General Remarks on Theories, Truth and Scientific Realism

However, the above general characterization requires further qualifications. What is a theory? The simplest account see theories as ordered sets of universal (possibly universal generalizations) propositions (laws, hypotheses, etc.) related to a specified

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University of Information, Management and Technology, Rzeszow, Poland

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E. Agazzi (ed.), Varieties of Scientific Realism,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_15

domain of reality. If T is a theory (empirical or mathematical), its internal order qualifies some of its elements as basic, primary, initial, fundamental, etc., but other as derived or secondary. Although I do not claim that empirical theories need to be axiomatized or formalized, it is convenient to accept the equality T = CnX, where X is a subset of T (consisting of axioms, postulates, principles, etc.) and Cn refers to the consequence operation. What is truth? Scientific realists, like Popper, for instance, insist that the concept of truth in SR should be based on the idea of correspondence (see Agazzi 2014, Chaps. 4 and 5): truth consists in the correspondence of truth-bearers (propositions, sentences, beliefs, statements, etc.) with reality (facts, states of affairs, etc.). I follow this view and consider STT as a modern version of the correspondence theory (see also Sect. 4 below). A further possible constraint on SR postulates (Chakravartty 2007; Ellis 2009, Chap. 2), that if T is a theory, its ontology accepts theoretical entities as well as denotations of observational terms.^[93] I will not focus on this question, because it is not particularly relevant for my tasks. What is the world? If ontology of SR is rich, it must admits abstract entities. Since my own ontological preferences are rather nominalistic and naturalistic, I am inclined to see the reality as the mereological unity. Hence, so-called abstract items exist in language eventually as constructs. Finally, following Agazzi, I think that SR appears as the best possible justification for objectivity as perhaps the most essential and socially required feature of science.

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