ANNEX PARTI
Bilateral Exercise 1: Integrated Negotiations about a trade and cooperation agreement between the European Union and Quarania
European Union
You will negotiate on behalf of the European Union with a government representative of Quarania about a new trade and cooperation agreement.
You will try to reach a negotiated result that should be as positive as possible by exchanging concessions.Below you will find two tables. The upper table contains a list of concessions that you may give to your opponent; the lower table contains concessions that you would like to receive from your opponent. Every concession has a certain value. This value is expressed by a number. A high number means that this concession is of great value to you. It is up to you to decide how many and which concessions you are willing to trade for concessions of Quarania, but try to maximize your final score!
You calculate your final score by adding up the concessions, if any, that you did not give away (in the upper table) to the concessions that you actually received (in the lower table).
| Possible concession of the European Union: | Valuetoyou |
| Better access to the EU market for agricultural products Technical assistance for industrial technology transfer Financial protocol (a 'soft' loan of 500 MEURO—another burden on the EU budget) Special aid programme to restructure the Quaranian government Abandoning of the import restrictions on textiles (southern EU member states have objections) Generous visa policy for citizens of Quarania (Quarania only has a small population) Subtotal of concessions that you did not give away: | 3 4 6 4 7 2 (A) |
| Possible concession of Quarania: | Value to you |
| Release profits of EU investments (the only way to make worthwhile investments for EU companies) Enlarging landing rights of EU carriers (the capital Tarbad has strategic position for flights to the Far East) Closing of the nuclear plant at Chozno Better market access for industrial EU products Better market access for EU services Political dialogue about democracy and human rights (one of the underlying conditions for this agreement is the democratic development of Quarania) Subtotal of concessions that you received: | 8 6 5 3 7 7 (B) |
Final Score (A+B)
Bilateral Exercise 2: Integrated Negotiations about a trade and cooperation agreement between the European Union and Quarania
Quarania
You will negotiate on behalf of the Quaranian government with a representative of the European Union about a new trade and cooperation agreement.
You will try to reach a negotiated result that should be as positive as possible by exchanging concessions.Below you will find two tables. The upper table contains a list of concessions that you may give to your opponent; the lower table contains concessions that you would like to receive from your opponent. Every concession has a certain value. This value is expressed by a number. A high number means that this concession is of great value to you. It is up to you to decide how many and which concessions you are willing to trade for concessions of the EU, but try to maximize your final score!
You calculate your final score by adding up the concessions, if any, that you did not give away (in the upper table) to the concessions that you actually received (in the lower table).
Possible concession of Quarania: Value to you
Release profits of EU investors (reinvestment of profits is essential for the economic development of 6 Quarania)
Enlarging landing rights of EU carriers on your national airport of Tarbad city 5
Closing of the nuclear plant at Chozno (most important supplier of energy) 4
Better market access for industrial EU products in Quarania 6
Better market access for EU services in Quarania 3
Political dialogue about democracy and human rights 2
Subtotal of concessions that you did not give away: (A)
Possible concession of the European Union: Value to you
Better access to the EU market for agricultural products (most important export sector) 2
Technical assistance for industrial technology transfer (however industry is hardly developed) 2
Financial protocol (a 'soft' loan of 500 MEURO—this support is crucial for your balance of payments) 10
Special aid programme for the restructuring of the Quaranian government services 8
Abandoning restrictions on textile import 5
Generous visa policy for citizens of Quarania (a lot of working migrants would like to move to the EU) 9
Subtotal of concessions that you received: (B)
Final score (A+B)
PART II
| Minilateral exercise | France | Italy | Spain | UK | Denmark | Sweden | Common total |
| Evacuation of EU Citizens | |||||||
| No decision is taken concerning evacuation | -20 | -10 | -5 | -10 | 0 | 5 | -40 |
| The Council decides not to evacuate EU citizens | -30 | -20 | -15 | -15 | -5 | 0 | -85 |
| The Council decides that evacuation will take place | 30 | 30 | 20 | 20 | 5 | -10 | 95 |
| immediately | |||||||
| or within the next two weeks | 10 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 15 | 55 |
| or within the next month | 5 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 10 | 20 | 45 |
