Medieval Europe boasts a long-standing reputation for brutality and disorder.
Nurtured by formative scholars such as Henry Charles Lea and Johan Huizinga, this vision of endemic violence and lawlessness is deeply entrenched in scholarly perceptions of the Middle Ages.
In this narrative, violence was a normal part of everyday life in medieval Europe. The scope of that violence is illustrated by two now infamous anecdotes. Fulminating on the pervasive and unrestrained violence of medieval urban life, Barbara Hanawalt explained that a person had a better chance of being murdered in medieval Oxford or London than of dying in an accident.1 James Given delivered an even more dire warning about life in medieval Europe, remarking that every person, ‘if he did not personally witness a murder, knew or knew of someone who had been killed'.[623] [624] This long heritage of hyperbole prompted Marcus Bull to observe that ‘[v]iolence was everywhere [in the Middle Ages], impinging on many aspects of daily life';[625] while Peter Hoppenbrouwers more recently coined the phrase a ‘culture of violence'.[626]Why medieval Europe was so violent is still a contentious subject. Appropriating theories from psychology, anthropology and sociology, historians have crafted a miscellany of incongruous answers to this question. At one end of the spectrum, we have those who see medieval man as having been stunted in his intellectual growth, lacking basic emotional controls. For example, Marc Bloch described violence as the inexorable outcome of medieval human nature. Medieval man was an unstable creature whose decisions were irrational and impulsive, and ‘emotionally insensitive to the spectacle of pain'. Homicide resulted from spontaneous heated exchanges in dense living conditions with no forethought or remorse.[627] J.
B. Given's provocative assertion that medieval man was incapable of thinking about the future and thus could not comprehend the consequences of his actions falls much into the same category.[628] Norbert Elias's hypothesis of murder and torture as ‘socially permitted pleasure(s)', ultimately forsaken by the elite in favour of more civilised (that is, restrained) behaviours, also ranks highly in its inflammatory analysis of medieval violence.[629]At the other end of the spectrum, Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish provides a more thoughtful yet narrowly political framework for the ideology that ‘might makes right'. He sees violence as an integral part of the process of medieval state building. The growth of monarchy was predicated on a monopoly of violence, intended to subdue destabilising violence with the coercive violence of a centralised state. To this end, the state engaged in a policy of terror, sponsoring public spectacles of violence in which punishment was stamped on the bodies of those who affronted the state in order to foster loyalty and ultimately deter resistance. Even if built on somewhat faulty underpinnings, Foucault's theory continues to garner strong support among historians.[630] Only recently have historians begun chipping away at the foundations of Foucault's compelling proposition. Where Foucault imagined a murderous, tyrannical state whose authority feeds on its subjects' fear, study of extant records reveal instead a state heavily reliant on the voluntary cooperation of a broad base of energetic subjects, which favoured conciliation over compulsion, where violence was most likely to be enacted on purses rather than bodies. Before the fifteenth century, executions were rare and distinctly unspectacular, and subjects were more bloodthirsty than were their kings, complaining loudly when the crown failed to command the violence justice seemingly demanded.
This vision of a callous and savage era is undermined further by the jarring realisation that the medieval records preclude us from accurately measuring rates of violence.
Historians who employ the tools of modern criminology, measuring homicide rates as n per 100,000 persons per year in order to compare medieval and modern rates of violence, open themselves up to scathing criticism for a variety of reasons. First, the survival rate of records for the medieval era is spotty at best. Wars, fires and inadequate storage techniques can be blamed for some of the losses. However, at times it is clear that the bureaucrats who created the records saw them as personal possessions and did not deposit them in a central repository as one might expect. Second, we do not have suitably reliable population estimates for the Middle Ages to be able to utilise the statistical formula in any meaningful way.Third, medieval states did not have the same objectives in mind when creating legal records as do modern authorities; often they do not contain sufficient data to provide appropriate comparisons. For example, medieval case records frequently omit sentencing. Can we comfortably compare medieval indictments with modern sentences? This is especially pertinent when we take into account the cavernous gulf between the theory and the practice of the law. While it was not the state's intention in devising the law, medieval communities regarded indictment as punishment: public pronouncement of one's crimes and time spent in prison awaiting trial was humiliating and financially debilitating, punishment enough for most crimes. Conviction was reserved for repeat offenders whose crimes were deemed egregious and highly antisocial. This distinctly medieval attitude led to a low number of actual convictions. Criminologists today would consider this a sign of systemic failure. In the Middle Ages, few convictions signalled a system functioning according to the needs of the people.
Finally, adding the final straw to our precarious heap, the works of Philippa Maddern and Claude Gauvard (among others) remind us that the legal records upon which these studies are founded cannot be read straightforwardly. Shrewd litigants regularly employed legal fictions, injecting force and arms (vi et armis) into indictments to bring a case into the king's jurisdiction, or inflating the number of violent acts to justify a death sentence. More confusing still, the terminology of crime has changed dramatically over time, so that ‘rape' in the Middle Ages might better be termed ‘elopement' today. Once again, changes of this magnitude make it difficult to compare like entities. The unavoidable conclusion is that no meaningful statistics about overall levels of violence can be drawn from such dissimilar sources.
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