Hedging

Christian Cotton

Often in intellectual conversation, we want to express ourselves clearly and forcefully. That is, we want to present the convictions of our thinking straightforwardly. This is surely an admirable desire. There are times, how­ever, when that desire leads us make claims that simply can’t be defended. In such instances, there is the temptation to preserve our position in the face of counter-evidence by weakening the initial claim. By weakening the claim, we make it harder to refute by creating indeterminacy. Hedging is that error in reasoning involving the systematic weakening of a claim - or the putting forward of an unreasonably restricted initial claim - so as to avoid refutation. Hedging occurs when a claim is systematically weakened as the dialogue proceeds in order to avoid the thrust of counter-evidence.

The defining characteristic of the hedge is the use of understatement. To understate a claim is to use words - often, though not always, weasel words - which diminish the force or content of the claim. There is nothing

inherently problematic about understatement. To be sure, it’s often the most appropriate form for a claim to take, especially on subjects about which our understanding is limited. Sometimes, our claims ought to be modest. That is not the case with hedging. Hedging uses understatement the way slippery slope (see Chapter 94) uses vagueness, begging the question (see Chapter 70) uses latency, and the straw man (see Chapter 47) uses overstatement.

Detensification involves using adverbs of degree to weaken a claim. As with understatement, the use of detensifiers isn’t problematic in itself as there may be good reason to weaken a claim. With the hedge, however, detensifiers are used to weaken the claim in order to avoid refutation without admitting the weakened claim is different from the original. Consider the following example.

Thomas: Humans are selfish by nature. Just look at how they treat each other: poverty, crime, war, commercialism, dog-eat-dog competi­tion. I swear, it seems the only thing that keeps them from wiping each other out is the heavy hand of the law that threatens them with severe punishment. And that’s just more evidence for my point: it’s their own selfish nature that keeps them aligned with the law.

John: All these things may be true, Thomas, but people still act in other-

regarding ways: charities and good Samaritans, doctors who heal, lawyers who defend the accused. So, I don’t think we can say that humans are selfish by nature.

Thomas: I can see those kinds of exceptional cases. But, that’s what they are: exceptions to the rule. So, I still say humans are basically selfish by nature.

In this example, the claim [humans are selfish by nature], when challenged, is detensified to [humans are basically selfish by nature]. Immediately, the sense of the claim is altered, although the proponent may protest that this new claim is nevertheless what he originally intended.

Qualification, the second form of understatement, involves limiting the application of a claim, making it not only weaker as a claim (because it covers fewer instances) but also more resistant to refutation. As even the novice student of logic understands, it only takes one counter-example to refute a universal or absolute statement since they admit of no exceptions. [Humans are selfish by nature] is refuted by the existence of a single unself­ish action.

Thomas: I’m telling you John, David is a totally selfish person.

John: Wait a minute. David? He’s a dedicated member of his local church,

and that means he gives a lot of his time in service.

Thomas: Well, he’s totally selfish when it comes to money. He won’t spend a dime on anyone.

John: But, he helped endow the new chair in Philosophy at the

university.

Thomas: Well, except for that he’s totally selfish about whom he gives his money to.

Here, when Thomas is challenged with counter-evidence about David’s seemingly unselfish giving of his time, he qualifies his initial claim by restrict­ing David’s selfishness to the giving of money. And again, when presented with a refuting claim about David’s philanthropy, Thomas hedges by further restricting his assertion. It should be clear that while Thomas continues to insist on the total selfishness of David, his claims have weakened in an attempt to avoid refutation by John.

The third form of understatement, substitution, can take two forms: sub­stituting contradictories for contraries and substituting weaker modalities for stronger ones. In the former, using a contradictory in place of a contrary weakens the claim by leaving open the possibility of a “grey area.” Continuing the conversation on selfishness, watch how substitution works to understate the original case.

John: Listen, Thomas, you can’t keep hedging about selfishness. First,

David is totally selfish; then he’s totally selfish when it comes to money; then he’s totally selfish about money except for this one case! Thomas: You’re right, John. But, you have to admit, he’s not a selfless per­son. I think the record is pretty clear on that.

John: There you go again, Thomas! Is there no end to your hedging

about this?!

Thomas: Fine, John. You win. Let’s just say that David can be selfish about some things.

John: By the heavens, Thomas! How pedestrian of you.

In this last exchange, we see the final way in which the hedge might be deployed, through the substitution of weaker modalities for stronger ones.

One either refines the claim in light of counter-evidence by weakening the claim and then treating the revision as though it were what one originally intended or begins with a claim whose meaning is ambiguous and can there­fore be more easily altered in light of counter-evidence without being refuted. Alternately, hedging involves using words whose meanings are ambiguous, then changing the meaning of them later. You are hedging if you refine your claim simply to avoid counter-evidence and then act as if your revised claim is the same as the original.

As with most informal fallacies, hedging can easily be avoided by accepting the counter-evidence against the initial claim and revising the claim in light of that evidence. Thomas could have turned to John, at any of the points where John showed that a claim was arguably false, and said, “Well, maybe I’m wrong. Let me think about what you’ve said and see if I can come up with a better response.” You’re not committing the fallacy if you explicitly accept the counter-evidence, admit that your original claim is incorrect, and then revise it so that it avoids that counter-evidence. This is true even if you wind up with a weakened or more restricted claim as a result. Often the truth is weaker than we’d like. Just remember that it doesn’t do to hold on to a strong claim that is false. In fact, there are no weaker claims than false claims. Temporarily retracting one’s claim until better evidence can be found is a reasonable way to save face. Plus, it provides you with more opportunity to engage in philosophical analysis.

Reference

Jason, Gary. 1988. “Hedging as a Fallacy of Language.” Informal Logic X(3): 169-175.