| Additionally, decides to have it protected by an | 10 | 5 | -5 | 0 | -5 | 0 | 5 |
| ad hoc coalition led by France | |||||||
| or by EU Forces | -5 | 10 | 5 | -10 | -5 | -5 | -10 |
| or by a NATO Combined Joint Task Force | -20 | -10 | 10 | 15 | 10 | -15 | -10 |
(Continued)
Part II cont’d
| Minilateral exercise | France | Italy | Spain | UK | Denmark | Sweden | Common total |
| Evacuation of EU Citizens | |||||||
| Mediation in the Conflict | |||||||
| No decision is taken about mediation | -10 | -10 | -5 | -5 | 0 | -5 | -35 |
| The Council decides to mediate in the conflict | 15 | 10 | 5 | -10 | 5 | 10 | 35 |
| The Council allows France to mediate on its behalf | 20 | 5 | -5 | -5 | -5 | -5 | 5 |
| The Council asks the UN to mediate | -20 | -15 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 5 | -5 |
| Humanitarian Aid | |||||||
| -5 | -5 | -10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -20 | |
| aid | |||||||
| The Council decides not to deliver humanitarian aid | -15 | -15 | -5 | -5 | -5 | 0 | -45 |
| The Council decides to deliver humanitarian aid, | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 10 | 5 | 75 |
| protected or not | |||||||
| Additionally, the Council decides to do so | 10 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 5 | -10 | 30 |
| under military protection | |||||||
| Council's Political Position | |||||||
| Press release condemns all parties involved within the | -5 | -5 | 10 | 15 | 15 | 30 | 60 |
| conflict | |||||||
| Press release condemns only the Janubian Government | -20 | -20 | 0 | 10 | 10 | -5 | -25 |
| Press release condemns only the IPP, the RIF and | 15 | 15 | 0 | -5 | 5 | -10 | 20 |
| similar groups | |||||||
| Press release expresses support of the Janubian | 30 | 30 | -10 | -15 | -5 | -15 | 15 |
| Government | |||||||
| Press release expresses neither support to nor | 5 | 5 | -5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| condemnation of any of the parties | |||||||
| National score in optimal solution (shaded cells) | 75 | 65 | 55 | 45 | 35 | 25 | 300 |
| Maximum national score (bold figures in table) | 125 | 120 | 70 | 80 | 60 | 65 | |
| Common result if national score is maximized | 245 | 245 | 285 | 245 | 195 | 250 | |
PART III
Multilateral Exercise
Case: Negotiating the establishment of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO)
Objective
The objective of this simulation exercise is to practice and sharpen multilateral negotiation skills and to analyse verbal and nonverbal negotiation behaviour.
Scenario
It is 21 July 1971.
Recent natural disasters, such as the severe floods in Central Europe, droughts in Afghanistan and Western Africa, as well as earthquakes in the USSR, Turkey, Indonesia and Peru, have prompted the United Nations to consider its structural involvement in disaster relief operations. Many UN institutions, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are in fact already working in this area, but their efforts are not well coordinated. Public opinion demands better coordination of relief efforts, as it does not want its (voluntary) funds to be wasted.At the initiative of a number of disaster- stricken developing countries, the General Assembly of the UN requested the SecretaryGeneral in 1969 to draft a comprehensive report on the possibilities of rationalizing and improving the work of the UN system in disaster relief operations. This report, which became available at the 3 July 1971 session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), emphasized the urgent need for improved organizational arrangements in the provision of assistance by and through the United Nations system.
The ambitious US Permanent Representative to the UN, George Bush, immediately followed up on the Secretary-General's report by calling for the establishment of a United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), that would ‘mobilise, direct and coordinate' disaster relief efforts by UN institutions and non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross. The staff of the US Permanent Representation to the UN at Geneva has been taking long hours in redrafting a resolution for adoption by the ECOSOC at its plenary session of 23 July, the day after tomorrow. Elements of this draft have been discussed in informal meetings with various member states, the UN Secretariat and other stakeholders.
Procedure
Before the crucial plenary session of 23 July, the draft resolution will be discussed in a Special Working Group on Disaster Relief, consisting of representatives of the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Tunisia, Peru, Indonesia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and chaired by the UN Secretariat (UNS) in Geneva. Consensus is needed between the representatives of the member states; UNICEF and the ICRC can only try to influence their decisions (they have no voting power). The meeting takes place in formal and informal sessions. The objective of the meeting—and the responsibility of the chair— is to iron out preferably all of the differences of opinion concerning the mandate, function and status of UNDRO.