Al-Qaeda since 9/11

see Chapter 19

The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington not only had a profound impact on the victim of the assault but also affected its instigator, al-Qaeda.

Jemaah Islamiyya (JI) (Arabic: Islamic Community) Southeast Asian Islamist Organization established by Indonesians Abdullah Sunkar and Abu Bakar Ba'ashir in 1995. JI seeks to establish a Southeast Asian Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines through militant means.

The repeated media exposure of the images of the spectacular collapse of the two towers served as inspiration for like-minded Islamists and those who sought to join al-Qaeda. Not surprisingly, this resulted in similar attacks in other parts of the world by organizations with and without direct links. For instance, in October 2002 Jemaah Islamiyya (JI), which had links to al-Qaeda through one of its commanders, Hambali, carried out simultaneous suicide bombings on the island of Bali and in August 2003 bombed the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. In March 2004 Islamists inspired by al-Qaeda attacked Madrid's commuter train network at rush hour, simultaneously bombing four stations three days before the Spanish elections. The Spanish judiciary was unable to establish a direct link with al- Qaeda.

While the ‘strengthening’ effect on al-Qaeda of the World Trade Center attacks was direct, the ‘strengthening’ effect of the US ‘war on terror’ was indirect and inadvertent. Indeed, initially, the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan weakened al-Qaeda, for with the toppling of the Taliban government al-Qaeda lost its hosts and its territorial base. However, rather than this facilitating the capture of its leaders and the collapse of the organization, al-Qaeda adapted itself. It adopted a simpler cell-type structure and transformed itself into a more loosely knit network and above all into an idea. Indeed al-Qaeda became one of the most powerful ideas in the Muslim world as its leadership, Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawaheri, eluded even the most highly trained American ‘special forces’ units.

One of the key factors which led to a strengthening of al-Qaeda was the weakening of American counter-terror efforts as the US opened another front in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. This operation diverted resources away from the real ‘war on terror’, leaving American forces overstretched and thus undermining continuing operations in Afghanistan. Moreover, the removal of Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian regime opened up Iraq not just to democratic aspirations but also to Islamist and jihadi forces, including al-Qaeda operatives and al-Qaeda sympathizers. The civil war that followed provided a fertile breeding ground for radical Islamist ideas and territorial pockets for jihadis.

jihad

Struggle in the way of God.

A fundamental tenet of Islam consisting of the Greater jihad which is above all a personal struggle to be a better Muslim and the Lesser jihad which is physical fighting.

And last but certainly not least, the US ‘war on terror’, rather than isolating the extremists by cutting them off from their popular support base, funding and communication, increased Muslim solidarity as its heavy-handedness and lack of political nuance allowed it to be perceived as a ‘war on Islam’. This too helped al- Qaeda to strengthen its organization. Thus it is not too surprising that in July 2007 the US government released a report stating that, despite many military campaigns and counter-terror operations against it, al-Qaeda had not only managed to regroup but was, in fact, now stronger than at any time since the 11 September attacks. Al-Qaeda had found refuge in the Afghan-Pakistani tribal border areas, which were de facto not under Pakistani state control. There, according to US intelligence, it was conducting training, planning operations and nurturing relations with its affiliates in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. US intelligence also detected an upsurge in communications and an increased flow of money, raising the possibility of further attacks. Moreover, the continuing political instabilty that dogged Pakistan as President Musharaf laboured to stay in power did not suggest that al-Qaeda’s territorial sanctuary was likely to be effectively challenged. If anything, the turmoil in Pakistan appeared to offer al- Qaeda a further breeding ground for new recruits and a promising arena for challenging American interests.