The challenge of nuclear proliferation

The public justification for the invasion of Iraq, namely the removal of a regime bent on developing WMD, did apparently have an impact on a number of countries. For example, Libya, which had been headed by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi since 1969, announced in December 2003 that it was about to abandon its WMD programme.

We are taking these actions in recognition of Libya's continued commitment to its renunciation of terrorism and the excellent co-operation Libya has provided to the United States and other members of the international community in response to common global threats faced by the civilized world since September 11, 2001.

(Cited at http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/15/libya/index.html) This was a far cry from 1986 when the United States had bombed Libya in retaliation for its support for a series of terrorist acts.

The sudden transformation of Libya from an international pariah to a co­operative partner in the global war on terror stood in stark contrast to the lack of progress with Iran and North Korea. In the years following the invasion of Iraq both countries successfully defied international pressure to abandon their nuclear programmes, thus starkly revealing the limitations on American diplo­matic and military power. In the case of North Korea the sheer impossibility of bringing coercive power to bear meant that the United States was forced to agree to give the former aid in return for an apparent suspension of its nuclear programme.

A North Korea with nuclear weapons was clearly dangerous, but at least Pyongyang was both strategically and ideologically isolated.

Publicly Iran's official line was that its nuclear programme, which had been suspended throughout the 1980s, was not aimed at developing weapons. Thus, unlike North Korea, Iran did not leave the NPT and, indeed, it engaged in limited co-operation with the UN. Thus, in 2003, following reports that it was engaged in developing nuclear materials at previously non-disclosed facilities, it allowed inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear watchdog, into the country. However, despite such co-operation, Iran's nuclear programme continued to cause concern around the world, particularly in the United States. One reason for this was the fact that Iran was sitting on large oil reserves, which made external observers deeply suspicious of its claims that it needed to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

Owing to the lack of diplomatic relations between Washington and Teheran, it was the so-called EU Three (Britain, France and Germany) that took the lead in negotations with the Iranian government. However, after two long years of talks, the issue finally came to a head in August 2005 when the Iranians opened a uranium enrichment facility in Isfahan (300 miles south of Teheran). To ward off any escalation of the crisis the EU promptly offered economic and political concessions in return for shutting down the facility, but these were quickly rejected by the newly elected Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an outspoken critic of the United States.

see Chapter 15

see Chapter 19

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT)

Proposed by the USSR and the United States in 1968, and subsequently approved by the UNGA, the treaty prohibits the proliferation of nuclear weaponry to ‘new’ countries. It has been ratified by more than 180 nations but has not prevented some states from either openly or secretly acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

European Union (EU)

A political and economic community of nations formed in 1992 in Maastricht by the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In addition to the agreements of the European Community, the EU incorporated two inter-governmental — or supra­national — ‘pillars’ that tie the member states of the EU together: one dealing with common foreign and security policy, and the other with legal affairs. The number of member states of the EU has expanded from twelve in 1992 to twenty-seven in 2007.

However, despite the obvious international concern, by the autumn of 2007 the standoff remained essentially unchanged. In August 2007 Iran and the IAEA negotiated a deal in which the former agreed to a timetable to settle any outstanding issues arising from their nuclear programme, but continued to insist that it had no intention of developing weapons. The Americans and the other Western powers remained sceptical, but there was a division between the permanent members of the UN Security Council. While the Americans received firm support from Britain and, after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in the spring of 2007, also from the French, this hardly sufficed, for Iran maintained good ties with Russia and China. In fact, the Iranian nuclear programme had benefited from both Russian technical assistance and purchases of Chinese material to help in the uranium enrichment process that is necessary to develop nuclear power.

In the end, the plain truth was that within a few years of the invasion of Iraq, the American ability to deal with what had been defined as a crucial aspect of its national security agenda, namely preventing unfriendly states from acquiring nuclear weapons, had been severely hampered. North Korea had apparently been successful in its nuclear blackmail. Iran remained defiant. President Ahmadinejad's speeches to the UN General Assembly in New York in October 2007 were notable for his references to ‘arrogant powers' and his criticism of the continued American occupation of Iraq. He also flatly maintained that the Iranian nuclear issue was ‘now closed'. The State Department imme­diately countered, saying that Ahmadinejad was the only one who thought that way, but it appeared that in 2007, with America's standing in the world severely diminished compared with just a few years earlier, the Iranians had no reason to be concerned about a potential attack. The once-confident ‘hyperpower', as the former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine described the United States, appeared to be in serious need of a fresh approach to its foreign policy.