Large-scale and Global Moral Obligations

Let me conclude by commenting on a controversial question, that has been receiving some attention in the literature: the problem of large-scale and even global collective obligations (Isaacs, 2011; Lawford-Smith, 2015; Schlothfeldt, 2009; Schwenkenbecher, 2013, 2017; Wringe, 2005, 2010).

One of the challenges of making definitive claims about ‘global moral obligations’ is that the problems these obligations are supposedly meant to address are usually extremely complex, unlike the fairly simple cases discussed above. This increase in epistemic complexity brings with it a certain ambiguity and vagueness in the ascription of obligations and responsibilities, not just in the collective case, but for individual duties, too.

Having said that, we might say that some large-scale collective action problems really are not too complex to be addressed by large and dispersed groups with no significant level of organ­ization if they are in a position to produce desirable outcomes by way of aggregating individual actions or their effects.

Here is one example: Herd immunity against some disease — that is, the absence of the pathogen causing it — is a public good that is only produced if in a given population the vac­cination rate is above a certain minimum threshold. Where herd immunity is undermined by lower-than-necessary vaccination rates, those who cannot be vaccinated because they are too young, too old, or ill, are at risk of contracting the respective disease, which — in the worst case — may lead to death.

Let me now return to the problem of climate change mitigation. Do we have collective obligations to address this problem through the combined effect of individual action choices? Clearly, climate change mitigation is much more complex a goal than herd immunity, for instance. Let me therefore make a conditional claim: If climate scientists are correct in assuming that aggregate individual behavioral changes can have a significant if not decisive impact on closing the global emissions gap²⁹ (Blok et al., 2012; Wynes & Nicholas, 2017) then I see no reason why we (capable citizens around the world³⁰) should not in principle have an obligation to make those behavioral changes with a view to contributing to large-scale collective action on climate change. However, I believe that public knowledge concerning the gap and the measures to reduce it is currently insufficient for grounding an all-out collective obligation to reduce or eliminate the emissions gap.

The crucial role that direct interaction and communication play in coordinating spontan­eous collective endeavors (such as the joint rescue of an injured motorist) and establishing the epistemic conditions for we-framing (and agency transformation) can potentially be fulfilled by other means, such as public information campaigns, blogs, social media, etc. when it comes to large-scale collective action. However, the latter will usually require greater levels of organ­ization and leadership and where these are absent we may lack the prerequisites for holding collective moral obligations to address these issues.

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the School of Arts at Murdoch University (2017) and an Oxford MartinVisiting Fellowship by the Oxford Martin School (2017—2018) to conduct research for this chapter. Further thanks go to the editors, Deborah Tollefsen and Saba Bazargan-Forward, for their constructive feedback on earlier drafts of the chapter.

Notes

1 To give just three examples from outside philosophy: Behavioural economists like Michael Bacharach (2006) emphasize the importance of ‘team reasoning' in strategic interaction, and evolutionary biologist Michael Tomasello (Warneken, Chen & Tomasello, 2006) posits the adaptive advantage from ‘collective intentionality' in our ancestors' thinking (Olson, 1971).

I am referring to group agents as described by List and Pettit (2011) or Tollefsen (2015).

I cannot say much more about this without abandoning the required level of generality. How moral obligations as such are grounded is a question that cannot be addressed here. In particular, I will refrain from committing to any ‘substantive' moral theory.

To jointly have an obligation is a plural moral predicate, much like to play a duet is a plural non-moral predicate.

Exceptions include Donald Regan's and Derek Parfit's works (Parfit, 1984; Regan, 1980).

See www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8761446/Trapped-motorcyclist-saved- by-bystanders-who-lifted-burning-car.html. There are countless other examples of strangers collabor­ating spontaneously to save the life of perfect strangers or to protect them from harm. See for instance www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-06/man-freed-after-leg-trapped-in-gap-on-perth-train-station/ 5652486 (both accessed July 7, 2018). I have used structurally similar examples in Schwenkenbecher 2013, 2014, and 2019, and so have a number of other scholars, such as Collins 2013 and Wringe 2016. I am adopting this term from Lawford-Smith (2012).

I first introduced this distinction in Schwenkenbecher (2017).

Another problem may arise if this turns out to be a wide joint necessity case, because it would then seem that in addition to being individually unable to guarantee the success of the collective endeavor, each passerby is also not strictly speaking necessary for its success. I leave this problem aside here and will return to it later.

Consequently, in a case of collective omission, no one would be blameworthy for the failure to free him. Further, if individual contributory obligations are understood as conditional, we run into the problem of mutual release. Simultaneous non-action by all potential contributors voids obligations of the kind ‘I ought to help if the others do' (see Goodin 2012).

