READINESS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The basic question in this section is under what conditions does a heavily esca­lated, “intractable” conflict become ready for deescalation and, hence, for nego­tiation or mediation? A derivative question is what can third parties do to hasten this readiness?

A variety of answers have been given to these questions.

A third approach involves ordinary mediation or various kinds of problem­solving workshops. (For the latter topic, see Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 2002; Lederach, 1997.) Research suggests that formal mediators have great difficulty solving heavily escalated conflict (Kressel, 2000), and the problem would seem even larger for problem solving workshops, which usually do not include the main decision makers of the groups involved in the conflict. More research is needed on the effectiveness of these methods but, as will be suggested for medi­ation, it seems likely that these methods are mainly useful in conjunction with other forces. A fourth approach, which was already mentioned, involves having powerful third parties (for example, United Nations peace keepers) pressure the disputants to stop fighting and start talking (Fisher and Keashly, 1990). This makes sense if such third parties are available and ready to serve, though much more research is needed on the details of how this works.

The present author (Pruitt, 1997, 2005c, forthcoming) has argued that a party’s readiness to deescalate and enter into negotiation or mediation (“readi­ness”) is a multiplicative function of its motivation to escape the conflict and its optimism about finding a mutually acceptable solution. This “readiness theory” is a restatement and extension of Zartman’s (2000) ripeness theory. Readiness theory focuses on the psychology of the individual actors (e.g., moti­vation to escape conflict) rather than the characteristics of the conflict system (for example, Zartman’s hurting stalemate). This focus and the assumption of a multiplicative function make readiness theory useful for building a set of testable hypotheses (Pruitt, 2005c), including the following:

1. Some level of readiness must be present on both sides for deescalation to go very far and for negotiation or mediation to start and be success­ful. The more severe the escalation, the greater must be the readiness.

2. Both motivation to escape conflict and optimism about finding a solu­tion must be present for readiness to develop. However, greater moti­vation can compensate for lesser optimism and vice versa.

3. Motivation to escape conflict is a direct function of the perceived costs and risks associated with the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived likelihood of winning the conflict.

4. New leaders are more likely than old leaders to recognize that a con­flict is producing unacceptable costs or risks or that it cannot be won. Hence, the likelihood of escaping an intractable conflict is greater at times of leadership change.

5. Optimism about finding a solution is greater when mediators are avail­able. This hypothesis, in conjunction with hypothesis 2, implies that mediators are most useful for resolving intractable conflict when moti­vation to escape the conflict has developed on both sides.

These and the many other hypotheses in readiness theory (see Pruitt, 2005c) would best be tested in laboratory experiments, because of the need for careful control of independent variables and close monitoring of participant states of mind. Devising and running a laboratory simulation where they could be tested would be a major undertaking, especially if intergroup conflict was involved, but it would be very worthwhile. Otherwise, a naturalistic setting would have to be found in which there were multiple conflicts of much the same kind and in which decision makers’ mind-sets could be measured. This would probably be more difficult to achieve than a laboratory simulation.