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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Putting the literature on the distribution of (individual) wages in the context of the (household) income distribution we are struck by the disconnect between the two. There is an extensive literature with a long tradition on each of them but very little on both, despite the fact that wage earnings are by far the most important source of income in modern society.

The strong shift from single-earner to dual-earner households that has come about with the rapid growth of female and in many cases part-time employment and the growing attention paid to the phenomenon of household joblessness make this an important lacuna. Significant policy implications may be suspected. The debate on household joblessness has already put into question the workings of labor market policies. The important debate on job polarization ignores how households may be affected or, alternatively, how they may offer compensation for the process. The interlinking of the two distributions raises doubts about the policies of redistribution. Traditional instru­ments found on each of the two sides, such as the minimum wage or income taxation, expectedly work out differently in a dual-earner world where household labor supply can involve low-paid jobs or low (part-time) earnings even at high levels of household income. As a result, the effects of these instruments will change and their political support in society may also be altered. Future research will require improved and systematic fact finding, the analysis will generate a better understanding of earnings as well as hours of work on an annual basis, consistent with incomes, and also broaden to include other, often newly minted institutions that affect joint household labor supply, such as child care provisions. There is no shortage of detailed research on various issues; however, the broad picture of the distributions as such is lacking.
Connections run in both directions, from earnings to incomes as much as the other way around, and household formation and con­comitant household labor supply cannot be taken as a given but are affected by both. Importantly, often the national work force has also doubled over recent decades, as a result of rapidly rising educational attainment and female labor market participation, and not only the global work force after the demise of communism.

Subsequently turning to the distribution of wages alone we have gone back to the origins of the debate in the early 1980s and sketched developments toward what is now a large and complex literature. We find that the unanticipated rise in earnings inequality in the United States over the 1970s put LMIs, such as (declining) unionization, as one possible explanation among others, such as demography or deindustrialization, on the research agenda. During the 1990s, the debate gave rise to the thesis of skill-biased technological change but also to international comparisons. The former approach has focused on market forces of supply and demand, the latter deemed those insufficient because of the growing international divergence in wage-inequality trends and has put the limelight on the role of national LMIs. After some leapfrogging of the two approaches from one consensus explanation to another during the 1990s, the two seem to be increasingly growing apart during the 2000s when important new contributions were made to the disadvantage of an integrated approach that could give each its proper place. Both sides may be at risk of creating “Ptolemaic epicycles” aimed to incorporating new observations. The supply-and-demand approach is challenged by the need for find­ing better empirical measures of technological change aimed at dispelling doubts that the relative demand of skills may be a tautology. It has added “tasks,” “offshoring,” and even “consumer preferences,” which risk being ad hoc additions,1 without realizing their

150

Compare Autor’s (2013, 25) remark “that there are almost as many distinct task classifications as there are papers in the task literature.”

institutional preconditions.

The institutional approach, on the other side, faces an abun­dance ofinstitutions and ever new ones are added. It lacks a sufficiently clear-cut concept of institutions, ranging from laws, regulations, and habits to actual policies, and of their interactions—be they mutually reinforcing or compensating—on the one hand, and a clear criterion for delineating the institutional scope on the other hand.

In light of this, the double aim of future work on both sides should be to foster itself and to integrate the other side into its own framework at the same time. Pursuing this may seem more a problem of empirical method for the institutional side, although by contrast on the demand and supply side the problem may be more one of theoretical method as long as institutions keep being viewed as bodies alien to the market and to theorizing. For both sides there is a perspective of work to do at the firm level. Matched employer— employee data can help enlighten the role of both institutions as well as labor supply and demand. Such data are increasingly becoming available. This brings us back to the availability and quality of the data in addition to the earnings/incomes fact-finding already mentioned. Data and analysis shall move beyond the commonly used earnings data for full-time workers only, which are less and less representative especially at the margins of earnings and incomes. Therefore, more needs to be done regarding individ­uals’ and households’ work efforts and earning outcomes on an annual basis. In addition, though much attention has been paid to data quality, a better grasp of the customary use of inequality measures—currently, each of the two approaches has its own rather exclu­sive preferences—seems desirable.

Finally, we have set up a simple model accounting for the correlation of the different components of inequality (between and within) with LMIs. We find indeed that union­ized labor markets are ceteris paribus less unequal in terms of annual earnings, because both hourly wages and worked hours are more evenly distributed.

We improve on existing approaches with the help of a pseudo-longitudinal approach linking workers cohort-wise to the change in institutions over their working life in three different ways. Empirical results of three cross-country exercises focusing on different inequality mea­sures and covering the United States and all European countries in 2010-2011, suggest inequality-reducing effects of unionization for hours, and of minimum wages for both hours and earnings.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful to Christina Haas, John Schmitt, Thomas Lemieux, Nicola Fuchs-Schiindeln for their help with the data and Anna Salomons for some useful suggestions. We thank in particular our editors, Tony Atkinson and Francois Bourguignon, for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

APPENDIX A. COUNTRY CODES

bgcolor=white>MT
ISO alpha-3 and alpha-2 country codes
AUS AU Australia
AUT AT Austria
BEL BE Belgium
BGR BG Bulgaria
CAN CA Canada (BC: British Columbia,

ON: Ontario)

CHE CH Switzerland
CYP CY Cyprus
CZE CZ Czech Republic
DEU DE Germany
DEU-W DE-W West Germany
DNK DK Denmark
ESP ES Spain
EST EE Estonia
EU European Union
FIN FI Finland
FRA FR France
GRC GR Greece (also named EL by Eurostat)
HUN HU Hungary
IRL IE Ireland
ISR IL Israel
ITA IT Italy
JPN JP Japan
KOR KR Korea
LTU LT Lithuania
LUX LU Luxemburg
LVA LV Latvia
MLT Malta
NLD NL Netherlands
NOR NO Norway
NZL NZ New Zealand
POL PL Poland
PRT PT Portugal
ROM RO Romania
SWE SE Sweden
SVK SK Slovak Republic
SVN SI Slovenia
UK UK United Kingdom (official code GBR not used)
USA US United States

APPENDIX B.

DATA SOURCES AND ADDITIONAL TABLES ON EARNINGS

We obtain data from the EUSILC survey conducted in 2010 (ver.1 dated 01/03/12), to which we added populations from Cyprus and Ireland extracted from the 2009 survey (ver.2 dated 01/08/11). Overall among European countries we consider 476,265 observations (of which 9902 Irish and 7557 Cypriots). For these individuals we know relevant demographics (age, gender, education,[239] marital status, birthplace), occupa­tional characteristics (whether employed or self-employed, full-time or part-time, permanent or temporary contract, ISCO occupational code, workplace size, work experience).

We obtain data on the United States from participants to PSID survey conducted in 2011. Basic demographics (age, gender, education,[240] marital status, labor market status) are obtained from individual file (file ind2011er.zip downloaded on 22/07/13), which includes 24,661 observations. Information on labor earnings are collected from one respondent for each of8907 households (typically a male household head), who responds about wage and hours for himself and his spouse (file fam2011er.zip downloaded on 22/07/13).

We adopt two selection rules:

(a) population in relevant working age, which we define as being between 20 and 64 years old. This is justified to allow for secondary school completion, and to take into account different early retirement rules in different countries. This leads to the exclusion of employed youngsters aged 15—19, a fraction of which is employed with an average hourly wage that is on average half of the average wage in the adult pop­ulation. Because countries differ in the duration of compulsory education as well as in institutional design, we have preferred to leave the youngster component of the labor force out of our analysis.[241]

(b) population in the labor market, who self-define as either employed (employee or self-employed) or unemployed. This takes as exogenously given the significant cross-country differences in participation/employment rates (see Table 18.A1).

These differences are even enhanced when we consider analogous rates computed at household level. Notice the high share of self-employed in Italy and Greece, which are also the countries where the share of top incomes accruing to them is largest. The final sample is made of 264,216 individuals in the labor market, among which 201,500 employees, 33,384 self-employed, and 29,332 unemployed.

