CONCLUSION

Understanding intrahousehold inequality and, more broadly, intrahousehold allocations is crucial for understanding the effects of policy and for targeting programs designed to alleviate poverty.

The implications are far reaching and they span simple questions of who will benefit from certain programs to deeper questions about child poverty and even child development. It is now well understood that treating households as an individual unit does not just provide an incomplete picture of standards of living but can be seriously misleading when we try and understand behavior and its reactions to the environment. In our review we have discussed both the questions underlying the notion of intrahousehold inequality as well as the extent of our ability to identify what goes on in the household from typically observed data. In this context we have argued that it is important to be able to observe variables that shift the bargaining power of spouses without affecting preferences as well as other approaches to peeking inside the household black box. It is evident from this discussion that better data would be important; and nothing is more important than detailed consumption and time use data. A renewed emphasis on such data is called for, given the importance of the issues at hand. A better understanding of what may constitute distribution factors and indeed experimental evidence would be an important way to support research into intrahousehold allocations.

However, beyond the above, research is now advancing into the dynamics of intrahousehold allocations and being linked to marriage markets. It is now becoming clear how the conditions at the time of marriage can affect intrahousehold allocations. Indeed, under full commitment, current distribution factors may have little to do with current allocations. On the other hand, full commitment is a very strong and some may argue an implausible assumption.

Thus, research is also advancing in understanding how allocations are determined when commitment is limited. In such limited commitment environments changes in the institutional framework, such as the structure of the welfare system or divorce laws, may have important implications for intrahousehold inequality as well as for the formation and dissolution of marriages. We thus are acquiring a rich theoretical and empirical framework that will allow us to better understand how individual welfare is determined within the context of the family. Important contributions in understanding the dynamics of intrahousehold allocations and of household formation include papers by Mazzocco (2007) and Voena (2013). We are convinced that this is a crucial direction for future research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

P.-A. C. gratefully acknowledges financial support from the NSF (grant 1124277).C.M.is grateful for financial support by the Cowles foundation andthe Institution for Social and Policy Studies atYale. Moreover, we thank Tony Atkinson, Francois Bourguignon, and Marc Fleurbaey for useful comments on a previous version. The usual disclaimer applies.

REFERENCES

Afriat, S.N., 1973. On a system of inequalities in demand analysis: an extension of the classical method. Int. Econ. Rev. 14, 460-472.

Attanasio, O., Lechene, V., 2014. Efficient responses to targeted cash transfers.}. Polit. Econ. 122 (1), 178-222. Banks, J., Blundell, R.W., Lewbel, A., 1997. Quadratic Engel curves and consumer demand. Rev. Econ.

Stat. 79 (4), 527-539.

Bargain, O., Beblo, M., Beninger, D., Blundell, R., Carrasco, R., Chiuri, M.-C., Laisney, F., Lechene, V., Moreau, N., Myck, M., Ruiz-Castillo, J., Vermeulen, F., 2006. Does the representation of household behavior matter for welfare analysis of tax-benefit policies? An introduction. Rev. Econ. Househ. 4, 99-111.

Basu, K., 2006. Gender and say: a model of household behavior with endogenously-determined balance of power. Econ. J. 116, 558-580.

Becker, G.S., 1974. A theory of social interactions. J. Polit. Econ. 82 (6), 1063-1093.

Beninger, D., Bargain, O., Beblo, M., Blundell, R., Carrasco, R., Chiuri, M.-C., Laisney, F., Lechene, V., Longobardi, E., Moreau, N., Myck, M., Ruiz-Castillo, J., Vermeulen, F., 2006. Evaluating the move to a linear tax system in Germany and other European countries. Rev. Econ. Househ. 4, 159-180.

Blundell, R.W., Walker, I., 1986. A life-cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross-section data. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (4, Econometrics Special Issue), 539-558.

Blundell, R.W., Duncan, A., Meghir, C., 1998. Estimating labor supply responses using tax reforms. Econometrica 66 (4), 827-861.

Blundell, R.W., Browning, M., Crawford, I.A., 2003. Nonparametric Engel curves and revealed preference. Econometrica 71 (1), 205-240.

Blundell, R.W., Chiappori, P.A., Meghir, C., 2005. Collective labor supply with children. J. Polit. Econ. 113 (6), 1277-1306.

Blundell, R.W., Chiappori, P.-A., Magnac, T., Meghir, C., 2007. Collective labour supply: heterogeneity and non-participation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 74 (2), 417—445.

