From one crisis to the next, 1905-13
Making judgements about the connection between long-term causes, which made war probable, and the immediate events and decisions, which triggered war, presents historians with complex problems.
Some maintain that the broad factors determined events. ‘Things have got out of control', wrote the German chancellor in July 1914, ‘and the stone has begun to roll.' Recent scholarship, however, tends to reject theories of inadvertent war or ‘war by timetable'. Statesmen in fact understood the potentially cataclysmic consequences of their decisions. In 1914 they deliberately cast aside the habits of nineteenth-century diplomacy. In particular, faith in the European Concert eroded over the period 1905—14. It is in this process of erosion that the connection between conditions and triggers is made. The breakdown of peace, as David Stevenson has argued, must be seen as a ‘cumulative' process, in which the Great Powers steadily rejected co-operation and moderation in the pursuit of national interests and turned towards armed diplomacy and violent solutions to their security problems.In examining the period from 1905 to 1914, one must focus on how the Great Powers responded diplomatically and militarily, and what consequences flowed from one crisis to the next. Significantly, the Moroccan crisis of 1905—06 was the first militarized confrontation between the Powers since the 1880s. Britain, Belgium and France made defensive preparations — the French reinforced units, trained reservists and procured arms — to signal their determination. Germany only took similar limited steps late in the crisis. Despite these moves, neither side desired war. The French knew that they were weak and did not wish to provoke the Germans, and Delcasse, the foreign minister, who alone advocated firmness, was forced to resign from the cabinet. Bülow, the German chancellor, alive to the danger of escalation, had no intention of risking a European war over African concessions.
Accordingly, the Powers turned to conference diplomacy at Algeciras in January 1906 to end the dispute. At Algeciras, close Anglo-French collaboration forced Berlin to accept a diplomatic defeat. This not only confirmed Berlin's isolation — only Austria-Hungary offered support — but more importantly France and Britain strengthened the Entente with secret military staff talks.Young Turks
Name given to a group of young army officers who in 1908 pushed the Ottoman Empire towards reformist policies and a more overtly Turkish nationalist stance.
In the next three crises — Bosnia in 1908—09, Morocco in 1911 and the Balkans in 1912—13 — the destabilizing trend of armed diplomacy continued. The first resulted from an attempt by the new government in Turkey, led by a group of officers known as the Young Turks, to assert sovereignty over the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Great Powers had agreed that the province should formally remain part of the Ottoman Empire but that Austria-Hungary should occupy and administer it. Vienna therefore reacted to the assertive policies of the Young Turks by annexing the province. The Austrian foreign minister, Alois Leza von Aehrenthal, hoped that this could be done peacefully. To his surprise, Serbia and Montenegro mobilized to object to the annexation of fellow Slavs among Bosnia's population, forcing the Austrians to mobilize in their turn. The Russians proposed a Great Power conference to deal with the annexation. After all Austria had challenged the authority of the European Concert by unilaterally overturning the decisions of the Congress of Berlin. However, armed diplomacy won the day. Germany stood beside Austria with a veiled threat of force. Of course, Bülow knew that the threat could be made safely. The Russians were too weak to intervene and made this clear. Russia and Serbia gave way. The crisis ended peacefully but not without serious consequences. Armed diplomacy had worked.
The machinery of Great Power management had been sidelined. Accordingly, once it had the benefit of its military reforms in place, Russia resolved to show firmness next time. Meanwhile, in Berlin, it was clear that without support Austria-Hungary could not hold its position in the Balkans for long.The second Moroccan crisis outwardly followed the pattern of the first. France moved to consolidate its claims in North Africa and Germany challenged it by sending the gunboat Panther to Morocco. In fact, the crisis took the inter-bloc confrontation a stage further, partly owing to blundering German diplomacy. Although France had acted in violation of the Algeciras agreement, Germany failed to communicate its limited goals. At one point, the German foreign minister claimed the entire French Congo in compensation for its control of Morocco. As a result, the Entente Powers closed ranks. Unlike in 1905—06, however, the two alliance blocs were now more evenly matched in armaments, and the Entente took yet more extensive, though still defensive, military measures in a display of determination. London, alarmed that it had lost track of the German fleet for a time, brought the Royal Navy to a high state of alert. German restraint again made for a peaceful outcome: the Germans avoided provocative military moves and accepted an unfavourable compromise. The legacy of the crisis was more important than the outcome. Germany, now perceived to be the chief antagonist by officials in London, was once again isolated by Entente firmness. Another victory for armed diplomacy reinforced the trend to security through military strength. Faced with what they perceived to be Entente ‘encirclement’, German decision-makers were now determined to swing the military balance back in Germany’s favour.
