Ukraine Besieged: The Pereiaslav Agreement with the Tsar of Muscovy

The victory at Batih did little to relieve the pressure on the Cossacks. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had not run out of resources and Jan Casimir was raising another army to occupy Ukraine.

The King’s spies were also bringing news of discontent which was brewing among some of the Cossack colonels and rank-and-file, directed against Khmelnitsky s increasing author­ity and his apparent refusal to take direction from Cossack rank- and-file “radas.” A particularly sore point was Timyshs defeat in Moldavia, which was blamed on his incompetence, a serious Cossack offense. The defeat had also brought about Timyshs death, and was a major setback for Khmelnitsky s foreign policy to form a Danubian Orthodox-Protestant alliance with Mol­davia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. The coalition, which was intended to outflank Polish forces in Galicia and other territories bordering Ukraine, was to involve members friendly to the Ottoman Empire.

His Grace the Hospodar rode out to welcome this unwanted son, with Their Graces the lords Boyars and an army of 8,000. His Grace the Hospodar was accompanied by six youths handsomely dressed in the Turkish style, and a cavalcade in rich dress.... Timysh also approached with 3,000 troops of the Zaporozhian Army. Although it is said that they were especially selected, they had a very paltry (ragtag) appearance. His Grace the Hospodar made a speech before him (Timysh) expressing joy at his arrival. Yet he did not utter even half a word in response, but only bit his lips and stood as if he were a graven image, or under a magic spell. Vihovsky answered for him.... Master Timysh had a caval­cade of 9 horses, meager and thin. Two of the saddles were costly: one was sown with pearls and the other was richly em-

broidered in gold. He himself wore a crimson satin mantle and a velvet robe lined with sable—but they did not fit him.... He is a tall young man, pockmarked and rather strong and clumsy... most of his men were dressed as rabble.¹

The wedding was celebrated in great style befitting a royal princess. It was attended by representatives from Prince Ra- koczi II OfTransylvania, the Hospodar Matei Basarab of Wal­lachia, and other Danubian nobility.

Khmelnitsky s newly acquired ally was not very popular with his own people and quickly proved to be a burden. It seems the Moldavian ruler had plans of his own when he agreed to the Cossack alliance, one which would unravel Khmelnitsky s policy. The rulers of Wallachia and Transylvania now turned against Lupu claiming he had aggressive intensions against them. He was overthrown by Wallachian and Transylvanian armies, and his minister Gheorge Stepan was crowned as the new Hospodar of Moldavia. Lupu fled when his men refused to fight, and Khmelnitsky soon received an urgent message beg­ging for assistance. He responded by sending Timysh at the head of 8,000 battle-hardened Cossacks who in 12 days were in Moldavia on the Jijia River.

Timysh soon received news that 30,000 Moldavians, Wal- Iachians, Hungarians and German mercenary troops were bar­ring his advance on Jassy and he quickly established a defensive wagon “tabor” position, surrounded by a trench and earthen ramparts. On 1 May the enemy infantry began to form up for an assault, and Timysh ordered that half of his men conceal themselves in the trenches while the remaining took positions before the wagons in full view of the enemy. Thinking that they were opposed by a small force, the massed coalition infantry began to advance on the Cossack camp, expecting an easy vic­tory. Allowing the enemy to approach well within range the Cossacks opened up with the usual volleys of musket fire and cannon grapeshot from both the wagons and the trenches.

... it is clear that all this danger and the similar calamities that the Kingdom of Poland is now suffering.... This danger has now increased even more with the victory of the Cossacks (“rebels”) in Moldavia, where 10,000 Cossacks easily defeated, in an initial attack, the 30,000 troops of Rakoczi (Transylvania), the Hospo­dar OfWallachia (Basarab) and the new Hospodar of Moldavia.²

The Cossacks could march into Galicia and Poland Minor, where they would be joined by rebellious serfs.

The Polish government also found itself in the unusual situation of having Lupu, its ally, being rescued by its enemy, Khmelnitsky. It reacted by sending the anti-Lupu coalition mil­itary support, while the Sultan offered Lupu and Timysh sym­bolic help, but refraining from interfering in the conflict. Fol­lowing the Cossack victory Timysh and Lupu advanced into Wallachia, laying all to waste.

