The form of the social world

The existence of the social essence and the appearance of the social world content indicate to the fact, that, herein we deal with the social form. To prove the given thesis, it is sufficient to point out, that all the concrete in general applies to the form.

As far as in this case the second nature is under consideration, we deal correspondingly not with the natural form, in which the first nature exists, but with the form, which has been remade twice. The social form is firstly changed, being reflected in the human's mind. And secondly it is changed in the social consciousness.

Thus, it should be mentioned, that the remade form is already familiar to us. As a rule, it is connected with the reflection of the objective world phenomena or of some particular things stored in the human memory. Of all the philosophers M. Mamardashvili was defi­nitely the one, who had the most delicate conscience of it, and in his works he based upon not only K. Marx’s analysis of the phenomena of economic fetishism and ideology, but also on psychoanalysis, on the Jungian concept of “archetypes”, on modern researches of my­thology and symbolism. “The remade form of existence, - M. Mama- rdashvili writes, - (it) is the product of transformation of some in­ner relations of a complex system, which takes place on its certain stage and conceals their real character and direct interrelations via stray expressions. These last-mentioned, being the product and the accumulation of the transformation of the system relations, at the same time exist independently in it in the form of a separate, per­fectly integral phenomenon, “a thing”, equally with others ” [116, 269-270].

In order to make an in-depth study of the phenomenon of the dou­ble transformed form, in which the social world exists and functions, we need to define the main attributive qualities of simple transformed forms. It is necessary to point out, that the transformed forms still possess their thingness, which was also present in initial exterior forms. But the thingness, certainly, exists also not in its initial forms, but in its transformed ones. M. Mamardashvli characterises the last- mentioned in the structure of a person as quasi-substantive objects, as quasi-subjects, subjects-phantoms. The whole complexity of their research consists in the fact, that the transformed forms are not sim­ply appearance, but the internal form of the appearance, i.e. a stable and reproducing kernel. He especially emphasizes, that the transfor­mation “is a particularly new discrete phenomenon, in which the pre­ceding intermediate cells “compressed” into a special functional body, which has already its special quasi-substantivity (and, accordingly, new sequence of accidences, often reverse valid)” [76, 275].

This circumstance rather complicates the presentation of the matter of the research, as far as we have to consider the complex trans­formed form of the social life as the driving force of evolution and involution. In other words, complex transformed forms - neoforma­tions, either being the result of the environmental influence or the spontaneous changes of the basis (grounds, reason), we consider to be a specific mechanism of the global mankind self-development, which prevents its continuous stagnation in the achieved forms of civilization (or lack of culture). In our further disclousure of the prob­lem we will look into it in more details.

Further we will point out, that in the course of study of natural forms we deal with the expedient activity (horme) of the person, to be precise, with the work and the communication; in the course of study of the simple transformed forms we face natural (social) intrinsic forces of the person, in the course of study of the complex transformed forms we deal with the social relations, and in the course of study of the nat­uralized complex forms we face “the iron person” of K.

It is much written on the problem of the interrelations between activity, intrinsic forces and social relations, so we have nothing new to add here. We only distribute the given concepts between the levels of the phenomenon, being analyzed. At the same time there are all reasons to consider, that the study of the given sequense of the form transformations, probably more precisely, of the lives of forms and their development, is capable not only to explain the occurrence of the phenomena of irrationality, syncretism, which are shown both in cognition, and in behaviour of the person, but also to reveal meta­morphoses, which are observed in the social world, to establish the peculiarity of the interchanges of the form between the first nature, the individual and the second nature more precisely.

On the basis of such interpretation of the double transformation of the form, we shall successively describe, at least in general, the correlation of the social form and the essence of “the social”, the so­cial form and the substrate (the subject) of the social world, the so­cial form and the content of the social world.

The essence of “the social” has a certain form and the determina­tion of the form. The essence, which we hereinabove presented as the exchange of the activity between the participants of the general vital process, possesses the stable spontaneity, or, in other words, it is substratum, only as the basis of the social world.

The exchange of the activity between people as interrelated sub­stratum is the essence of the social world, which we have already de­termined; owing to this positing, it inherently has in itself the form of the social relation. If the essence of “the social”, i.e. the kinds of activity or social relations, was not distinguished, the exchange could not have place basically, as this process makes sense only in the case, when its participants exchange such kinds of activity, which supple­ment each other. Therefore, the form (the social relations) determi­nations are, on the contrary, such determinations, which exist in the very essence of “the social”; the essence lays in their foundation (ba­sis) as the undetermined, indifferent to them in its determination; they have in it their reflexion in themselves.

The reflected determinations of the kinds of activity, let us as­sume, of material and spiritual (intellectual) or economic and politi­cal activity remain in themselves and are independent quantities (val­ues); but their independence is their disintegration; thus, they have this independence in the other; but this disintegration itself is this identity with itself or the basis of stability, which they give to them­selves.

