The Ukrainian Orientation

The Ukrainian orientation provides a counter-position to this view. In its cruder version, it has produced narratives that describe a proto-Ukrainian people arriving on the territory over a thousand years ago, sometimes in alliance with tribes from Asia who crossed the Carpathians and then formed the Hungarian nation.

However, there are more sophisticated versions of the Ukrainian ori­entation. One has been presented by Vincent Shandor, an official in the Carpatho-Ukrainian state with responsibility for liaison with Prague. He has provided extensive documentation to show that at the end of the First World War, the Rusyn-Ukrainian population was strongly opposed to joining Hungary and accepted the idea of becoming part of a federated Czechoslovakia when the terms of the 1919-20 Peace Conference offered it autonomy, a legislative assembly (Diet), and representation in the Prague parliament (Shandor 1997, 23). Hungary’s interwar revisionist move­ment refused to accept losing its territories, including Carpatho-Ukraine. According to Shandor, during the interwar period, an unremitting strug­gle took place on the territory between two distinct cultural movements,

which he describes as “the populist” and “the Muscophile” (ibid., 44). The former included most of those who considered themselves Rusyns or Rusyn-Ukrainians, while the latter was artificially foisted upon the popu­lation by both Czech and Hungarian officials and by some politicians who wished to divide or blunt the development of a Rusyn-Ukrainian movement for autonomy (ibid., 44).

The first prime minister of Carpatho-Ukraine, Andrii Brodii, was arrested by Czech authorities for leaking secret information to Hungary. On 26 November, he was officially replaced by a Ukrainophile admin­istration headed by Monsignor Avgustyn Voloshyn (Augustin Volosin), a Catholic priest. Three weeks later at the Vienna Arbitration, Hungary obtained the economically most developed area in the south, includ­ing the capital Uzhhorod and the towns of Mukachevo and Berehovo.⁶ Many in the Hungarian community were elated. However, they had lived in a democratic Czechoslovakia for twenty years and would soon show apprehension toward their new rulers. The Hungarian administration immediately began closing Ukrainian schools and cultural institutions (ibid., 76). Avhustyn Shtefan, an attorney who had in 1918 served the Hungarian government, wrote on 12 October 1938 in the newspaper Lidove Noviny:

Since 1919 much has changed in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The youth feel Ruthenian and are nationalists. The young generation admits that the Czecho-Slovak state has given the land a lift in every respect. The Czecho-Slovak state has rectified the injustices committed by the Hungarian regime. If the Hungarians love us, as they constantly assert, then let the Pest [Hungarian] propaganda leave us in peace.

(quoted in ibid., 76)

The Carpatho-Ukrainian administration was moved to the small town of Khust, which “overnight became an international strategic and politi­cal arena” (ibid., 1997, 86). In the months that followed, both the Hun­garian and Polish governments conducted subversive operations which involved sabotage and shootings.

The War for Carpatho-Ukraine in 1938-39 103 reports in the Polish press that Soviet-style collective farms had been set up and that the population was demonstrating against its government (Shandor 1997, 91). However, throughout this period, the population remained remarkably loyal both to the Carpatho-Ukrainian state and to the Czechoslovakian federation. In the election of 12 February 1939, which the government in Khust treated as a plebiscite on autonomy, of the 284,365 eligible voters, 243,557 cast ballots of support and only 19,645 voted against the list of candidates (ibid.,1997, 143).

After keeping the Ukrainian card in play for over a year, during which time he dropped hints that a Greater Ukraine might be created, Hitler allowed Hungary to invade Carpatho-Ukraine. The American journal­ist Robert Parker asked Hungary’s Prime Minister Count Pal Teleki in March 1939 whether Germany had agreed to let Hungary take over the territory. The Prime Minister answered: “We were told to go ahead. [...] It was the price Hitler paid for the right to talk with Stalin.” The Fuhrer, he explained, sent word to Stalin that this action proved that Germany no longer had any designs on Ukraine. The “inclusion of the territory in Hungary, abandonment of the Ukraine militia, and dispersion of the local government showed Russia had nothing to fear from him” (Parker 1944, 90-91; quoted in Shandor 1997, 95-96).

Several scholars have supported the idea that Hitler toyed with the idea of using Carpatho-Ukraine as a Piedmont for the creation of a Greater Ukraine.

Germany refuses to support Hungary’s claim to Ruthenia, or any change that would give Hungary and Poland a common frontier. She does not want her way eastward barred by neutral nations nor to make it easy for Poland and Hungary to support one another in the future.

The Ukrainian population of Poland at the time held mass demonstra­tions in support of Carpatho-Ukraine. Fearing the growing restiveness of its own Ukrainian population, Warsaw lobbied Berlin for the establish­ment of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier that would eliminate the

autonomous state. Poland was also concerned that hundreds of Ukraini­ans were illegally making their way to join the Carpathian Sich militia that was being organized by the OUN.

Shandor has written: “In my opinion, Carpatho-Ukraine, and along with it the overall Ukrainian issue at that time, played a decisive role in Hitler’s political plans. Hitler was trying to decide whether he should deliver his first blow at the East or at the West” (Shandor 1997, 134). The German leader, in other words, was using the Ukrainian card to play states off against one another. In the end, “by ceding Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary, Hitler satisfied both Stalin and Poland, relieving both of them of the dangerous specter of the Ukrainian problem” (ibid., 135).

Carpatho-Ukraine had almost no options. The Vienna Arbitration had removed its southern territory, so that now the main railway line passed through Hungary. This allowed the latter to block exports of timber and salt, the main earner of foreign currency. Germany, which purchased most of these imports, failed to provide any economic or political help, despite Khust’s appeals and attempts to ingratiate itself with Berlin by introducing a single-party system (which included repre­sentation from minorities).