Attempts by the Wallachian Hospodar Basarab to block the advance failed as in three successive battles his army was driven off the field by Timysh s Cossacks and Moldavian allies. Towards the end of May, after a seven day march Timysh and Lupu with some Greek units which had joined them reached the market town of Tirgovishte (Torgovishche), where they were Confrontedby a combined Wallachian and Transylvanian army reinforced by a Polish regiment and German and Serbian mercenaries. Here Timysh committed a serious strategic blunder which would spell his defeat.

The Cossack and Moldavian army was met before Tirgo- vishte by Basarab s 9,000 man detachment at the Milcov River near Fochani.

It was Timysh who would flee the field and leave many of his men behind. Inexplicably he had divided his army by sepa­rating the cavalry from the infantry, and when a successful Mol­davian attack was beginning to push the enemy back he failed to follow through with a Cossack charge. This would have bro­ken the enemy lines and led to the destruction of Basarab s army.

The tactical error was seized upon by the Polish regiment, which launched an attack on the unprotected Cossackinfantry and drove it back into camp with heavy losses. Timysh was losing control of the situation and became indecisive with the Cossacks calling out “tell us clearly—do we attack or entrench ourselves?” At that moment, a heavy spring downpour with hail Struckthe Cossackmusketeers rendering their weapons useless, while Basarab s men who had kept their powder dry began pour­ing volleys of fire into those Cossacks who still remained on the field. The contemporary Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin has left us with a detailed record of the battle.

These were the reasons HospodarMatei (Basarab) won such a victory, one unlike he had ever known in his life, however many battles he had fought. For who could have imagined that the enemy’s army could rout the Cossack army and its camp? What could match the Cossacks’ cannon barrage? It will be said that Hospodar Matei had with him not only the Wallachians but also Serbs, Hungarians, and Poles. True as that was, the Poles were few. What could they have done if order in the Cossack army had been the way it usually was? As marksmen the siemens (infantry) recruited among the Serbs and Hungarians—there were no Wal­lachian recruits—were no match for the Cossacks: nor could the Moldavian infantry troops match their Cossack counterparts.

Setting aside divine will and speaking only from the human point of view, I believe that Hospodar Matei’s victory on the Hinta was the result of Timyshs poor judgment on the one hand, and on the other of Matei’s courage, and the former was undoubtedly more significant. For had the Cossack army engaged in battle as a single military camp rather than in the three parts into which Timysh separated it, and inflicted a barrage in unison, then no matter how courageous Matei might have been, he could not have escaped disaster: his siemens would not have been able to withstand Cossack fire for long, and Matei himself would have been killed or wounded. Fully to blame was the foolhardiness of Timysh, who would not heed any advice or consult with his colonels or anyone else. Just think of an army exhausted from a march, being obliged to go into battle that same day, its camp di­vided into three parts, and you will understand why the battle took the course it did.

In Timysh s absence, the trapped infantry quickly elected a new leadership and during the night withdrew from the battlefield. Miron Costin continues his account of the events. To his amaze­ment:

Nobodywould have thought that the infantry would be able to rescue themselves after the Cavalryhad abandoned them, but in calamity the Cossacks have a strange nature! After all their offi­cers and the hetman (Miron means Timysh) himself had fled, they elected a chief (“capu”) from among themselves, closed the train (wagon “tabor”), and defended themselves until evening. During the night they set fire to the wagons and the bush. Then all together, to a man, they marched on foot, without any discord at all, until they arrived here (in Moldavia).³

Not all Cossacks who survived the battle managed to escape and those taken prisoner were killed on Basarabs orders.

