Special Pleading

Dan Yim

I think it is disgusting, shameful, and damaging to all things American. But if I were twenty-two with a great body, it would be artistic, tasteful, patriotic, and a progressive, religious experience.

Shelley Winters, on the topic of posing nude

One way to grasp the meaning of the special pleading fallacy is to focus on a general principle of fairness: We ought to treat individuals alike unless there is some relevant difference between them that merits the differential treatment. If there is no relevant difference between individuals, it would be unfair to treat them in dissimilar ways, especially if the differential treat­ment conferred a benefit on one, punished the other, or both.

Notice that the principle is consistent with justified differential treatment of two individuals. Different treatment can be merited if there is a relevant difference between the two that makes the differential treatment sensible. For example, suppose that a university is downsizing and is going to make redundant one of two untenured professors, and that these two professors are alike in all respects except that one has a good publication record and the other does not. The difference in publication record is justifiably a rele­vant difference that would merit differential treatment by the university’s retaining the one and terminating the other. Because the different treatment is explained by a relevant difference between the two candidates, rewarding one professor with continued employment but not the other is consistent with the principle of fairness.

In argumentation and logical reasoning, there is also a corollary fairness principle:

Principle of fairness*: We ought to subject competing arguments or perspec­tives to the same rules of assessment unless there is some relevant difference between them that merits the differential treatment.

The principle states that when we evaluate the rational credentials of two competing claims and their arguments, we should apply the same standards of assessment to both sets of arguments. If the arguments are deductive, then we should evaluate them for validity and soundness using the same standards. If the arguments are inductive, then we should evaluate them for cogency and strength using the same standards. This is rational fair play.

Now take the following example of irrational and unfair play. Suppose two sides are arguing about global climate change and presenting competing argu­ments about whether human action is a major contributing factor. Side A and Side B agree that it is a general virtue of premises and arguments that they should be self-consistent (i.e., they should neither contain nor imply contra­dictions). When Side A is made aware of internal inconsistencies in its data and evidence sets, Side A replies that these particular inconsistencies are excus­able because the scientists who produced the results are upstanding persons of high moral character. Side A therefore claims an exemption from the general rule about argumentative and evidential self-consistency. The claimed exemp­tion in this case is based on the moral fiber of the scientists on Side A. Notice that even if we grant the high moral caliber of scientists on both sides, this feature of Side A is irrelevant. It is not a rationally relevant consideration or difference that merits the exemption of Side A from the general rule. In fact, it is highly unlikely that Side A would grant the same exception to Side B if the tables were turned. Yet Side A claims the exemption anyway.

This is logically suspicious behavior, and we have a name for it: special pleading (SP). As Morris Engel (1976) explains in With Good Reason, “To engage in special pleading is to be partial and inconsistent. It is to regard one’s own situation as privileged while failing to apply to others the stand­ard we set for ourselves (or, conversely, failing to apply to ourselves those standards we apply to others)” (192).

While SP is most clearly illustrated in the context of two competing, discrete arguments and an explicit, unjustified application of an evidential double standard, this informal fallacy also occurs in simpler, colloquial con­texts that apply double standards in the choice of words. Consider these:

I like to think of myself as firm and steadfast in my beliefs. Others, however, are inflexible and pigheaded.

Horses sweat; men perspire; women glow.

We are freedom fighters - the enemy, terrorists.

We are planners; they are schemers.

In these cases, the double standard is clear in that the very same behavior or feature is either excusable or even admirable in one case but not so in the other, with no evidence presented that there is a relevant difference that would justify the different treatment. In fact, there might even be some rel­evant differences, but the point of the fallacy is that such evidence is either missing or simply not presented.

SP occurs also in contexts other than pure arguments or colloquial word­play. Consider that in the past decade in the field of sports media, it has become common for women to appear as professional reporters and com­mentators on sidelines and as co-anchors in televised commentary studios for the NFL and NBA - career arenas that have traditionally been the domain of men only. One of the criticisms that women in these positions have faced is that many of them lack firsthand athletic experience in those sports - the implication being that such a lack disqualifies them from these kinds of jobs.

Avoiding SP can be very difficult for two reasons. First, the fallacy takes so many forms. It can appear in the form of an explicit double standard in the assessment of competing arguments. It can appear in the usage of biased language that is designed to convey that bias to the reader or listener. It can also appear in professional practices such as employment and promotion. Second, SP can be difficult to avoid because it is often invisible to the one who commits the fallacy, and in this respect it is like a bad, invisible cogni­tive habit.

The most explicit form of SP is in the application of double standards to arguments. It takes great effort to change a bad habit, even an explicit one. In fact, it may take a few different strategies. First, one might commit to acquiring knowledge about logical fallacies, such as what one does when consulting a book such as this. Buy and read more books on logic (and recom­mend this one to friends)! Second, one might begin to introduce new cognitive behaviors into one’s argumentative repertoire.

When one is raising a criticism about another view or argument, one should practice a procedure of rational fair play. Explicitly ask, “Is my competing claim or position susceptible to the same or similar critique? Do I pass the very test that I am subjecting my rival to?” This is not a natural behavior for most people. This is why it will likely be the sort of thing that one does through an artificial-feeling rule of behavior, such as when very small children are taught by rote to utter the words “Thank you” as a way of creating a habit of politeness. But this artificial rule of behavior, if repeated over time, can become two things. First, it can become an avenue for a person self-consciously to begin to think about rational fairness. Second, it can initiate the process through which a person actually becomes more fair-minded in her character and cognitive habits. In that respect, the rule is like practicing musical scales for a musician or practicing free throws for a basketball player. Eventually, the behavior can become a fluid habit that feels natural to the musician or athlete. Similarly, practicing fair-mindedness can over time become a sustainable virtue of cognitive character to replace the vice of SP.

Reference

Engel, S.M. 1976. With Good Reason. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.