Interest Rate Pegging and Price Level Indeterminacy
In the representative household models with money in the utility function and cash-in-advance constraints (such as the ones we have analyzed so far), one can show that if monetary policy pegs the nominal interest rate, then the price level and the money supply cannot be determined uniquely.
In contrast, under a policy that pegs the money supply, the price level and its rate of change are uniquely determined.This result is known as price level indeterminacy and was first alluded to by Wicksell [1898] in the context of a static monetary model, and, more recently, by Sargent and Wallace [1975], in the context of an IS-LM macro model with rational expectations. The same indeterminacy applies in the representative household dynamic general equilibrium models with money that we have examined so far. For simplicity, we will assume that there is no uncertainty and that the nominal interest rate is pegged by the central bank to a constant level i0.
12.8.1 Interest Rate Pegging and Price Level Indeterminacy in Representative Household Models
From the money demand function of the representative household model with money in the utility function, the money demand equation implies that
In (12.71) we have imposed the equilibrium condition in the goods market: Ct = Yt. Given that real income Yt is exogenous, this condition is satisfied for an infinite number of combinations of Mt and Pt. For given Yt, if it is satisfied for M0 and P0, it is also satisfied for λM0 and λP0, for any λ. Thus, both the money supply and the price level are indeterminate.
The reason for the indeterminacy is that, under interest rate pegging, no monetary anchor can determine the price level, as in the case where the central bank determines the money supply.
Because the central bank is committed to providing unlimited liquidity at a nominal interest rate i0, the money supply is determined by the demand for money. Neither the price level nor the money supply can be identified uniquely by the demand for money, as the latter is a demand for real money balances. The equilibrium condition for money demand can be satisfied with both high prices and a consequent high stock of money, and with low prices and a consequent low stock of money (i.e., virtually for any level of prices).11The same problem arises in the cash in advance representative household model. From the Euler equation for consumption (12.42) and the goods market equilibrium condition Ct = Yt for every t, it follows that
Because income is exogenous and the nominal interest rate is fixed, (12.72) is satisfied for any price level. Multiplying Pt and Pt+1 by a coefficient λ means that (12.72) continues to be satisfied, because it is linearly homogeneous in prices. The price level is thus indeterminate.
Again, the reason for the indeterminacy is that, under interest rate pegging, there is no monetary anchor that can determine the price level, as in the case where the central bank determines the money supply. Neither the price level nor the money supply can be identified uniquely under interest rate pegging. The equilibrium condition for consumption can be satisfied with both high prices and a consequent high stock of money, and with low prices and a consequent low stock of money (i.e., virtually for any level of prices).
This, indeterminacy is especially problematic, because the key monetary instrument used by most central banks has not been the money supply, but nominal interest rates. How is it possible for the price level to be determinate if interest rates are the key monetary instrument of central banks?
12.8.2 The Wicksell Solution to the Problem of Price Level Indeterminacy
The main solution of this problem was provided by the monetary economist who first realized its existence, namely Wicksell [1898, p.
189]. Wicksell proposed thatSo long as prices remain unaltered, the banks’ rate of interest is to remain unaltered. If prices rise, the rate of interest is to be raised; and if prices fall, the rate of interest is to be lowered; and the rate of interest is henceforth to be maintained at its new level until a further movement of prices calls for a further change in one direction or the other.
Wicksell’s interest rate rule can be written as
where P0 is the target price level of the central bank, and ϕ a positive coefficient denoting the response of the central bank to deviations of the actual price level from the target price level.12
Substituting (12.73) for i0 in (12.72), assuming that output is constant and taking logs, we get
If ϕ is positive, as Wicksell proposed, then (12.74) is a stable difference equation that fully determines the price level. The price level is uniquely defined, as it adjusts immediately to P0, the target price level of the central bank. If ϕ is equal to zero, then we have price level indeterminacy, as in equation (12.72).13
Wicksell’s rule is a good example of a stabilizing interest rate rule that makes the nominal interest rate a function of endogenous variables, such as the price level, about which the central bank is concerned. The nominal interest rate is not pegged but is a positive function of the price level. Such an interest rate rule does not result is price level indeterminacy. Instead, it stabilizes the price level around the target price level of the central bank.
Alternative ways to solve the problem of price level indeterminacy when the policy instrument of the central bank is the nominal interest rate have subsequently been proposed: inflation targeting rules; nominal income rules (McCallum [1988]); and more recently, the Taylor [1993] rule, which is a generalization of the Wicksell rule.
We shall examine the properties of such rules, and in particular the Taylor rule, in chapters 14–17 on aggregate fluctuations and in chapter 20 on monetary policy.12.8.3 The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
One theoretical development worth mentioning in this context is the fiscal theory of the price level, proposed in Leeper [1991], Sims [1994], and Woodford [1994, 1995]. This theory argues that even if monetary policy rules do not suffice to determine the price level, the price level can be determined as the level ensuring that nominal government debt does not follow an explosive path. This requirement is sufficient in such models to determine the price level. The path for the price level ensures a path of nominal government debt that satisfies the intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
12.8.4 The Pigou Effect and Price Level Determinacy in OLG Models
Note that the problem of price level indeterminacy under interest rate pegging does not arise in OLG models. Unlike the representative household model, where both the current and the future price level are non-predetermined variables, in the OLG models, the price level is determined through the predetermined nominal financial assets of old households. These function as a monetary anchor and help determine the price level.
For example, in the cash in advance version of the Samuelson OLG model, the equilibrium condition in the goods and services market is given by (12.55). Assuming that the nominal interest rate is pegged at i0 by the central bank, one can solve (12.55) for the price level:
The price level is uniquely defined. Because consumption depends on the real value of financial assets of the old households and these assets are positive, the price level is determined and positive, regardless of the interest rate policy of the central bank.
In static ad hoc monetary models, such dependence of consumption on the financial wealth of households has been called the Pigou effect (see Pigou [1943]), or the real balance effect (see Patinkin [1956]). As Sargent and Wallace [1975] indicated in their original analysis of price level indeterminacy, in the presence of a Pigou or real balance effect, the problem of price level indeterminacy does not arise, even if the central bank pegs the nominal interest rate at a constant level, because nominal financial assets anchor the price level.
12.9