Once out of reach of the enemy and rejoined by Timysh the Cossacks rested for a week, tended to their weapons and left for Ukraine, while Roxanda and her mother sought refuge in the Suceava castle. Responding to the pleas of Lupu, who had joined Timysh in Chihirin, Khmelnitsky decided to send his son on a second expedition to Moldavia to relive Suceava which was being besieged by a 25,000 man Polish, Wallachian, and Moldavian army, and by the end of August, with 8,000 Cos­sacks Timysh had established a fortified camp by the castle walls. Not content to remain on the defensive the Cossacks took every opportunity to harass and attack the enemy, as recounted by Paul of Aleppo who was in the Moldavian CapitalJassy at the time:

Every day Timysh sorties against his enemies... no one could withstand his great courage. He shot from his bow with either his right hand or his left, slashed with his saber, and fired his shoul­der gun (musket) from under the horse’s belly.... He was such an excellent rider that no one could hit him, with a bullet or any other weapon.⁴

This was an interesting observation on Cossack cavalry fighting techniques. The bow was still an effective weapon against men without armor, delivering a rapid rate of fire which in the hands of skilled marksmen could cause much damage. The siege lasted until early October, by which time the Cossacks were running out of food, water, and fodder for horses, many of which had to be slaughtered to avoid starvation. Then Timysh was hit by artillery fire either directly or by a wooden splinter, and six days later he was dead. Electing a new com­manding hetman the Cossacks decided to Surrenderwhen they were offered free passage from their camp. The main reason for the offer was that unknown to them, Hetman Khmelnitskyhad finally sent a strong force to relieve the siege, and was only several days away. True to form the Polish command broke its promise and attacked the Cossacks when they were in the open and had left their camp, but the assault was beaten back with heavy Polish losses. Some 4,000 Cossacks managed to get away and join the relieving force but about the same number perished in the fighting. The elected commander Fedorovich who had Successfullyled the Cossacks from their camp expressed criti­cism of the whole operation and was ordered by Khmelnitsky to be executed, supposedly because he had helped himself to some ofTimyshs possessions. The real reason was that the crit­icism found widespread agreement among the rank-and file who approached Khmelnitskywith their atamans and captains “very rudely,” accusing him of favoritism towards his son, “and it would appear if the hetman said only a slight word to them in anger I expected that there would have been a great calamity as recounted by Colonel Syluian Muzhylovsky.”⁵ Timysh s body was buried on the family ranch at Subotiv where he was born and had spent his early youth.

Khmelnitskyhad lost his potential Danubian allies, who were now orienting themselves towards the Polish Common­wealth, and Ukraine found itself literally facing hostile powers on all sides. The Sultan had failed to intervene on Lupus and Khmelnitsky’s behalf (Transylvania and Wallachia were also his dependencies), the Tatars were showing signs of hostility, and the Commonwealth had signed a peace treaty with Mus­covy. To make matters worse the Black Death made its first ap­pearance in Ukraine and was taking a heavy toll of Cossack numbers. The Cossacks found themselves in dire straits, and once again Khmelnitsky turned to the Moscow Tsar with a pro­posal for an alliance. At first the idea had found little support with the ruling strata of Muscovy who had been watching the Ukrainian revolution and the rise of Cossackpowerwith some unease. The “Time of Trouble” was still fresh in their minds, particularly the role played by Cossacks. Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the Cossack administration, on the other hand, were be­ginning to feel the need of a monarch to legitimize Ukraine’s international position, and above all to receive military support. Not only did Ukraine not have a royal ruler or a feudal nobility, it did not even possess state institutions, which had disappeared with the Rus state. All sovereignty was vested in the Zaporo- zhian Army—the rank-and-file and the officers’ “rada” coun­cils—with an elected Hetman as the supreme commander. The Ukrainian revolutionary movement found itself isolated, and did not even have the support of the Greek Orthodoxhierarchy in Kyiv.

