Undistributed Middle
Charlene Elsby
Minds are computers, since minds calculate and computers calculate, too...
The typical freshman in college
This chapter deals with the fallacy of the undistributed middle term.
Also see the other chapters on the exclusive premises fallacy (Chapter 4), fallacy of four terms (Chapter 5), and the illicit major and minor terms fallacies (Chapter 6).In order to understand the fallacy of undistributed middle, we need to know that the middle term is the term that appears in both of the premises but not in the conclusion. In addition, we need the concept of distribution. “Distribution” is meant to describe the extension of the term, that is, how many things it applies to. If it’s all of them, then the term is distributed, as is the term “cats” in “All cats are blue.” I have said something about all of the cats, and so that term is distributed in my premise. “Blue” is not distributed, since I haven’t included all of the blue things in my statement. (There could be other blue things besides cats, like the sky, or it could be that all and only cats are blue, but the statement does not tell us whether that is true.) With regard to its place in the history of logic, William Kneale and Martha Kneale (1985) credit the medieval logicians with applying the term “distribution” to this property of terms: “it came later to indicate the property which a general term is supposed to have when it is used to stand for all the individuals to which it is applicable” (272).
Stated succinctly, the fallacy of undistributed middle occurs when the middle term isn’t distributed in either premise. This fallacy was apparent to medieval scholars like John Buridan in his Treatise on Consequences in Summulae de Dialectica (1350/2001): “Sixth Conclusion: No syllogism is valid in which the middle is distributed in neither premise, unless the middle is used in the minor with a relative of identity” (121).
That’s not to say that the problem wasn’t already apparent in Aristotle. It is the reason many of the possible combinations of premises result in “no syllogism.” Many forms of argument fail due to their middle term’s being undistributed, and while Henry Aldrich (1862) uses the undistributed middle term to explain why an argument is invalid, it doesn’t seem to have been formalized as a “fallacy” until Richard Whately’s Elements of Logic (1827). Still, in Aristotle, we get the idea through his examples of situations where no syllogism is possible. One of these situations is where the middle term is undistributed. Another note on terminology - where the middle term is that which is repeated twice in the premises, the “extremes” are the other two terms of the syllogism. If, for instance, we have “substance” as a middle term and “animal” and “human” as extremes, then the start of a non-syllogism with an undistributed middle would look like this:
(1) All animals are substance.
(2) All humans are substance.
And from that we can’t conclude anything, because neither all of the animals nor all of the humans are enough to extend the reach of all substance.
Aristotle formulated this rule in the Prior Analytics: “But if M is predicated of every N and O, there cannot be a syllogism. Terms to illustrate a positive relation between the extremes are substance, animal, man; a negative relation, substance, animal, number—substance being the middle term” (27a19).
We cannot conclude anything from the two statements above, since we have not accounted for the entirety of substances in either of the premises. It is completely possible that the animals that are substances and the humans who are substances aren’t the same substances. Alexander of Aphrodisias (1991) fully comprehends the reasoning behind this, although he doesn’t use the term “distribution.”
The reason why there is no syllogistic combination from two universal affirmatives in the second figure is that the middle is predicated of both extremes, and the predicate is the major term.
Thus, being major in relation to both, it may be predicated of one extreme term in virtue of one of its parts, and of the other in virtue of another. And in this way there is nothing which the extremesUndistributed Middle 65
share with each other, if they each share with the middle term in virtue of different parts of it. For the extremes must share in one and the same thing if there is to be a syllogism. (151)
Basically, demanding that the middle term be distributed in at least one of the premises ensures that there’s going to be some overlap between the two premises so that it is possible to deduce their relation. If the middle term is undistributed, the argument is invalid.
There exist any number of ways this fallacy could be avoided; that is, the way to avoid the fallacy of undistributed middle is to create any valid syllogism. While not all syllogisms with distributed middles are valid, a syllogism must have a distributed middle in order to be valid. Distribution of the middle term is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for a valid syllogism. If we imagine a world where no humans are substance, then we could reform the example above to look like this:
(1) All animals are substance.
(2) No humans are substance.
And from these premises we could conclude
(3) No humans are animals.
In order to do so, we have had to distribute the middle term - the fact that the classes of “human” and “substance” are mutually exclusive means that, at some point in our syllogism, we have taken all of substance into account. That is, all of substance is excluded from being human.
References
Aldrich, Henry, and H.L. Mansel. 1862. Artis Logicae Rudimenta, from the Text of Aldrich. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Alexander of Aphrodisias. 1991. On Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1.1-7, translated by Jonathan Barnes, Susanne Bobzien, Kevin S.J. Flannery, and Katerina Ierodiakonou. London: Gerald Duckworth.
Aristotle. 1984. Prior Analytics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Buridan, John. 1350/2001. Summulae de Dialectica (Compendium of Dialectic), translated by Gyula Klima. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kneale, William, and Martha Kneale. 1985. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Whately, Richard. 1827. Elements of Logic. London: J. Mawman.
More on the topic Undistributed Middle:
- Illicit Major and Minor Terms
- Four Terms
- Arp R., Barbone S., Bruce M. (eds.). Bad arguments: 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. New York: Wiley-Blackwell,2018. — 450 p., 2018
- Exclusive Premises
- Index
- Why Be Concerned about Fallacies?
- XAT 2011