<<
>>

Conclusion

The greatest difficulty for advocates of the civilising thesis occurs when there is an upswing in violence, because this requires a new process of regression or ‘de-civilisation’.

Revolutions leave them perplexed. ‘The paradox is that the [French] Revolution reintroduced large-scale violence to a land in which, for more than a century, the “process of civilisation” had made notable advances, radically reducing and circumscribing violence.’ This leaves them struggling for an explanation: ‘At the end of the eighteenth century, the civilising process had not yet transformed all the inhabitants of the kingdom. The personality structure that instilled in individuals stable and rigorous mechan­isms of self-restraint, substituting self-imposed prohibition and repression for exterior constraints was not yet universal.’[984] This argument rests on two false assumptions: that violence is a primeval force that requires taming; and that revolutionary violence does not have its own logic.

This chapter has argued differently. It has shown that violence was subject to significant chronological and regional variation in the early modern period. This was rooted in feelings and beliefs that were shaped by the social and political environment. The evidence suggests that interpersonal violence increased significantly across much of Europe from the mid sixteenth century onwards and only fell again in the second half of the seventeenth century. Renaissance civility did not canalise and control violence. Rules of etiquette and protocol were complicated from the fifteenth century as the social elite expanded and became more diverse: boundaries were tested and transgressed in the constant battle to assert and win status. This was compounded by the emphasis on heroic autonomy. When threatened with the law in a Parisian street in 1622, Henri de Saveuse simply unsheathed, saying ‘that he cared not for justice and, showing his sword, said that this was justice’.[985] It was the experience ‘of unbridled chaos, of a myriad of competing claims battling each other to extinction, [which] made thoughtful men realise that these reckless assertions of private will were the surest route to disaster'.[986] The freer codes of conduct that resulted emphasised civil living together, in contrast to ceremonial relations with their relentless attention to the opaque signs of honour.

An expert on the law of insults attacked the traditional code ‘which commanded men to peace, amity and goodwill; but through ill-will only united them in tearing themselves apart and harming each other on every occasion on which they met'.[987] The change that occurred during the seven­teenth century was not a subconscious process, but a recognition that many forms of violence were bad manners, demonstrating a lack of breeding. The male honour code was predicated on control over female sexuality and consequently the easiest way to provoke an enemy was to play the gallant with his wife, daughter or mistress. The new civility demanded changes to masculine behaviour and this permitted the sexes space to mix more freely. For Morvan de Bellegarde it was axiomatic that the company of women civilise: ‘They are much more polish'd and agreeable in Civil Society: and it is chiefly by conversation with them, that we learn Civility and Politeness.'[988] By the eighteenth century the treatment of women was considered a measure of civilisation and the manner in which he treated women a sign of the gentle­man's self-discipline and right to rule. Politeness did not completely supplant the honour code; rather, it relativised it. It became possible to laugh at its trivialities. There were, however, new fields of battle. The salon became the centre of news and gossip, where rancour was sublimated and reputations regulated by ridicule. Wit was the instrument of social warfare. But it was a battlefield where women could participate on more equal terms. The contrast to affairs in eighteenth-century Naples enraged the city's enlightened thinkers. They made explicit the link between the excessive levels of violence in the city and the grotesque treatment of women, who were hidden away from the male gaze and whose veneration encouraged excessive male gal­lantry and nourished the honour code. They recognised that civility was based on free communication between the sexes, since women's conversa­tion and company was a civilising influence.

The limits to the new social decorum were also fixed according to class. In the rural world the routine murder of servants, tenants and vassals by their masters continues to stand out in the judicial records of France, Italy and Germany in the seventeenth century. This was compounded by the cheap­ness of lives of the poor: compensating for the life of a French peasant was valued at less than 200 livres (£14) in the 1780s. By the eighteenth century it had become widely accepted that force had to be exerted within reasonable limits and that doing so was a sign of social superiority. Nevertheless, in polite society the use of corporal punishment against the lower orders went largely unquestioned until the very end of the eighteenth century: ‘If any boy or girl, under fourteen years of age, shall be found begging out of the parish where they dwell,' wrote John Locke in a plan to revise the poor law, ‘they shall be sent to the next working school, there to be soundly whipped and kept at work till evening.' Slaves represented an altogether different category; they were disqualified from civil society. The Jamaican plantation owner Thomas Thistlewood (1721-86) was a self-made gentleman who combined an Enlightenment belief in progress and modernity with the pursuit of his interests through the use of private and public violence. He was a brutal and sadistic master who controlled his slaves through the use of extreme violence and arbitrary and cruel tyranny.[989] Yet Thistlewood was a civilised man of letters who knew his Montesquieu, Voltaire and Locke and who kept up with the latest in polite fashion through subscriptions to the Tatler and Spectator. Thistlewood's diary lays bare civilisation's heart of darkness.

<< | >>
Source: Antony Robert, Carroll Stuart, Pennock Caroline D. (eds.). The Cambridge World History of Violence. Volume 3: AD 1500-AD 1800. Cambridge University Press,2020. — 710 p.. 2020

More on the topic Conclusion:

  1. Conclusion
  2. Conclusion
  3. Conclusion
  4. Conclusion
  5. Conclusion
  6. Conclusion
  7. Conclusion
  8. Conclusion
  9. Conclusion
  10. Conclusions