The Donbas

A common view expressed in conversations was that in the Donbas sup­port for separatism was small, but the population there had proved easy to manipulate because it was passive, politically indifferent, and pater- nalistically minded.

A number of comments cited sociological surveys of the region and the population’s political preferences (Holovakha, Stiazhkina, Zakharov).⁶ According to these surveys, throughout the Donbas as a whole, 20% of people held pro-Ukrainian views, 30% pro-Russian, and the rest were simply not interested in the issues. However, out of the 30% who stated

The Euromaidan, Revolution, and War With Russia 155 they were for integration with Russia, only 3-4% showed a readiness to act in pursuit of this integration, which they defined variously in cultural, political, economic, or linguistic terms. The rest of the population was confused or indifferent.

It was also pointed out that the region was very differentiated. Many areas had in previous centuries been settled by Ukrainians, while some areas of Luhansk had originally been settled by Russians. Some of these last areas, such as the one once settled by the Don Cossack Army, were 80% pro-Putin. These areas had most readily accepted what was described as “the syndrome of loss, humiliation, and phantom pain caused by imperial dismemberment.” People in other sections of the Donbas had developed a “Stockholm syndrome,” meaning that they had become the hostages of gangs, and were defending and even collaborating with these as a survival strategy. It was generally felt that the imperialist spirit was artificially supported by Russian propaganda and media coverage, and that even a short dosage of balanced reporting made an enormous differ­ence.

Zhadan, who himself is from Luhansk and whose recent novel Voroshi- lohrad (the name of the city of Luhansk in Soviet times) is now available in English and is being made into a film, offered the following comment:

I believe that the Donbas will return, and Crimea too. I am not a politician and do not want to make predictions as to when this might happen or how, but I am sure they will return because, well, look, I am from Luhansk. I continually visited it [in the past] and still go there frequently, and I simply do not see the territory as a separate politico-economic and socio-cultural community of some kind. Of course, there are specific attitudes there, and much has changed in the last year. They are being constantly pumped with propaganda, and the mood has shifted toward radicalization, but I am sure that all this will end in the same way as the partitioning of Germany ended. The wall will come down and Ukrainians from east and west will meet on the wall, embrace one another and wonder why they spent so much time fighting each another.

(Zhadan)

Olena Stiazhkina, the president of the now exiled Donetsk University (it has been transferred to Vinnytsia), who is herself of Russian origin and from the Donbas, spoke extensively of the Donbas identity or, more pre­cisely, of attempts to create it:

Is there a separate Donetsk identity? The Kremlin worked for twenty years to create one, continually raising the question and try­ing to make people ask it. They put colossal sums into organizing

conferences devoted to the “regional” identity, into the Party of Regions, into developing regional symbols and signs. Today we have all become wise with hindsight and can say that this all began in the mid-1990s, around 1995-96. An obvious trend appeared at the time toward growing the Donetsk identity, nurturing and discussing it. Over the ensuing years the process waxed and waned; at times it came to a halt, only to be revived again.

To the external world, to the world outside the Donbas, this Don­bas identity was broadcast as a reality. Without a doubt I believe that Yanukovych was supposed to personify it. He was supposed to show all Ukraine the disgusting type of person who lives in Eastern Ukraine. There was no need to do that, to demonize the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. One could have found a more acceptable figure to push into the presidency. They had enough money and the “technolo­gies” to do that, but the choice fell precisely on him. The idea was to associate him with the region, so that when Russia began its aggres­sion they could say: “This is our identity, these are our people.” And the response from Ukrainians would be: “Okay, leave us, thanks, but we do not need this kind of person.” Was this done deliberately? I am convinced it was.

(Stiazhkina)