The labor earnings variable is defined as either “gross yearly earnings from dependent employment—cash or near cash”[242] or “gross yearly cash benefits or losses from self­employment” (see Table 18.A2 for means and standard deviations).[243] Unemployed subsidies received by (temporarily) unemployed workers are also considered in the computation of earnings inequality.[244]

In order to distinguish between annual earnings and hourly wages, we need infor­mation about the number of hours worked. In both survey hours worked are recon­structed thanks combining answers to two questions (weekly hours usually worked in recent months—thus referred to the period of interview—and number of months worked in the previous year).[245] The gross hourly wage rate is then computed dividing the yearly earnings by the hours worked.[246] Descriptive statistics on hours worked and hourly wages are reported in Table 18.A3. Notice that there is a significant loss of infor­mation when moving from yearly data (259,500 observations with nonnegative annual earnings) to hourly wage (228,153 observations with nonmissing hourly wages), due to missing information about weekly hours worked. A probit estimate indicates that young uneducated women holding a temporary contract are more likely not to report hours.

Table 18.A1 Descriptive statistics computed from microdata—SILC 2010 and PSID 2011—labor market attachment (sample weights)

Female

bgcolor=white>0.109
Participation rate Employment rate Unemployment rate Share self­employed participation rate
Austria 0.734 0.676 0.079 0.124 0.596
Belgium 0.732 0.650 0.112 0.106 0.597
Bulgaria 0.800 0.670 0.163 0.096 0.620
Cyprus 0.754 0.710 0.058 0.139 0.644
Czech 0.752 0.675 0.103 0.167 0.582
Republic

Denmark

0.782 0.715 0.085 0.094 0.702
Estonia 0.783 0.647 0.173 0.074 0.648
Finland 0.765 0.673 0.121 0.135 0.650
France 0.754 0.672 0.109 0.099 0.637
Germany 0.792 0.711 0.102 0.055 0.659
Greece 0.736 0.644 0.125 0.304 0.553
Hungary 0.687 0.595 0.134 0.124 0.542
Iceland 0.789 0.731 0.073 0.125 0.685
Ireland 0.707 0.592 0.162 0.149 0.532
Italy 0.682 0.607 0.219 0.485
Latvia 0.791 0.602 0.239 0.071 0.593
Lithuania 0.804 0.649 0.193 0.100 0.662
Luxembourg 0.739 0.692 0.063 0.078 0.609
Malta 0.632 0.593 0.063 0.136 0.423
Netherlands 0.760 0.732 0.037 0.154 0.660
Norway 0.797 0.771 0.033 0.073 0.741
Poland 0.716 0.640 0.105 0.214 0.571
Portugal 0.788 0.672 0.148 0.144 0.617
Romania 0.689 0.653 0.053 0.265 0.547
Slovak 0.764 0.660 0.137 0.108 0.603
Republic

Slovenia

0.737 0.633 0.141 0.096 0.587
Spain 0.787 0.624 0.207 0.161 0.546
Sweden 0.823 0.776 0.057 0.043 0.751
United 0.768 0.728 0.052 0.122 0.677
Kingdom

United

0.791 0.709 0.104 0.109 0.683
States

Average

0.752 0.671 0.108 0.138 0.605

Table 18.A2 Descriptive statistics computed from microdata—SILC 2010 and PSID 2011-labor earnings (sample weights)

Gross

bgcolor=white>6260.98
Country name Gross earnings from dependent employment (mean) earnings from dependent employment (SD) Gross earnings from self­employment (mean) Gross earnings from self­employment

(SD)

No. of observations with nonmissing values on yearly earnings
Austria 26,461.08 25,858.63 4096.55 17,355.84 6116
Belgium 26,723.36 20,772.17 2717.21 11,508.15 6387
Bulgaria 3024.31 2925.93 446.67 2378.81 7731
Cyprus 18,748.41 16,532.35 3139.14 13,762.04 3970
Czech 7499.50 6937.02 1752.81 6380.98 9489
Republic

Denmark

38,504.27 26,550.36 2017.71 18,497.89 7005
Estonia 7507.27 6367.43 122.38 959.08 5891
Finland 27,382.17 21,351.46 2076.83 10,272.64 12,705
France 22,219.13 19,263.07 2110.23 15,184.50 11,518
Germany 24,586.15 22,526.16 1968.18 14,598.60 12,693
Greece 12,219.81 14,306.38 5645.76 18,567.37 7163
Hungary 5038.98 5062.23 777.84 3393.05 10,240
Iceland 23,832.86 17,620.38 818.24 3899.32 4075
Ireland 26,624.65 28,929.35 4520.33 19,799.64 4766
Italy 17,593.58 17,522.40 7017.56 24,495.35 19,637
Latvia 5942.19 6430.71 207.53 1370.13 6742
Lithuania 4979.52 5607.18 447.30 2589.25 6097
Luxembourg 42,588.71 38,248.88 2896.52 22,171.74 5717
Malta 13,787.59 11,406.58 2393.88 8493.19 3678
Netherlands 31,138.58 26,156.98 3186.18 16,507.76 11,621
Norway 42,686.63 32,290.34 3409.42 23,335.28 6269
Poland 5567.64 6017.03 1020.09 3613.49 14,693
Portugal 10,768.63 12,283.16 1432.51 5655
Romania 2664.20 2452.14 333.46 1338.79 7342
Slovak 6322.45 8057.32 683.42 2971.25 8071
Republic

Slovenia

14,493.82 12,900.63 1125.57 4699.40 14,085
Spain 14,620.40 14,235.10 1305.97 7504.83 16,812
Sweden 25,384.12 18,901.72 753.78 5208.48 8355
United 24,787.20 28,023.56 3654.77 26,042.01 7818
Kingdom

United

51,786.79 840,084.88 7103.13 35,807.86 7159
States

Average

18,819.88 32,903.78 2627.03 16,288.20 259,500

Note: Data in 2010 Euros except US where data are in 2011 US dollars.

Table 18.A3 Descriptive statistics computed from microdata—SILC 2010 and PSID 2011—hours and wages (sample weights)

Hours worked (mean) Hours worked (SD) Hourly wage (mean) Hourly wage (SD) No. of observations with nonmissing values of hourly wages
Austria 1801.05 648.58 17.14 25.54 5689
Belgium 1742.40 630.42 18.74 16.46 5662
Bulgaria 1924.69 413.00 1.83 1.67 6381
Cyprus 1844.24 527.32 10.67 8.73 3743
Czech 1979.71 489.53 4.23 3.29 8685
Republic

Denmark

1752.24 449.20 24.02 15.45 6615
Estonia 1761.99 498.25 5.22 5.93 4795
Finland 1718.94 558.07 19.46 21.05 11,479
France 1746.34 617.55 15.20 18.75 10,223
Germany 1746.93 619.15 15.24 11.98 11,569
Greece 1829.68 553.70 7.96 8.64 6212
Hungary 1844.58 403.42 3.05 2.71 8876
Iceland 1914.37 642.18 14.38 19.49 3783
Ireland 1637.80 693.63 22.17 29.44 3917
Italy 1829.60 474.38 11.17 10.77 17,248
Latvia 1816.58 487.95 4.07 4.06 5092
Lithuania 1784.31 415.07 3.38 3.41 4995
Luxembourg 1833.12 576.49 25.13 20.55 5311
Malta 1863.97 517.44 8.22 7.08 3353
Netherlands 1582.64 553.61 21.33 19.91 11,212
Norway 1765.72 504.90 25.81 21.14 6043
Poland 1894.65 517.62 3.40 4.36 13,077
Portugal 1866.69 470.88 7.02 7.65 4281
Romania 1950.27 352.44 1.46 1.24 6589
Slovak 1913.54 395.13 3.81 4.11 7180
Republic Slovenia 1897.84 415.46 8.76 7.16 12,131
Spain 1821.19 536.07 10.32 10.42 12,783
Sweden 1516.64 496.22 19.80 24.18 7755
United 1785.60 637.22 15.39 19.19 7328
Kingdom

Unites States

1937.14 848.38 8.65 26.66 6146
Average 1793.65 564.99 12.37 15.44 228,153

Note: Data in 2010 Euros except US where data are in 2011 US dollars.

