International Relations

The emergence of an independent Ukraine was an event of major geopolitical significance. However, the international community was slow to realize it. The Kremlin was convinced that Ukrainian independence was a passing phenomenon, doomed to fail as it had in the past.

By the mid-1990s, Western and, more slowly and reluctantly, Russian statesmen began to consider the ramifications that a Ukrainian state, strategically located between Russia and Europe, would have for the greatly altered geopolitical chessboard of Eurasia. The influential American analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski put it most succinctly: “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire,” adding that if Russia subordinated Ukraine, it would become an empire again.¹ Soon, contacts between Washington and Kiev began to expand. East European countries such as Poland and Hungary realized the usefulness of having Ukraine serve as a buffer between them and an unpredictable Russia. Moreover, West European states came to view Ukraine as a possible bridge to its huge northern neighbor. For Russia, a key goal of its foreign policy became the prevention of Ukraine’s entry, be it political, economic, or military, into the western camp. For a country that only a decade earlier had been a nonentity on the geopolitical map, this rise to international significance was a remarkable change indeed.

Despite the fact that Kiev had practically no experience in conducting international affairs, it did remarkably well.

Undoubtedly, the paramount issue in Ukraine’s foreign policy was the country’s relationship with Russia. As the disarray caused by the disintegration of the USSR settled, Russia’s new (and not so new) policy towards the former Soviet republics emerged. Its goal was, first, to establish Russia’s primacy in the former Soviet space and, second, to integrate, politically, economically, and militarily, the newly independent states into a Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine’s position was diametrically opposed: it insisted on equality in its relations with Russia and steadfastly rejected any aspects of the CIS that might infringe on its sovereignty. In dealing with Russia, Ukraine’s first two presidents differed in style: Leonid Kravchuk (1991–4) was more belligerent while Leonid Kuchma (1994–) was more cooperative, especially in economic affairs. But neither was willing to compromise on the key issue of sovereignty. As a result, tensions and confrontations between the two countries occurred throughout much of the decade.

Dismayed by Ukraine’s refusal to recognize Russia’s regional primacy, Russian politicians – the Duma and Iuri Luzhkov, the powerful mayor of Moscow, were especially outspoken – responded by threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

Another source of friction was economic relations. Ukraine depended on Russia for about 90% of its oil and 77% of its natural gas needs, accumulating huge debts for these energy supplies. When Russia threatened to cut off supplies, as it did during the so-called energy war in 1993–4, or to raise prices and demand payment, Ukrainians complained that this was done in order to exert political pressure. By the late 1990s, Russian gas and oil companies began to demand repayment, if not in cash, which Ukraine did not have, then in kind. They expected Kiev to sign over ownership to Russian companies of the refineries and the pipelines that carried Russian oil and gas through Ukraine to the West. If this option were unacceptable, Russian energy companies demanded ownership of other attractive industrial objects in Ukraine. The threat that Ukraine’s industry might become increasingly foreign-owned loomed large.

Russian pressure on Ukraine was all the more threatening because it was abetted by influential elements within the country, notably the resurgent Communist party – a dominant force in Parliament – and many Russian-speakers in the eastern regions. Both wanted Ukraine to join the Russian-Belarus union. To counter this pressure, Ukraine began to develop closer ties with the United States and NATO. Confronted with a stalemate, both sides decided to introduce some stability into their tense relationship by signing, in May 1997, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership. Moscow acceded to a key Ukrainian demand: it recognized Ukraine’s borders and territorial integrity, including its sovereignty over Crimea and Sevastopol. In a separate accord, Russia received 80% of the Black Sea Fleet and the use of facilities in Sevastopol on a 20-year lease.

To a large extent, Ukraine’s relationship with the West was a function of its relationship with Russia. If its independence were to have any real meaning, Ukraine had to balance the preponderant and unavoidable Russian influence by developing closer ties with the West. But this had to be done in a manner that would not exacerbate tensions with its huge northern neighbor. Other factors also played a role in the development of contacts with the West. Ukrainians viewed themselves as Europeans and, for the most part, supported the idea of “a return to Europe.” (Whether Europe welcomed this “return” was another question.) Moreover, the West’s high standards of living added greatly to its attractiveness. Indeed, from the all-important economic point of view, only the West could provide the investment needed to resuscitate Ukraine’s collapsing economy.

