EMPIRICAL PATTERNS

The deployment of peacekeepers

Most research has taken peacekeeping opera­tions as a given, with little or no consideration of when such operations are deployed. Beyond some research design concerns with the absence of control group comparisons (e.g.

Several scholars (De Jonge Oudraat, 1996; Gibbs, 1997) have asserted that the national interests of the major power states determine where peacekeepers are sent (for a critique of this position, see Andersson, 2000; Jakobsen, 1996). Yet, there have been few systematic studies that test such assertions. Mullenbach (2005) argues that international-level factors, rather than state-level ones, best account for decisions for third-party actors to create peacekeeping missions. Specifically, he notes that peacekeeping is less likely when the target state has an alliance with a major power or is a major power itself. In contrast, peacekeeping missions are more likely to form when there was prior major power intervention or involvement by the UN or a regional organization.

Other scholars focus on conditions associated with the conflict to explain mission onset. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) examine post-Cold War civil conflicts and conclude that peacekeeping operations are more likely to be deployed in high severity and protracted conflicts, but less likely in states with large government armies.

Does peacekeeping make a difference?

There are essentially two sets of empirical analysis on peacekeeping outcomes. By far, the less common but perhaps the most important are those that assess the impact of peacekeeping on conflict processes. Typically, these measure peacekeeping's effects vis-a­vis other important factors and consider both cases with peacekeeping, as well as con­trol groups' conflicts without peacekeeping deployment. In contrast are numerous studies that look at only peacekeeping cases and judge what elements lead to success or failure.

The focus and findings of peacekeeping studies depend heavily on which kinds of operations are chosen for study and what kinds of missions are assessed. In perhaps the only systematic study of its kind, Greig and Diehl (2005) examine the impact of peacekeepers on peacemaking, or the likelihood that disputants will sign a peace agreement.

To what extent does peacekeeping actually help to keep the peace? In a series of studies, Fortna (2003, 2004a, 2004b) demonstrates that peacekeeping lengthens the time for the reemergence of war, especially in the post­Cold War era, and even across different types of peace operations (observer, traditional, and multidimensional peacekeeping). Peace is more durable when peacekeepers are present. Fortna (2004b) attributes such success to a number of factors. She contends that the peacekeepers make attacks more difficult, take away the element of surprise, and raise the international costs of aggression. Among parties that desire peace, peacekeepers mitigate the security dilemma, signal mutual intentions for a peaceful resolution, and lessen the likelihood of accidents or minor engagements that could escalate.

Another set of studies concentrate on peace-building, looking at the impact of peacekeeping operations on a broad set of outcomes beyond the limitation of violence. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) explored the aftermath of civil wars to look at the conditions under which states were able to move toward democracy and avoid further conflict. Among other factors, the presence of UN peacekeepers was found to have a positive impact.

Overall, the empirical results demonstrate that peacekeeping operations do have an impact on conflictual relationships, even when controlling for other factors. Most of the time, this is positive as peacekeeping forces consistently are able to deter or otherwise inhibit the renewal of conflict. Peacekeepers are also valuable in peace-building activities. Yet, more systematic evidence also exists that peacekeeping may actually lessen the likelihood of conflict management attempts, as well as lessen their success rate when such diplomatic efforts do occur. Unfortunately, many of these findings are based on statistical analysis in which peacekeeping is merely a dichotomous variable (peacekeeping/no peacekeeping), with only a few studies going a step farther in breaking down mission types. Such studies go a long way in establishing general effects of peacekeeping operations. Yet, we know that some peacekeeping oper­ations are more successful than others, and simple analyses will not be able to detect (1) which characteristics of such operations enhance or limit their impact and (2) what con­ditions interact with peacekeeping operations to produce differential impacts. Some clues to these concerns are found in analyses of peacekeeping success.

The correlates of peacekeeping success

If the studies in the previous section have the weakness of only looking at peacekeep­ing as a dichotomous variable, studies of peacekeeping success have the advantage of examining specific peacekeeping character­istics and conditions very closely.

To some extent, what scholars find as correlates of peacekeeping success depends on where they look. Practitioners and former military officers have regularly identified a series of factors at the operational level (e.g. Skogmo, 1989). These include the clarity of the mandate, the resources provided for the operation, and a variety of concerns associated with training. Many of these findings are suspect because they are based on the biased and personal experiences of the observers as applied to unsystematic conceptions of peacekeeping success. One might surmise that they are better understood as indicative of the elements that affect the efficiency of a peacekeeping operation, rather than primary determinants of its overall success. Even when some aspects are relevant in a broader sense, they are merely indicators of some broader processes; for example, problems with mandate clarity or resources are merely indicators or manifestations of the lack of consensus within the organizing coalition or major powers in the regional or international system.

