Introduction
Endogenous growth theory formalizes the role of technical progress in explaining modern economic growth. Although this is a relatively recent development, many of its ideas were already stressed by authors such as Kuznets, Griliches, Schmookler, Rosenberg and Schumpeter.
During the 1950s and 1960s, mainstream economics was dominated by the one-sector neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), whose main focus was on capital accumulation. The model postulated the existence of an aggregate production function featuring constant returns to scale and returns to each input falling asymptotically to zero; given that some inputs cannot be accumulated, the model could not generate sustained growth unless technology was assumed to improve exogenously. This simple treatment of technology as exogenous was considered as unsatisfactory for two main reasons: first, by placing the source of sustained growth outside the model, the theory could not explain the determinants of long-run economic performance and second, empirical evidence pointed out that technical progress often depends on deliberate economic decisions.The first attempts to endogenize the rate of technical change addressed the first, but not the second, problem. Assuming technical progress to be an unintentional by-product of the introduction of new capital goods through a process named “learning-by-doing”, Arrow (1962) was able to generate sustained growth at a rate that depended on investment decisions. Attempts at explicitly modeling investment in innovation faced another difficulty. A replication argument suggests that, for a given state of technology, productionfunctions should exhibit constant returns to scale. If technical progress is considered as an additional input, however, the technology features increasing returns to scale and inputs cannot be paid their marginal product.
Models of learning-by-doing avoided the problem by assuming that increasing returns were external to firms, thereby preserving perfect competition. However, this approach is not viable once investment in technology is recognized as intentional. The solution was to follow the view of Schumpeter (1942), that new technologies provide market power and that investment in innovation is motivated by the prospect of future profits. In this spirit, Shell (1973) studied the case of a single monopolist investing in technical change and Nordhaus (1969a) wrote a growth model with patents, monopoly power and many firms. In neither case did the equilibrium feature sustained growth.[40]A tractable model of imperfect competition under general equilibrium was not available until the analysis of monopolistic competition in consumption goods by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), later extended to differentiated inputs in production by Ethier (1982). These models also showed how increasing returns could arise from an expansion in the number of varieties of producer and consumer goods, an idea that is at the core of the models studied in this chapter. The first dynamic models of economic growth with monopolistic competition and innovation motivated by profits were built by Judd (1985) and Grossman and Helpman (1989). Yet, these authors were interested in aspects other than endogenous growth and none of their models featured long-run growth. Romer (1987), who formalized an old idea of Young (1928), was the first to show that models of monopolistic competition could generate long-run growth through the increased specialization of labor across an increasing range of activities. The final step was taken in Romer (1990), which assumed that inventing new goods is a deliberate costly activity and that monopoly profits, granted to innovators by patents, motivate discoveries. Since then, the basic model of endogenous growth with an expanding variety of products has been extended in many directions.
The distinctive feature of the models discussed in this chapter is “horizontal innovation”: a discovery consists of the technical knowledge required to manufacture a new good that does not displace existing ones. Therefore, innovation takes the form of an expansion in the variety of available products. The underlying assumption is that the availability of more goods, either for final consumption or as intermediate inputs, raises the material well-being of people. This can occur through various channels. Consumers may value variety per se. For example, having a TV set and a Hi-Fi yields more utility than having two units of any one of them. Productivity in manufacturing may increase with the availability of a larger set of intermediate tools, such as hammers, trucks, computers and so on. Similarly, specialization of labor across an increasing variety of activities, as in the celebrated Adam Smith example of the pin factory, can make aggregate production more efficient. The main alternative approach is to model innovation as quality improvements on a given array of products (“vertical innovation”), so that technical progress makes existing products obsolete. This process of “creative destruction” was emphasized by Schumpeter and has been formalized in Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopou- los (1990). The two approaches naturally complement each other. The main advantage of models with horizontal innovation lies in their analytical tractability, making them powerful tools for addressing a wide range of questions. However, because of their simplistic view on the interaction between innovators, these models are less suited to studying the effects of competition between “leaders” and “followers” on the growth process.
Section 1 of this chapter describes a simplified version of Romer (1990) and some extensions used in the literature. The model exhibits increasing returns to scale and steady-state endogenous growth in output per capita and the stock of knowledge.
The key feature of the theory is the emphasis on investments in technical knowledge as the determinant of long-run economic growth. Ideas and technological improvements differ from other physical assets, because they entail important public good elements. Inventing new technology is typically costly, while reproducing ideas is relatively inexpensive. Therefore, technical knowledge is described as a non-rival good. Nevertheless, firms are willing to invest in innovation because there exists a system of intellectual property rights (patents) guaranteeing innovators monopoly power over the production and sales of particular goods.Growth models with an expanding variety of products are a natural dynamic counterpart to trade models based on increasing returns and product differentiation. As such, they offer a simple framework for studying the effects of market integration on growth and other issues in dynamic trade theory. This is the subject of Section 2, which shows how trade integration can produce both static gains, by providing access to foreign varieties, and dynamic gains, by raising the rate at which new goods are introduced. Product-cycle trade and imitation are also considered.
In many instances, technical progress may be non-neutral towards different factors or sectors. This possibility is considered in Section 3, where biased technical change is incorporated in the basic growth model. By introducing several factors and sectors, the economic incentives to develop technologies complementing a specific factor, such as skilled workers, can be studied. These incentives critically depend on the definition of property rights over the production of new ideas. The high variability in the effectiveness of patent laws across countries has important bearings on the form of technical progress. In particular, governments in less developed countries may have an incentive not to enforce intellectual property rights in order to speed up the process of technology adoption.
However, the undesired side effect of free-riding is that innovators in industrialized countries lose incentives to create improvements that are most useful in developing countries, but of limited application in industrialized markets.Section 4 introduces complementarity in innovation. While innovation has no effect on the profitability of existing intermediate firms in the benchmark model, in reality new technologies can substitute or complement existing technologies. Innovation may cause technological obsolescence of previous technologies, as emphasized by Schumpeterian models. In other cases, new technologies complement rather than substitute the old ones. For instance, the market for a particular technology tends to be small at the time of its introduction, but grows as new compatible applications are developed. This complementarity in innovation can lead to multiple equilibria and poverty traps.
Complementarities in the growth process may also arise from financial markets, as suggested in Section 5. The progressive endogenous enrichment of asset markets, associated with the development of new intermediate industries, may improve the diversification opportunities available to investors. This, in turn, makes savers more prepared to invest in high-productivity risky industries, thereby fostering further industrial and financial development. As a result, countries at early stages of development go through periods of slow and highly volatile growth, eventually followed by a take-off with financial deepening and steady growth.
Finally, Section 6 shows how models with technological complementarities can generate rich long-run dynamics, including endogenous fluctuations between periods of high and low growth. Cycles in innovation and growth can either be due to expectational indeterminacy, or the deterministic dynamics of two-sector models with an endogenous market structure.
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