Thus, inherent in the essence of “the social” determinations of the form as a reflected definiteness are the identity and the differ­ence (diversity), the identity as some featureless activity, and the difference (diversity) as the variety of opposite kinds of activity, which represent the essence or the subject of the process of exchange.

But, besides, the base ratio also belongs to them, for this ratio, despite being a withdrawn reflex determination, due to this ratio the essense is given, at the same time, as something posited. The identi­ty, which has its basis in itself (the essential forces of the human per­sonality), is not related to the form, and particularly is not related to the fact, that positing as withdrawn and positing per se, the basis and the constituted is the same reflexion, that constitutes the essense as the elementary basis, which is the retention of the form. But this retention of the form of “the social” is underlying in a personality as in the basis of the social being; in other words, this essense itself in­herently is given as a certain activity; eo ipso it is again the moment of the base ratio and the moment of the form.

Consequently, the form of “the social” is a complete whole of the reflexion; it also contains the determination of the reflexion to be with­drawn; therefore, the form, being also the unity of its process of deter­mination, pari passu is correlated with its withdrawal, with the other, i.e. with the exchange of activity as the activity of all living things in general, which is not the form itself, but to which it is related.

The external reflexion usually is satisfied with this distinction of the essence and the form; this distinction is necessary, but this very distinction is their unity, as well as this unity of the basis is the essence of “the social”, which withdraws itself from itself and which becomes positing. So, the form of “the social” is the absolute nega­tivity itself, or the negative absolute identity with itself, through which the essence of “the social” is not the essence of the social world, but its content. This identity, taken abstractly, is the essence, which is opposed to the form, to the same extent, as the negativity, taken abstractly as positing, is an individual determination of the form of “the social”.

Hence, the form of the social world has in its own identity the essence (content) of the social world, the same, as the essence has the absolute form in its negative character. So, it is impossible to ask, in what way the form joins the essence: after all it is only the appear­ance of the essence in itself, immanent to it its own reflexion. The same as the form in itself is the self-reflexion or the identical essence, which returns in itself; in the course of its determination the form transforms the determination into positing as positing. Therefore, the form is always essential (substantional), while the essence is al­ways formed.

The expression “the form determins the content” means, therefore, that the form of the social world in its distinction withdraws this very distinction and is the identity to itself, which is the essence, that re­tains the determination. The social form is a contradiction: it is with­drawn in its positing and in this withdrawal it remains; due to this fact it is the basis as the essence, identical with itself, when it is determined and subjected to sublation (denial, contradiction, negation).

The definition itself of the essence of the social world as “an ex­change of activity between people” requires the presence of not just a form, but its rational modification, as far as the given process by its character is reasonable, it is necessarily attended with the production of specific intellectual products. And the presence in the content of the categories “process” and “product” also requires diffetrent kinds of forms for its distinction, namely: the process form and the morpho­logical form. We will consider this question therein after.

The determining form of the social world is correlated with itself as some withdrawn positing; due to it, it is correlated with its identi­ty as with something different. It posits itself as withdrawn; due to it it foresees its identity; the essence of the social world is, according to this moment, that indetermined, for which the form is the other.

Thus, the essence of the social world is not the one that is an abso­lute reflexion in itself, but it is determined as the identity, devoid (deprived) of the form; it is what in philosophy is used to be named an intelligible substance, to be more exact, the field form of the uni­verse.

The essence becomes a subject, when its reflexion determines it­self so, that it relates to the essence (content) as to the concrete, de­prived of the form. Consequently, the substance is a simple, devoid (deprived) of the differences identity, which is the essence, deter­mined to be the other of the form. That is why it and its own basis is either the substrate of the form, for it constitutes the reflection of the social form in itself, or that independent value, which it corre­lates to as to the positive retention of itself.

The substance is, as it is known, something quite abstract. Its field form is not an exception. And it is principal for us, that the natural scientists made a conclusion, that “the living material must be seen as a pequliar flow, merging of the material-energy-informa­tional content” [87, 59]. Beyond such flows the terrestrial life doesn’t exist. Following from that, the integral living material (monolith) may be defined as a material integrity, specially organised.

If we abstract away from all the definitions of tha social form, then the indetermined intelligible substance remains. It is necessary to re­member, that the term “intelligible” (from Latin intellegibilis - men­tal) denotes only, that the given kind of substance, or its field form, is comprehended only by the mind or the intellectual intuition [187, 149] on the basis of, as it is used to say today, the weak ecological, and we say, intellectual, interactions of people with each other.