Table 18.A4 Estimates of model relevant parameters—employed or unemployed individuals—SILC 2010 and PSID 2011

APPENDIX C. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON LMIs

Data on institutional measures were collected over a time interval spanning half a century, from 1960 to 2010.

Union density

It measures the fraction of wage and salary earners who are members of trade unions. It excludes unemployed and retired workers (net version). Source: ICTWSS database version 2 (Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007—see Visser, 2009—variable Ud—downloaded on 04/04/13).[247]

Coverage

It measures the fraction of employees covered by wage-bargaining agreements over all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining. Source: ICTWSS database version 2 (variable AdjCov).

Wage centralization

It represents a summary measure (ranging between 0 and 1) of centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining, taking into account both union authority and union concentration at multiple levels—source: ICTWSS database version 2 (variable CENT).

Strike activity

It measures the days not worked for strikes and lockouts divided by participant worker—total economy. Source is ILO (downloaded on 04/04/13).

Minimum wage

It takes the ratio of the statutory minimum wage relative to mean wage of full-time workers (sometimes known as “Kaitz index”—see Dolado et al., 1996). However this measure does not consider the possibility of differentiation across workers types. For this reason, Aghion et al. (2011) have combined the ratio of the minimum wage to the GDP per capita with an index of stringency derived from ILO.[248] Forthis reason, the variable is set to zero when minimum wage provision is absent. Data are downloaded from the OECD Stats website (except than in the case of Iceland, whose values are taken from Table 5.5 of Danish Technological Institute. Assessment of the Labour Mar­ket in Iceland. Contract no. VC/2010/038 Final report—Policy and Business Analysis—April 2011).

Employment protection legislation

The measure we use is provided by OECD, which recently have partially revised their country assessment (OECD, 2012).[249] It measures the stringency of firing regulation and is based on eighteen dimensions of the firing procedure.[250] There is a second series provided by World Bank, which has been used among others such as Botero et al. (2004).[251]

Unemployment benefit

Unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance benefits—gross replacement rate (ratio to the average wage) for a full-time adult worker. The source is OECD historical series, which is available in odd years and imputed using intermediate means in even years. It is the average between single worker and one-earner married couple with two children.[252]

Tax wedge

Average tax wedge (sum of social contributions and income taxes as ratio to the aver­age wage). It considers the average between single worker with no child and one- earner married couple with two children. The source are the estimates from the OECD microsimulation model.

Social expenditure

It measures the expenditure for cash benefits and benefit in kind for social assistance, as percentage of GDP. The source is OECD historical series, which are available on 5-year base, and then interpolated.

Child care

It measures the enrollment rate in early child care and preprimary education (aver­age between age 3, 4, and 5—full- and part-time students) and proxies the availabil­ity of child care facilities. Available values for years 2005 and 2010, while intermediate values are interpolated. The source is OECD, Education at a Glance 2012, Table C2.1.

Parental leave

It captures the possibility of reconciling work and fertility, by measuring weeks of paid leave for childbirth. The series is available since 1970. The source is Thevenon and Solaz (2013). Further documentation can be found at http://www.oecd.org/social/ soc/oecdfamilydatabase.htm

Tax treatment of household incomes

This variable aims to capture the potential favorable tax treatment of working couples vis-a-vis individual taxation. It is constructed as the ratio between the average tax rate of single earner family (earning 170% of average wage) and the average tax rate of a two earners family (main earner at average wage and second earner making 67% of average wage). The reported variable consists of a further averaging between two household situation with respect to children (zero children and two children families). A higher value would indicate a favorable treatment of labor market participation of a second earner. Data available since 2001. The underlying data is obtained from the OECD microsimulation model, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? DataSetCode=FIXINCLSA.

Active and passive labor market policies

It considers the public expenditure on active or passive labor market policies as per­centage of GDP. It combines two data sources: when available we have been using OECD statistics for homogeneity with other series; otherwise we have resorted to Eurostat, which classifies as actives expenditure categories from 2 to 7 (2. Training—3. Job rotation and job sharing—4. Employment incentives—5. Sup­ported employment and rehabilitation—6. Directjob creation—7. Start-up incen­tives) and passive expenditure categories 8 and 9 (8. Out-of-work income maintenance and support—9. Early retirement).

Overall means and standard deviations for these variables are reported in Table 18.A5. Country means are reported in table with reference to the most recent decade.

Table 18.A5 Descriotive statistics for institutional measures, sample period 1960-2010, 30 countries

Variable No. of observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Union density 1123 45.99 22.97 6.67 100.00
Coverage 931 70.70 21.74 7.50 100.00
Centralization 1016 0.42 0.19 0.08 0.98
Strike activity 730 5.09 7.29 0.00 61.14
Minimum wage 1179 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.71
Employment protection 506 2.37 0.88 0.26 5.00
legislation
Unemployment benefit 918 27.02 15.48 0.00 70.00
Tax wedge 294 25.32 7.75 8.17 41.88
Social expenditure 615 2.07 1.00 0.20 4.40
Child care 144 81.73 16.46 24.70 101.13
Parental leave 887 40.82 43.57 0.00 214.00
Tax treatment of household 228 1.93 1.47 0.26 8.21
incomes
Active labor market policies 560 0.70 0.52 0.03 3.04
Passive labor market policies 572 1.25 0.99 0.08 5.45

Table 18.A6 Sample means of institutional measures—recent years (average 2000-2010)

bgcolor=white>34.64
Union density Coverage Central­ization Strike Minimum wage Employment protection legislation Unemploy­ment benefit Tax wedge Social expenditure Child care Parental leave Tax treatment of household incomes Active labor market policies Passive labor market policies
Austria 32.37 98.91 0.90 1.03 0.00 2.47 31.67 31.90 2.72 78.00 117.09 0.85 0.66 1.32
Belgium 51.88 96.00 0.46 23.07 0.44 1.82 40.91 36.97 2.63 99.54 28 1.93 1.17 2.23
Bulgaria 24.01 32.50 0.31 na 0.00 na 46.40 21.43 na na na na 0.30 0.25
Cyprus 61.63 57.35 0.25 2.33 0.00 na 60.40 8.50 na na na 0.56 0.13 0.58
Czech 20.74 43.77 0.25 na 0.31 3.21 6.14 17.74 1.87 82.01 185.64 0.33 0.23 0.27
Republic

Denmark

71.62 81.87 0.47 3.49 0.00 2.13 52.72 39.19 3.55 91.91 48.91 2.26 1.72 2.06
Estonia 9.69 25.06 0.36 0.21 0.30 2.43 50.00 17.60 1.79 87.08 na 0.67 0.11 0.39
Finland 71.84 87.13 0.40 2.16 0.00 2.19 34.56 32.57 2.98 51.29 42.35 2.69 0.90 1.84
France 7.84 90.00 0.21 22.47 0.47 2.42 39.88 24.90 3.02 100.99 32.55 0.69 1.02 1.46
Germany 21.44 64.40 0.48 1.60 0.00 2.80 25.85 36.73 1.96 91.57 60.1 4.11 1.03 1.78
Greece 25.03 65.00 0.34 na 0.33 2.80 14.42 22.77 1.14 72.30 24.09 1.06 0.17 0.44
Hungary 18.01 37.85 0.23 1.36 0.36 2.00 13.31 34.13 3.26 86.86 110 1.11 0.42 0.44
Iceland 86.47 88.02 na 16.74 0.51 1.73 40.76 26.00 3.00 95.44 25.97 3.16 na na
Ireland 37.55 49.91 0.52 6.20 0.45 1.36 34.95 11.86 2.70 53.51 20.91 2.42 0.75 1.24
Italy 34.01 80.00 0.34 1.01 0.00 2.76 24.59 1.31 97.71 48 4.05 0.50 0.83
Latvia 19.41 19.41 0.48 4.01 0.33 na 60.00 25.11 na na na 1.08 0.19 0.46
Lithuania 13.93 12.16 0.30 2.41 0.36 na 47.62 23.61 na na na 2.74 0.18 0.23
Luxembourg 41.00 58.22 0.31 na 0.34 2.25 26.67 19.89 3.36 85.95 42 1.19 0.42 0.60
Malta 56.02 58.26 0.37 1.35 0.00 na 30.63 14.94 na na na 1.13 0.04 0.36
Netherlands 20.69 82.63 0.57 2.58 0.43 2.87 41.74 32.36 1.67 68.02 20.73 1.40 1.31 1.74
Norway 54.44 72.94 0.51 11.38 0.00 2.33 51.80 28.46 2.93 91.93 37.91 5.97 0.65 0.44
Poland 19.18 39.00 0.23 3.48 0.34 2.23 10.89 28.74 1.13 49.00 122.55 0.70 0.43 0.74
Portugal 20.92 60.07 0.34 1.35 0.36 4.45 42.23 18.55 1.15 81.19 18.65 1.75 0.64 1.11
Romania 36.28 70.00 0.25 13.27 0.29 na 32.20 27.34 na na na na 0.08 0.38
Slovak 24.34 44.70 0.50 0.01 0.35 2.30 9.50 18.22 1.89 72.53 164 0.99 0.30 0.46
Republic

