AN OVERVIEW OF PERSUASION THEORY AND RESEARCH

Although theory and research on persuasion have been brought to bear on the study of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution, our perusal of recent reviews (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley, 2000; Pruitt, 1998) suggests that conflict researchers may be largely unaware of current advances in under­standing persuasion.

The Paradigmatic Persuasion Experiment

Before we discuss theory and research in persuasion, it is important to under­stand how research is typically conducted in this area of social psychology and how we can (and cannot) relate the results obtained in such settings to real- world situations such as negotiation. In this section, we describe the prototypical persuasion experiment, highlight key differences between the laboratory and the “real world,” and discuss how persuasion research has addressed this gap.

The prototypical persuasion study takes place in a university laboratory and investigates what effect exposure to persuasive messages has on an audience’s atti­tudes, beliefs, or behavioral intentions. These studies typically involve a message (information about a given issue), a source (the communicator of the message), and an audience or recipient (the person receiving the persuasive message). Most notably, such studies examine the extent to which message recipients’ attitudes move toward the position advocated in the message. Such messages are designed to convey not only the specific position advocated by the source, but also a series of arguments that support the truth, desirability, or reasonableness of that position.

The issues addressed in such paradigmatic persuasion studies are wide-ranging, including foreign affairs (for example, should Israel withdraw from the West Bank?), racial issues (affirmative action, policing policies), business and government proposals (retirement benefits, corporate mergers), and a host of more mundane issues of relevance to targeted audience members’ work, school, or personal lives. The traditional paradigm allows experimenters to study how aspects of the source, the message, and the recipient influence attitude change. For example, research has established that persuasion tends to increase as the perceived trust­worthiness, expertise, and likeability of a source increase or as the number and strength of the arguments presented increase. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.)

Despite the range of issues and variables studied in persuasion research, the essential paradigm is somewhat constrained in its portrayal of natural persua­sion settings. A one-way, source-to-audience model of persuasion only directly reflects some of the contexts in which social influence occurs. Although it might afford an accurate picture of persuasion through exposure to public media such as television, newspaper, and the Internet, or in public forums such as political rallies, it is unlikely to capture the dynamic aspects of persuasion that occur in the kinds of interpersonal interaction that characterize negotiations.

In contrast to the one-shot, one-way message transmissions used in the per­suasion paradigm, conflict and conflict resolution involve dynamic, repeated inter­actions between sources and targets who together engage in bidirectional, mutual attempts at persuasion.

Persuasion researchers can and do study persuasion as it relates to complex social settings; they traditionally do so by adding layers of complexity to the basic paradigm described earlier. This involves introducing new variables that capture the essential features of particular settings. For example, researchers have explored the role of multiple sources by varying whether persuasive messages are attributed to a single source or to multiple sources and have exam­ined the effects of direct interpersonal influence by leading study participants to expect an interaction with the message source. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1998.)

So, although the prototypical persuasion paradigm serves as the underlying framework for theory and research, it has been treated only as a skeletal framework onto which variables are added to understand more fully the complex processes of persuasion. At the same time, it is clear that the framework represents in some ways a simplification of social influence in real-life contexts, such as those involving conflict resolution, and it is probably the case that no one experi­mental paradigm in persuasion can ever address all the inherent complexities of persuasion in such situations with complete success.

The Heuristic-Systematic Model

Theories of persuasion that explain how attitude change occurs as a result of two qualitatively different modes of processing are called dual-process theories. Dual-process perspectives have been increasingly influential in numerous domains of social psychology, including prejudice, stereotyping, and decision making (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999) and have recently been applied in the negotiation domain as well (see De Dreu, 2004).

Our theoretical perspective, called the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996; Chen and Chaiken, 1999), is one of several dual­process models proven to be important in contemporary social psychology. We treat this model simply as a perspective, borrowing terms and insights from other dual-process models wherever it is useful to do so. Our goal is to acquaint the reader with dual-process models in general and exploit the general perspective these models offer for understanding conflict and negotiation.

Modes of Information Processing. Like other dual-process theories, the heuristic-systematic model proposes two distinct modes of information processing. Systematic processing involves attempts to thoroughly understand any information encountered through careful attention, deep thinking, and intensive reasoning about relevant stimuli (such as arguments, sources, and the causes of sources’ behavior) and to integrate this information as a basis for subsequent attitudes, judgments, and behaviors. A systematic approach to pro­cessing information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might entail reading as many magazine and newspaper reports as possible to learn and develop an opinion about the “best” course of action for a given party.