At the same time it denotes, that other stereotypes concerning the social form depend only on the receptiveness of the human organ­ism, with which they identify themselves with the help of electro­magnetic field (or weak intellectual ties), and depending on the dif­ference of this receptivity or sensitivity of, so called “spiritual sens­es” [134, 122], first, the capability to differentiate the humanized nature, and after this, to form its various forms purposefully. It is clear, that the receptivity here is understood as physiologically real­ized by the human receptors perception of the substantional and se­mantic Universes and transformation of the energy of the irritants into the nerve irritation [187, 149].

So, the intelligible substance is not perceived by the five outer senses, which are the result of work of the entire history that pre­cedes the history of the world. For its perception the availability of specific inner, or, according to K. Marx, spiritual (intellectual) sens­es, practical senses (will, love etc.) is necessary [134, 122]. The group of senses, which the scholars relate to the capability to perceive the conciliar unity, which is based on the inner, in-depth, not formulat­ed rationally, inexpressible and inexplicable relation, should also be referred to it. S. Frank, for instance, saw the above mentioned capa­bility in the sense of coindependence (mutual independence) concern­ing the unity “we”, in confidence, appearing as a result of the direct eye-contact. In all, what is difficult and even impossible to express with the help of words, but without what a single human contact is impossible, neither on the basis of the involuntary concordance of individual aspirations and deeds, nor according to any treaty, or sub­mitted to someone’s personal will. So the task of making feelings human, to be more precise, the creation of proper human feelings, appropriate to the variety of natural human spirit, is the cause of the oncoming stage of the world history.

In such condition the interrelation of the human being with the environement, and, first of all, with other people, becomes cardinal­ly different. It as though “leaves” habitual for us terrestrial, Newto­nian space. To the possible influence of this space the human being responds to the least extent, the sensibility of its receptors, sensors to these factors changes (decreases). But its life with the dominating field form of the living matter intensifies, the sensitivity to the elec­tromagnetic (field) cosmoplanetary environement, the range of its life activity in this form (type) of intellectual relations extends con­siderably, runs to infinity: the organism functions as the fraction (particle) of the unbounded cosmoplanetary electromagnetic medi­um, space, its field organisation. This conclusion follows the organic unity of the world, which we have proved in the course of the analy­sis of the social world nature.

Thus, the social form admits the intelligible substance, with which it correlates on the basis of the weak intellectual interactions of people with each other. But it doesn’t mean, that the social form and the intelligible substance oppose each other externally and ran­domly; neither substance nor form are self-existent, in other words, eternal. The substance is indifferent to the form, but this indiffer­ence is the determination of the identity with itself, to which the form returns as to its source. The social form admits the intelligi­ble substance, because it considers itself to be withdrawn and due to this it correlates with this identity as with something different. And vice versa, the social form is admitted by the intelligible sub­stance, for the substance is not mere essense, determined as posi­tive, just as something, that is given only as the withdrawn subla- tion (denial).

But, on the other hand, as far as the social form posits itself to be the substance, only because it withdraws itself and due to this fors- ees the substance, the substance also is determined as the dprived of the basis of retention of itself. So, intelligible substance is not deter­mined as the basis of the social form; for the substance posits itself as the abstract identity of the withdrawn determination of the form, but it is not identical as the basis, and thus, the form relating to it is deprived of the basis.

Due to this the social form and the intelligible form are both de­termined, not as the posited by each other, but as the basis of each other. The intelligible substance is rather the identity of the basis and of the founded as the basis, which opposes this relation of the social form. This common for them determination of indifference is the determination of the substance per se, and also forms the interre­lations of both of them. The same as the determination of the social form to be their correlation as of separate (uncoordinated) is another point of their interrelation.

The intelligible substance, what is determined as indifferent, is passive, as opposed to the social form, as to what is active. The so­cial form as the self-related with itself negative is the contradic­tion inside itself, is what disintegrates, and rejects itself from it­self and thus determins itself. The social form is correlated with the intelligible substance and is posited in order to correlate with this retention of itself as with the other. The substance, on the con­trary, is posited in order to correlate only with itself and be indif­ferent to the other; but in itself it correlates with the social form, for it contains the withdrawn negativeness and is the substance by means of this determination.

It correlates with the form as with the other, only because the form in it is not posited, because it is the form only in itself. In it implicitly the form is contained, and only it is absolute congeniality to the form, which absolutely contains it inside in itself and what is its content determination in itself. That is why the intelligible sub­stance is to take (adopt) the social form, and the social form is to materialize, to impart itself in the substance the identity with itself, in other words, stability.

For this reason the social form determins the intelligible sub­stance, and the intelligible substance is determined by the the social form. It denotes, that, firstly, the social form and the intelligible sub­stance admit each other. This unity of form and content, opposite to each other as the social form and the intelligible substance, is the absolute basis, which determins itself.