It was, as might be expected, the relationship with the United States that was most crucial for Ukraine. Clearly this global superpower was best suited to serve as a counterweight to Russia. However, matters did not begin auspiciously. The United States was obsessed with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ukraine, convinced that only its status as a nuclear power guaranteed its security and ensured that it would merit attention internationally, refused to ratify Salt II and to disarm its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, after the Soviet collapse, Washington adopted a “Russia first” policy on the assumption that Moscow was best able to restore stability in the former USSR. For its part, Ukraine consistently rejected the idea that Russia had a natural claim to primacy, in the cis or otherwise. The fact that reforms in Ukraine moved more slowly than in Russia only added to the American perception of Ukraine as a “spoiler republic.”

Beginning in 1994, however, u.s.-Ukrainian relations improved dramatically.

Another important aspect of Ukraine’s relationship with the West was its contacts with NATO. The decision of this military-political alliance to accept such former Soviet satellites as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into its ranks confronted Kiev with a dilemma: an expanding NATO on one side and an assertive Russia on the other left neutral Ukraine in a highly vulnerable position. Initially, Ukraine expressed its doubts about the wisdom of NATO expansion. But here also a sudden and radical shift occurred. On 8 February 1995, Ukraine became the first CIS country to accept NATO’S invitation to enter its Partnership for Peace program, which called for limited cooperation between the alliance and non-member countries in the area of military training and security arrangements.

If history were a guide, then Ukraine might have expected serious problems with its immediate neighbors to the west, especially Poland, Hungary, and Romania. In the past, all of these states had been strongly, even uncompromisingly, opposed to the very idea of Ukrainian independence. Moreover, after 1991 there was the potential for conflicts arising over territorial claims and the treatment of minorities. Fortunately, not only were confrontations avoided but relations with these neighbors developed, for the most part, surprisingly well. Kiev perceived in these countries, some of which were about to be accepted into NATO and the European Union, potential supporters of its efforts to “return to Europe.” They, in turn, realized the value of having Ukraine serve as a buffer between them and Russia. This view was enunciated by Jacek Kuron, the prominent Polish intellectual and politician when he stated, “There can be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine.”²

In April 1993, Kravchuk attempted to entice the so-called Vishegrad Countries of Eastern Europe into a broadly based mutual security arrangement that pointedly excluded Russia. Because the East Europeans were intent on entering NATO, they politely rejected this proposal. But in 1996 they did invite Ukraine to join the Central European Initiative, a grouping of ten central and southern European countries whose goal was to foster greater regional economic and political cooperation. In 1999 President Kuchma hosted a conference of presidents from these countries in Lviv.

In terms of bilateral relations, Ukraine’s unusually close and productive ties with Poland were by far the most important. Poland had been the first state to recognize Ukrainian independence. As their contacts broadened, the two states signed, in May 1997, a Declaration of Understanding and Unity, which called on their citizens to set aside the animosities of the past and to concentrate on cooperative relations. As it had in the past, Poland served as Ukraine’s primary link with Europe. It was in Poland’s interest to encourage Ukraine’s western orientation. Poland’s policy of keeping its borders open to Ukrainians was only one example of these cordial relations. Ukraine’s relations with Hungary also developed well. To a large extent, this was due to Kiev’s liberal treatment of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority of about 160,000, which was concentrated in Transcarpathia.

Ukraine’s relations with its other neighbors were more problematic. In the early 1990s, its relations with Romania were strained by Romanian claims that northern Bukovyna, southern Bessarabia, and oil-rich Serpent Island had been illegally annexed to Ukraine as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. Because of its desire to join NATO, Romania was anxious to avoid controversy with its neighbors, and it eventually dropped its territorial claims. In June 1997, the two countries signed a Treaty on Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations. Another potential trouble spot was Mold-ova, where pro-Russian elements established the so-called Dniester Republic, a separate mini-state. Here Ukraine attempted to play the role of honest broker between the separatist elements and the Moldovan state. The one neighbor Ukraine was clearly at odds with – in terms of policies, not actual confrontations – was Belarus. The attempts of Belarussian president Aleks-ander Lukashenka to preserve as much as possible of the Soviet system and, especially, the entry of Belarus into a union with Russia set an example that many leftists in Ukraine wanted to follow. But it was contrary to what the Ukrainian political elite and, apparently, the majority of Ukrainians desired. Consequently, relations between these two closely related neighbors remained correct but cool.

Although Ukraine’s policy of drawing closer to the West was certainly aided by its diplomatic successes, there was no guarantee that this goal would be achieved. Repeatedly Ukrainians heard from their western partners that the true measure of Ukraine’s readiness to “return to Europe” would be not diplomatic arrangements but progress in domestic, particularly economic, reforms. Here success would be much more difficult to achieve.