Slovenia

35.96 97.40 0.40 na 0.43 2.65 61.64 29.09 1.07 80.67 na 1.00 0.29 0.41
Spain 15.60 87.84 0.36 2.55 0.34 2.36 34.98 16.41 1.16 98.68 16 0.65 0.79 1.78
Sweden 74.40 93.17 0.51 3.58 0.00 2.62 37.62 31.25 3.29 90.39 59.95 3.50 1.20 1.06
United 28.74 34.64 0.11 2.20 0.36 1.20 15.99 25.87 3.14 91.88 28.55 1.84 0.36 0.23
Kingdom

United

12.07 13.88 0.18 na 0.26 0.26 18.05 18.16 0.70 63.01 0 1.49 0.15 0.49
States

APPENDIX D. LITERATURE SUMMARY TABLES: HOUSEHOLD INCOMES AND EARNINGS AND WAGE DISPERSION AND INSTITUTIONS165

165

Tables A7 and A8 make generous use of summaries, abstracts, introduction and conclusions of the underlying papers.

Table 18.A7 Household incomes and Earnings (see Section 18.2)—cont'd

Data sets* and

id="Picutre 398" class="lazyload" data-src="/files/uch_group77/uch_pgroup315/uch_uch7350/image/image398.jpg">

Table 18.A7 Household incomes and Earninas (see Section 18.2)—cont'd

Karoly and United States; Census and Decompose changes in Gini coefficient Increase in proportion of single-head
Burtless (1995) 1959,

1969,1979,

1989.

March CPS;

Personal equivalent income distribution.

following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984). families boosted inequality over entire period. Forty percent reduction in income inequality in the 1960s because of the decline in earnings inequality among male heads of families; more than one-third of increase in inequality after 1969 because inequality in male earnings soared. Since 1979 females’ gains in earnings have increased inequality because these gains have been concentrated increasingly in families with high incomes.
Larrimore (2013) United States;

1979-2007

March CPS,

log incomes and Theil index by several

exists between employment subgroups
ITA, NLD, UK; 1979. 1982); net household income. socioeconomic characteristics. (employees, self-employed, and not- working). Other important characteristics are age and education of the main breadwinner. The place of living household appeared to be of minor importance, and number of breadwinners is only of secondary importance.

Table 18.A8 Wage dispersion and the recent polarization and offshorability approaches to supply and demand (see Section 18.4.5)—cont'd

Authors Years and countries Data sets* and sample selection Method and important variables Main findings
Autor et al. United States; DOT occupational The paper argues that computer capital Within industries, occupations, and
(2003) 1960-1998. characteristics appended to Census IPUMS 1960-1990 and ORG CPS 1980-1998; employees aged 18-64, FTE weights. (1) substitutes for workers in performing cognitive and manual tasks that can be accomplished by following explicit rules; and (2) complements workers in performing nonroutine problem solving and complex communications tasks. Provided that these tasks are imperfect substitutes, the model implies measurable changes in the composition of job tasks. education groups, computerization is found to be associated with reduced labor input of routine manual and routine cognitive tasks and increased labor input of nonroutine cognitive tasks. Translating task shifts into education demand, the model can explain 60% of the estimated relative demand shift favoring college labor during 1970-1998. Task changes within nominally identical occupations account for almost half of this impact.
Blinder

(2007)

United States; 2004. O*NET. Using detailed information on the nature of work done in over 800 BLS occupational codes, this paper ranks those occupations according to how easy/hard it is to offshore the work—either physically or electronically. Using that ranking, it estimates that somewhere between 22% and 29% of all US jobs are or will be potentially offshorable within a decade or two. Because the rankings are subjective, two alternatives are presented—one objective, the other is an independent subjective ranking. It is found that there is little or no correlation between an occupation’s “offshorability” and the skill level of its workers (as measured either by educational attainment or wages). However, it appears that, controlling for education, the most highly offshorable occupations were already paying significantly lower wages in 2004.
Blinder and

Krueger

(2009)

United States; 2008. Special survey for Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII). This paper reports on a pilot study of the use of conventional household survey methods to measure something unconventional: what we call Offshorability appears to be particularly prevalent in production work and in office and administrative jobs. By industry group, it is most common in manufacturing,
“offshorability,” defined as the ability to finance and insurance, information

perform one’s work duties (for the same services, and professional and technical

employer and customers) from abroad. services. More educated workers appear to

Notice that offshorability is a characteristic hold somewhat more offshorable jobs. But

of a person’s job, not of the person. differences in offshorability by race, sex,

age, and geographic region are all minor. In estimated multivariate econometric models, offshorability does not appear to have consistent systematic effects on either wages or the probability of layoff. union

Dunne

et al. (2004)

United States; 1977 and 1992. March CPS and LRD; only plants that reported investments. members and people in licensed positions are always less likely to hold offshorable jobs; and, perhaps surprisingly, routine work is no more likely to be offshorable than other work.

Using establishment-level data, we shed The findings are (1) the between-plant

light on the sources of the changes in the component of wage dispersion is an

structure of production, wages, and important and growing part of total wage

employment that have occurred over dispersion; (2) much of the between-plant

recent decades. increase in wage dispersion is within

industries; (3) the between-plant measures of wage and productivity dispersion have increased substantially over recent decades; and (4) a significant fraction of the rising

Goos and Manning (2007) (see also 2003) UK; 1976-1999. NES complemented by for part-time workers. dispersion in wages and productivity is accounted for by changes in the distribution of computer investment across plants.

The more nuanced version of SBTC This paper presents evidence that

recently proposed by Autor et al. (2003) employment in the United Kingdom is

makes a different prediction about what is polarizing into lovely and lousy jobs in

happening to employment in low-wage consistence with the nuanced view. Job

jobs. polarization can explain one-third of the

rise in the log(50∕10) wage differential and one-half of the rise in the log(90∕50).

Continued

Table 18.A8 Wage dispersion and the recent polarization and offshorability approaches to supply and demand (see Section 18.4.5)—cont'd

Authors Years and countries Data sets* and sample selection Method and important variables Main findings
Goos et al. 15 EU countries; LFS-EU, excl. This paper develops a simple and The routinization hypothesis of Autor et al.
(2011) (see also 2009 and 2010) 1996-2006. agriculture and fishing, and OECD STAN empirically tractable model of labor demand to explain recent changes in the occupational structure of employment as a result of technology, offshoring, and institutions. This framework takes account not just of direct effects but indirect effects through induced shifts in demand for different products. (2003) is found to be the most important factor behind the observed shifts in employment but offshoring does also play a role. Shifts in product demand are acting to attenuate the impacts of recent technological progress and offshoring. By implication, wage-setting institutions play little role in explaining job polarization in Europe.
Liu and United States; ORG CPS, O*NET; Is the third industrial revolution indeed The well-known increase in between-
Grusky (2013) 1979-2010. nonmilitary wage and salary workers including part-time, aged 16-65. driven by rising payoffs to skill? This simple but important question has gone unanswered because conventional models of earnings inequality are based on exceedingly weak measurements of skill. By attaching occupational skill measurements to the CPS, it becomes possible to adjudicate competing accounts of the changing returns to cognitive, creative, technical, and social skill. occupation inequality is fully explained when such skills are taken into account, while returns to schooling prove to be quite stable once correlated changes in workplace skills are parsed out. The most important trend, however, is a precipitous increase in the wage payoff to synthesis, critical thinking, and related “analytic skills.” The payoff to technical and creative skills, often touted in discussions of the third industrial revolution, is shown to be less substantial.
Mishel United States; ORG and May CPS The influential “skill-biased technological Principal findings include:
etal. (2013) 1973-2007. (provide an independent test of earlier results based primarily on the decennial census and the American Community Survey); change” (SBTC) explanation claims that technology raises demand for educated workers, thus allowing them to command higher wages—which, in turn, increases wage inequality. A more recent SBTC explanation focuses on computerization’s role in increasing employment in both higher-wage and lower-wage occupations, 1. Technological and skill deficiency explanations of wage inequality have failed to explain key wage patterns over the last three decades, including the 2000s.