For a more detailed defence of this account, see Schwenkenbecher (2019).

An option for acting is ‘collectively available' if it is an option for two or more agents acting (or produ­cing an outcome) together, but not something an individual can do (or bring about). For instance, the option of getting married is not available to me as an individual. It is only available to me and another person together.

My notion of ‘we-reasoning' is equivalent to what Hakli et al. (2010) called ‘we-mode reasoning.' It differs from what Gold and Sugden (2007) and Sugden and Gold (2007) call ‘team-reasoning' in that it is not a joint (or team) effort.

A more detailed account of the difference between I-mode reasoning and we-mode reasoning can be found in Schwenkenbecher (2019).

This is a payoff-matrix for a Hi-Lo game. We can easily imagine moral decision-making scenarios that have this structure. Even when each player is ignorant of the other player's choice, it seems obvious that they should pick option A.

Player 1

Player 2

A

Hi/Hi

0/0

B

0/0

Lo/Lo

Hi > Lo > 0

Joint ability is temporal and comes in degrees.

This requires at least that agents are able to conceive of a collective pattern of actions, which their own and other agents' individual actions could form part of.

[A]n action of each of three billion people touching his or her nose next Tuesday is correctly classified as unfeasible because there are not three billion people who could know next Tuesday how to do it or that their individual contributions are needed. (Of course it remains open that this may become possible in future, in which case the action will become feasible then.)

(Stemplowska, 2016)

18 In a wide joint necessity case, the same clause applies. It must be possible for each to intentionally perform their contributory action, which may mean to refrain from contributing where their contri­bution is either superfluous or detrimental to the success of the joint endeavor.

19 I cannot go into the debate on collective intentions or ‘we-intentions’ here. Suffice to say that plural intentions in the minimal sense are not interlocking intentions (of the kind that Michael Bratman (2014) focuses on), but ‘independent’ individual intentions.

20 A belief that x obtains is shared between two agents if each agent believes that x obtains. It is a common belief if it is shared and if each agent knows that it is shared (first order common belief). See also (Roy & Schwenkenbecher, under review).

21 This is what Scott Shapiro refers to as a ‘shared plan’ (Shapiro, 2014).

22 One might extend this period of blameless ignorance to the second half of the twentieth century. I am assuming that Svante Arrhenius’ discovery of the greenhouse effect towards the end of the nineteenth century was not public knowledge for a long time. However, at the very latest with the adoption of the UNFCCC in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, climate change and the greenhouse effects should have been widely known.

23 It should be noted, though, that Zimmerman is an individualist about moral obligations and would probably not subscribe to the idea of collective obligations defended here.

24 Bacharach (2006) and others (e.g. Butler et al., 2011) insist that we-reasoning involves what they call ‘agency transformation.’ This means that individuals consider the group the locus of agency, rather than themselves (see also Woodard, 2011).

25 Another way to put this is to say that it depends on which moral reason(s) for action outweigh all others (see e.g. Woodard, 2011).

26 It should be noted that these conditions are jointly sufficient for collective obligations, but are not all necessary. This is because such obligations can also arise in the absence of joint necessity where one person alone can produce a morally optimal outcome or perform the corresponding action, but it is a matter of fairness that another agent (or other agents) help her in doing so. Cases of joint obligations arising from distributive justice rather than joint necessity are not discussed here.

27 Finally, whether or not a pro-tanto collective obligation becomes an all-out collective obligation depends on whether or not for the contributing agents there are competing overriding (collective or individual) duties. Or, to put it differently, it depends on whether or not the group-based reasons for contributing to the collective endeavor weigh heavier than other reasons (on group-based reasons for action see Woodard, 2017).

28 This question is different from that of ascribing duties to group agents such as states or international organizations. The question of duties of the global citizenry (if you like) or humanity arises not least, because those (group) agents whom we would consider principally responsible are failing in resolving problems such as climate change or global poverty. However, I do not claim that states’ and other pol­itical agents’ failure to resolve these problems is the only or even the major source of joint obligations to address large-scale collective action problems.

29 The emissions gap is the gap between the level of emission reductions required for limiting global warming to maximally 2°C (with a high probability) and the emission reductions states have currently committed to (UNEP, 2017).

30 A fully-fledged argument for this conclusion would need to specify who counts as ‘capable’ in this regard. My first instinct would be to suggest anyone who has the economic, intellectual, and epistemic capacity to make such behavioral changes without incurring disproportionate costs. Obviously, this need not be tied to certain nationalities — it may well be that a rich person from Zambia is more ‘cap­able’ in this sense than a poor person from the United States.

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