Relative to systematic processing, heuristic processing is much less demand­ing in terms of the mental work required and much less dependent on adequate levels of personal or situational capacity (such as knowledge and time). In fact, heuristic processing has often been characterized as relatively automatic insofar as it requires little cognitive effort and capacity (Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Heuristic processing involves focusing on salient and easily comprehended cues, such as a source’s credentials, the group membership of those endorsing an opinion, or the number of arguments presented. These cues activate well- learned decision rules known as heuristics. Examples include “experts know best,” “in-group but not out-group sources can be trusted,” and “argument length implies argument strength.” These simple associative rules allow judg­ments, attitudes, and intentions to be formed quickly and efficiently, with little additional cognitive processing. A heuristic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might involve simply adopting the opinion of a noted Middle-East political expert. Put simply, heuristics are the ifs in an if-then rule structure, and judgments are the thens (“If expert, then agree”).

Cognitive Consequences of Processing Modes. Although heuristic processing is more superficial, and systematic processing involves greater depth of detail, neither mode is necessarily more or less rational. Nonoptimal, poor, or biased judgments can ensue from either mode. In the case of heuristic processing, many of the mental rules of thumb that people use to make judgments have proven useful and reliable in the past and should presumably remain so in the present. Moreover, in a world that offers abundant information but too little time or opportunity to think in a detailed, systematic way about every decision, heuristic processing can be highly functional.

However, heuristic processing is obviously fallible. Experts can sometimes be wrong, one’s own group is not always right, and numerous reasons are not always good reasons. Thus, although heuristic processing can and often does produce reasonable judgments that people hold with relatively high confidence, it can sometimes produce judgments that are different—and subjectively poorer—than those people would reach if they processed information more systematically. This is because systematic processing of persuasive appeals can increase both the breadth and depth of a person’s issue-relevant knowledge in ways that heuristic processing cannot.

Systematic processing involves sustained attention and information search. This can increase the depth of understanding about a particular issue, or at least about a particular point of view. Moreover, when driven by a need for accuracy, systematic processing can involve more objective and evenhanded thinking than heuristic processing, which tends to be biased in favor of prior judgments and habitual responses. Controlled, objective, systematic thought can increase the breadth of knowledge about a given issue and, more importantly, about alternative perspectives from which it can be understood.

For example, systematic processing driven by accuracy motivation can lead to complex thought patterns that involve examining issues from multiple viewpoints and weighing the pros and cons of opposing perspectives. Research on cognitive complexity has established that a number of advantages are associated with this kind of reasoning, including diminished susceptibility to overconfidence, and superior performance in group problem solving (Gruenfeld and Hollingshead, 1993; Tetlock, 1992). Of special relevance to conflict settings, cognitive complexity has been associated with increasing tolerance for alterna­tive viewpoints, facilitating compromise, and identifying integrative solutions to conflict (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Tetlock, Armor, and Peterson, 1994). Hence, individuals who process information in cognitively complex ways are often more effective in conflict and decision-making settings.

Importantly, systematic processing is more likely than heuristic processing to lead to deep, pervasive cognitive restructuring. This means that the cogni­tive changes that occur as a consequence of systematic processing are likely to persist and thus affect future judgments and behavior, relative to the changes that accompany heuristic processing. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1998.) Hence, in the long run, systematic processing may well produce more optimal judgments than heuristic processing.

Sources of Bias. Although enduring, systematic processing is far from foolproof. This is because the cognitive effort associated with systematic processing does not necessarily mean that all possible information will be sought out and weighed in an evenhanded manner. In fact, sometimes systematic processing simply strengthens prior convictions. Systematic processing can be biased both by “cool” cognitive factors (such as a message recipient’s existing attitudes and knowledge structures) and, as discussed later, “hotter” motivational factors (such as a recipient’s goals or ideological commitments).

People’s attitudes can exert a selective effect at virtually all stages of infor­mation processing. Existing attitudes bias our attention to information in the environment (we tend to selectively seek and attend to information that confirms our existing attitudes), our interpretation of this information (for exam­ple, how extreme we judge a statement to be that is dissimilar to our existing attitudes), and our memory for attitude-relevant information (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). The way our minds organize information often makes it easier for us to process information that is congenial to our own attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, 1998). Thus, through the cool, cognitive process of critically thinking about a source’s arguments, perceivers may find themselves genuinely swayed by arguments that fit their preexisting beliefs and attitudes.

Importantly, even if perceivers engage in modest to high amounts of systematic processing, heuristics can provide one such source of cognitive bias. For example, consider the possible impact of listening to a Democratic senator versus a Republican senator argue for a new law designed to provide a com­promise between prolife and prochoice positions on abortion in the United States. Perhaps you are a Democrat and share a social identity with the Demo­cratic senator. Before hearing the speaker, and without necessarily consciously thinking about it, you are likely to have already formed the tentative, heuristic­based expectation that a Democrat’s arguments will be more compelling and valid than a Republican’s. This may guide systematic processing in a way that verifies your initial expectation. As you attend to a Democrat’s arguments, you may perceive them to be compelling, and you may elaborate them in ways that make them even more convincing (“This will not only help decrease the num­ber of poor women resorting to unsafe abortions, but also focus attention on other problem areas”). In contrast, if you instead hear exactly the same argu­ments put forth by a Republican, you may not perceive them to be very credi­ble and may interpret and elaborate the arguments in ways that make them even less plausible (“... and besides, in the long run this will undermine progress toward a woman’s right to choose”).

