Genetic Fallacy
Frank Scalambrino
For this situation is nothing new. It has an infantile prototype, of which it is in fact only the continuation. For once before one has found oneself in a similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in relation to one’s parents.
One had reason to fear them, and especially one’s father; and yet one was sure of his protection against the dangers one knew. [...] In the same way, a man makes the forces of nature not simply into persons with whom he can associate [.] but he gives them the character of a father. He turns them into gods.Sigmund Freud
One commits the genetic fallacy (GnF) when advocating for a conclusion based solely on origin. This is a fallacy of relevance - irrelevance, really - because the origin of a claim may be irrelevant to its truth-value. That is to say, providing an account of the genesis of a claim, its history or origin, may be informative and helpful; however, it need not determine the truth-value of the claim. Therefore, when one draws a conclusion regarding the truth-value of a claim based solely on the origin of the claim, then one may have committed the GnF.
Like other fallacies of (ir)relevance, GnF is sometimes referred to as the “lunatic fallacy.” Colorfully, then, the fallacy is characterized by the truism: “Just because a lunatic said it, doesn’t mean it isn’t true.” Neither the origin of a claim nor the process of its genesis determines the truth-value of the
claim. Just as strong feelings of dislike for the truth of a claim do not make the claim false, strong feelings regarding a claim’s origin do not change its truth-value.
As an example, philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1970) has been influential in charging the psychoanalytic reasoning of Sigmund Freud with the GnF, especially in regard to the truth-value of psychoanalytic claims regarding religion. As the above Freud quotation from The Future of an Illusion clearly shows, Freud’s critique of religion involves tracing the genesis of religious belief for the sake of identifying a “wish” that such belief might be understood as fulfilling.
That is to say, given the manner in which, when essentially helpless, children may be said to simultaneously fear parental figures while hoping for care from them, Freud identifies such a relation as the origin of later religious belief.Though Ricoeur acknowledges that Freud’s genetic account may successfully propagate suspicion regarding religious belief and perhaps raise reasonable doubts, it does not necessitate that religious claims are false. Hence, were one to conclude in favor of atheism on the grounds of Freud’s argument, then one would be drawing a conclusion from fallacious reasoning.
Similarly, Michel Foucault’s (1995) genealogies regarding the claims upon which various societal institutions and conventions stand may also be seen in this light. That is to say, even considering knowledge and belief as social phenomena, illuminating the history upon which a social practice has emerged does not necessitate the falsehood of the principle for which it stands. In other words, though there is value in exposing political corruption, nepotism, financial favoritism, and injustice, it does not negate the truth of the claim that certain individuals whose behaviors endanger the lives of others should be restrained or confined.
Moreover, similar to the ability of Freud’s genetic accounts to provoke or incite suspicion, indicating the presence or absence of particular social practices among other historical periods or cultures may be helpful for illuminating different perspectives regarding current social practices; however, even convincingly showing the genesis of current social practices does not determine the truth-value of claims that form the foundation of such practices.
Whereas the fallaciousness of arguing for the truth of a claim regarding its origin should be straightforward in terms of logical reasoning, it is interesting to note the role of such arguments within the context of legal reasoning. For example, claiming that an unlawful action originated from a person deemed certifiably “insane” does not change the truth-value regarding how the action is identified or the fact that the action occurred; however, that a person may be deemed “not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)” does indicate the potentially mitigating force of referring to the origin of action.
In the ethical language of “means and ends” reasoning, GnF helps highlight - what many take to be - the problematic nature of the Utilitarianstyle disconnect between the justice of actions and the goodness of their consequences. In other words, some Consequentialists argue that so long as the outcome of a set of actions brings about greater good for a greater number than the pain associated with the set of actions as its means, then the outcome is good. In the same way, though an actual set of events may have conditioned some outcome such as belief in God or the institution of various social practices, there is a clear disconnect between the truth-value of the outcome and the means from which it emerged. Supposing a group of children believe they should not touch a hot stove because there is a wicked spirit in the stove who bites hands, the falsity of the origin of the belief that hot stoves shouldn’t be touched does not change the prescriptive value of the claim. In other words, even if there is not a wicked spirit in the hot stove, it does not mean children should therefore place their hands on hot stoves. Ultimately, in order to avoid this fallacy, we should not base the warrant of an argument’s conclusion solely on the origin of its concluding claim.
References
Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan. New York, NY: Vintage.
Freud, Sigmund. 1989. The Future of an Illusion, translated by J. Strachey. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1970. A Philosophical Interpretation of Freud: An Essay on Interpretation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.