DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE PROCESSES: THE CARTER CENTER

Note: This section is built upon open-source material and interviews with actors directly involved in the NGO.

Former US President Jimmy Carter and former First Lady Rosalynn Carter established the Carter Center in 1982.

1. Emphasize action and results. Based on careful research and analysis, it is prepared to take timely action on important and pressing issues.

2. Do not duplicate the effective efforts of others.

3. Address difficult problems and recognize the possibility of failure as an acceptable risk.

4. Remain nonpartisan and act as a neutral in dispute resolution activities.

5. Believe that people can improve their lives when provided with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources.

The Carter Center collaborates with other organizations, public and private, in car­rying out its mission. Considered to be free of political or partisan positions, non­governmental organizations such as the Carter Center have been able to gain access, build relationships, and offer mediation services in situations where more formal diplomacy has not been immediately welcomed (Diamond & McDonald 1996). War-torn countries also may be more receptive to organizations such as the Carter Center that have already provided them with humanitarian or devel­opment assistance.

Early on, the Carter Center developed cri­teria for its engagement in violent conflict. In particular, it established that three conditions had to be met in order to develop a full intervention. The first condition was that conflict parties must explicitly and directly request the intervention. While explorations were conducted in many situations, only when all relevant parties involved explicitly requested a more active role for the Carter Center was engagement initiated. The second criterion for engagement was that the Carter Center must be able to identify a clear role for it to play in the engagement. Due to the international respect afforded former President Carter, and the esteem in which the Carter Center is held, it became obvious that appeals for assistance would be made to the Center regardless of its ability to deliver niche services. The last criterion for engagement was monetary. Before engaging in peace­building activities, the Carter Center verified that an appropriate financial investment was available to make its initiatives sustained and viable.

Among the most notable experiences of the Carter Center, the following are clearly relevant to this study: Korea (starting in 1993), Yugoslavia (1994), Burundi (1991), Haiti (1994), Uganda (2002), Sudan (1990), and Liberia (1992). Each case would require an in-depth analysis, but it is helpful to note that in several of these cases the contribution of the Carter Center has lasted due to the effects that its initiatives produced in the larger system. For example, in Burundi, where the peace process is coming to a positive conclusion after years of very difficult negotiations, the Carter Center was able to initiate a trend that led to constructive steps.

The Carter Center plays an important role in the monitoring of elections worldwide (Lindberg 2006; Santa Cruz 2005). It was this role that led to the Center's pro­longed engagement in Venezuela beginning in 1998. The election-monitoring delegation was led by President Carter, whose trust­building work at that time would prove invaluable in future conflict resolution ini­tiatives. In 2002, The Carter Center joined the Organization of American States and the UN Development Program to begin a formal process to help resolve Venezuela's political crisis. This tripartite working group initiated talks between Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's government and opposition groups consisting of the business community, religious foundations, and guilds, which were organizing strikes and large street protests (Ahmed & Potter 2006). The Carter Center's plan was to combine high-level mediation activities with an attempt to energize positive grassroots involvement (DeMars 2005). After consultation with William Ury of Harvard University, the Center instituted a strategy of exploring the nexus between government supporters and opposition members. Ury's “Third Side” methodology was instructive in helping to identify the actors in the nexus, who hailed from diverse backgrounds including government, civil society, academia, the business community, and religious institu­tions, and who were dedicated to nonviolent processes (Ury 2000).

Contrary to media images of popular street violence, it became clear that the nonviolent members of the process were in the majority (Sharp 2005). The real challenge was to insist that the parties continue discussions about the conflict (Johnson et al.

The credibility of third-party interveners became a key issue in the Venezuelan conflict (Arnson & Whitfield 2005). After the coup attempt against President Chavez, the United States was demonized and the OAS was viewed as too close to the American government. But President Carter’s previous involvement in election monitoring that brought Chavez to power created trust and credibility that extended from the government to the opposition and onward to the business elite. They respected the manner in which Carter and his Center professionally and impartially conducted business. At that time, there were very few people who had the capacity or credibility to engage in conflict resolution in Venezuela. It was this process of trust-building that strongly reinforced the Center’s already formidable status in the minds of the relevant actors. (See www. cartercenter.org)