Blundell, R.W., Browning, M., Crawford, I.A., 2008. Best nonparametric bounds on demand responses. Econometrica 76 (6), 1227—1262.

Blundell, R., Horowitz, J.L., Parey, M., 2012. Measuringthe price responsiveness of gasoline demand: economic shape restrictions and nonparametric demand estimation. Quant. Econ. 3 (1), 29—51.

Browning, M., Chiappori, P.A., 1998. Efficient intra-household allocations: a general characterization and empirical tests. Econometrica 66 (6), 1241—1278.

Browning, M., Chiappori, P.A., Lechene, V., 2010. Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling. Econ. J. 120 (545), 786—799.

Browning, M., Chiappori, P.A., Lewbel, A.,2013. Estimating consumption economies ofscale, adult equivalence scales, and household bargaining power. Rev. Econ. Stud. 80 (4), 1267—1303.

Browning, M., Chiappori, P.A., Weiss, Y., 2014.

FamilyEconomics. Cambridge University Press, NewYork.

Browning, M., Bourguignon, F. Chiappori, P-A., Lechene, V. 1994. Income and outcomes. J. Polit. Econ. 102 (6), 1067-1096.

Cherchye, L., de Rock, B., Vermeulen, F., 2007. The collective model of household consumption: a nonparametric characterization. Econometrica 75 (2), 553-574.

Cherchye, L., De Rock, B., Vermeulen, F., 2009. Opening the black box of intrahousehold decision making: theory and nonparametric empirical tests of general collective consumption models. J. Polit. Econ. 117 (6), 1074-1104.

Cherchye, LJ.H., de Rock, B., Lewbel, A., Vermeulen, F.M.P., 2012. SharingRule Identification forGen- eral Collective Consumption Models, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 2012-041.

Chiappori, P.-A., 1988. Rational household labor supply. Econometrica 56 (1), 63-90.

Chiappori, P.-A., 1991. Nash-bargained household decisions: a rejoinder. Int. Econ. Rev. 32 (3), 761-762.

Chiappori, P.-A., 1992. Collective labor supply and welfare. J. Polit. Econ. 100 (3), 437-467.

Chiappori, P.-A., 2012. Modeles d’appariement en conomie: quelques avances recentes. Texte de la Confidence Jean-Jacques Laffont Revue Economique 63 (2012/3), 437-452.

Chiappori, P.-A., Ekeland, I., 2006. The microeconomics of group behavior: general characteriation. J. Econ. Theor. 130 (1), 1-26.

Chiappori, P.-A., Ekeland, I., 2009a. The micro economics of efficient group behavior: identification. Econometrica 77 (3), 763-799.

Chiappori, P.-A., Ekeland, I., 2009b. The economics and mathematics of aggregation. Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics. Now Publishers, Hanover, USA.

Chiappori, P.-A., Kim, J.-H., 2013. Identifying Heterogeneous Sharing Rules. Mimeo, Columbia University, New York.

Chiappori, P.-A., Meghir, C., 2014. Intrahousehold Welfare, mimeo.

Chiappori, P.-A., Salanie, B., 2014. The econometrics of matching models. J. Econ. Lit., forthcoming.

Chiappori, P.-A., Weiss, Y., 2007.

Divorce, remarriage and child support. J. Labor Econ. 25 (1), 37-74.

Chiappori, P-A., Costa-Dias, M., Meghir, C., 2014. Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education Choice. Mimeo, Columbia University, New York.

Chiappori, P.-A., Donni, O., Komunjer, I., 2012. Learning from a Piece of Pi. Rev. Econ. Stud. 79 (1), 162-195.

Chiappori, P.-A., Fortin, B., Lacroix, G., 2002. Marriage market, divorce legislation, and household labor supply. J. Polit. Econ. 110 (1), 37-72.

Chiappori, P.A., Iyigun, M., Weiss, Y., 2009. Investment in schooling and the marriage market. Am. Econ. Rev. 99 (5), 1689-1717.

Chiappori, P.-A., Salanie, B., Weiss, Y., 2011. Partner Choice and the Marital College Premium. Columbia University Academic Commons.

Chiappori, P.-A., McCann, R., Nesheim, L., 2010. Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness. Econ. Theor. 42 (2), 317-354.

Chiappori, P.A., Iyigun, M., Lafortune, J., Weiss, Y., 2013. Changing the Rules Midway: The Impact of Granting Alimony Rights on Existing and Newly-Formed Partnerships. Mimeo, Columbia University, New York.

Choo, E., Siow, A., 2006. Who marries whom and why. J. Polit. Econ. 114 (1), 175-201.