2. History shows that middle-wage occupations have shrunk and higher-wage occupations have expanded since the 1950s. This has not driven any changed

Spitz- DEU-W 1979, wage and salary workers aged 18—64.

Qualification and

resulting in “job polarization.” This paper contends that current SBTC models—such as the education-focused “canonical model” and the more recent “tasks framework” or “job polarization” approach mentioned above—do not adequately account for key wage patterns (namely, rising wage inequality) over the last three decades.

A unique data set from West Germany

pattern of wage trends. 3. Evidence for job polarization is weak. 4. There was no occupational job polarization in the 2000s. 5. Occupational employment trends do not drive wage patterns or wage inequality. 6. Occupations have become less, not more, important determinants of wage patterns. 7. An expanded demand for low-wage service occupations is not a key driver of wage trends. 8. Occupational employment trends provide only limited insights into the main dynamics of the labor market, particularly wage trends.

Occupations are found to require more

Oener 1985/1986, Career Survey BBIB; enables looking at how skill requirements complex skills today than in 1979, and the
(2006) 1991/1992, employees living in have changed within occupations. Two changes in skill requirements have been
1998/1999. West Germany, German nationals, aged 18-65. hypotheses are tested: (1) IT is a substitute for routine manual and routine cognitive activities, and (2) IT is complementary to analytic and interactive activities. most pronounced in rapidly computerizing occupations. It occurred within occupations, within occupation-education groups, and within occupation-age groups, changes in skill requirements similar to those in the United States. The question that now arises is why similar changes in skill requirements in all of these countries have not led to similar changes in the structure of wages.

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)

Authors

i. Overviews of the

Blau and Kahn

Countries and years literature

13 EU

Data sets* and sample selection

Draws on

Methods and important variables

This chapter examines the

Types of institutions**

AP, CP, DI,

Main findings

There is considerable evidence that

(1999) countries and existing impact of wage-setting MW, UB, centralized collective bargaining,
CHE, AUS, literature and institutions and government UD minimum wages, and antidiscrimination
CAN, JPN, data sources policies on wages and policies raise the relative wages of the low
NZL, United used there. employment, focusing on the paid. Evidence of the impact of these
States; 1970s OECD countries. institutions and other policies such as
to 1990s. mandated severance pay, advance notice or unemployment insurance is more mixed with some studies finding active employment effects while others do not. This may reflect the adoption by many OECD countries of offsetting policies, such as public employment, temporary employment contracts and active labor market programs, which, although they may have reduced the adverse relative employment effects of their less-flexible labor market institutions on the low skilled, appear not to have prevented high overall unemployment.
Blau and Kahn IALS: IALS, 1994, Documents and provides ED, HR, International differences reflect diversity
(2009) 8 countries; 200 + annual explanations for levels of and MW, UB of working population and prices, which
OECD: hours and 10 + trends in earnings inequality, in turn are affected by supply and demand
12 countries. annual weeks; focusing on international as well as institutions. Collective
OECD (OECD) differences. bargaining and the minimum wage bring
Earnings Distinguishes between wage up the bottom, leading to employment
database, 1980, rates, hours worked, and losses. Offshoring deserves further
1990, 2000. earnings. attention (and may actually narrow wage differentials); so do employment protection, product market regulation and norms.

Doucouliagos United States Extensive Multivariate meta-regression MW Recently developed meta-analysis
and Stanley

(2009)

literature search. analysis accommodate a potentially complex employment effect, misspecification biases and differential propensities to report adverse employment effects. It uses employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage as the metric. methods applied to 64 US minimum­wage studies (almost 1500 estimates) show that the minimum-wage effects literature is contaminated by publication selection bias, which is estimated to be slightly larger than the average reported minimum wage effect. Once this is corrected, little or no evidence of a negative association between minimum wages and employment remains. The results confirm those of the meta-analysis of Card and Krueger (1995b).
De Linde

Leonard et al.

(2013)

UK Extensive literature search. Multivariate meta-regression analysis of 236 estimated minimum-wage elasticities and 710 partial correlation coefficients from 16 UK studies. MW The study finds no overall practically significant adverse employment effect. Unlike US studies (see Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009), there seems to be little, if any, overall reporting bias. It identifies several research dimensions that are associated with differential employment effects. In particular, the residential home care industry may exhibit a genuinely adverse employment effect.
Freeman (2005) OECD No new empirics. This paper argues that there are two reasons for inconclusive debate over the claim that labor institutions impair aggregate performance. The first reason is that many adherents to the claim hold strong priors that labor markets operate nearly perfectly in the absence of institutions and let their priors dictate their modeling choices and interpretation of empirical results. The second reason is that the cross-country aggregate data at issue is weak—too weak to decisively reject strong prior views or to convince those with weaker priors. Various The debate over the influence of labor market flexibility on performance is unlikely to be settled by additional studies using aggregate data and making cross­country comparisons. Although this approach holds little promise, microanalysis of workers and firms and increased use of experimental methods represent a path forward. Steps along this path could help end the current “lawyer’s case” empiricism in which priors dominate evidence.

Continued

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Authors Countries and years Data sets* and sample selection Methods and important variables Types of institutions** Main findings
Freeman (2007) OECD No new empirics. The paper documents the large cross-country differences in labor institutions that make them a candidate explanatory factor for the divergent economic performance of countries and reviews what economists have learned about the effects of these institutions on economic outcomes. It identifies three ways in which institutions affect economic performance: by altering incentives, by facilitating efficient bargaining, and by increasing information, communication, and trust. CP, UB The evidence shows that labor institutions reduce the dispersion of earnings and income inequality, which alters incentives, but finds equivocal effects on other aggregate outcomes, such as employment and unemployment. Given weaknesses in the cross-country data on which most studies focus, the paper argues for increased use of microdata, simulations, and experiments to illuminate how labor institutions operate and affect outcomes.
Katz and Autor

(1999)

United States No new empirics. The chapter presents a framework for understanding changes in the wage structure and overall earnings inequality. It emphasizes the role of supply- and-demand factors and the interaction of market forces and labor market institutions. Recent changes in the US wage structure are analyzed in detail to highlight crucial measurement issues that arise in studying wage structure changes and to illustrate the operation of the framework. The roles of skill-biased technological IR, MW, UB, UD Several directions for future research are suggested: the roles of changes in labor market institutions (the incidence of labor market rents) and changes in competitive supply-and-demand factors. A key issue model is how to model the effects of institutions on employment rates and composition as well as on wages. The extent to which institutional changes reflect exogenous political events as opposed to responses to market forces can help sort out the effects of institutions from supply-and-demand factors. Taking a longer-term historical perspective will also be helpful as the US experience for
Kierzenkowski OECD Recent change, globalization forces, changes in demographics and relative skill supplies, industry labor rents, unions, and the minimum wage in the evolution of the US wage structure arc examined, as are differences and similarities in wage structure changes among OECD nations. Despite a general trend of MW, UB the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s illustrates.