Secondly, the social form as an independent one, is, becides, the contradiction, which withdraws itself. It is posited as the contradic­tion from the very beginning, for it is independent and at the same time substantially correlated with the other, due to this fact it with­draws itself. And because it itself is duplex, this withdrawal has two sides: first, it withdraws its independence, transforms itself into something determined, something, what is in the other, and this oth­er is the intelligible substance. Second, it withdraws its determina­tion against the field form of the substance, its correlation with it, due to this fact eliminates its postulation (positedness) and thus in­duces itself stability.

Following from that, the activity of the social form, which defines the intelligible substance, consists in the negative relation of the form to itself. But also vice versa, it, due to this fact, relates to the sub­stance negatively too; though this determination of the intelligible substance is to the same extent the intrinsic motion of the social form itself. The form is free from of the substance, but it withdraws its independence and is the substance itself, for in it the social form has its essential identity. As far, as, thus, it transforms it into the dter- mined then it is similar to the fact, that it transforms the subject into something definite.

But the described from the other point of view intrinsic identity of the social form at the same time becomes external identity, the intelligible substance is its other; for the substance becomes altogeth­er undetermined because of the fact, that the form withdraws its own independence. But the intelligible substance is independent only against the social form; in case the negative withdraws itself, the positive withdraws itself also. So, as far as the form withdraws it­self, the determination is dismissed, the determination, which the intelligible substance has against the social form, to be undetermined continuity.

What represents the activity of the social form, further is to the same extent the intrinsic motion of the intelligible substance itself.

Thirdly, due to the muvement of the social form and the intelligi­ble substance, their initial unity, on the one hand, is restored, but on the other hand is now the posited unity. The intelligible substance as much determins itself, as this process of determination is an exter­nal action of the social form for it; and, vice versa, the social form so much determins only itself or has the determined by it intelligible form in itself, that in the course of its determination it relates to the other; both of them, this and the other (the field form effect and the motion of the field substance), are the same, wth the only difference: the first one is the action, i.e. negativeness as posited, and the other is the motion or formation, negativeness as the essential determina­tion in itself. As a result there is the unity in itself of the existence and postulation. The intelligible substance, per se, is determined or, by all means, has some social form, and the social form is a mere sub­stantial (field) form, which is retained

The social form, as far as it admits the intelligible substance as intrinsic other, is finite. It is not the basis, but only what is active. The same as the substance, as far as it admits the social form as its non-existence, is the finite substance; it is not the reason of its unity with the social form either, but it is just the reason for the social form. But neither this finite (field) substance, nor the finite (field) form has the truth; each one correlates with the other, in other words, only their unity is their truth.

The field substance, which has taken the form, or the form of the field, that is retained, is not only the above mentioned absolute unity of the basis with itself, but also the posited in the existence unity. Just in the motion under consideration the absolute basis, i.e. the interacting humanity, represents its moments per se, which withdraw themselves and due to this fact posit each other. In other words, merg­ing with itself, the restored unity rejects itself from itself, and de­termines itself; for its unity as performed through the sublation (de­nial) is also the negative unity. That is why it is the unity of the social form and of the intelligible substance as their basis, but as their def­inite electromagnetic basis, which is the intelligible substance, that has gained the social form, is at the same time indifferent to the form and the substance as to the withdrawn and insignificant. This unity is the content of the social world.

The social form opposes, first, the essense of the social world; in this case it is the ratio of the basis and its determination - this is both: the basis and the established (founded). Second, it opposes the intelligible substance; in this case it is the determining reflexion and its determination - it is the same reflective determination and its retention. Besides, it opposes the social content; in this case its de­termination is again it itself and the substance. What was earlier iden­tical with itself (first the basis, then the retention per se and, at last, the substance), gets under the domination of the form and again is one of its determinations.

It is well known, that the social content, being the determining side of the second nature as of some organic whole, represents the unity of all main elements of the social world, its characteristics, internal pro­cesses, connections, contradictions and tendencies, and the social form is the mode of existence and the expression of this content.

That is why the social content has, first, some form and some (in­telligible) substance, which it has and which are essential for it; it itself is their unity. But as far as this unity is at the same time defi­nite or determined unity, the social content opposes the social form; the form constitutes the postulation and against the content it is not essential. That is why the content is indifferent to the form; the so­cial form includes both: the form per se, and the substance; and, thus, the social content has also some form, and some substance, the basis of which it constitutes and which are only the postulation for it.

Second, the social content is the same what is identical to the form and to the substance, for the social form and the intelligible substance are seemingly only indifferent external determinations. They are the postulation per se, which, though, has returned in its content to its unity or to its basis.

