The 'war on terror' in South-East Asia

The ‘war on terror’ was not, however, limited to the Middle East and what the world perceived as the heartland of the Muslim faith, for the rise of political Islam

see Chapter 19

also had repercussions for other regions less commonly associated with radical Islamic beliefs.

Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Organization founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand to provide a forum for regional economic co-operation.

From 1979 it took on more of a political and security role. Membership increased with the accession of Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Burma in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.

The bombings shook up a hitherto complacent Indonesian government, which had previously denied the existence of JI. It placed formulating a response to JI on the top of the security agenda of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) because of JI's regional aims and structure. These aims are to establish a South-East Asian Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines and Thailand, as well as purifying Islam within those countries. JI is structured hierarchically under an emir across four regions or mantiqis. Mantiqi I covers Singapore and Malaysia and its main function is eco­nomic.

While ASEAN increased security and intelligence co-operation in order to deal with JI it was left up to the individual member states to devise their own counter­terror strategies. As a result there was no uniform approach. The Philippines, in whose southern territories most of JI's training camps were located, decided to confront JI militarily. The counter-terror efforts thus became integrated into the ongoing low-intensity conflict of the Manila government with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. As a predominantly Christian country, the Philippines had no difficulty accepting American military aid, including troops. However, President Gloria Macagapal Arroyo made it very clear that in doing so the Philippines was not joining the global ‘war on terror' but rather the United States was contribut­ing to a local ‘war on terror' that pre-dated the American effort by three decades. The aim of the military operations was the total destruction of JI's camps in order to remove its training capacity.

Singapore's counter-terror strategy revolved around the already existing Internal Security Act (ISA), which allowed for surveillance and arrests of terror suspects. The city-state's approach resulted from the discovery of a JI plan to attack US and Israeli targets in Singapore in December 2001. Increased surveillance and pre-emptive arrests were accompanied by a rethinking of non-Muslim—Muslim relations, increased efforts to include Singapore's Muslim minority more comprehensively in all aspects of life, and a conscious decision to reach out to the families of the arrested jihadis and to support them. Like Singapore, Malaysia based its strategy on its ISA. However, unlike Singapore, Malaysia had to balance counter-terror against the Muslim sensitivities of its own population and the government's own Islamic credentials.

Indonesia faced the greatest obstacles in formulating a counter-terror strategy. The country had been heavily hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and was still in the process of its transition to democracy after the fall of Suharto in 1998. As part of this reform process the military’s power had been reduced and any involvement of the army in counter-terrorism was ruled out because there were fears that the armed forces might use such a role in order to regain their old position. Similarly the idea of an ISA was rejected because it could be abused by the security sector. Counter-terror thus became the domain of the police, which was undergoing a ‘civilianization’ and reform process and whose capacity was limited in both resources and personnel. Moreover, like Malaysia, the Indonesian government had to tread carefully as it was a predominantly Muslim country with very vocal Islamist opposition groups. At the same time it had to act, as Indonesia was JI’s arena of jihad and the country was thus faced with more vio­lence than any other state. Indeed, as Indonesian investigators soon discovered, the Bali bombings were not the first JI attacks. They had been preceded by a car bomb attack on Jakarta’s Istiqlal mosque in April 1999, a bomb attack on the residence of the Philippine ambassador in August 2000, a car bomb attack on the Jakarta stock exchange in September 2000, bomb attacks on eleven churches across the country on 24 December 2000 and on two churches in Jakarta in July 2001, another bomb attack on a church in November 2001, and a grenade attack near the US embassy warehouse in Jakarta in September 2002. Until the Bali bombings, these attacks were seen as unconnected and were attributed to elements disgruntled with the reform or political process.

The Indonesian government adopted what it called a ‘soft’ counter-terror approach. At the heart of this approach were intelligence gathering and arrests, followed by prosecution and trials, jail sentences and even death sentences. This was accompanied by an innovative de-radicalization programme through which the Indonesian police was able to gain further insight into the JI network as well as obtaining crucial intelligence, which allowed them to arrest operational commander Abu Dujana in 2006. It is to this arrest that Indonesia attributes the lack of JI activity in 2006 and 2007.

While Indonesia was criticized by the West for treading too softly, its counter­terror approach nevertheless produced results. Since 2002 more than 200 JI members have been arrested, including several of the organization’s emirs and operational commanders. The primary impact upon JI was the disruption of its mantiqi structure and internal factionalization. Following the arrest and con­viction, albeit for immigration offences, of JI co-founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, a split emerged between Ba’asyir’s followers and a group of younger militants. The former wanted to open up the movement through the Majles Mujahedin Indonesia and to take advantage of the new post-Suharto openness to struggle politically for an Islamic state, while the latter wanted to step up the underground, military struggle. This factionalization has made it both easier and more difficult to deal with JI. On the one hand, intelligence has been forthcoming from JI members on the more radical elements. On the other hand, the disruption of the structure has meant that JI now mainly exists in cell form, which has made it more difficult to track down, infiltrate and dismantle.