Religion had played a big part in the uprising and contin­ued to do so, but the Kyiv Metropolitan and the Church re­garded the Cossacks with suspicion if not with a measure of hostility. The Metropolitanate was still imbued with the order of medieval Rus, its class-based state institutions and legal system while the Cossack administration (in spite of the nobles present in its ranks) oriented itself towards commoners such as rank-and-file Cossacks, peasants, and town burghers. Also, there was a physical and a symbolic separation between the Metropolitan’s seat in princely Kyiv and Khmelnitsky’s Cossack steppe fortification of Chihirin (where he was born) as the cen­ter of his administration. The Greek Orthodoxhierarchy owed its existence to Hetman Sahaidachny who had secretly re­instated the ecclesiastical leadership in 1620 protected by his Cossacks, and with the ascent of Wladyslav IV to the throne in 1632 the Orthodox Church had become legal when the Coro­nation Sejm ratified his document entitled “Measures for the Accommodation of Citizens of the Greek Faith,” and the Or­thodox nobility obtained a similar right by the “Accommoda­tion of the Rus Nation.” The Metropolitan of Kyiv, Isaia Kop in­ski, who had been installed by Colonel Demian Harbuz (“Pumpkin”) and his Cossacks, was arrested by the nobility’s candidate Petro Mohila (Movila), following his confirmation as Metropolitan in 1633 which took place with great pomp in Lviv. Mohila was the son of the Moldavian Prince who was found to be unacceptable to the Turkish Sultan and had to seek refuge in Poland. A learned man, having studied in western uni­versities such as Paris and Oxford, he gave up a military career and entered the Orthodox Church. Togetherwith the magnate Adam Kisil, Mohila would lead the Orthodox nobility’s anti­Cossack royal establishment until his death in 1647. His ambi­tions became Iegendaryin folk culture as illustrated by a poem following his death: “Mohila’s body is in the grave; his soul soars somewhere in heaven, For him, the world both here and there will be too small.”⁶ (The lines are based on a pun, since “mohila” in Ukrainian means “grave.”) With Khmelnitsky’s uprising, the tension between the Cossacks and the Church became tense (even though many priests supported the people), leading a Cossack Colonel FedirVeshniak to exclaim to the Polish royal commissioners in 1649 in somewhat blunt but colorful lan­guage: “...both your priests and our priests are all sons-of- whores!”⁷ Mohila’s SuccessorMetropolitan Sylvester Kosov and the Church hierarchy sided with the Commonwealth nobility and at times had to be protected by Khmelnitsky’s men from the Cossack commoners, peasants, and town burghers. The Metropolitan considered the Church to be a state institution, particularly after KingJan Casimir’s proclamation of 31 August 1651, which (at least in theory) extended royal protection to the Orthodox clergy.⁸

In spite of the lack of support from the Orthodox Church the Ukrainian revolution was sweeping southern Rus. With the great increase in the size of the Cossack army, direct democracy and decision-making became unwieldy and were raising security issues since it was known that the king had his spies in the Cossack camp. Also, the lack of a central and effective mil­itary leadership had been a reason for the failures of the earlier Cossack and peasant uprisings, and Khmelnitsky had decided to both expand intelligence gathering and to concentrate mili­tary strategy and decision making into his own hands. Most Cossacks were not opposed to strong and effective leadership— during a campaign the elected commander’s authority was ab­solute—and by the time of the victory at Batih, Khmelnitsky had ceased to even call the officers’ “rada.” Cossacks captured at Pochaiv in May 1651 admitted that “Khmelnitsky never took counsel, either with the officers or with the rank-and-file. And so he rules, together with Vyhovsky.”⁹ In fact Khmelnitskywas planning to convert the hetman’s position into a hereditary monarch-like institution, justified by Patriarch Paisios’ decla­ration in Kyiv where he, the Hetman, was addressed as “Illus- trissimus Princeps” (illustrious Prince). His defeats of the pow­erful Polish-Lithuanian armies had given Khmelnitsky great prestige bestowing on him the authority to rule by divine right, by “The Grace of God,” since only He could have granted such great victories. Khmelnitsky’s given name, Zinovy, by which he was christened, was almost never used and people called him

Bohdan, or God Given.¹⁰ His colonels referred to him in letters as the “most illustrious,” he who was “ordained by God,” and just before his death in 1657 he was signing letters as “Dux” (Duke).

Khmelnitsky also faced the problem of legitimacy in the international arena. The beginning of the Ukrainian revolution coincided with the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648, which brought to an end the ThirtyYears^jWarbetween Catholics and Protestants. It was a historic landmark and transformed Europe into a continent of independent states to be ruled legitimately Onlybytitled monarchs. Thus the democratic Swiss federation gained independence by placing itself under the nominal rule of the Hapsburg monarchs, and Khmelnitsky would have rec­ognized the difficulty Ukraine was in as he had diplomats on his general staff such as Colonel Pavlo Teteria, who had extensive legal training.¹¹ By 1653 any accommodation with the King of Poland was out of the question and swearing allegiance to a foreign but Orthodox Christian Tsar would fulfill interna­tional requirements, to have Ukrainian independence recog­nized by the ruling monarchs of Europe.