The next stage in the breakdown of peace contributed greatly to the atmosphere of near-permanent crisis. The Franco-Russian response to the 1913 German Army Law convinced German decision-makers that they could not win the arms race.
As the Bosnian crisis had shown, Austria-Hungary — Germany’s principal ally — needed Germany in a contest with Russia. Since 1897, co-operation between Vienna and St Petersburg had helped to keep the Balkans ‘on ice’. After 1909, the Russians were no longer content to do so. Confident in the French alliance and its own growing strength, Russia helped to form a league of Balkan states (Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece) to promote its interests when the time was right. However, much to St Petersburg’s chagrin, the small Powers took the initiative. In the winter of 1912—13, with the Ottoman Empire still reeling from Italy’s successful attack in 1911, the Balkan League went on the offensive and succeeded in driving the Turks back to the Bosphorus in the First Balkan War of October 1912 to May 1913. The defeat of one of the region’s two multinational empires placed a question mark beside the viability of the other. The Balkan League partners later fought among themselves over the spoils in the Second Balkan War of June-July 1913, and Serbia made additional territorial gains and drove westward to the Adriatic Sea. Austria-Hungary in reply increased its troop strength and demanded a halt to Serbian expansion. Germany promised support. Russia backed the Serbs. Britain announced that it would assist France. And France backed Russia. In the end, though, the Great Powers steered away from war. The ambassadors of the Great Powers met in London and hammered out a joint solution. Outwardly, the Concert had worked successfully once again.However, the formalities of Great Power co-operation did not add up to much when set against the consequences of the Balkan wars. The crisis in the Balkans had sparked unprecedented levels of militarization and, moreover, tipped the strategic balance against Germany and Austria-Hungary, for Vienna’s south-eastern enemies were now becoming more powerful just as Russia entered the game of armed diplomacy. In contrast to 1909, when the Russians had been forced to acquiesce, they had now flexed their muscles with a display of menacing military activity.
Britain and France had also prepared for war. Germany had neither pressed Austria to back down, nor taken threatening measures. His behaviour would change in 1914, but during this crisis Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the German chancellor, had resisted pressure from his soldiers to act. Indeed, when Serbia had defied Vienna's warnings against the capture of an outlet to the Adriatic, and in response to Britain's warning about a German attack on France, the German military leadership had assembled in the absence of the chancellor for the so-called ‘War Council' of 8 December 1912. Wilhelm had favoured an Austrian war with Serbia. Moltke had agreed and pointed out that a European war was inevitable and ‘the sooner the better'. The German historian Fritz Fischer has portrayed the meeting as a German decision to delay aggression until 1914. The judgement of one participant is closer to the mark: the result was ‘pretty much nil'. As an indication of the changing mood in Berlin, though, Moltke's words tell us much. The mood in Vienna, now utterly disillusioned with the Great Power co-operation, was not much better. Furthermore, although the Conference of Ambassadors agreed to set up an Albanian state as a barrier to Serb expansion, Serbia had still doubled in size in two years and only complied with the London decisions when Vienna threatened force. In sum, this last gasp of the Concert and Great Power management succeeded only in containing the Balkan wars, not the general crisis in the states system. Viewed from Berlin and Vienna, the future no longer promised co-operation and moderation, but increasing isolation and inferiority. Instead of guaranteeing the security and independence of all the Great Powers, which had been the bedrock of nineteenth-century international stability, the system now appeared to be jeopardizing the survival of the Central Powers.