Cross-country comparative work and differences across regions within a country may also provide useful variation in demand-and-supply shocks and institutional factors.

SBTC (canonical view) fails to explain

and Koske

(2012)

literature. increasing labor income inequality, there have been differences in the timing, intensity, and even direction of these changes across OECD countries. These stylized facts have led to numerous studies about the main determinants of labor income inequality and, as a result, a significant revision of the previous consensus about the key drivers. The most researched channels include skill-biased technological change, international trade, immigration, education, as well as the role of labor market policies and institutions. why inequality has diminished at the bottom relative to the median since the late 1980s as well as why within-group wage dispersion has grown substantially and mainly for college-educated workers. SBTC (nuanced view) explains why OECD labor markets have become polarized. International trade seems to have important implications for at least some groups of workers. Immigration has a rather small impact on native workers and sizable adverse wage or employment effects on the cohorts of previous immigrants. Education: Wage inequality is negatively correlated with the average level of educational attainment. Labor market policies and institutions: The impact of declining unionisation and of the lower relative minimum wage is most pronounced at the lower end of the wage distribution while cross-country evidence suggests that government employment reduces wage inequality.
Lemieux (2011) AUS, CAN, No new Wage inequality has been MW, UD, Although demand factors linked to
United States; since 1980s. empirics. increasing in most industrialized countries over the last three decades. There are, nonetheless, major differences across UW technological change may be a leading factor behind the secular growth in wage inequality (or the more recent polarization of wages), they cannot

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Continued

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Data sets* and

Authors Countries and years sample selection Methods and important variables Types of institutions** Main findings
to enforce long-term commitments, and insufficient insurance mechanisms against employment-related risks. Labor policies and institutions can in principle be used to address these imperfections. It is important, then, to understand the role and the impacts of policies and institutions like labor market regulation, collective bargaining, active labor market programs, and social insurance. But the main constraints to the job creation often lie outside the labor market, and a clear approach is needed to support appropriate policy responses. chains. But policies should also ensure voice and social protection, especially for the most vulnerable. Ideally, policies should aim at removing the market imperfections and institutional failures preventing the private sector from creating more of those jobs. If the constraints cannot be easily singled out or are difficult to remove, offsetting policies may be considered.
ii. Aggregate studies (institutions may be indirect)
Acemoglu AUS, BEL, CPS and LIS; Relative-supply-demand model MW, UW, Relative demand for skills increased
(2003) CAN, DEU, annual earnings to determine differential effects, some differentially across countries. Labor
DNK, FIN, ISR, NLD, NOR, SWE, UK, United States; mid­80s to mid­90s. of full-time, full-year male household heads aged of 18-64. followed by a model of Differential Technology Responses across countries (not tested). Demographics market institutions creating wage compression in Europe also encourage more investment in technologies increasing the productivity of less-skilled workers, implying less skill-biased technical change in Europe than the United States.
Alderson and 16 OECD; Deininger and Gini of incomes regressed on OP, UD, WE Direct investment and North-South
Nielsen (2002) 1967-1992. Squire (1996) for income inequality. economic aggregate measures. trade have played a role in the determination of income inequality in the contemporary period; likewise for immigration.
Autor et al. United States; March CPS and Extends quantile decomposition MW Compositional shifts in labor force have
(2005) 1973-2003. May/ORG CPS; real log hourly wages of wage and salary workers. that nests DiNardo et al. (1996) in view of more differentiated developments over the earnings distribution after 1990s (as 90/50 and 50/10 trends diverge). contributed to earnings inequality during the 1990s.
Autor et al. United States; March CPS, Kernel reweighting approach of ED, Upper-tail (90/50) inequality has
(2008) 1963-2005. matched with DOT;

FTFY workers log earnings.

Abstract, routine and manual tasks within occupations.

Lemieux used to facilitate a direct comparison.

Overall 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10; between-group educational differentials; within- group 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 residual wage gaps conditioned on measures of education, age/ experience, and gender.

occupations by mean years of schooling, MW increased steadily since 1980 and fluctuations in the real minimum wage are not a plausible explanation; a puzzling deceleration in relative demand growth for college workers in the early 1990s potentially reconciled by a modified version of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis that emphasizes the role of information technology in complementing abstract (high-education) tasks and substituting for routine (middle­education) tasks. Employment and wage growth by skill percentile are found to be positively correlated in each of the last two decades.
Blanchard and 20 OECD; Nickell’s and AP, CP, Interactions shock and institutions are
Wolfers (2000) 1960-1995. OECD institutions data. ED, MW,

PM, TA,

UB, UD, WE

essential for understanding international differences.
Bedard and AUS, BEL, Wage data from Compares test scores at age 13 to ED Wage dispersion, as summarized by Gini
Ferrall (2003) CAN-BC/ ON, DEU- W, FIN, FRA, JPN, NLD, SWE, UK, United States;

1964/1982

vs.

1969...1992

national sources; test data from IME conducted in 1964 and 1982. wages later in life. coefficients, is significantly related to test­score dispersion. For the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, with more data, evidence of skill-biased changes in wage dispersion between the early 1970s and the late 1980s is found.

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Authors Countries and years Data sets* and sample selection Methods and important variables Types of institutions** Main findings
Bertola and EU15; OECD, Institutions protective of labor CP, TA, UD, Labor market reforms are becoming
Boeri (2003) 1982-1995. Eurostat, ILO. serve some intended purpose. More intense competition may increase demand for protection, and certainly calls for reforms. A stylized model of the effects of structural change and resulting reform tensions is used to examine recent evidence. WE relatively more frequent in EMU countries, and many of them reduce welfare system generosity and deregulate labor markets. Most reforms are marginal, however, and in many cases deregulation- oriented reforms are accompanied by measures which appear to try and offset the implications of stronger competition instead. To exploit fully the advantages of economic and monetary integration, the institutional structure of labor and other markets needs to be revised extensively.
Budria and

Pereira (2005)

DEU, FIN, FRA, GRC, ITA, NOR,

PRT, SWE, UK; 1980s, 1990s.

EDWIN microdata, private-sector males ages 18-60, 35 + hours, nonagricultural employees. Quantile regression and OLS of returns to education. ED Inequality increasing effect of tertiary education, through the “within” dimension, became more acute over last years.
Christopoulou AUT, BEL, EU-SES 1995, Split between composition effect MW, OP, Wage inequality growth diverges across
et al. (2010)

iii. Specific institut

Baccaro (2008)

DEU, ESP, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA,

NLD, 1995 and 2002.

ions in more dep

51 Advanced,

Central and

Eastern European,

Latin

2002; hourly wage including regular bonuses and payment for overtime.

th (see iv for jobs

New ILO data set on industrial relations and labor law, various

and returns effect, and residual.

polarization)

Between- and within-country regressions.

UB, UD

UB, UD, labor-law compliance

countries. Only minor contribution of compositional change, but association with technology and globalization, while with immigration wages decline. Mixed effect of labor market institutions.

What changes from the 1990s on in advanced countries is the capacity of industrial relations institutions to reduce inequality directly by compressing market earnings. In particular, centralized

Barth and American and Asian countries late 1980s to early 2000s; and analysis of 16 Advanced countries from the late 1970s.

AUT, BEL,

dimensions of globalization, and controls for demand and supply ofskilled labor.

EDWIN,

Model with supply and demand CP, ED, UB, collective bargaining seems to have become less redistributive than in the past. To the extent that industrial relations institutions continue to support and reproduce the welfare state, they reduce inequality indirectly though this channel.

No evidence of increasing “over-

Lucifora (2006) DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GRC, ITA, NOR, SWE, UK;

1973...2003.