On 11 October 1653 Tsar Alexei convened the Zemsky Sobor (“Assembly of the Land”) to seek advice on the Ukrainian Cossack (“Cherkasian”) question. The assembly agreed that the time was ripe to accept the Zaporozhian Army “under the Tsar’s high hand,” and on 2 November the Tsar cancelled his treaty with KingJan Casimir and declared war on the Com­monwealth. It was agreed that Tsar Alexei was to send envoys to Pereiaslav to discuss terms with the Cossacks and to conduct what Moscow was expecting to be the swearing of oaths. The Tsar was seeking desperately needed revenue while Khmel­nitsky needed military support as the situation had become critical. Casimir had again gathered an army to move into Ukraine with the intention to occupy all the territory up to the Dnipro River, and he was again supported by the Crimean Khan. Three armies now faced each other in Podilia: the king entrenched close to Kamianets, Khmelnitsky camped some eight miles away, and the khan who had advanced to within five miles of the Cossack camp. For a payment of40,000 “zloty” by Poland and a promise of future tribute Khan Islam Giray de­clared that he was ready “to bring the Cossacks to their former obedience” to the Polish state as was signed in the Zboriv Agree­ment. Faced with the danger of being encircled by two enemy armies, Khmelnitsky withdrew, and headed towards Bar.

On IOJanuary 1654 the Tsar s mission arrived in Pereiaslav led by Vasili Buturlin and was met by Church and Cossack dig­nitaries with a 600 man honor guard under Colonel Teteria. A general “rada” was called by Khmelnitsky, as described in the records of a Muscovite diplomatic report:

After the council that the hetman had with the colonels in the morning they beat the drums for about an hour at two in the af­ternoon so that the populace would gather to listen to what was to be. A great multitude of people of all ranks assembled and a large circle was formed for the hetman and the colonels. Then the hetman himself came out beneath the “bunchuk” (horse-tail standard) and with him the judges, “osauls” (aides-de-camp), the chancellor (secretary) and all the colonels. The hetman stood in the center of the circle, and the “osauls” of the (Cossack) Army ordered everyone to be silent. When they quieted down, the het­man began to speak to the people.

Master colonels, osauls, captains, and the whole Zaporozhian Army and all Orthodox Christians. It is known to you all how God delivered us from the hand of the enemies who are perse­cuting Gods Church and wronging all Christian folk of our East­ern Orthodoxy. For six years we have been living in our land without a ruler, in perpetual wars and bloodshed with our perse­cutors and enemies, who wish to extirpate God’s Church so that the Rusian name will not even be mentioned in our land. This has greatly aggrieved us all and we see that we can no longer live without a tsar (ruler). That is why we have today convened a public council for all the people so that you may choose one of four rulers for yourselves, whomever you wish.¹²

Khmelnitsky then proceeded to list the Ottoman Sultan, the Crimean Khan, the Polish King, and the Orthodox Ruler of “Great Rus,” the last clearly being the preferred choice.

After the general “rada” approved Khmelnitsky s recom­mendation to accept the Tsar’s “rule” the hetman and the officers returned to the Muscovite envoys, where in a prepared speech Buturlin presented Khmelnitskywith a letter from the Tsar. All made their way to the church where oaths on the Bible and the cross were to be sworn. Khmelnitsky then asked that the Muscovites swear first to uphold Cossack rights and privi­leges, but to his surprise Buturlin answered that this was not possible. In the entire state of Muscovy it was the subjects who swore to serve the Tsar—but to swear on his behalf, that has never existed and shall never be. And it was even unseemly to speak of such a thing! On the other hand, if the Hetman and the entire ZaporozhianArmywere to swear Ioyaltyto the Great Sovereign, then undoubtedly they should benefit from his bless­ings and protection.

