Conclusion

In this chapter, I have elaborated the theory of collective moral responsibility as joint moral responsibility (JMR). Roughly speaking, other things being equal, participants in a morally sig­nificant joint action are collectively morally responsible for that action, i.e.

Notes

1 An earlier version of the material in this section appeared in Miller (2001a).

2 Thanks to the editors for thinking of this possibility.

3 An earlier version of the material in this section appeared in Miller (2014).

References

Bratman, Michael (2014) Shared Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clarke, Randolph (2014) Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Copp, David (2006) “On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXX:194-220.

Davidson, Donald (1963) “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy 60(23):685-700.

Downie, R. S. (1969) “Collective Responsibility,” Philosophy 44:66-69.

French, Peter (1984) Collective and Corporate Responsibility, New York: Columbia University Press.

Gilbert, Margaret (2002) “Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings,” Journal of Ethics 6(2):115-143. Lewis, H. D. (1948) “Collective Responsibility,” Philosophy 24:3-18.

List, Christian and Pettit, Philip (2011) Group Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ludwig, Kirk (2017) From Plural to Institutional Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Makela, Pekka (2007) “Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Social Philosophy XXXVIII(3):456-469.

May, Larry (1992) Sharing Responsibility, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mellema, Gregory (1988) Individuals, Groups and Shared Moral Responsibility, New York: Peter Lang.

Miller, Seumas (1992) “Joint Action,” Philosophical Papers 21(3):275-297.

Miller, Seumas (1995) “Intentions, Ends and Joint Action,” Philosophical Papers XXIV(1):51-67.

Miller, Seumas (2001a) “Collective Responsibility and Omissions,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 20(1):5-24.

Miller, Seumas (2001b) “Collective Responsibility,” Public Affairs Quarterly 15(1):65-82.

Miller, Seumas (2006) “Collective Moral Responsibility: An Individualist Account,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXX:176-193.

Miller, Seumas (2007) “Against the Moral Autonomy Thesis,” Journal of Social Philosophy 38(3):389-409.

Miller, Seumas (2010) The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Study in Applied Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, Seumas (2011) “Collective Responsibility, Epistemic Action and Climate Change,” in N. Vincent, I. van de Poel and J. van den Hoven (eds.) Moral Responsibility: Beyond Free Will and Determinism, Heidelberg:Springer:219-246.

Miller, Seumas (2014) “Police Detectives, Criminal Investigations and Collective Moral Responsibility,” Criminal Justice Ethics 33(1):21-39.

Miller, Seumas (2018) “Joint Epistemic Action: Some Applications,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(2):300-318.

Miller, Seumas and Makela Pekka (2005) “Collectivist Approach to Collective Moral Responsibility,” Metaphilosophy 36(5):634-651.

Narveson, Jan (2002) “Collective Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics 6:179-198.

Smith, N. (ed.) (1982) Mutual Knowledge, London: Academic Press.

Strawson, P. F. (1962) “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48:1-25.

Sverdlik, Stephen (1987) “Collective Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 51:61-76.

Szigeti, Andras (2014) “Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Moral Responsibility Morally Deficient?” in A. Konzelman Zif and H. Bernhard Schmid (eds.) Institutions, Emotions and Social Groups, Dordrecht:Springer:343-354.

Tuomela, Raimo and Miller, Kaarlo (1988) “We-intentions,” Philosophical Studies 53:115-137.

Velasquez, Manuel G. (1983) “Why Corporations are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do,” Business and Professional Ethics 2(3):1-18.

Zimmerman, Michael, J. (1985) “Sharing Responsibility,” American Philosophical Quarterly 22(22): 115-122.