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Hypothesis and empirical challenges

This is a book made of intuitions. Any statement, let's say, on the oligarchies involved in the establishment of a constitutional framework and the violence undertaken to build the legal order (or the understanding of a constitutional decision as a basic decision on the allocation of power resulting from a grave conflict) would need endless empirical research.

I have only envisaged the concurrence of the mentioned circumstances in a more elaborated way in the cases of the United States and the German Federal Republic which, due to their weight in the configuration of the constitutionalist tradition, both count with an oceanic background of literature (even though, in my opinion, the critical literature considering the violent strains of both systems and their influence in the determination of constitutional institutions is, particularly in the German case, much scarcer).

If the episodes related to describe the factual, historical, and sociological conditions that lie behind the struggle of creating a constitution, or transforming it, are necessarily incomplete in dealing with both the U.S. and the German precedents, they might be more meagre in alluding to the scenarios in which constitutional transformations have been experienced during the last decades. Furthermore, every constitutional system should be subjected to the test on examining if the involvement of violence has been decisive in the configuration of its constitutional principles.

My initial position is that no constitutional system escapes from this dark side; that when examining the history of creation of public authority, it is easy to find deaths and all sorts of bloodbaths and, in the same way, constitutional supremacy is a device to ensure (and to remember) those deaths, coercions, and bloodbaths that occurred as events of genesis of the new political order.

My contribution would be only limited at least in determining the conceptual frame in which ulterior analysis might be developed.

As such, I will be concerned with defining the time and the space of the constitution-making and thus the gap in which the eruption of violence should be considered. In other words, my research would offer some steps forward for future research if it would enable scholars to have some certainties about what to count.

Every constitutional democracy, thus, would need at least a book written wearing the glasses of the “genealogical” model in order to ascertain if my hypothesis is correct. Hence a profound quantitative analysis of that sort is still pending, which could be developed by political scientists with exhaustive statistics (which for the mainstream, also in social sciences, is the only way for passing off a research activity as “science”). However, the information currently available will suffice, in lieu of more patient scientific efforts in the future focused on the reconstruction of particular historical, sociological, and economic conditions of the founding moments; while respecting those already developed in the past, such as the noble and advanced works for their time written by Charles Beard (1964) concerning the case of the U.S. Constitution.

My aim will be achieved, if I place the question of violence and its relationship with the legitimacy of constitutionalism in liberal democracies, at the centre of debate.

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Source: Bofill Hector Lopez. Law, Violence and Constituent Power: The Law, Politics and History of Constitution Making. Routledge,2021. — 270 p.. 2021
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