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What Is a Social Explanation?

To explain an outcome is to demonstrate why it occurred; what conditions combined to bring it about; what caused the outcome in the circumstances, or caused it to be more likely to occur (Salmon 1984, Miller 1987, Kitcher and Salmon 1989, Knowles 1990, Little 1991).

The most fundamental aspect of an explanation of an outcome or pattern is a hypothesis about the causal processes through which it came about. So social explanation requires that we provide accounts of the social causes of social outcomes. This approach begins in a different place from the central theory of explanation offered in the philosophy of science, the covering-law model of explanation (Hempel 1965). This deviation is deliberate: the underlying conception of a domain consisting of law-governed regularities is not well suited to the real nature of social phenomena. Instead, the central component of this theory of explanation is the idea of a causal social mechanism.

There are other theories of social explanation that have been advanced: functional explanation (X occurs because of the beneficial consequences it produces for system S), hermeneutic explanation (X expresses such-and- such meaning within the cultural system), rational-intentional explanation (X occurs because circumstances C give agents reason to behave B, aggre­gating to X), and materialist explanation (X exists because it serves the material interests of G). (These and other models of explanation are more fully discussed in Little 1991.) Functional explanations in the social sciences have been greatly discredited because they generally fail to provide an account of the sustaining causal mechanism, from future benefits to cur­rent social arrangements (Elster 1982, 1983, 1990). And materialist and rational-intentional explanations are really just varieties of causal explan­ations. So causal relationships among social phenomena (and environmental circumstances) continue to serve as the most plausible foundation for social explanations.

The next section will look more closely at the idea of social causation. But it is worth asking whether all causal explanations work in roughly the same way; and the evidence of social science practice suggests that they do not. Instead, there are some large categories of “types” of causal explan­ations that can be discovered when we consider a large number of social and historical explanations of outcomes and patterns as provided by sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and historians. (Robert Nozick approached the theory of explanation from this point of view, particularly in his theory of “filtering” explanations; see Nozick 1974, 1981.) For example, consider:

Selection mechanisms. Why are passengers on commercial aircraft better educated than the general population? Because most airline passengers are business travelers, and high-level and mid-level business employees tend to have a higher level of education than the general population.

Evolutionary explanations. Why does the level of efficiency of a firm tend to rise over time? Because the net efficiency of a firm is the product of many small factors. These small factors sometimes change, with an effect on the efficiency of the firm. Low efficiency firms tend ultimately to lose market share and decline into bankruptcy. Surviving firms will have features that produce higher efficiency.

Imitation mechanisms. Why did the no-huddle offense become so common in the NFL in the 1980s? Because it was successful for a few teams, and other coaches copied the offense in the hope that they too would win more games.

Rational-intentional explanations. Why do boycotts often fizzle out? Because participants are rational agents with private goals, and they make calculating decisions about participation.

Aggregative explanations. Why does technological innovation occur con­tinuously within a market-based society? Because firms are constantly looking for lower-cost and higher-value-added methods of manufacturing, and this search leads them to innovations in products and technologies.

These individual efforts aggregate to a social pattern of technology change. Conspiracy explanations. Why did the United States move away from passenger railroads as the primary form of intercity transportation? Because powerful industries took political actions to assure that private automobiles would be encouraged as the primary form of transport.

Culture explanations. Why were so many Quaker men conscientious objectors at great personal cost during World War II? Because their religious beliefs categorically rejected the violence of war and they refused to participate in this immoral activity.

Path-dependency explanations. Why do we still use the very inefficient QWERTY keyboard arrangement that was devised in 1874? Because this arrangement, designed to keep typists from typing faster than the mech­anical keyboard would permit, was so deeply embodied in the typing skills of a large population and the existing typewriter inventory by 1940 that no other keyboard arrangement could be introduced without incurring massive marketing and training costs.

Upon analysis, it is clear that these are all different aspects of causal processes in social life: how certain social arrangements combine to bring about other arrangements or outcomes. So let us now turn to the topic of social causation.

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Source: Allhoff F.. Philosophies of the Sciences: A Guide. N.-Y.: Wiley-Blackwell,2010. — 386 p.. 2010

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