Thus, the identity of the content of the social world with itself is, on the one hand, the definite indifferent to the social form identity, and, on the other hand, it is the identity of the reason. The basis first vanishes in the content; but the content is at the time the negative reflexion in itself of the determined form; its unity, which previous­ly is only indifferent to the form, is also a formal unity or the ratio of the basis, per se. That is why the social content has this ratio as its essential form and, vice versa, the basis has some content (the poten­tial social world).

Thus, the content of the basis is the basis, which has returned to its unity with itself; the basis is first of all the essense, identical with itself in its postulation; as different and indifferent to its postula­tion essense is the undetermined substance; but as the content it, at the same time, has obtained the form of identity, and this form be­comes the ratio of the basis, because the determinations of its con­traries are postulated in the content as such, that are unsublation- able (undeniable). The content is determined further in itself not only similar to the substance as indifferent in general, but also as the sub­stance, which has gained the form, so that the determinations of the form become intrinsic substantional, indifferent stability.

Due to this fact, the basis in general became the definite basis, and the definiteness (determinatcy) itself is of double nature: it is, first, the definiteness of the content and, second, the definiteness of the form. The first definiteness of the social content, which is imma­nent to the basis, is the social life, taken as the combination of all kinds of activity or social relations. The second definiteness of the social basis is to be in general the external to the content, which is indifferent to this ratio, - it is the social organism.

The moment of the definiteness in the determination of the con­tent of the social world arrives in connection with the actual appear­ance of specific information of the knowledge, which is generated by the human for the retention of the processes of the second nature. Due to information in particular, the social world or the intelligible substance begins to be mastered by the intellectual (spiritual) senses (feelings) of the humanized human being. The complex of the feel­ings (senses) composes the sensitive content of the object images of reality, represents the source and the premise of the cognitive rela­tion. In the course of interrelation of the information with the or­gans of the sensible substance, the complex of the feelings is caused by the action of the external stimulus, and under the effect of the same signal in the other plane - the image of the objective reality develops. By the level of extention (development) of interference of the signals between the planes, in our opinion, the words of K. Marx can be explained: “the feelings of the social person are the feelings, different from the feelings of the non-social person. Only due to the resources of the feature thoroughness (diversity) of the human es- sense, the resources of the subjective, human sensibility develop, and partly even for the first time appear” [134, 122].

The second nature, which before was perceived by the human mainly through the device of intuition, now is presented as the di­verse social world, and it begins to master it, gradually passing from its less complicated field elements of the social organs to the system reflexion of the integral field form or of the social life, which has, as is generally known, the characteristics of a process. Thus the con­tent of the social world, which we described before as the organic unity of the intelligible substance and of the social form, splits into two parts: the potential social world, hidden in the structure of the hu­man organism, from which it acts as from its basis; and the actual­ized social world - social medium, generated on the grounds of the independent activity (functioning) of the collective intellectual en­ergy, rejected by the participants of the general life process into the environment.

The potential social world in the structure of the human person­ality, i.e. in the self-existence, represented by the essential forces, which we can consider as the subjective form of the social relations (personality). At the same time actualized, generated by people so­cial world acts as the based (founded) or as the objective form of the social relations (society). The interference between them, as between the subjective component (ingredient) and the objective component (ingredient) of the organic entity (whole), is realized, as was men­tioned before, due to the functioning of knowledge as a specific form of information. The availability of knowledge in the human struc­ture is marked by its peculiar features, known as the intelligence, and their presense in the structure of society, it is possible to assume, is marked by the peculiar quality of the weak interaction force - by the thinking environement (egregor). The merging of the intelligence of the individual with the intelligence of the collective personality or the egregor (thinking environment) is a new quality, which particu­larly we can call reason.

It is quite sensible here to suggest a current hypothesis, concern­ing the idea, that the reason is the cultivated information, the prod­uct of the Semantic Univers. The similarity we see in, for example, technical equipment (machinery), which is nothing short of cultivat­ed substance - the product of the Physical Universe. The given simi­larity follows from the fact that on the planetary level the Semantic Universe is represented by the information, in much the same way, as the substance in machinery represents the Physical Universe. If we consider the substance and the information through the lenses of the system of the special ideological directions (instructions), so called semantic filters, it will become clear, that they may be presented as the spirit (intellect) and the substance. In this case the reason can be defined as the spirit, which has appeared in a phenomenon.

