Collective Responsibility for Conspiracy Theories

I have argued that, in democratic and fairly uncorrupted countries, conspiracy theorizing is prima facie wrong, as it undermines the reasonable and socially important presumption that the major fact-gathering institutions are, generally speaking, trustworthy and truth-conducive.

33.4.1 Actions of Ordinary Believers and Disseminators

The dissemination of unverified information is not morally unproblematic, especially when one should be aware that it conflicts with what is told by the relevant epistemic authorities, and when it is likely that the information will be taken more or less seriously — that it may decrease the level of trust in social institutions and make someone believe in a conspiracy that does not exist. A parent who distributes an anti-vaccine conspiracy theory in her Facebook or Twitter accounts by sharing a link surely knows that the information provided is “unofficial,” to say the least (Kata 2010).

The ordinary dissemination of conspiracy theories can be compared to littering. Litterbugs may appreciate a clean environment but refuse to do their own share. They do not care about the bad example they provide. Although a single litterbug’s contribution can be small and harmless in her own eyes — maybe she is cleaning out her car or a bag — the overall effect may be quite unpleasant, especially if others do not have enough resources to prevent the harm. Both the ordinary disseminators of conspiracy theories and litterbugs are responsible for their con­duct — they should realize what they are doing. Although the question is of the possible overall impact of the actions committed by individual persons, the talk about “collective responsibility” is appropriate. The undesirable effects are produced together, and it seems that conspiracy theories provide an example of “unintentional collective action” here (Chant 2007, 255). Participants share the responsibility for the undesirable outcome (cf. May 1992). Shared responsibility does not require shared intentions or shared goals.

33.4.2 Actions of Developers and Publishers

Some conceptions of collective responsibility require that there must be we-intentions, or joint commitments, or decision-making procedures, or mutual obligations (Gilbert 2013; Tuomela 2013). However, to say that several people are collectively responsible for a harm does not entail the view that they compose a group which is itself the bearer of responsibility.

People who develop and publish conspiracy theories are usually interested in revealing conspiracies, and the dissemination of conspiracy theories cannot succeed without some plat­form (such as internet chat rooms). The question about the origin of conspiracy theories varies case by case, but often individual conspiracy theorists get ideas for their theories by following other conspiracy theorists and that, in some cases, conspiracy theorists work together in groups (Sunstein 2014, 22; cf. Cassam 2016, 163). The groups, in turn, may be connected to one another — an example would be the 9/11 Truth Movement that consists of various groups. Although the links between the active conspiracy theorists are sometimes pretty loose, there are some links. In particular, the members of the active wing are capable of communicating with one another, if not directly, then indirectly via other people who also study the possibility of hidden, unrevealed conspiracies. Although the dissemination of conspiracy theories happens largely in ordinary people’s personal networks on the internet, or in the “alternative media” (Fine and Ellis 2010, 111; Del Vicario et al. 2016, 554; Stein 2017, 168), the active conspiracy theorists get support from each other and share the attitude of distrust. They are willing to transmit the attitude to others. Since conspiracy theorists act jointly, they can be held collectively responsible in that sense.

The active conspiracy theorists should realize what they are doing. Quassim Cassam (2016, 169) argues that conspiracy theorists are not necessarily responsible and blameworthy, as their “intellectual vices” are not within their control.

33.4.3 Omissions of Developers and Publishers

It is important to notice that the number of active conspiracy theorists is considerably smaller than the number of ordinary believers and disseminators. This raises the question whether the active conspiracy theorists could transform “a collection of people into an organized group or collectivity,” as is sometimes the case (Held 1970, 479). Conspiracy theories are developed all around the world, but that should not prevent the founding of an association or a union. Many worldwide groups have their own organizations. Arguably, the active conspiracy theorists could relatively easily turn “into an organized group capable of taking action requiring a decision” (Held 1970, 479). If so, then the failure of not transforming seems to be a fault that should be attributed to the active conspiracy theorists as a group. Furthermore, it is a moral fault, since there is certainly a moral reason to associate, namely, the reason that without an organization they cannot regulate the publishing of theories that are far too implausible to deserve public attention. Seen in this way, the active conspiracy theorists are collectively responsible for failing to establish an organization that would guide its members along the lines of investigative journalists, or some other group that has its own principles, however freely formulated. Conspiracy theories are harmful, but they could be less harmful, if some of them were censored.

In principle, an international “union of independent social critics” (or whatever) could pre­vent some of the risks that the development and publishing of conspiracy theories create. I say “some of the risks,” as it is clear that not all of the active conspiracy theorists would join in such an association: they would suspect a conspiracy behind the scenes of “the Fifth Estate” (Burnett 2005, 11). Furthermore, not all conspiracy theories are published in detailed articles or books, although many of them are (Turner 1993; Meyssan 2002; Smith 2004; Fetzer and Palecek 2015). Conspiracy theories are often immediate reactions to some dramatic events, and the “theories” are expressed in a few sentences and published in the internet chat forums or by tweets. No association could prevent such reactions that are all too natural for many people: big events must have big causes (van Prooijen 2012). Notice also that conspiracy theorists are often rivals, and that the content of the possible regulations of the independent critics would hardly be too demanding. In all likelihood, the rules would allow the publication of doubts that are quite poorly supported by appropriate documents, just in order to create critical public discus­sion. Still, we could say that failing to take steps toward an organization or an association is a moral fault. An international association would not be meaningless — whatever we think about the value and acceptability of the activity that is regulated. Collective self-regulation is in many cases very effective. For the active conspiracy theorists, an association should be a welcome add­ition, not only from a moral point of view, but also from a strategic point of view. The fewer ridiculous conspiracy theories around, the more seriously are the rest considered by the agencies that should investigate them further. Of course, it is quite unlikely that the active conspiracy theorists would in fact organize their action. But that does not bear on the question of whether they should.

No doubt, it can be objected that collective self-regulation would not work in the context of conspiracy theories. Given that conspiracy theories are prima facie implausible, conspiracy the­orizing cannot be “done well,” in the same way that pseudoscience cannot be done well. This objection, however, misses the target of (possible) self-regulative actions. The point of regulative rules would not be to develop “epistemically good conspiracy theories.” Rather, the rules would only limit the number of terribly bad and the most offensive theories by censoring them. If we cannot reach the ideal world, we should improve the non-ideal world.

It can also be objected that an organization could increase the credibility and influence of conspiracy theories. Suppose that the active conspiracy theorists would organize their action and put some limits on public conspiracy theorizing. That would have the desirable effect that the amount of completely implausible and insulting conspiracy theories would decline. Arguably, however, the conspiracy theories that would be around might get more support from people, as they had now passed a sort of critical evaluation, a referee process. That could increase the popularity of conspiracy theories. If so, one could argue that, after all, the active con­spiracy theorists should not organize their action. However, the evaluation of the consequences of “organized conspiracy theorizing” is a complicated matter. It is hard to establish that the undesirable consequences of having a “union of conspiracy theorists” would be larger than its desirable effects.

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