Racism Without Racists?

Does the idea of a social institution that has and promotes a racist goal without any of its officers being racist imply that there can be racism without racists?¹⁷ On the face of things, it does.

Let’s consider the case in which “racism” is understood to refer exclusively to overt racism (Anderson 2010: 47—48). Racism is “overt” when it is conscious and endorsed. To say that an attitude must be conscious to count as racist is to say that the person to whom a racist attitude or behavior is attributed must be aware of holding the particular attitude or engaging in the particular behavior in question. (It is not, however, to say that the person must be aware that her attitude is racist. A person may be aware of holding attitude A without recognizing that A is racist.) To say that that an attitude must be endorsed to count as racist is to say that the person to whom the attitude or behavior is attributed must affirm or approve the attitude or behavior in question. Attitude-independent racism can obtain without overt racists. Racism can exist without there being anyone who is to blame for racism that is overt. Making room for this point is one of the reasons for which the notion of institutional racism is introduced.

Let’s now expand our understanding of “racism” to allow that racism consists not only of overt racism but also includes attitudes that are covert. Racism counts as “covert” if it is uncon­scious or unendorsed. This idea can be motivated by starting with the plausible thought that racial antipathy (race-based hatred and hostility) and racial derogation (treating members of racial groups as unworthy of the respect owed to human beings as such) are properly counted as racist.¹⁸ It is certainly clear that these attitudes are racist when conscious and endorsed.

The understanding of“racism” just presented fixes the usual way in which the adage “racism without racists” is understood. But it is arguable that the term’s scope extends beyond racial antipathy and derogation to include racial indifference.²⁰ To be racially indifferent to Rs is to be indifferent to the harm, suffering, or disadvantage Rs experience, simply because they are Rs (members of a particular racial group). It is characterized by the absence of good will toward members of a particular race. Call this indifference racism. One specific form of indifference racism is indifference to racism. Indifference to racism counts as a species of indifference racism because one cannot be indifferent to racism without being indifferent to the suffering it causes. Like antipathy and derogation racism, racial indifference is inherently racist. It counts as racism regardless of whether it is conscious and endorsed.

Once racial indifference is recognized as a genuine form of racism, the idea of racism without racists loses some of its luster. As indicated above, it is not part of the idea of attitude­independent racism that, in the absence of racial antipathy and derogation, such racism can obtain without being supported by some form of racial indifference. “Attitude-independent racism” turns out to be less attitude-independent than at first appeared.

These reflections suggest that structures and attitudes both play an essential role in the caus­ation and constitution of structural racial oppression. What Haslanger sees clearly is that racial oppression cannot be accounted for without looking at structures. What we have just seen is that racial oppression cannot be accounted for without also looking at attitudes.²³ In racial oppression structures and attitudes work together in tandem.

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