Institutional Racism of a Different Kind
We have been focusing on the specific form of institutional racism with respect to which the no-individual-is-to-blame thesis is most plausible, namely attitude-independent racism, and have just touched upon a way in which the thesis needs to be revised.
Before closing, I would like to note that there is another conception of institutional racism with respect to which the no-individual-is-to-blame thesis clearly does not hold.The specific conception I have in mind finds its inspiration in the writing of Jorge Garcia (1996,1999, 2004). It holds that institutional racism can be exhibited by institutions that are not inherently racist but regularly operate in a racially discriminatory way, owing solely to the personal racism of their members. By hypothesis, the rules and criteria of such institutions are not overtly or covertly racial biased or discriminatory, but are regularly applied in racially biased and discriminatory ways by a significant number of their office holders. Such institutions—call them F-like—count as racist because they generally operate in a racist way.
Since this form of institutional racism is not found in the purpose or organization of the F-like institution but rather in the personal conduct of the individuals who occupy its roles, it might be called extrinsic institutional racism. It is wholly due to the personal racism of the occupants of the institution’s roles.24 Since this extrinsic form of institutional racism traces back to the attitudes of individuals, it can be called attitude-based institutional racism (attitude-based racism for short). It is “non-structural” in that it is not rooted in the organization of the institutions that exhibit it but is instead wholly dependent upon the personal racism of the individuals who inhabit it. And so, it can also be called non-structural institutional racism.25
A caveat.
In calling non-structural institutional racism non-structural, I do not mean to suggest that the institutional structures of non-structurally racist institutions do not matter. Obviously, they do. Racist participants in F-like institutions use the institutional structures of those institutions to carry out racist acts. These institutions make it possible for racist individuals to actualize racist ends that individuals could not actualize on their own. “Non-structural institutional racism” should be heard as non-structural institutional racism. Institutional structures are essential constituents of racism of this type.It is clear why the no-individual-is-to-blame thesis fails to hold with respect to attitudedependent racism. By hypothesis, all the racism of an attitude-dependent racist institution traces back to the personal racism of its office holders. Some officers of such an institution may be free of racism, but necessarily a significant number of them are not. Those who are not, can be blamed for their personal racism and for contributing to the racism of the institution of which they are a part. Attitude-dependent racism is thus a kind of institutional racism for which individuals are necessarily on the hook. There can be no attitude-dependent racism without individual racists. Reflection on this case reinforces the point that individual responsibility is not eliminated by the idea of institutional racism as such.
Now the fact that the idea of attitude-dependent racism unambiguously incorporates the idea of individual responsibility might be thought to give it a huge leg up over the idea of attitudeindependent racism, in which the place of individual responsibility is more difficult to see. But the clarity of its incorporation of individual responsibility is purchased at a very high price. For it utterly abandons the thought that institutional structures may themselves be a problem. Nor is this an accident. Garcia is hostile to this latter idea.
This, indeed, is why Haslanger attributes to him the project of discrediting the idea of institutional racism as such (Haslanger 2004: 98); for, by “institutional racism” (which she prefers to call “structural oppression”), she means structural racism.Inasmuch as Garcia is perfectly clear about wanting to account for institutional racism and explicitly takes issue with some who deny its possibility, there is some awkwardness in Haslangers reading.26 We can sidestep the disconnect by introducing a generic idea of institutional racism as the idea of racism that is perpetrated by institutions, or alternately, racism that can be said to “reside” in institutions. Thinking of institutional racism in this generic way has the advantage of allowing us to say that Haslanger and Garcia have two distinct conceptions of the same idea. Haslanger offers an attitude-independent structural conception of institutional racism. Garcia offers a conception of institutional racism that is attitude-dependent and non-structural.
On the face of things, it is theoretically possible that both kinds of institutional racism obtain. Some institutions might conceivably exhibit attitude-dependent racism and others might conceivably exhibit attitude-dependent institutional racism. The US medical system could arguably be said to exemplify attitude-dependent racism (Green et al. 2013) and the US criminal justice system could arguably be said to exemplify attitude-independent racism (Alexander 2010). Addressing the question Which of these two conceptions of institutional racism better accounts for racial oppression generally? would also take us beyond the scope of this chapter. But the hunch which initiated our inquiry is that the structural conception is the better candidate.
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