Conclusion

In this chapter, I have looked at some questions about the overarching institutions of the state. From the very earliest times, philosophers have asked such questions about the nature and the justification of the institutions of their own societies.

We have seen that the question of the justification of political authority was raised naturally by the question What is a state? Hobbes and Rawls and Nozick all agree that there are certain demands that we should make of a state if it is to be justified in its monopoly of coercive power. But Rawls' and Nozick's conditions for a just state are goals to aim at, not conditions that must be met if there is to be a state at all. I shall take up again in the next chapter the question whether any system that meets Hobbes' very minimal demands can be called a “state.” Even if we reject his claim that the sovereign may do anything, provided the citizens are better off than they would be in the state of nature, we might still be able to accept his view that a system that meets this condition deserves to be called a “state.”

In the next chapter I will look at an institution within the state, namely, the legal system. With a grasp of the central issues of political philosophy, we can turn now to the philosophy of law.

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Source: Appiah Kwame Anthony. Thinking It Through: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press,2003. — 425 p.. 2003

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