Introduction
This chapter will develop standards for assessing individual moral responsibility for collective action. In some cases, these standards expand a person’s responsibility beyond what she or he would be responsible for if performing the same physical behavior outside of a group setting.
I will argue that structural differences between two ideal types of groups—organizations and goal-oriented collectives—largely determine the baseline moral responsibility of group members for the group’s collective action. (Group members can be more or less responsible for collective action beyond that baseline due to personal qualities like knowledge of the intended collective outcome.) The same individual physical behavior can make the member of a goal- oriented collective responsible for the entire collective action to an equal degree with her fellow group members, whereas the typical organization member is only responsible for his contributory action.I will proceed with a culpability standard of responsibility in mind when I discuss individual responsibility. Many agree that culpability is the most morally satisfying standard of individual responsibility because actors are fully able to control the behavior for which they are deemed responsible. It follows that people can be instructed how they ought to behave; they can intentionally aim at that behavior; and they take conscious steps to reform if they miss the mark.
After the problem of assessing individual responsibility for collective action is exemplified with a thought experiment in section 19.2 and some key definitions are provided in section 19.3, the heart of the argument about individual responsibility in goal-oriented collectives and organizations will be presented in sections 19.4 and 19.5, respectively.
19.2