Not satisfied with Buturlin’s answer, Khmelnitsky with­drew to a neighboring building to consult with his senior colonels while the delegates stayed in the church to await his decision. After several hours, colonels Teteria and Listnitsky arrived to demand once more that Buturlin swear on behalf of the Tsar, and again received the same answer: “it has never been that subjects swore on behalf of the Tsar; subjects only swore to the Tsar.” When the colonels pointed out that Polish kings always swore to their subjects, Buturlin answered that Polish kings could not serve as an example: not only were they heretics (not Greek Orthodox Christians) but they did not hold power on their own (not born as kings), but were elected. And besides, they never kept their oaths anyway.¹³ When Colonel Teteria de­clared that the officers believed the Tsar’s promises were im­mutable but this was not necessarily the case with the rank- and-file, he was answered it was the colonels’ job to explain this to the Cossacks. Khmelnitsky and the officers had little choice but to accept Buturlin s answer and agreed to swear loyalty and service to the Tsar. The hetman took the precaution to send his envoy Herasym Lobachevsky to the Don Cossacks to explain his allegiance and to seek their support.

This, at least, is the story as recorded later in Moscow in Buturlins state report to the Tsar, and at best is a selective version of what occurred. There are no written Ukrainian ac­counts or other documents relating to the famous 1654 PereiaslavAgreement—at least none that have survived, which in itself is strange given its claimed importance. Did Buturlin give unauthorized verbal assurances to the Cossacks in order to secure an agreement? Probably. There is no doubt that loyalty was sworn to the Muscovite Tsar, since when spring came we know that the Tsar s officials came to administer the oath and carry out a census for tax purposes, assisted by local Cossack officers. Based on the results there were at least 117 towns and cities and 127,000 “individuals” (family households) half Cos­sacks and half town burghers, although these results are Certainlyincomplete. The Muscovite “voivodas” (military ad­ministrators) who came down had little respect for the people and made a poor impression, being described as “by their nature arrogant and uncouth in every manner,” for in their country they do not have any good education.” To nail things down, a 23-point “petition” was prepared by the Cossacks during the winter and brought to the Tsar in March by Cossack envoys. The document is of interest, since it not only is a list of what they expected to get out of the PereiaslavAgreement but also provides us with a virtually complete description of what the Cossacks, as a whole, considered to be important, and helps us understand their own self-conception. They knew that Cossack Ukraine was very different from Muscovy, and were anxious that these differences be recognized and accepted by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich as the new monarch of the country.

We, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, and the whole Christian Rusian community make obeisance (bow) to the ground to the great sovereign, Tsar and Grand PrinceAlexeiMikhailovich, autocrat of all Major (“Great”) and Minor (“Little”) Rus, sovereign and possessor of many states, by the grace of God.... May it please Your Majesty to show your favor and grace in all that which our envoys will be making obei­sance from us to your Tsarist Majesty.

1. To confirm the military rights and privileges, “as has been in ages past in the Zaporozhian Army, which was judged by its own laws and had its own liberties in the courts, so that neither voivoda nor boyar nor master of the table in­terfere in the military courts, but that the men be judged by their officers. Where three men are Cossacks, two should try the third.”

2. “That the Zaporozhian Ukrainian Army always have the full complement in the number of60,000.”

3. “The nobility... may it retain its liberties and elect offi­cers from among its members for court offices, and hold its properties and liberties as it was under the Polish Kings. The land and castle courts are to be administered by those officials who they themselves will voluntarily elect as it was previously. Also, those nobles who had their money in fortresses and properties, may that money be paid to them now or may they be allowed to remain on the given properties for the allotted time.”

4. “That worthy officials be elected from among our people in the towns, who would govern or administer the sub­jects of Your Tsarist Majesty, and honestly submit the due (tax) income to the treasury of Your Tsarist Majesty.”

5. “As the Chihirin Starosta district with all appartenances was granted for the hetman s mace (authority), so may it now remain for (the hetman’s) every need.”

6. “... may the Zaporozhian Army itself elect a hetman from among themselves and inform His Tsarist Majesty.”