Thus, the human personality as the basis is the identity, nega­tively related to itself, which, resulting from this, becomes the pos­tulation; this identity negatively relates to itself, being in this nega­tivity identical to itself; this identity is the basis or the content of the social, which in this way composes indifferent or positive unity of the ratio of the basis and,what mediates it, the specific field life, which systematically is reflected by the phenotypic information. In this content the definiteness of the basis (of the potential social world) and the founded (actualised social world) against each other vanish. But the mediated is, in addition, the negative unity. The negative, which is contained in this indifferent basis, is its immediate definite­ness, due to which the individual (personality) as the basis has its definite social content. But then the negative is the negative ratio of the form with itself. The postulated, i.e.social being (existence), on the one hand, withdraws itself and returns to its basis, i.e personali­ty; the basis, in its turn, as a substantional independency relates neg­atively to itself and becomes postulated. This negative mediation of the basis and the founded is the characteristic mediation of the form per se, i.e. the formal mediation.

So, both sides of the form now posit themselves together in one identity as withdrawn, exactly because each of them passes into the other, due to the phenotypic information; ipso facto they at the same time posit this identity. It is a definite content, with which the for­mal mediation correlates through itself as with the positive media­tor. This content is what is identical in both of them - it is the field life or the social life, and, as far as they are diverse, but each of them in its peculiarity is the correlation with the other, this content is their maintenance retention, the retention of each of them as a whole in itself. The way it functions we have described in the course of the analysis of the content of the social world. Hence, everything begins with the personality and everything finishes with it.

Thus, it becomes clear, that in the human, as the basis of the so­cial life in general, there are following items: first, some definite so­cial content, which should be considered from two points of view: as far as it is posited as the basis (the potential social world) and as far as it forms the basis (the actualized social world). The content itself is indifferent to this form; in both cases it is in general only the de­termination. Second, the basis itself (the potential social world) is to the same extent the moment of the form, as the founded by it (the actualized social world); it is their formal identity. It is the same sub­stance that exists in two different forms, and thus is destined to in­teract with itself. This very interaction we observe as the social life.

The fact is that it is quite indifferent, which of these two defini­tions they put first, i.e. it is indifferent, wether to pass from one of them as from the based to the other, or from the one as the base to the other as the based (founded). The based (the actualized social world), considered separately, is the withdrawal of itself; due to this it is, on the one hand, based (founded), and on the other hand, as the positing of the base (the potential social world). The same motion is the basis (the potential social world) per se; it transforms itself into the based (the actualized social world) and due to this it becomes the basis of something, i.e. it is in this motion both: as the based (founded), and as, what is only now available (actual), as the basis. The based (found­ed) is the base of what is the base itself, and, vice versa, the basis thereby appears to be something based (founded).

The mediation begins to the same exstent with the one (personal­ity), as with the other (society); each side is to the same extent the basis, as it is the based, and each side is the whole mediation or the whole form. That is why the problem of what is initial (premordial) - the personality or the society - has the same characteristic as the well- known controversy on what appeared first - an egg or a hen.

Further on, all this form, as something identical with itself, is itself the basis of the determinations, which make up both sides of

the basis (person) and of the based (society); thus, the form and the content are themselves the same identity - the social life. That is why there is nothing in the basis (person), that would not be in the based (society), as well as there is nothing in the based (society), that is absent in the basis (person).

The determination of the basis, it appeared, is, on the one hand, the determination of the basis or the determination of the content, and on the other hand, it is the other (different) existence in the very ratio of the basis, particularly the difference of its content and form: the correlation of the basis and the based exists as the exterior form against the content, indifferent to these determinations. But actual­ly the two mentioned items are not exterior to each other, for the cintent is the identity of the basis with itself in the based and of the based in the basis. It emerged, that the side of tha base (person) is itself something based, and the side of the based (society) is the basis itself: each of the items of the integrity under analysis is in itself the identity of the whole. But, as far as they at the same time belong to the form and constitute its certain (definite) differency, each one in its self-determination is the identity of the whole with itself. Thus, each of them has the content, different from the other. But, if con­sidered from the view of the content, for the content is the identity with itself as the identity of the ratio of the basis, it inherently con­tains in itself this difference of the form and as the basis it is differ­ent from the based. But due to the fact, that the basis (the potential social world) and the based (the actualized world) have different con­tent, the ratio of the basis ceased to be formal: the returning to the basis and the returning from it to the based is no longer the tautolo­gy; the basis is realized.

This ratio (correlation) gives itself further determination. But particularly as far as its both sides are different content, they are indifferent to each other; each of them is the immediate, identical with itself definiteness. Further, being correlated with each other as the basis and the based, the basis acts as the reflected in itself and in the other as in its postulation; thus, the content, which the side of the basis contains, will be present also in the based; the based as some­thing, that is postulated, has only in the basis its identity with itself and its stability (determination, definiteness). But exept this con­tent of the basis (individual) the based from this time on has also its own, peculiar content (as the cumulative product of the collective generation of the free energy), and so, is the unity of ambiguity.

