Introduction
Humility has been claimed to be a virtue that is relevant to a variety of legal scholarly discussions.2 However, the most prominent use that humility has been put to in law is as an adjudicative virtue that favors judicial restraint.
The first section of this paper examines this prevalent conception of humility and argues that it is grounded on a problematic view of humility as an assertion of one's poor epistemic standing. Contrary to what views of humility as judicial restraint hold, the value of humility in law is hardly restricted to the judiciary — let alone to it providing an argument for judicial deference. Humility, understood as a relational virtue that is a mean between self-aggrandizement and self-deprecation, is exceedingly relevant for all the legal professions. More specifically, I will argue that humility has an important impact on the organizational dimensions of the legal profession (Section 38.3); it is critical for excelling in professional legal practice (Section 38.4); and it is also central to professional development (Section 38.5). Section 38.6 suggests some ways in which legal education and professional training could foster this valuable trait. I conclude (in Section 38.7) with a few reflections on the political implications of giving an important role to humility within the legal professions.38.2
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- III Timetable of important events and laws
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