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Conclusion

Out of the myriad details of the military histories of empires, we can distill a few general points. First, there can be no empire without military organizations, in the sense of groups of people to whom governments delegate the legitimate right to shed blood.

Second, these organizations must be able to not only conquer the empire's rivals, destroying and annexing them, but also apply force to help the em­pire manage its internal and external relations. Third, empires have to work out ways to control military organizations and pay for them; and fourth, as the history of RMAs shows all too clearly, military organizations must be institutions capable of learning, because, pace Tacitus, the secret of empire actually consists of military adaptation to the evolving threat environment.

If we fail to grasp these basic principles, the military history of empires is likely to dissolve into the infamous ODTAA, “one damned thing after another.”[379] But on the other hand, if left at this level of generality, the principles run afoul of what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz called the characteristic weakness of all social- scientific theorizing—that “[t]heoretical formulations hover so low over the interpretations they govern that they don't make much sense or hold much interest apart from them. This is so, not because they are not general (if they were not ge­neral, they would not be theoretical), but because, stated independently of their applications, they seem either commonplace or vacant.”[380]

What this means, I think, is that this chapter will be most useful if read alongside the imperial case-studies that fill the second volume of this work. As Clausewitz himself said, “Theory exists so that one does not have to start afresh every time sorting out the raw material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order.”[381]

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Source: Bang Peter F., Bayly C.A., Scheidel Walter (eds.). The Oxford World History of Empire. Volume One: The Imperial Experience. Oxford University Press,2020. — 584 p.. 2020

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