Due to this fact the basis, determining itself as something real (actual), desintegrates into exterior definitenesses through the dif­ferences of the content, that forms its reality. Both correlations - the essential content as the simple direct identity of the basis and the based, and subsequently of the correlation of now separate content are two different basis; the identical with itself form of the basis van­ishes, the same as once as the essential and another time as the based; thus, the correlation (ratio) of the basis became exterior to itself.

That is why the exterior basis (actualized social world) combines in it different contents and determines, which of them is the basis, and which of them is what is posited by the basis; neither of these contents has this determination. So, the real basis is the correlation of the other: on the one hand, it is the correlation of the content with the other content, and, on the other hand, it is the correlation of the relation of the basis (the form) to its other, in particular, to some­thing immediate, posited to it.

When the social nature is treated as the basis of the social world, what is called nature, is, on the one hand, the same as the world, and the social world is no other than the nature itself. Though they are at the same time different, for the nature is mostly indeterminacy or, at least, the world essense, definite only in general differences in laws and identical to itself; and in order that the nature becomes the world, from without (from outside) the variety of determinacies attach to it. But these determinacies have their basis not in the nature per se; it is rather indifferent to them as to the randomnesses.

The regression of the actual basis to its basis results in the re­sumption of the identity of the basis and of the based in it or in the resumption of the formal basis. The newly appeared ratio (relation) of the basis is a complete relation, because it contains both: the for­mal and the actual (real) basis and the mediating those determinacies of the content, which in the actual basis are immediate against each other.

Thus, the ratio of the basis has determined itself more complete­ly and in this particular way. Firstly, something has some basis, it contains the determination of the content, which is the basis, and another determination as posited by the basis. But as the indifferent content, the former is the basis not in itself, and the latter is the based former also not in itself; this correlation is withdrawn and posited in the immediacy of the content and, per se, has its basis in other corre­lation. This second correlation as separate (incomplete) only in the form has the same content, as the first one, but the two determina­tes of the content are their immediate connection.

Thus, both of them, the potential and actualized social worlds, proved to be two different ratios of the content. Against each other they are in identical formal ratio of the basis; they are the same con­tent in the whole, namely: both determinations of the content and their correlation; they differ only by the mode of this correlation, which in one of them is immediate relation, and in the other it is pos­ited, as the result of which one of them differs from the other only by the form as the basis and the based.

Secondly, this ratio of the basis is not only formal but also actual (real). The formal basis transforms into the actual; the moments of the form reflect into themselves; they are an independent content, and the ratio of the basis also has its specific content as the basis, as much as it is the subjective form of the social relations and the spe­cific content as the based, it is the objective form of the social rela­tion. The content constitutes first of all the immediate identity of both sides of the formal basis; per se, they have the similar social content, which is reflected in the collective consciousness by the so­cial relations.

But the social world has also the form in itself and, thus, it is a double meaning, concerning both: as the basis and as the based. That is why one of the two definite determinations of the content of both social worlds is determined not only as general for them according to the external confrontation, but as their identical substratum and the basis of their correlation.

As opposed to the other determinacy of the content it is the es­sential determinacy and the basis of this other determinacy as the based; in particular, of the based in that something, the correlation of which is the based correlation. In the first something, which is the ratio of the basis, this second determinacy of the content also imme­diately and in itself is connected with the first by the determinacy of the content. The second something contains only one determinacy in itself as in what it is immediately identical with the first something, the other determinacy it contains as posited in it. The first determi- nacy of the content is the basis of this posited determinacy, for it in the first something is initially connected with the other determinacy of the content.

In other words, the actual social world contains only one deter- minacy in itself as something, in which it is immediately identical with the potential social world, the other determinacy it contains as the posited in it. The first determinacy of the content is the basis of this posited determinacy, for it in the first something is initially con­nected with the other determinacy of the content.

The actual basis is revealed as the exterior to itself reflection of the basis; its complete mediation is the resumption of its identity with itself.

The basis ratio in its “general totality” (parent universe), due to this, inherently is, what the reflexion admits; the formal basis ad­mits immediate determination of the content, and this determina­tion as the actual basis admits the form. Thus, the basis is the form as the immediate connection, but so, that it rejects itself from itself and rather admits immediacy, correlates with itself in it as with some­thing other.

Now it is impossible to present a social reality in its determina- cies as it is presented by us in the form of the summation of social processes proceeding simultaneously, which exists without specific social structure, that formalizes and retains in integrity its flows of substance, energy and information, while they are in the social space and actualises in the dimention of the social time. In passing, we shall mention, that the basing of the second nature as an energy-power field puts the question concerning space, time and motion in quite differ­ent way. This question needs separate consideration.We might no­tice, that such organizational form for maintenance of a normal be­haviour of the social life is the social to organism.