Donni, O., 2003. Collective household labor supply: non-participation and income taxation. J. Public Econ. 87, 1179-1198.

Donni, O., 2009. A simple approach to investigate intrahousehold allocation of private and public goods. Rev. Econ. Stat. 91, 617-628.

Dunbar, G.R., Lewbel, A., Pendakur, K.,2013. Children’s resources in collective households: identification, estimation, and an application to child poverty in Malawi. Am. Econ. Rev. 103 (1), 438-471 (34).

Edlund, L., Korn, E., 2002. A theory of prostitution. J. Polit. Econ. 110 (1), 181-214.

Fleurbaey, M., Gautier, G., 2009. International comparisons of living standards by equivalent incomes. Scand. J. Econ. 111, 597-624.

Fleurbaey, M., Decancq, K., Schokkaert, E., 2014. Inequality, Income and Well-Being.

Elsevier, Amsterdam, this Handbook.

Gersbach, H., Haller, H., 2001. Collective decisions and competitive markets. Rev. Econ. Stud. 68, 347-368.

Gosling, A., Machin, S. Meghir, C., 2000. The changing distribution of male wages in the U.K. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67 (4), 635-666.

Gousse, M., 2013.Marriage Market and Intra-HouseholdAllocation: Evolution ofPreferences and Transfers in the UK from 1991 to 2008, mimeo Sciences Po.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S., 1993. On the Economics of Marriage: A Theory of Marriage, Labor, and Divorce. Westview Press, Boulder.

Haddad, L., Kanbur, R., 1990. How serious is the neglect of intrahousehold inequality. Econ. J. 100, 866-881.

Haddad, L., Kanbur, R., 1992. Intrahousehold inequality and the theory of targeting. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 372-378.

Hammond, P.J., 1994. Money metric measures of individual and social welfare allowing for environmental externalities. In: Eichhorn, W. (Ed.), Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality. Springer, Berlin.

Jacquemet, N., Robin, J.-M., 2011. Marriage with labor supply. CES Working Papers 2011.50.

Lechene, V., Preston, I., 2011. Noncooperative household demand. J. Econ. Theor. 146 (2), 504-527.

Lewbel, A., Pendakur, K., 2013. Unobserved Preference Heterogeneity in Demand Using Generalized Random Coefficients. Boston College, Mimeo.

Lise, J., Seitz, S., 2011. Consumption inequality and intrahousehold allocations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 78 (1), 328-355.

Lundberg, S., Pollak, R.A., 1993. Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market. J. Polit. Econ. 101 (6), 988-1010.

Manser, M., Brown, M., 1980. Marriage and household decision-making: a bargaining analysis. Int. Econ. Rev. 21 (1980), 31-44.

Mazzocco, M., 2007. Household intertemporal behaviour: a collective characterization and a test of commitment. Rev. Econ. Stud. 74 (3), 857-895.

Mcelroy, M.B., Horney, M.J., 1981. Nash-bargained household decisions: toward a generalization of the theory of demand. Int. Econ. Rev. 22, 333-349.

Myck, M., Bargain, O., Beblo, M., Beninger, D., Blundell, R., Carrasco, R., Chiuri, M.-C., Laisney, F., Lechene, V., Longobardi, E., Moreau, N., Ruiz-Castillo, J., Vermeulen, F., 2006. The working families’ tax credit and some European tax reforms in a collective setting. Rev. Econ. Househ. 4, 129-158.

Samuelson, P.A., 1956. Social indifference curves. Q. J. Econ. 70 (1), 1-22.

Ulph, D., 2006. Un modele non-cooperatif de Nash applique a l’etude du comportement de consommation du menage. Actualite economique: revue d’analyse economique 82, 53-86.

Varian, H., 1982. The nonparametric approach to demand analysis. Econometrica 50, 945-974.

Vermeulen, F., Bargain, O., Beblo, M., Beninger, D., Blundell, R., Carrasco, R., Chiuri, M.-C., Laisney, F., Lechene, V., Moreau, N., Myck, M., Ruiz-Castillo, J., 2006. Collective models of labor supply with nonconvex budget sets and nonparticipation: a calibration approach. Rev. Econ. Househ. 4, 113-127.

Voena, A., 2013. Yours, Mine and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples? mimeo University of Chicago.

<< | >>

↑

Source: Atkinson Anthony, Bourguignon François. Handbook of Income Distribution. Volume 2B. North Holland, 2014. — 2366 p..

More economic literature on Economics.Studio

CONCLUSION

More on the topic CONCLUSION: