatars to defeat the Poles at Zhovti Vody? Probably not. The Cossack-Tatar joint military campaign against non-Tatars was without precedent and at first drew criticism from most Cossacks, as is illustrated by the speech given by a Cossack at a “rada” meeting:

Master Hetman and lads! The hetman’s (otaman’s) will, and yours are free, but I do not know whether it would be good for us to take pagans (non-Christians) as our protectors. God will grant, and our Army can ensure, that without these pagans we can defend ourselves against the Liakhs, and obtain redress for our grievances from our Lord the King.¹⁴

The speech was met with wide approval. It also did not help matters that Khmelnitsky knew Turkish and could quote from the Koran. Had he secretly converted to Islam? The pres­ence of several thousand Tatar horsemen was certainly helpful but the most important factor was strategy. Khmelnitskyneeded to ensure that his rear was secure from attack as he moved into Ukraine, which (as future events would indicate) would have occurred if Poland decided to renew its treaty with the Crimean Khan and the Ottoman Sultan. King Wladyslavs refusal to con­tinue the payment of tribute had antagonized Khan Islam Giray and Khmelnitsky realized that his proposal for a military alliance stood a good chance of being successful.

Unsure as to the size of Khmelnitsky’s army and alarmed by the annihilation of Szemberg s forces, Hetman Potocki de­cided to retreat to Korsun. Khmelnitsky was spreading misin­formation about the size of his Cossack and Tatar forces in order to hide his weak numbers and to avoid being attacked by Po- tocki’s powerful and well-equipped regiments. Alarmed at the reports of the huge Cossack and Tatar forces, the Poles stripped Korsun of anything that could be useful to the enemy, burned it to the ground, and proceeded to dig a camp outside of the town, surrounded by trenches and wagons, to await the arrival of Prince Wishniowiecki, who had sent a courier to announce his arrival with 6,000 men. Khmelnitskywas Continuallybeing informed as to the movements and composition of Wish- niowiecki’s army, which was swelling rapidly with Catholic and Jewish refugees. Having taken over most of the left bank Ukraine as his property the Prince ruled his possessions as an absolute monarch and by 1647 his vast holdings consisted of 38,460 households!¹⁵ Khmelnitskywas now in a dangerous sit­uation. His force was too weak to attack Potockis dug-in army, and with Wishniowieckis arrival he would be greatly outnum­bered, attacked on two fronts, and annihilated.

Time was of the essence, and Khmelnitsky acted quickly. He first sent word through his network to have every boat on the Dnipro River destroyed to prevent the Prince from crossing to the west. Next, Khmelnitsky turned his attention to Potockis positions. His spies were keeping him abreast of developments in the Polish camp and he now learned that the Poles were in a great state of apprehension, believing that the Cossack and Tatar forces were much larger than they actually were. After all, how else could Szemberg have been defeated so completely, with just a single survivor? Khmelnitskypaid a great deal of attention to intelligence gathering, and he knew that Potocki would do the same. Towards the evening a Polish scouting party captured a Cossack “but” or translator and brought him back for ques­tioning. When interrogated under torture he at first refused to talk, but eventually “broke down” and “revealed” that Khmel­nitsky was on his way with a force of 15,000 regular Cossacks, supported by 40,000 Tatar cavalry led by Tughay Bey of Pere­kop. The “but” also volunteered the information that the Cos­sacks were damming the Stebliv River to deprive the Poles of drinking water. When Potocki was brought news that the river level was indeed falling, the “but s” Credibilitywas confirmed.

A council was convened by Potocki, where it was decided not to risk annihilation at the hands of what was obviously a much superior enemy force. The next day the Polish army began to pull out towards Bohuslav along the Ros River, protected by 8 rows of wagons but only 12 pieces of artillery since most of the guns had to be left behind. This is what Khmelnitsky was waiting for. The only way out which Potocki was allowed to take led through a heavily wooded ravine, the Horokh Woods, where the 6,000 man Polish army would be strung out in a long line. As the Polish rear entered the depression the advance units found their path blocked by great tree trunks which had been dragged across the road, and the Korsun Cossack regiment com­manded by Maksim Krivonos (“Crooked Nose”) lying in wait.¹⁶ At the given signal Cossack infantry emerged from the ambush pouring volleys of musket and artillery fire into the massed Pol­ish file, and with sabers and pike charged the enemy. Hemmed in and unable to deploy their forces, the Polish army was trapped, unable to bring into play its artillery. The battle lasted the whole day at the end of which Potocki s army was all but destroyed. Only Prince Koretsky managed to fight his way out

The multi-barrel handheld Cossack “ozhiha ” 17th century. Ignited by fuses, the barrels could be discharged either individually or in sequence, usually at close range. Ukrainian Cossack regiments rou­tinely faced armored cavalry and infantry and relied heavily on fire­power (Ukrainian National Museum, Kyiv).

with half of his cavalry regiment and reach Kyiv.¹⁷ Much needed military equipment and supplies fell into Cossack hands. The spoils of war were very rich since many of the high nobility had brought fine table settings, silverware, expensive clothing and other personal valuables, expecting the expedition against the “rabble” to be something of an outing. Bohdan Khmelnitsky himself was given 13 Ioadedwagons by the Cossacks as his share of the spoils. Both Polish Hetmans Potocki and Kalinovski were wounded and many officers and over 1,000 soldiers were taken prisoner and handed over to the Tatars as part of their spoils of war. In fact the Tatar cavalry had played a minor role in the cramped quarters of the battle, where “the barrel of a gun almost reached the other (enemy) side” as recounted by a surviving Polish musketeer. 520 soldiers and 60 officers were able to buy their freedom on the spot, while the remaining prisoners were brought to the Crimea with the Polish Hetmans who were each held for a ransom of20,000 pieces of gold. Some of the Polish troops were Greek Orthodox Rusins who expressed a wish to join Khmelnitsky, while those who did not were allowed to go free. With the exception of the debacle at Tsutsora against the Turks this was the greatest defeat suffered by Polish Common­wealth arms to date and sent Warsaw into a panic.