7. “That no one confiscate Cossack properties. May those who have lands, freely dispose of all profits (income) from those lands. And may widows of surviving Cossacks and their children have the same liberties as their ancestors and parents.” (This had to be stressed, since personal ownership of property was not guaranteed in Muscovy, where the Tsar and the Church owned most of the land.)

8. “That the Chancellor (secretary) of the Army be given 1,000 gold pieces for the undersecretaries, as well as a mill for sustenance.”

9. “That each colonel be given a mill, for they also have great expenses.”

10. Also 300 gold pieces and a mill each for the judges of the Army, and 100 gold pieces for the court secretary.

11. “We also ask your Tsarist Majesty that osauls (aides-de- camp) of the army and the regiments who are always on military service and cannot plow for bread, each have a mill.”

12. “For labor concerning the artillery of the Army, for the gunners, and for all the working people in the artillery, we ask Your Tsarist Majesty’s gracious solicitude for the win­ter, in the camps. Also 400 gold pieces for the quarter­master.”

The money requested was understood to be given on an annual basis, and the request for the bombardiers and “all working peo­ple in the artillery” indicates the importance of firepower in the Cossack army.

13. “That rights granted by princes and kings in ages past to clergy and laymen alike not be violated in anyway.”

14. “That the Lord Hetman and the Zaporozhian Armybe al­lowed to receive envoys who in the past ages have been coming from foreign lands to the Zaporozhian Army, with good intentions... and if there should be anything against His Tsarist Majesty, we are to inform His Tsarist Majesty.”

15. An established sum be handed over to the tsar as “tribute” (tax), but only by a locally elected person.

16. Cossack envoys are to reach an understanding about point #15, “for a voevoda who comes from abroad would break the laws and establish some kind of (new) resolutions, and that would be met with great vexation, for people... cannot bear such (newly imposed) burdens. Ifthere are officers (“elders”) from among the local people, then they will govern accordingly to local laws and institutions.”

17. “Our envoys are to entreat earnestly that His Tsarist Majesty give us written charters, with hanging seals—one for Cossack liberties, and the other for those of the no­bles, so that they will be immutable for all times... and whoever is a Cossack will have Cossack liberty, and who­ever is a dependent peasant will render customary obedi­ence to His Tsarist Majesty, as it was previously.”

18. “They are to make mention of the Metropolitan when they negotiate, and we have given our envoys a verbal order for that.”

19. Tsar to send troops to attack Smolensk.

20. Tsar to send 3,000 or more troops to be stationed on Ukrainian border with Poland.

21. A repeat request for all Cossacks to be paid: 100 tallers for colonels, 200 ducats for each regimental osaul, 400 ducats for each army osaul, 100 ducats for each captain, and 30 ducats for each Cossack.

22. The Tatars are not to be harassed but should they (Mus­covy) be attacked, then Muscovites were to advance on them from Kazan and Astrakhan, and the Don Cossacks are also to be ready (that is, supplied with gunpowder and ammunition).

23. The 400 Cossacks who are stationed in the Kodak fortress are to be provided with food and gunpowder, as well as other Cossacks who are stationed “Down Under.”

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich responded by presenting the Cossack envoys with articles and charters which granted most of the Cossack “requests.” Ukrainian cities and towns could elect their own officials with the authority to collect taxes for local purposes, and for the Tsar’s treasury. Apart of the collected revenue was to go to pay the Zaporozhian Army as requested, with the total size of the CossackArmy set at 60,000 men. As will be seen later, the payments to the rank-and-file were never made, and the money was returned to the Tsar. Senior officers also received mills to offset expenses, while artillery bombar­diers and “artillery workers” were to be supported over the win­ter from local taxes. Cossack officers were to be elected as in the past, personal ownership of property for nobles and Cos­sacks (with inheritance rights) was recognized, and the Church Metropolitan of Kyiv was confirmed in his office with Church lands. The Tsar agreed that the Cossack hetman had the right to conduct independent (but not hostile) diplomacy, and to receive foreign envoys. TsarAlexei thus recognized Ukraine as an independent and a distinct part of his domain, which bore little resemblance to any other region in Muscovy, and the 23 points can be taken to define the political basis and status for Ukraine.¹⁴

