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Background

In the transition from the classical imperial order to what we can call the early medieval period in the tenth to twelfth centuries, the centralised imperial bureaucracy gradually gave way to new ways of organising society and government.

From the late ninth century, the central government was increasingly dominated by a few powerful families, who established complex vertical alliances with low- and middle-ranking nobles both at court and in the provincial administrations.[372] Personal ties of clientele gradually gained importance at the expense of the functions of government, even though the same families were often in control of both avenues of power. In this process, the central government as a bureaucratic organ lost much of its influence over military resources and its control over the agricultural labour in the provinces.[373] By the mid-Heian period (795-1185), three groups found them­selves in constant and intense competition over agricultural resources: the capital elites of nobles and temples; provincial government officers; and resident provincial elites.[374] Although the middle tier of provincial officers was gradually replaced by local warrior families during the Kamakura period, the picture of lord-client relations and incessant competition over land rights and access to resources among both central and local elites continued well into the medieval period of the fifteenth century.

The political and managerial segmentation resulted in a much weakened state structure, where the government possessed very few economic resources or means of coercion.6 This system of decentralised administra­tion also led to severe competition for resources, not least among peers at the same tier in the hierarchy. Landed wealth became one of the most important means of political influence, as private estates provided not only resources for the individual family but also the means for engaging with people from the other tiers and establishing a relationship of clientele.

The nobility came to assume a dual role as they scrambled to amass huge landed estates in the provinces. Not only were they the key members of the central administration at the imperial court, they were also private landholders in direct competition with the provincial officers of the same state that they represented.

The competitive nature of the state was given added impetus as scores of professional warriors began to make their presence felt in both provincial and capital affairs by the second half of the Heian period. I will not go into a more detailed discussion of the rise of warriors to national power here, but only note that the appearance of new, military families of great coercive power only added to the competition amongst the elites in all tiers. It did not significantly alter the state. By the middle of the thirteenth century, the warrior government in Kamakura had assumed many of the judiciary and administrative functions of the state, besides of course the responsibility of all military and police matters. Still, the Kamakura regime never tried to replace the imperial court and chose instead to utilise the prestige of the court to

bolster its own authority, thus embedding itself in the court-centred national state system as one among other oligarchic groups.[375]

Although the Kamakura regime on the surface looked all-powerful, it was not the sole judiciary agent in the realm, nor did it enforce or even claim a monopoly on violence. The imperial court continued as the most important arbiter of conflicts, and only in cases where retainers of Kamakura were involved would Kamakura take over the mediation of conflict. Both capital centres thus developed effective systems of justice, each with its own court­rooms and jurisdictions.[376] The landholding elites in the capital, consisting of the imperial family, court nobles, temples and shrines, maintained control over extensive estates and their resources and the power naturally derived from these.[377] In large part due to their ‘monopoly on prestige distribution’, as one historian has labelled it, the capital elites succeeded in maintaining some degree of control over their landed assets, even if most of these elites were more interested in a steady stream of revenue than in actual managerial control.[378] [379] Although it can be said that violence suffered ‘almost universal condemnation’ in the Kamakura period,11 this was only true in the official version of society.

The reach of the state - that is, the imperial court and the Kamakura regime combined - was very limited and never extended much further than to those in direct personal relation with the judicial centres. Local agents of Kamakura were slow at best and often actually insubordinate when it came to apprehending criminals at large. In most cases, they were not even allowed to enter privately held estates belonging to the capital elites - a privilege of non-interference in private estates that the landholders defended with passion.[380] This meant among other things that provincial policing authorities could not normally apprehend any estate residents who had committed illegalities inside or outside the estate.[381] Since the system involved a retraction from the judiciary system of the state, it implied that estate administrations had to deal with criminals and other unruly residents on their own.

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Source: Gordon Matthew, Kaeuper Richard, Zurndorfer Harriet (eds.). The Cambridge World History of Violence. Volume 2: AD 500-AD 1500. Cambridge University Press,2020. — 696 p.. 2020

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