ECHP; nonagricultural employees 18-64 15 + hours, gross hourly earnings. for different types of labor, as well as institutions affecting the bargained relative wage. UD education” in Europe. Bargaining coordination and employment protection have compressing effect on wages, but at different points of the wage distribution.
Bassanini and 21 OECD; Aggregate employment and AP, MW, Changes in policies and institutions
Duval (2006) 1982-2003. group-specific participation, institutional/policies interactions. PM, TA, WE appear to explain almost two-thirds of noncyclical unemployment changes over the past two decades.
Bassanini et al. OECD; OECD annual Examines effect of dismissal CP Empirical results suggest that mandatory
(2009) 1982-2003. cross-country aggregate data on the stringency of employment protection legislation and industry-level data on productivity. regulation on productivity. dismissal regulations have a depressing impact on productivity growth in industries where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding. By contrast, no evidence is found of a productivity effect of regulations concerning temporary contracts, which suggests that partial reforms, facilitating the use of fixed-term and atypical contracts, are unlikely to have an important impact on efficiency and technological change and cannot therefore be a substitute for comprehensive reforms whereby dismissal restrictions for open-ended contracts are also weakened.

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Data sets* and

bgcolor=white>Methods and important variables
Authors Countries and years sample selection Types of institutions** Main findings
Bertola et al. 28 OECD Database of Analysis why the United States AP, CP, TA, Although macroeconomic and
(2001) countries;

1960-1999.

Blanchard and

Wolfers together with wage distributions from OECD Earnings database and labor force and population data from ILO.

moved from relatively high to relatively low unemployment over the last three decades. Institutions are largely assumed to be invariant. UB, UD, WE demographic shocks and changing labor market institutions explain a modest portion of this change, the interaction of these shocks and labor market institutions is the most important factor explaining the shift in the United States relative unemployment. This is consistent with Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). Controlling for country- and time­specific effects, high employment is associated with low wage levels and high levels of wage inequality. Disaggregating, the employment of both younger and older people fell sharply in other countries relative to the United States since the 1970s, with much smaller differences in outcomes among the prime-aged.
Bicakova (2006) FRA, UK, United States; 1990-2002. National LFS; 25-54; incl. self-employed; hourly wages (net in FR); skill groups: sex ? age ? education. Focus is changes in the between- group variation in earnings, employment, unemployment, and inactivity; labor supply and demand model with heterogeneous types of labor, using a pseudo-panel of different skill-groups; three equations for wage, employment, and labor force participation as a function of exogenous supply and demand shifters, as implied by the structural model, is estimated by two-way fixed effects on group- level panel data. Wage rigidity (MW in sideshow) Trade-off inequality to unemployment for declining demand for low-skilled is found for FRA vs. UK and United States.

Bingley et al. DNK; LFS; males aged Investigates the relationship WE Unemployment insurance is associated
(2013) 1980-2003. 21-55 working full time in private sector. between life-cycle wages and individual membership of unemployment insurance schemes, separating permanent from transitory wages and characterise them using membership of unemployment insurance funds. with lower wage growth heterogeneity over the life cycle and greater wage instability, changing the nature of wage inequality from permanent to transitory. Robustness checks suggest that moral hazard is relevant.
Blau and Kahn OECD; Various, both Discusses the literature and AP, CP, ED, Interventionist labor market institutions
(2002) (see also

1996)

1979-1999 macro and micro. builds on own earlier contributions to compare US labor market performance to other countries. TA, UB, WE in Europe compress wages and lower wage inequality; however, jobs most be lost for some groups. Institutional and demographic change and macroeconomic policy also differs to the advantage of the United States.
Boeri (2011) Europe; since

1980.

fRDB-IZA social policy reforms database. Reviews literature building on institutional reforms as quasi­natural experiments. AP, CF, CP, TA, UB, WE Literature is very informative but insufficiently accounts for long-lasting asymmetries between reformed and unreformed segments of the labor market. Extends Mortensen-Pissarides model with this segmentation for a theoretical approach that can help improving the identification of causal effects using reforms. Also gives empirical evidence on reforms.
Boeri and

Jimeno (2005)

ITA;

1986-1995.

LFS rotation panel, Italian social security records (INPS archives). Within-country exemptions to coverage of employment protection provisions allow making inferences on the impact of EPL when assessing the effects on dismissal probabilities and, using a change in EPL in 1990, on the equilibrium size distribution of firms. CP Results are in line with predictions of the theoretical model. Workers under permanent contracts in firms with less restrictive EPL are more likely to be dismissed. However, there is no effect on the growth of firms.

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Authors Countries and years Data sets* and sample selection Methods and important variables Types of institutions** Main findings
Bryson et al. (2012) Europe and

United States; early 2000s.

GSS 2002 and 2006, EWCS 2000 and 2005; employees with a permanent contract in private sector and in profit oriented firms only excluding managers and CEOs. Presents new comparable data on the incidence of performance pay schemes. The percentage of employees exposed to incentive pay schemes ranges from around 10-15% in some European countries to over 40% in Scandinavian countries and the United States. Individualpay and profit/gain sharing schemes are widely diffused, whereas share ownership schemes are much less common, particularly in Europe. UW A number of empirical regularities are found. Incentive pay is less common in countries with a higher share of small firms. Higher product and labor market regulation are associated with lower use of incentive pay. Capital market development is a necessary requirement for a wider diffusion of incentive pay, particularly sharing and ownership schemes. Controlling for a large set of individual characteristics and company attributes, the probability that a worker is covered by an incentive scheme is higher in large firms and in high-skilled occupations, while it is much lower for females.
Card and

DiNardo (2002)

United States; around 1970-2000. CPS: March, May and ORG; diverging samples are compared. Extended discussion of the measurement of technological change and of changes in the structure of wages in the U.S. labor market over the past 20-30 years, concluding to myriad shifts. MW Viewed from 2002, it now appears that the rise in wage inequality was an episodic event. A key problem for the SBTC hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing advances in computer technology; SBTC also fails to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality.
Card et al. CAN, UK, CAN-LFS + Comprehensive analysis of the UB, UD, Unions reduce male inequality also after
(2004) United States; 1973/ 1984...

2001.

supplements, UK-LFS and GHS, May and ORG CPS; hourly wages of employees aged 16-65. evolution of unionization and wage inequality for both men and women in all three countries over the past two to three decades, as a sequel to Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984). The countries collect comparable data and share similar collective bargaining institutions. MW controlling for skill; but they increase female inequality; over time the declining unionization has eroded equalization.

Checchi and 11 EU LIS; na Labor market institutions are a CP, MW, TA, The evidence indicates that stronger
Garcia Pefialosa

(2008)

countries, AUS, CAN, NOR, CHE and United States;

1969-2004.

crucial determinant of wage inequality, the wage share in aggregate income, and the unemployment rate. Because these variables affect, in turn, the distribution of income across households, the question arises of whether stronger labor market institutions have an impact on income inequality. Institutions can in principle have conflicting effects. This paper examines what is the overall impact of labor market institutions on household income inequality. And counterfactually simulates adoption in other countries of labor standards of United States, UK or EU average. UB, UD institutions are associated with lower income inequality, but in some cases also with higher rates of unemployment. The magnitude of this trade-off is explored, and the changes in inequality and unemployment are quantified that would be observed if a common labor standard were imposed on members states of the European Union—results are not encouraging as a consequence of a lowering of employment protection; this could be accompanied though by a reinforcement of wage coordination and union density but these are no obvious policy targets.
Checchi and OECD; Aggregate data This paper argues that personal MW, TA, It is found that greater unionization and
Garcia Pefialosa

(2010)

1960-2000. from various sources (see paper’s Appendix B). income inequality depends on the wage differential, the labor share and the unemployment rate. Labor market institutions affect income inequality through these three channels, and their overall effect is theoretically ambiguous. UB, UD greater wage bargaining coordination have opposite effects on inequality, implying conflicting effects of greater union presence on income inequality.
Coelli et al.

(1994)

14 OECD countries; around 1970-1990. OECD National accounts sectoral data. This paper examines the issue of wage flexibility in an international context using sectoral wage dispersion data from 14 OECD countries. It draws comparisons between a UB No strong systematic relationship exists between wage dispersion and the degree of centralization of labor market institutions.