Motives for Processing

Researchers have identified three types of motives that influence how individ­uals process information. An accuracy motive is geared toward discovering what is correct. The other two “directional” motives are geared toward validating a particular judgment or stance: defense motivation is self-focused and egoistic, whereas impression motivation is other-focused and relational. (See Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996; Kunda, 1990.)

The motivation to attain accurate judgments is pervasive in everyday life, because we need to accurately understand the world around us in order to behave effectively. When accuracy motivation is present but not particularly great, people tend to look for heuristic cues that signal accuracy, such as source credibility. Indeed, communicators often seek to enhance others’ perceptions of them as trustworthy experts and likeable individuals, because this provides heuristic information to the recipients about the accuracy of the advocated posi­tion. However, if accuracy motivation increases, heuristic processing may be accompanied by systematic processing: if we want to be very confident that a judgment is accurate, we are often uncomfortable making a snap decision based on a simple heuristic.

How much processing occurs, and thus whether heuristic or systematic pro­cessing dominates judgment, depends primarily on (1) the extent to which judg­ment-relevant heuristics are accessible (for example, the “in-group sources can be trusted” heuristic may be particularly salient in conflict situations; see Chen and Chaiken, 1999); (2) the extent to which personal and situational capacity for systematic processing is adequate (in negotiations, anxiety or time con­straints could decrease the capacity for systematic processing); (3) the extent to which one believes that systematic processing will indeed confer better judgments; and (4) the level of judgmental confidence a perceiver desires. Assuming the first three factors are in place, our theoretical perspective predicts that people will process as little as possible but as much as necessary: in general, people want to satisfy their goals as efficiently as possible, without expending unnecessary effort. As the desired level of confidence increases, the minimal amount of processing necessary to reach this “sufficiency threshold” increases as well (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996).

Thus, when accuracy motivation is modest (or when capacity is inadequate), heuristic cues such as source expertise, consensus opinion, and people’s own atti­tudes and ideologies can exert a powerful influence on judgment—regardless of persuasive arguments or other information that might otherwise temper or reverse the heuristic-based judgment (Chaiken, Wood, and Eagly, 1996; Petty and Wegener, 1998). Ample systematic processing occurs only if accuracy motivation is higher— for example, if the issue is of great personal importance or the perceiver is account­able to others (but bear in mind that accuracy-motivated systematic processing can still be biased by initial heuristics).

Although accuracy motivation is pervasive, other motivations may often sup­plant or at least compete with it (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996). Defense motivation compels message recipients to process information in ways that protect and validate beliefs, images, and interests that are important to their sense of self. For instance, these beliefs could be about one’s own valued qualities (“I’m intelligent”), one’s fundamental underlying value commitments (“Anyone can achieve success in my society through hard work”), or one’s iden­tity in valued groups (“Being Jewish is important to who I am and what I value”). These self-interests or self-definitional beliefs are defended because the perceiver feels, at least unconsciously, that overall personal integrity and well­being would be threatened if they were challenged.

When defense motivation is present but moderate, desired confidence and therefore the amount of processing are also moderate. Thus, heuristic process­ing dominates judgment—but defensively, or selectively. In other words, since the goal of processing is to arrive at judgments that protect the self, heuristics are selected to the extent that they serve this goal. For example, a defense- motivated target might invoke the heuristic “experts know best” if the position of an expert source reinforced the target’s cherished values and social identity, but might choose a different heuristic (for example, “out-group sources can’t be trusted”) if the position threatened his social identity. When defense motivation is strong, additional, systematic processing occurs until the target is sufficiently confident in her self-protective judgment. However, defense-motivated system­atic processing is biased by one’s favored position. For example, targets tend to counterargue information that threatens their preferred position (Eagly, Kulesa, Chen, and Chaiken, 2001).

The third broad motivational concern addressed by our perspective is impres­sion motivation, which involves considering the interpersonal consequences of expressing a particular judgment in a given social context (such as in an inter­action between two negotiators). Here, the target’s goal is to express positions that are socially acceptable to other people in their environment. As with defense motivation, impression-motivated processing is not necessarily self­conscious and is marked by a selective bias.