Among the numerous assessments of peacekeeping and across different concep­tions of success, there is some consensus on what factors are associated with peace­keeping success. With respect to traditional peacekeeping operations and its relatives, scholars note several factors related to the operation itself, although above the tactical level. Certainly, mandate clarity is mentioned, but as noted above this may only be a surrogate for the underlying support (political and material), or lack thereof, for the mission. More important is the geographic elements of a mission (Diehl, 1994). Peacekeeping missions are most successful when deployed so as to detect cease-fire violations adequately, be relatively invulnerable to attack, and clearly separate the combatants.

Most of the other factors identified by analysts have concerned the behavior of actors and the conditions associated with the conflict. The cooperation of the primary disputants (Bratt, 1997; Jett, 2000; MacQueen, 2002) is thought to be critical for peacekeeping success. Yet, such claims run the risk of a tautology: if peacekeeping success is defined by the lack of violence by the disputants, then lack of violence by the disputants cannot be considered a causal factor. Existing research has not clearly specified when and why disputants would choose to abandon a cease-fire and undermine the peacekeeping operation.

Beyond the primary disputants, most rel­evant are the actions of neighboring states or interested major powers. Third-party states can influence the success of a peacekeeping operation in several ways (Urquhart, 1983). Most obviously, they can directly intervene militarily in the conflict, causing a renewal of the fighting or jeopardizing the safety and mission of the peacekeeping operation. More subtly, they might supply arms and other assistance to one of the disputants (or to a subnational actor — see below) that serves to undermine the peacekeeping force's ability to limit violence. They might also bring diplomatic pressure to bear on one of the actors, such that the actor is more or less disposed to support the peacekeeping presence (Diehl, 1994; Bratt, 1997; Jett, 2000). Third-party states might also have an indirect influence on the peacekeeping operation by virtue of their relationship to the primary disputants in other contexts. Conflict between a third-party state and one of the disputants over issues related or unrelated to the conflict in question can heighten tension in the area. The new conflict could spill over and poison the cease-fire between the primary disputants. Most dangerous would be a situation in which a primary disputant is aligned with a third-party state that becomes involved in a militarized conflict with the other primary disputant. In that case, the primary disputants are often dragged into renewed conflict by virtue of competing alignment patterns. Third parties have the potential to play either a positive or negative role in the performance of peacekeeping operations. One suspects, however, that the latter is more likely. There are potentially more ways to complicate a peacekeeping operation than to assist it. Furthermore, a third-party state that supports a peacekeeping operation will likely stay out of the conflict, whereas in opposition it will tend to take a more active role.

The exception may be the major power states, especially the remaining superpower, the United States (Bratt, 1997; MacQueen, 2002). Major powers have the military capac­ity and political influence to prod recalcitrant disputants to cooperate with the peacekeeping force. Yet, for most peace missions, that major power must act impartially even if it is aligned with one of the protagonists. Major powers can also play an important supplemental role, providing critical political support within the organizing agency and contributing money, logistical support, and other forms of help to the peacekeeping operation.

Third-party states are not the only relevant actors, as many peacekeeping deployments are subject to the actions of subnational actors (e.g. see Norton, 1991). These include ethnic groups, competing political movements, and terrorist organizations. The behavior of these groups could be especially important when peacekeeping forces are thrust into areas of internal instability (Diehl, 1994; Bratt, 1997; Jett, 2000). In some cases, subnational actors may actually control larger geographic areas than the recognized government. Unlike third-party states, however, subnational actors affect peacekeeping operations primarily by direct actions of support or opposition. Their cooperation could be crucial in fostering a minimum level of violence in the area of deployment.

Overall, the key concerns with respect to third-party cooperation are their (1) prefer­ences and interests and (2) the resources they command (Diehl, 2000). If the peacekeeping operation does not serve the interests of third parties, this is likely to generate opposition to the force. Yet, this opposition alone is not sufficient to jeopardize peacekeeping success. Third parties must have significant resources that could be brought to bear upon the peacekeeping mission. Such resources include political influence with key actors and the local population in the area of peacekeeping deployment. The ability to intervene militarily or supply weaponry to those opposed to the operation may also be critical.