The nature of Ukraine’s relationship with Muscovy (and later Russia) as implied by the documentation has been sub­jected to a number of different interpretations, the main view being that Ukraine entered into a vassal-like relationship with the Tsar.¹⁵ Nothing, however, could be farther from the truth. What must be distinguished are the purely formal aspects, and the substantive. Firstly, the CossackHetman was just a military commander, and as a commoner could not have become a vassal to a monarch—simply a subject. Secondly, a whole coun­try could not swear to become collective vassals, and what oc­curred in Ukraine was the Cossacks and burghers simply swore to serve the tsar. Ukraine needed a monarch for purposes of le­gitimacy, and the model for Khmelnitsky and the Cossack offi­cers was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth whereby two independent states shared a common monarch in the person of Jan Casimir, who was both the King of Poland and the Great Prince of Lithuania-Rus. A monarchy would also strengthen Cossack hegemony in Ukraine and give it a firmer legal foun­dation. That the Cossacks considered Ukraine to be independ­ent of Muscovy is further indicated by a letter sent in the summer of 1654 to Queen Christina of Sweden, who had just abdicated in favor of her cousin Charles X. “But if for any reason the Muscovite Tsar should begin a war against your Majesty then his Excellency the Zaporozhian hetman promises to be on the side of Your Royal Majesty.”¹⁶

And if at any time the Swedish monarch needed troops, the Hetman would send as many men as needed. The agree­ment with Charles X of Sweden would be reaffirmed during the invasion of Poland, when open disagreement and conflicts broke out between the Cossacks and the Muscovite command­ers. This would be but the beginning of a clash between Mus­covite authoritarianism and the Ukrainian Cossack principle of individual rights. As pointed out by the Swedish King in a letter to Hetman Khmelnitsky: “...a certain agreement (at Pereiaslav) had been concluded between the grand prince (tsar) and the Zaporozhians (of Ukraine)—but one that left the free­dom of your people whole and intact.”¹⁷

There is little doubt that the immediate and overpowering considerations for the Cossack high command were military, as without international recognition Khmelnitsky was beginning to face European support for the Polish king, which included that of the Crimean Khan. We have Hetman Khmel­nitsky’s lengthy reply to the khan, when the latter attempted to convince the hetman to break his treaty with the tsar: “Know, your majesty, that the Poles have incited not only the Germans but many other foreigners against us while we having only part of (i.e., a lesser) an army and allies favorable to us, do not wish to break our oath (with the tsar) for all time.”¹⁸

The total strength of the Ukrainian Cossack army stood at 100,000, which were needed as reserves, for border guard duty against Poland, Lithuania-Rus, and the Crimean Tatars.¹⁹ The Cossack army was finding itself in an impossible situation, caught between three fronts on the north, west, and south, and judging from Khmelnitsky’s correspondence with the Crimean Khan, it is clear that the new relations with Muscovy were in­tended to remove this threat, as they did eventually.

Directly related to Cossack vulnerability was the funda­mental mathematical fact—Ukraine was outnumbered by the overpowering populations of its hostile, aggressive neighbors. Expanding Cossack authority was imperative if the Ukrainian revolution was to succeed. The population of the regimental Bratslay Kyiy and Chernihiv provinces had reached only 1.5 million, while that of the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom stood at 11 million. While the Tatar population is not known it probably consisted of several million Nogay and other nomads, and Crimean settled dwellers. Worse still, Ukraine was losing people with entire territories annihilated by the Polish and Tatar inva­sions, and as Cossacks headed towards Zaporozhia and the lower Don River. Also, entire villages were resettling on the nearby Muscovite territories, which were becoming known as Sloboda Ukraine, where Cossacks were exempt from taxation in return for border guard duty against Tatar attacks. By declaring himself as the tsar’s vassal and ally, Khmelnitskywould have the support of Moscow s large armies to further his aim— extend Cossack authority to the Lithuanian Greek Orthodox lands ofBelarus and the western territory of Rus under the Pol­ish king, which Khmelnitsky considered as extending to the Vistula River, “where the Greekreligion and their language was and still is used.”