Impression-motivated heuristic processing entails selective application of heuristics that ensure a smooth interaction with specific others. For example, when interacting with a person or group whose views on an issue are unknown or vague, a perceiver might invoke the heuristic “moderate judgment minimizes disagreement.” On the other hand, when others’ views are known, a “go along to get along” heuristic might better serve the same goal.

With sufficient cognitive capacity and higher levels of impression motivation, people may also process systematically, but selectively. Thus, a negotiator who is motivated not only to be well-liked by others but also to appear forceful and expert may systematically process information from other participants so as to be prepared to counterargue their positions and arguments. Importantly, parties in conflict resolution are often concerned with the impressions they make on multiple audiences, and the content of the desired impressions may differ depending on the audience. For example, a negotiator seeking to resolve an inter­national conflict may be motivated to look collaborative to the other party, tough and competent to his constituency, and dignified to the world at large. Which of these audiences is most salient at a given moment may influence which desired impression motivates the negotiator’s information processing.

Illustrating the importance of impression-motivated processing, Chen and Chaiken (1999) reported a study in which participants anticipated a discussion about a social issue with a partner who allegedly held either a favorable or an unfavorable opinion on the issue. Before this discussion, participants read “imagination scenarios” subtly designed to activate (or “prime”) either the accuracy goal of determining a valid opinion or the impression goal of getting along with another person. After this task, participants familiarized themselves with the discussion issue by reading an evaluatively balanced essay concerning the issue (in this case, whether election returns should be broadcast while polls are still open). Participants then listed the thoughts that had occurred to them as they read the essay and indicated their own issue attitudes. Finally, they learned that there would be no actual discussion and were excused.

Impression-motivated participants expressed attitudes that were much more congruent with their alleged partners’ attitudes than did accuracy-motivated participants: when the partner favored one side of the issue, they favored the same side, whereas when the partner opposed it, they opposed it. Interestingly, accuracy-motivated and impression-motivated participants exhibited the same amount of systematic processing (as measured by the number of issue-relevant thoughts that were listed). However, whereas accuracy-motivated participants’ systematic processing was open-minded and unbiased by their partners’ attitudes, impression-motivated participants exhibited systematic processing that was biased toward their partners’ attitudes. For example, when the partner favored allowing broadcasts of election returns while the polls were still open, impression-motivated participants listed thoughts that revealed much more favorable thinking about arguments supporting the broadcasting of returns and more unfavorable thinking about arguments opposing it.

Although accuracy motivation, defense motivation, and impression motiva­tion may sometimes operate in isolation from one another, it is likely that multiple motives may be relevant in any given setting. A negotiator, for example, may be motivated both to attain an accurate understanding of the opposing party’s needs and demands and to present an image of himself as tough and assertive. Thus, both heuristic and systematic processing may be influenced by more than a single motivation.

To examine contexts in which multiple motives are operative, Zuckerman and Chaiken (cited in Chen and Chaiken, 1999) conducted an experiment similar to the Chen and Chaiken study described above. Instead of directly activating accu­racy versus impression motivation, Zuckerman and Chaiken used a mood manipulation to influence the relative importance of the motivations. Partici­pants were randomly assigned to watch either a comedy routine by Jerry Seinfeld (the “good mood” condition) or a videotape concerning house building (the “neutral mood” condition). Because positive mood generally increases people’s confidence in their own abilities and hence their tolerance for interpersonal con­flict, it was hypothesized that placing participants in a good mood would miti­gate impression motivation.

Consistent with the idea that impression motivation would drive information processing in a basic get-acquainted discussion with a partner, participants who watched the neutral film engaged in impression-motivated processing, favor­ing the issue more when their alleged partner did so. In contrast, consistent with the idea that being in a positive mood increases toleration for disagreement or self-confidence in expressing one’s own attitude, positive-mood participants expressed attitudes that were relatively unaffected by their partner’s position. Moreover, they arrived at their attitudes through unbiased, accuracy-motivated systematic processing.

Conclusions Regarding the Two Modes of Cognitive Processing Although the heuristic-systematic model focuses primarily on the motivational and processing mechanisms that govern recipients’ responses to persuasive communications, it also has important implications for those who seek to persuade. To increase the potential for evenhanded consideration of issues and long-term attitude change, negotiators and mediators should in general seek to facilitate accuracy goals and maximize systematic processing among all parties. Additionally, negotiators should attempt to manage the heuristic cues included in their messages. Negotiators can, for example, demonstrate their knowledge and authenticity to maximize others’ perceptions that they are expert, trust­worthy, and likable. They can also be aware of and try to mitigate factors, such as time pressure and stress, that heighten reliance on heuristic processing by limiting motivation and capacity to process. By facilitating mutual persua­sion, participants in conflict resolution can increase the likelihood of identifying win-win solutions and creating long-lasting agreements.