Generally, it seems clear that peacekeeping operations experience more problems in con­flicts that have an internal conflict component as compared to those purely between two or more states (Diehl, 1994; Wesley, 1997; Jett, 2000). There appear to be several expla­nations. First, civil conflicts often involve more than two identifiable groups in conflict; by definition, an internationalized civil war involves more than two actors. In contrast, interstate disputes have been overwhelmingly dyadic. Thus, as the number of actors in the dispute increases so does the likelihood that one or more of them will object to the cease­fire and the provisions for the deployment of the peacekeeping forces; they may take military action against other actors or the peacekeeping forces. Beyond the difficulty of aggregating multiple preferences in support of a peacekeeping operation, the geographic requirements (found to be significant above) are different in a civil conflict than an interstate one. Civil instability may mean that several groups are operating in different parts of the country. This could necessitate that the peacekeeping operation covers a broader territory, opening up the possibility of more violent incidents. Furthermore, unlike an identifiable international border or cease­fire line, it may be impossible to demarcate a line or area that separates the many sides in the conflict. Being from the same state and often not wearing military uniforms (indeed, sometimes not being traditional military or paramilitary units at all), participants in a civil conflict are hard to identify, much less to separate when they occupy the same geographic area. Interstate disputants can more easily be identified and separated across internationally recognized borders or mili­tarily defined cease-fire lines. Civil conflict may be quite dangerous to peacekeeping and the situation more difficult to control. James (1994: 17) notes that in civil conflict, ‘Arms are likely to be in the hands of groups who may be unskilled in their use, lack tight discipline, and probably engage in guerrilla tactics. Light arms are also likely to be kept in individual homes, and may be widely distributed.' These conditions open the peacekeepers up to sniper fire and other problems, as well as making it virtually impossible to secure a given area fully. The international response to civil conflicts, or at least that of UN peacekeepers, has been inappropriate and has undermined effectiveness (Wesley, 1997). UN planners have misread many of the situations and the traditional peacekeeping strategies have not easily translated into the civil conflict context.

Peacekeepers have also been judged to be more effective in the later phases of conflict than in earlier ones (Diehl, 1994; Bratt, 1997; Jett, 2000; MacQueen, 2002). There has only been one operation in the previolence phase (UN operation in Macedonia), and therefore no basis yet for generalizations. Yet, research indicates that peacekeepers have problems during active hostilities as they do not have the equipment or mandate to carry out what are essentially enforcement missions (Boulden, 2001). Peacekeepers are given credit for conflict abatement in the post-cease fire, pre­settlement phase. Yet, the consensus seems to be that peacekeeping is most effective in a fourth conflict phase; after the disputants have signed a peace agreement (not merely a cease-fire) and the peacekeeping force is charged with assisting in the implementation of that agreement. Deployment in that phase gets the operation out of the peacemaking dilemma identified by Greig and Diehl (2005) and increases the likelihood of cooperation from relevant parties.

Deployment in the final phase of conflict may increase the chances of success, but it does not guarantee it. Many of the missions in this phase are peace-building ones, and prominent research has helped identify when such missions are likely to be successful. Peace-building is a long-term process and it is difficult to identify correlates of success for a process that is still incomplete in most cases. Paris (2004) is critical of the way that peace­building strategies have been implemented. He decries the world community's attempts to build democracy and stability too quickly and without adequate resources. He also thinks that the domestic institutions need to be properly strengthened before peace­building can succeed. This is suggestive that there may be prerequisites for success that are directly outside the control of the peace-building operation itself. The war- proneness of democratizing states (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005) is also a condition that seems to complicate any attempts at peace­building.

Doyle and Sambanis (2006) considered peace-building in the aftermath of a large sample of civil wars. They conclude that a UN mission is a virtual prerequisite for some peace-building success; even under the best of other conditions (even with low levels of hostility), UN intervention is needed unless high levels of local capacity are present. UN missions usually produce results superior to those in which UN action is absent, but suc­cess may be elusive under conditions of high hostility and a legacy of significant casualties. In general, peacebuilding is also negatively affected by ethic cleavages, large numbers of factions, and low initial development levels. As with some of the factors associated with success in traditional missions, these are contextual factors largely out of the control of the peacekeeping operation.

Another looming concern is the effect of the organizing agency on the effectiveness of the operation. Regional organizations have recently taken on greater peacekeeping roles, and the relative effectiveness of those operations vis-a-vis those managed by the United Nations is a theoretical and policy concern. It is difficult to generalize on this given the wide variation in capabilities and peacekeeping scenarios across different regional organizations. Nevertheless, there are a number of hypothesized advantages to regional operations, such as greater consensus and support and restraint of third-party states. Similarly, some purported disadvan­tages, relative to UN operations, including problems with regional hegemons, meeting external threats, and inadequate resources, may outweigh such advantages (see Diehl, 1994; Bellamy and Williams, 2005b). There is not yet, however, a definitive study that systematically compares UN and regional effectiveness (nor hybrid operations).