Here we have approached to considering the place and the role of the form for the existence of the social world or the second nature. From the material considered by us before it becomes clear, that the content of the concrete social world as it is developed to the certain degree of a maturity rational living matter, for the complete self­realisation of the organismal form, which, on the one hand, provides the retention of the basic attributive qualities of the intelligible sub­stance, and on the other hand, it reaches (attains) the necessary and sufficient potentiality to realise its specific general (phasic) function - to generate the space form of life. As well as the biological form is “withdrawn” by the social form, the social form now is necessarily withdrawn by the space form of life. Here the term “the space form of life” is not absolutely exact. It will be certainly specified further.

F. Scheling was absolutely right, saying that the organism is not the way of the material substance, which constantly varies, it is an organism only by means of its image or of the form of its material life. The life depends on the substance form, in other words, the form became essential for the life. Therefore, the purpose of activity of an organism is not the immediate retention of its substance, but the re­tention of the substance in such form, in which it is the form of exist­ence of higher potentiality. The organism is called so, for, notwith­standing its existance not for itself, as it seemed before, there are only the implements in it, the apparatus (organ) of elevated (lofty) matters [206, 482].

We have already shown, that according to its origin, the social organism is an incessantly fluid flow of energy, generated by a man. It is the intergrative field of ethnics.

It appears, that for an intelligible substance, i.e. such, that is per­ceived on the receptive level, motion is the same attributive quality, as massiveness for sensible (lat. sensus ) matter, i.e. it is capable to be perceived by usual senses. An intelligible organism has appeared in the process of the superorganic, though spontaneous by nature behav­ior, of the organic synthesis of the physical and spiritual principles (basis) of a man - of this subjective and finite image of the objective and of the infinite iversum. And what is actual vitality? None other than an integral organism. Thus, the reality of the social life consists in the fact, that it represents an integral social organism [56, 561].

In other words, the social organism generated in the result of the dialectic interaction of organisms of the phenomenological and nou- menological worlds. It is very important, because the organism dif­fers from the system by the fact, that it should be born (generated) by the other organism or organisms. Therefore the philosophical idea of a social organism is this very identity of the two times canged form of the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, comprehended (realised) in the intellectual phenomenon. It is the herald (messenger) of the Semantic Universe, and the sense of the concept “organism” is re­vealed here, according to Hegel (Philosophy of Law), as the big archi­tectonic construction, as the hieroglyph of mind which expresses it­self in really [54, 322].

While considerating the correlation of the form and the content in the social world, we have already mentioned above the process of the generation of the initial material for the organisation of the space form of life. By this fact we have proved the presence in a social or­ganism of the basic attributive property - the ability to generate life, and consequently, other original organisms. Therefore the appropri­ateness and correctness of usage with respect to the given form of the self-determined social content of the term “organism” is demon­strated (proved).

The analysis shows, that all kinds of the general coexistence of the material and spiritual worlds in the state of maturity gain organ­ismic forms. Such posture was at their primary interosculation which has acted on a surface as a biological organism, now the same takes place at their secondary interosculation when the social organism is generated, and it is already clear, that the same thing occurs at their tertiary interosculation. Here such live systems - organisms are gen­erated, to which we still cannot give the name. For us they are still hidden behind terms the God, Space, etc.

The substantial essence of a social organism we understand as the human mind which in its concrete value provides the unity of the form and the content of the social world, “because the form in its concrete value as G. Hegel (Philosophy of Law) writes that is a mind (reason) which comprehends the world in concepts, and the content is a mind (reason) as substantial essence of the moral and natural reality; the realised identity of both of them is a philosophical idea [54, 55].

Thus we should underline, that it is a question of the superior type of mind, i.e. such mind, which is realised by the person. It is none other than knowledge. We have already written above about this division of mind into conscious and unconscious and presented cor­responding arguments in favour of this concept, referring to the re­sults of researches of F. Scheling, G. Hegel, S. Freud, A. Puankare, S. Peipert and other philosophers.

So, we have started to solve a problem of philosophical compre­hension of the second nature from a theoretical image of a social or­ganism as from the direct whole, the idea of which soared before re­searchers of the social life throughout many centuries, and which was studied in its nessesity from the concept “the social organism”. Here we understand image as the intellectual subject as whole, taken ex­clusively in its correlation with itself. It was necessary for us, in or­der we could get rid of everything insignificant, introduced by the change of concrete conditions, in the course of our philosophical re­search.

The given image became for us the beginning of the process of theoretical cognition of the problem of a social organism and at present has already played its positive, and it is necessary to note directly - a considerable, heuristic role. With its help we were able to approach to the condition, when a social organism arose before us as already existing, i.e. which is realised from the real, easy to our un­derstanding and to the theoretical analysis of the specific process - from an exchange of activity between people.

At this point the gnoseological analysis does not come to an end, as we have now to consider a social organism as the dialectic contra­diction.