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Continued

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Authors Countries and years Data sets* and sample selection Methods and important variables Types of institutions** Main findings
graduates

17-19.

inequality were much more pronounced in the United States than in Canada. Study the effect of labor market institutions on changes in wage inequality by computing simple counterfactuals such as the distribution of wages that would prevail if all workers were paid according to the observed nonunion wage schedule. wage inequality between the two countries.
Dustmann et al. DEU-W; IABS Using the kernel reweighting UD Wage inequality in West Germany has
(2009) mid-1970s to mid-2000s. 1975-2004, and LIAB 1995-2004; ages 21-60. procedure (DiNardo etal., 1996) it is shown that it is important to account for changes in workforce composition, in particular at the upper end of the wage distribution. Fluctuations in relative supply explain the evolution of the wage differential between the low- and medium- skilled very well, but do a poor job in predicting the evolution of the wage differential between the medium- and high-skilled. increased over the past three decades, contrary to common perceptions. During the 1980s, the increase was concentrated at the top of the distribution; in the 1990s, it occurred at the bottom end as well. Technological change is responsible for the widening of the wage distribution at the top. At the bottom of the wage distribution, the increase in inequality is better explained by episodic events, such as supply shocks and changes in labor market institutions. Occupations with high median wages in 1980 experienced the highest growth rate, whereas occupations in the middle of the 1980 wage distribution lost ground relative to occupations at the bottom.
Eissa and United States; March CPS; Simulation of 1984 and 1996 TA EITC family targeting can disincentivize
Hoynes (2004) 1984-1996. married couples residing in the EITC rules on married couples labor participation. Effects estimated using both quasi- secondary earners: 1% fall married women, strong increase for single-parent women, slight increase married men.

Firpo et al. United States; same household, ages 25-54, and less than high school in main estimates

CPS and

experimental and traditional reduced-form labor supply models, with same conclusion.

Changes in returns to

OP, UD Technological change and
(2011) 1976/1977,

1988/1990,

2000/2002,

2004/2004,

2009/2010.

O*Net; male

employees

occupational tasks have contributed to changes in the wage distribution over the last three decades. Using a decomposition based on Firpo et al. (2009). deunionization played a central role in the 1980s and 1990s, and offshorability became an important factor from the 1990s onward.
Fortin and United States; CPS; workers Show what the variance of the MW, PM, Historical evidence from the United
Lemieux (1997) 1979 and 1988. aged 16-65. (log) wage distribution would have been, if each of the three institutional changes had not happened. Decompose distribution of wages using three elements: the fraction of workers “affected” by the institutional factor of interest; the mean level of log wages among affected and nonaffected workers; and the dispersion of log wages among affected and nonaffected workers. By reverting some of these measures to their previous level, simulate what would have happened if the institutional changes had not taken place. UB, UD States, international comparisons among industrialized countries and analyses of US data for the 1980s all yield the same conclusion: institutional forces simply cannot be overlooked in any serious attempt to understand the recent rise in wage inequality in the US labor market.
Golden and 16 OECD Examine three main hypotheses OP, UB, UD, Causes for pay inequality are quite
Wallerstein

(2006)

countries;

1980-2000.

for the rise of pay inequality: postindustrial, globalization, and institutional. Main idea is WE different in the 1980s than in the 1990s. In the 1980s, growing wage dispersion is due to changes in the institutions of the labor

Continued

Continued

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Authors Countries and years Data sets* and sample selection Methods and important variables Types of institutions** Main findings
between prevailing-wage-law middle-income workers most. Right-to-
states and right-to-work law work laws decrease unionization by
states, and controlling for between 5% and 8% points and reduce the
demographic, educational, and average construction worker’s earnings
work factors, including

24 distinct occupations.

by 6% in the national economy.
Nunziata (2005) OECD; Various. An empirical analysis of the CP, MW, TA, Labor market regulations can explain a
1960-1994. determinants of labor cost, with UB, UD, large part of the labor cost rise in the last
particular reference to the impact UW, WE few decades once we control for
of labor market institutions from productivity.
1960 to 1994. The paper also discusses the econometric issues
related to the estimation of a macro pooled model like ours: among other things, the hypothesis of poolability and the cointegration properties of the model. The explanatory power of the model is finally tested by means of a series of country by country dynamic simulations.
Oliver (2008) 14 OECD Unpublished With a series of cross-sectional UW The results strongly indicate that the
countries; data set from time-series analyses, this article presence of industrywide wage scales is a
1980-2002. the OECD investigates how a particular key factor in the evolution of wage
wage-bargaining institution: the extent to which industrywide wage minima (wage scales) cover both higher and lower skilled workers, mitigates pressures from growing international competition and new production techniques and affects the degree of wage inequality growth. inequality across OECD countries.
Plotnick (1982) United States; Unpublished This study uses newly available UD The major finding is that the observed
1957-1977. earnings data Henle and Ryscavage (1980), CPS (unpublished and several specific data sources; males). time series data to analyze trends in earnings inequality. It shows that although a human capital approach fits the data well and most of its predictions on signs are correct, the model’s more exacting implications are not satisfied. A complementary more ad hoc approach retains variables found to be significant and looks beyond aggregate inequality measures into parts of the distribution which gain or lose. slow upward trend in earnings inequality is well explained by a small number of plausible economic factors. Earnings inequality is significantly related to the level of unionization, dispersion in weeks worked, the age distribution of workers, and inequality of education. Once such factors are considered, there was no secular trend in earnings inequality over the 1958-1977 period.
Scheve and AUS, CAN, Top-incomes Although explaining post-1970 UB Regression analysis over the 13 countries
Stasavage (2009) CHE, DEU, DNK, FRA, IRL, JPN, NLD, NZL, SWE, UK, United States; 1916-2000. data, OECD earnings database, Lydall (1968), existing data on political institutions and new political data coded by the authors. differences in income inequality between OECD countries is an important task, it is also the case that convincing comparative political economy hypotheses should be able to account as well for inequality trends in earlier time periods. The article considers the correlation of centralized wage bargaining and government partisanship with three separate top incomes fractions. With a longer time span there has been significantly more variation within countries over time than there has been between countries. A longer time span also enables examining whether within-country changes in institutions like wage bargaining centralization have been associated with changes in inequality. and the whole period gives little evidence that government partisanship and wage­bargaining centralization can account for variation in inequality over the long run. A test of four individual countries that established a centralized system of wage bargaining in the middle of the twentieth century (DNK, IRL, NLD, SWE) also shows little evidence of an effect on inequality.

This raises questions about the extent to which centralized wage bargaining is an institution that has a causal effect on inequality or alternatively whether centralized bargaining is simply an outcome that has, along with income equality, evolved over time in response to an underlying political or economic process.

Table 18.A9 Wage dispersion and institutions (see Section 18.4.6)—cont'd

Authors Countries and years Data sets* and sample selection Methods and important variables Types of institutions** Main findings
Schivardi and

Torrini (2008)

ITA;

1986-1998.

INPS comprehensive longitudinal matched employer­employees data set. The paper studies the effects of the more stringent employment protection legislation that applies to firms with over 15 employees. It considers firms' propensity to grow when close to that threshold and changes in employment policies when they pass it. Using a the stochastic transition matrix for firm size. CP The probability of firms' growth is reduced by around 2% points near the threshold. The long-run effects of EPL on the size distribution of firms are quantitatively modest. Contrary to the implications of more stringent firing restrictions, workers in firms just above the threshold have on average less stable employment relations than those just below it; this might be because firms above the threshold make greater use of flexible employment contracts, arguably to circumvent the stricter regulation on open-end contracts.
Van der Wiel

(2010)

NLD;

1997-2001.

Dutch

Socio­Economic Panel SEP1984- 2002: five waves containing contractual information.

This paper empirically establishes the effect of the employer's term of notice on the wage level of employees through a fixed effects regression model. The term of notice is defined as the period an employer has to notify workers in advance of their upcoming dismissal. The wages paid during this period are an important element of firing costs and hence employment protection. To find a causal effect, the paper exploits the exogenous change in the term of notice that resulted from the introduction of a new Dutch law in 1999. CP Strong evidence is found that a longer “dormant” term of notice leads to higher wages. In the sample used, an additional month of notice increases wages by 3%, ceteris paribus.

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Source: Atkinson Anthony, Bourguignon François. Handbook of Income Distribution. Volume 2B. North Holland, 2014. — 2366 p..
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