Comparing and Contrasting

For some to gaze in wonder, perhaps awe, and occasionally distaste may be sufficient. For others however the question of where if anywhere in this variety truth lies will be the central issue.

There is inevitably a temptation in our competitive and judgemental world to begin with points of comparison and to end up with a ‘league-table’ of religions. Theology has sometimes followed certain patterns of belief by emphasising this. There are two general comments which I offer on such a tendency.

The first is that the most important single factor in determining religious allegiance or affiliation is place of birth. I hazard the guess that there are few devotees of the Eskimo female deity Sedna in Chelsea, London, or living by the banks of the Ganges. This must be the fundamental starting-point of any discussion of truth and error in religion.

The second general comment is that, notwithstand­ing the relativity of all of our respective starting-points, it is undoubtedly the case that many religions are so structured that the commitment demanded from believers is of a non-relative kind. Those who were bom in Chelsea and who are Christians do not preface the affirmation of the Creed with, ‘Most probably because I was bom in Britain rather than northern Greenland, I believe in...’

The resolution of the tensions implicit in these two comments is not easy and cannot be achieved in the brief compass of a few remarks here.

One central danger of which Hume was too well aware is the equation of the existential ‘I believe’, with ‘God says’. This is not to underestimate the importance of an affirmation sincerely made that ‘I believe that God says x or y [or mutatis mutandis, the comparable affirmation where it exists in other religions].’ Rather it highlights what such a confession is—an act of human piety.

What the study of religions and indeed of The World’s Religions does do, however, is to alter the believers’ perception of what they are doing. It does not rule out (nor for that matter compel) belief, but it emphasises the fact that belief is in the first instance contextual. One’s beliefs are held, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, but always in a context which is demarcated by the social, intellectual and experiential options open to one. As that context changes one’s beliefs may, indeed probably will, alter, sometimes fundamentally but most often in limited fashion. However, the fact that beliefs are in principle revisable in the light of growth should not be confused with the paralysing claim that belief must therefore always be tentative and decisions postponed.

The general point is this. Growth in awareness of other cultures and other religious beliefs and practices is bound to bring reflection upon any religious commitments which we have. As such it can be disturbing, but need not be negatively disruptive. In any case these issues arise not only in inter-religious contexts, for all of the major world religions and many other of the world’s religions also have diversity and change within them. Indeed their strength is in part located in their capacity to respond to as well as to initiate change. A believer must in the nature of his or her commitment recognise that fact.

The study of The World’s Religions is intended in part to aid the enquirer—whether or not they have particular or firm religious commitments—to engage in and perhaps to contribute to reflection upon these issues. Equally, however, this book is an invitation to increase both our understanding of and our wonder at the rich if incomplete and ever-changing tapestry which is signalled in its title.